[Challenge] Gruenberg v Compliance Commission

[Glen-Rhodes]

Gruen has submitted a challenged against "Compliance Commission", a proposal written by Imperium Anglorum.

Link to challenge: viewtopic.php?f=9&t=395707
Link to proposal drafting thread: viewtopic.php?f=9&t=373574
Link to submitted proposal: https://www.nationstates.net/page=UN_vi ... 1479871105

Text of challenge:

Link to the proposal.

Ardchoille has already ruled that mentioning the possibility of noncompliance is illegal for metagaming - this is just one example of a position moderators have consistently taken on the rules.

This proposal mentions nations "actively destroying evidence of crimes against humanity", which would not be in compliance with, among other resolutions, Prevention of Torture.

Whether or not previous resolutions require enforcement, and noncompliance with such is impossible, was extensively argued during Repeal "International Criminal Court". Eventually the mods rejected the legality challenge on that proposal, meaning that its contention - "that each WA member nation ensures that crimes outlawed within WA legislation are appropriately pursued and prosecuted within their sovereign territory" - was ruled to be true. Given I was extensively involved in that argument, I'll try to avoid bias by linking to someone else's post: Bears Armed made the best summary of the arguments involved.

Rule the proposal legal, illegal, purple, whatever, I don't give a damn. Just don't scurry off like rats to your secret little forum, and instead, try to engage with the players in the forum who actually play this game. It cannot be the case that both Repeal "International Criminal Court" and "Compliance Commission" are legal, as they are mutually incompatible in their position on whether or not non-compliance takes place. This is exactly the kind of thing the metagaming rules are meant to enforce. So please just tell us which one of them is illegal.

Text of proposal:

Category: International Security
Strength: Mild
Proposed by: Imperium Anglorum

Description: Concerned that nations are unwilling to prosecute violators of World Assembly legislation and actively destroying evidence of crimes against humanity,

Asserting that members have an obligation to comply with policies enacted by the democratic mandate of the World Assembly as they have consented into its jurisdiction, and

Believing that cases of non-prosecution or destruction of evidence ought be investigated and archived so that a more objective conception of the truth can be established for future reference,

This august World Assembly hereby:

1. Establishes and empowers the WACC, hereafter referred to as the Compliance Commission, to conduct investigations on matters vis-à-vis observance with World Assembly resolutions and thereby establish an impartial and objective factual basis for future claims of jurisdiction and prosecutions thereof;

2. Requires both civilian and military police forces to create a liaison point with the Commission to provide evidence on war crimes in particular and adherence to WA legislation in general, and to those ends, demands that documents requested by the Commission not to be destroyed and to be handed over promptly so long as state security permits;

3. Permits the Compliance Commission, in specific investigations, to accept information and data which are presented by non-member nations and nations not party to that investigation; further allows the Compliance Commission to request the assistance of nearby nations to more accurately assess and access the facts of the matter under investigation;

4. Strongly encourages nations to cooperate with the Compliance Commission on matters relevant to their security and conduct their own investigations into observance with World Assembly resolutions as soon as possible; mandates the Compliance Commission inform nations of the passage of legislation, promulgation of regulations, or enactment of administrative policies relevant to their nation; and

5. Reminds member nations that this resolution establishes the Compliance Commission as a truth-seeking commission and does not grant it the ability to enforce or compel warrants, subpoenas, or judicial action on any nation, its leaders, or its citizens.

[Kryozerkia]

My two-cents: The ruling is 6+ years old. We had a tight framework when it was made. But times have changed and we have 300+ resolutions, even if most are repeals. An argument can be made for the allowance of 'non-compliance' since nations can RP non-compliance. The 'compliance commission' is a game-creation but so is the WA itself. Of course, it's up to the members here to decide on this.

[Glen-Rhodes]

Thanks for your thoughts, Kryo. This is a big question and our decision will definitely be a landmark one.

I've written a rather lengthy argument for why the acknowledgement of noncompliance should be legal. I've put a detailed explanation under the fold of a general summary. Given the gravity of the ruling, length is probably necessary!

Mentioning the possibility of noncompliance with a duly passed resolution is not a violation of the Metagaming rule. Given that there is no explicit rule in the General Assembly Rules for Proposals against it, and that the only justification for a ban on acknowledging noncompliance rests upon Metagaming itself, we rule that it is entirely legal to acknowledge the possibility of noncompliance in resolutions. We reaffirm this moderator ruling: viewtopic.php?p=29588233#p29588233.

To explain in more detail:

The question raised today is whether or not it is a violation of the Metagaming rule to mention the possibility of noncompliance with duly passed resolutions. “Compliance Commission” acknowledges the possibility of noncompliance with war crimes-related resolutions, in that it uses the possibility of destroying evidence as its justification. This presupposes that member states engage in crimes against humanity (a violation of Prevention of Torture) and that they’re destroying evidence of it (a violation of On Universal Jurisdiction).

The idea of noncompliance being impossible rests upon the game coding, specifically stat changes that occur when a resolution passes. There is no universally recognized in-character explanation for “mandatory compliance,” as it’s more widely known. Some use the idea of “magical gnomes” that force compliance with resolutions, but this isn’t officially sanctioned in the rules. We’re hesitant to obligate players to recognize these gnomes, or any other magical elements of roleplay, into their own canon. We're also hesitant to accept that stat changes are relevant to this question. After all, those changes can be reversed by answering Daily Issues, and those issues themselves often contradict GA resolutions.

While application of this idea has been inconsistent at times, past Mod rulings have declared proposals illegal for “trying to further enforce compliance when compliance is already enforced by the game mechanism.” (http://forum.nationstates.net/viewtopic ... 8#p6177108) Mods have also contemplated the idea of levying fines for non-compliance with provisions in law, and ruled them to be illegal “because it [would] accept non-compliance as possible.” (http://forum.nationstates.net/viewtopic ... 4#p3688994) This last ruling was, in fact, overturned by the Mods themselves: viewtopic.php?p=29588233#p29588233. We reaffirm that ruling.

Let's look at an instance where acknowledging noncompliance has been on the books for some time now. WAR#7 Workplace Safety Standards Act, contains the following provision:

13) Requires that each nation ensure that within it there exist at least one adequately funded governmental body that inspects work sites and ensures compliance with this act throughout its territory.

If noncompliance with the provisions of the act is impossible, why was this resolution not deleted for requiring the creation of bodies to ensure that noncompliance doesn’t happen? Many other resolutions include innocuous references to the possibility of noncompliance, often in ways that aren’t immediately apparent. This is why they likely didn’t raise flags with the Mods. Proposals deleted for acknowledging noncompliance, prior to the recent overturning of this convention, tended to be blatant in their acknowledgement. But any time a resolution creates a committee or tasks member states with “ensuring compliance” or “certifying compliance”, we are acknowledging at least the possibility of noncompliance by member states (or actors within).

In the end, what is more reasonable? That a government can’t cover up a war crime, because a resolution says it can’t, and for some reason we can’t explain in in-world terms, it’s just an impossibility? Or that a government can indeed flout the terms of resolutions with impunity, especially if there’s no enforcement mechanism in a resolution? The latter is not only realistic, but it’s the current state of affairs in many resolutions. We see no reason why acknowledging noncompliance is or should be impossible.

Member states have an obligation to follow laws, but so do the criminals who break them. Good faith obligations are broken all the time, and it’s beholden upon the law-writers to think of ways to prevent it and/or punish it. That being said, not every resolution needs a court or committee to enforce its terms. As in the real world, the international system itself can have a way of doing this. But if authors wish for something more guaranteed, they are free to create enforcement mechanisms in their proposals.

[Sedgistan]

Just noting, as I think it's been missed, but the original Ardchoille ruling that Gruen has cited was actually explicitly overturned a few months ago.

[Glen-Rhodes]

Looks like a lot of us missed that! So, it's not that landmark of a decision anymore. I've updated my draft opinion to reflect that decision, Sedge. I still think we should explain the logic behind it, though.

[Bears Armed]

One important reason for the 'Mandatory Compliance' rule, if memory serves me correctly, was so that proposals' authors wouldn't have to use any of the limited number of characters available to them explaining how those proposed resolutions would be enforced... c.f. the presumption that WA committees will always be honest & efficient, so that the authors of proposals involving committees also don't have to explain how that will be ensured...

My view on the possibility of of non-compliance is that the passage of a resolution automatically involves the incorporation of that resolution into all members' law-codes (as the 'Compliance Commission' TGs state is the case); that a government which then disobeys a resolution outright -- instead of finding a "creative" interpretation that is actually still compliant with the wording but gets around some of the author's intended meaning -- is therefore breaking one of its own nation's laws; that a "reasonable" national government generally will not blatantly break its own laws, if only because of the precedent that that sets when they tell other people to obey those laws; and that, as we've been told on multiple occasions before this, we only need to legislate for "reasonable" nations because trying to prevent every method that "unreasonable" ones might attempt to evade the laws wouldn't be possible in the space available anyway... Therefore, I'd prefer to see the ruling reinstated.

Anyway, isn't this proposal illegal as a 'committee only' violation of the rules?

[Glen-Rhodes]

One important reason for the 'Mandatory Compliance' rule, if memory serves me correctly, was so that proposals' authors wouldn't have to use any of the limited number of characters available to them explaining how those proposed resolutions would be enforced... c.f. the presumption that WA committees will always be honest & efficient, so that the authors of proposals involving committees also don't have to explain how that will be ensured...

That's never been an explanation mods gave, when I've asked them over the past several years. This seems ad hoc. Authors are stifled by character limits for issues that could use more characters, even without introducing committees. That seems like an argument for upping the limit, not imposing a rule that noncompliance can't exist in the WA world. Even so, how do you explain the numerous resolutions that already deal with aspects of noncompliance? We've been acknowledging it for years-- see WAR#7.

that a "reasonable" national government generally will not blatantly break its own laws, if only because of the precedent that that sets when they tell other people to obey those laws

A national government that finds an international law directly in opposition to its vital interests will reasonably violate that law. It happens all the time in the real world. Self-interest dictates it. Governments also violate their own laws all the time, too. Even liberal democracies like the US.

... and that, as we've been told on multiple occasions before this, we only need to legislate for "reasonable" nations because trying to prevent every method that "unreasonable" ones might attempt to evade the laws wouldn't be possible in the space available anyway... Therefore, I'd prefer to see the ruling reinstated.

It seems vastly more unreasonable to say that some magical force makes noncompliance impossible, than to say that authors are allowed to acknowledge an intrinsic aspect of international governance.

Anyway, isn't this proposal illegal as a 'committee only' violation of the rules?

Even if this is true, ducking out on the actual challenge -- again -- isn't really acceptable now.

[Christian Democrats]

I'm concerned that this proposal breaks the Meta-Gaming Rule. In NationStates, the WA Compliance Commission is a body that already exists. Attempting to expand its mandate is, in my mind, little different from trying to expand, let's say, the powers of the Security Council.

[Bears Armed]

that a "reasonable" national government generally will not blatantly break its own laws, if only because of the precedent that that sets when they tell other people to obey those laws

A national government that finds an international law directly in opposition to its vital interests will reasonably violate that law. It happens all the time in the real world. Self-interest dictates it. Governments also violate their own laws all the time, too. Even liberal democracies like the US.

We might disagree about how often "reasonable" nations will blatantly break international laws but, even so, if some nations are willing to do that then what would make those same nations comply with this proposed resolution? Anything? If not then it seems pointless, and pointless proposals (although perhaps no longer explicitly illegal?) aren't really worth the GA's time, are they?

I'm concerned that this proposal breaks the Meta-Gaming Rule. In NationStates, the WA Compliance Commission is a body that already exists. Attempting to expand its mandate is, in my mind, little different from trying to expand, let's say, the powers of the Security Council.

I think the author's hope was that as we "can't" mention the game-created 'Compliance Commission' because of the Rule against Meta-gaming this would have to be taken as a different [IC] 'Compliance Commission' instead.

_____________________________________________________________________

Anyway, with only 1 day [approximately] until this proposal would hit the floor, do we have an agreement that it's illegal -- although our precise arguments about why that's so might differ -- and should be pulled from the list?

[Christian Democrats]

I'm concerned that this proposal breaks the Meta-Gaming Rule. In NationStates, the WA Compliance Commission is a body that already exists. Attempting to expand its mandate is, in my mind, little different from trying to expand, let's say, the powers of the Security Council.

I think the author's hope was that as we "can't" mention the game-created 'Compliance Commission' because of the Rule against Meta-gaming this would have to be taken as a different [IC] 'Compliance Commission' instead.

I disagree with that argument.

It's as if someone created a nation named Osama bin Laden and condemned it in the SC. "Well, I'm not condemning the real Osama bin Laden; I'm just condemning a different IC Osama bin Laden." The SC mods would rightly say, "Good try, but we know what you're doing."

In this case, "Good try, IA, but you can't name a committee after something that already exists in the game."

Anyway, with only 1 day [approximately] until this proposal would hit the floor, do we have an agreement that it's illegal -- although our precise arguments about why that's so might differ -- and should be pulled from the list?

In this thread, here's what voting looks like so far:

Legal (1): GR
Illegal (2): BA, CD

[Sciongrad]

Sorry I've been sort of absent the past week, thanksgiving holiday and all. I'll provide more detail later, but I think the proposal is legal.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

My own view is that the WA both IC and mechanics-wise has to assume that official state non-compliance is impossible, basically for the reasons Bears explicates... but non-state (whether by companies, organized crime, or individuals from homeless people all the way up to high public officials) non-compliance is perfectly acceptable IC, since after all we do not actually live in a perfect world. And there are myriad reasons a nation might not go public with its prosecutions, or quietly sweep everything under the rug, or just blatantly let someone off (just suppose Gerald Ford hadn't pardoned Richard Nixon, and some coked-up attorney general decided to try to prosecute him...). We act at our own peril ruling absolutely that mention of non-compliance, without any adjectives or modifiers, is or is not legal. I caution against cavalierly tossing victory to one side or the other in the long-running dispute about the nature of GA compliance.

I'll try to have something formal soon.

[Glen-Rhodes]

@CD: Where do you stand on the substantive question of noncompliance? That's what we're really being asked here. IA will simply change the name and resubmit if it's ruled illegal for the committee name.

That still makes no sense. Is it impossible for a criminal to be in government? Again, how do you explain the myriad resolutions that already implicitly acknowledge noncompliance? Nobody's yet to explain this. Nobody's yet to offer any vision of how you explain mandatory compliance without meta gaming. Nobody's yet to explain why we should foreclose author creativity and actual due diligence in thinking through how international governance works... just because a a FAQ Max wrote 10 years ago hasn't been updated, or because old players just get skeeved out by noncompliance.

There really seems to be no justification for forcing every player to change how they role play, and then going around and saying mandatory compliance exists because it's actually forced role play to not comply.

And, frankly, that last part about how we shouldn't "toss victory" to one side is a bit ridiculous, SL, let's be honest. Why shouldn't we? How are you *not*? You're defining noncompliance as something that's never been illegal. It's ALWAYS been legal to talk about non-state actors and crimes and whatnot. There are whole categories dedicated to it. The debate on mandatory compliance is whether MEMBER STATES are forced to comply and that it's actually literally impossible to not comply. The way you've framed the debate isn't right. Your ruling would indeed toss victory to one side.

[Bears Armed]

It's "impossible" for member nations not to have all of the passed GA resolutions incorporated into their own law-codes... and any national government which deliberately does ignore those laws is rather likely to ignore any new resolutions that are aimed specifically at enforcing compliance, too, isn't it?
That being the case, any resolutions aimed specifically at enforcing compliance with the whole body of passed GA resolutions are probably "not worth the WA's time" (which used to be an illegality in itself) and the GA openly admitting that entire national governments -- rather than just some individuals within member nations -- can be deliberately non-compliant is a bad idea.
I think that the rules should therefore include a ban on such admissions.

[Sedgistan]

Just noting that the quorate proposal was removed at the author's request, so you're not so rushed for time any more.

[Christian Democrats]

@CD: Where do you stand on the substantive question of noncompliance? That's what we're really being asked here.

We don't need to decide the "substantive" question. This proposal is illegal for using the name of something that already exists in the game. Naming your GA committee the Compliance Commission is no different than naming your GA committee the Security Council. "But it's a different Compliance Commission! But it's a different Security Council!" Sorry, no. You can't do that.

[Sciongrad]

@CD: Where do you stand on the substantive question of noncompliance? That's what we're really being asked here.

We don't need to decide the "substantive" question. This proposal is illegal for using the name of something that already exists in the game. Naming your GA committee the Compliance Commission is no different than naming your GA committee the Security Council. "But it's a different Compliance Commission! But it's a different Security Council!" Sorry, no. You can't do that.

I actually disagree. As far as the GA is concerned, neither the Compliance Commission nor the Security Council exist. I made the following argument in the Gruen v. NAPA thread:

The SC cannot do anything that the GA is capable of recognizing due to the metagaming rule. It doesn't make any sense, then, for the GA to be able to recognize an institution whose most basic functions can't be mentioned. Any argument that suggests the SC is part of the WA and is therefore entitled to IC recognition by the GA ignores not only the clear, deliberate bifurcation of the two back in 2009 but fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of the metagaming rule.

This obviously must similarly apply to the compliance commission. In other words, if the GA cannot recognize the OOC SC or Compliance Commission because of the metagaming rule, it must be able to create agencies with their names because they don't exist otherwise within the IC universe. While the resolution might be illegal because it recognizes non-compliance (although I don't buy that either), I would not hold that it's illegal on account of the committee name.

[Christian Democrats]

We don't need to decide the "substantive" question. This proposal is illegal for using the name of something that already exists in the game. Naming your GA committee the Compliance Commission is no different than naming your GA committee the Security Council. "But it's a different Compliance Commission! But it's a different Security Council!" Sorry, no. You can't do that.

I actually disagree. As far as the GA is concerned, neither the Compliance Commission nor the Security Council exist. I made the following argument in the Gruen v. NAPA thread:

The SC cannot do anything that the GA is capable of recognizing due to the metagaming rule. It doesn't make any sense, then, for the GA to be able to recognize an institution whose most basic functions can't be mentioned. Any argument that suggests the SC is part of the WA and is therefore entitled to IC recognition by the GA ignores not only the clear, deliberate bifurcation of the two back in 2009 but fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of the metagaming rule.

This obviously must similarly apply to the compliance commission. In other words, if the GA cannot recognize the OOC SC or Compliance Commission because of the metagaming rule, it must be able to create agencies with their names because they don't exist otherwise within the IC universe. While the resolution might be illegal because it recognizes non-compliance (although I don't buy that either), I would not hold that it's illegal on account of the committee name.

I suppose your argument kind of makes sense theoretically, but there's a major problem with your fundamental premise: "As far as the GA is concerned, neither the Compliance Commission nor the Security Council exist." On the contrary, the Meta-Gaming Rule explicitly mentions the Security Council: "Proposals cannot break the 'fourth wall' or attempt to force events outside of the WA itself. This includes and is not limited to forcing the Security Council to carry out specific actions, mandating that regions carry out specific actions, and forcing compliance on non-member nations." From the standpoint of the GA Rules, the SC, regions, non-member nations, etc. are real things. Calling one's committee the Security Council or the WA Compliance Commission crosses the boundary established by the Meta-Gaming Rule.

[Glen-Rhodes]

I disagree that calling the committee the "Compliance Commission" is metagaming. IA clearly isn't talking about the fake account used to TG players about resolutions. There's nothing about the name forcing you to break the fourth wall. It's just a name.

As for the substantive question, we do have to address it. IA will obviously change the committee name and resubmit the proposal, if that's all we decide on. There's no point in wasting everybody's time by avoiding addressing the questions Gruen's actual challenge is asking us. With IA removing the proposal from quorum, we don't need to issue a narrow ruling to buy ourselves time, either.

[Sciongrad]

I disagree that calling the committee the "Compliance Commission" is metagaming. IA clearly isn't talking about the fake account used to TG players about resolutions. There's nothing about the name forcing you to break the fourth wall. It's just a name.

As for the substantive question, we do have to address it. IA will obviously change the committee name and resubmit the proposal, if that's all we decide on. There's no point in wasting everybody's time by avoiding addressing the questions Gruen's actual challenge is asking us. With IA removing the proposal from quorum, we don't need to issue a narrow ruling to buy ourselves time, either.

We can rule on both, just to get it out of the way. If we do reach the conclusion that the name doesn't violate the metagaming rule, then that would only serve to buttress the holding in Gruen v. NAPA.

[Glen-Rhodes]

It's "impossible" for member nations not to have all of the passed GA resolutions incorporated into their own law-codes... and any national government which deliberately does ignore those laws is rather likely to ignore any new resolutions that are aimed specifically at enforcing compliance, too, isn't it?

And? This isn't an argument for saying noncompliance is impossible and it's a Metagaming violation to say otherwise. Reasonable nations violate international laws that go against their national interests. Enforcement mechanisms can provide disincentives against violations. That's why we have them in the real world. ("Trust, but verify.") Countries that routinely flout international law are pariah states and isolated. In NationStates terms, we use our IGNORE cannons.

That being the case, any resolutions aimed specifically at enforcing compliance with the whole body of passed GA resolutions are probably "not worth the WA's time" (which used to be an illegality in itself) and the GA openly admitting that entire national governments -- rather than just some individuals within member nations -- can be deliberately non-compliant is a bad idea.

It's "not worth" our time to have thoughtful debates about how international law can be enforced? That's not right, Bears. That's a dumbing-down of the game.

Again, how do you explain the myriad resolutions -- quality resolutions by any standard -- that implicitly or explicitly recognize the possibility of noncompliance, and create enforcement mechanisms because of it? It's been happening since the beginning of the WA, as noted in my opinion. Do you really think those resolutions wasted the WA's time?

And, again, how do you explain a ban on acknowledging noncompliance without being forced to Metagame yourself?

[Sierra Lyricalia]

Ultimately I vote this is legal. I don't have the time to write a concurrence (for which I assume we're all a bit thankful ), so I join Glen-Rhodes.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

Bananaistan has added an argument against this proposal's legality:

In case this post was missed.

GAR#312, On Universal Jurisdiction, section 5, states "Strongly encourages member states to volunteer any evidence relevant to the prosecution of an individual for a crime listed in section 2 of this resolution;"

The proposal on hand in section 2 states "Requires both civilian and military police forces to create a liaison point with the Commission to provide evidence on war crimes in particular and adherence to WA legislation in general, and to those ends, demands that documents requested by the Commission not to be destroyed and to be handed over promptly so long as state security permits;"

For the purposes of this challenge, my contention is that GAR#312 by merely "strongly encouraging" a nation to volunteer evidence creates an implicit right not to volunteer any evidence whereas the current proposal now requires member states to provide such evidence. This is a contradiction.

So in general, I would like the council to rule as to whether a clause which urges or encourages a nation to do X, grants a nation a right not to do X and whether any further resolution can legally amend this implicit right not to do X and create a requirement for a nation to do X. Is expanding an encouragement in one resolution to a requirement in a new resolution legal or not? As far as I am aware, there is no specific precedent on this matter.

The WA has only encouraged nations to volunteer the evidence: current international law is that nations are entitled to withhold the evidence if they so wish. Whereas were this proposal to pass, one resolution would say they can withhold the evidence and another would say cannot.

I would take issue with this because the proposal "demands" that evidence be turned over. My four year old kid "demands" ice cream and I don't fucking give him any¹, so as a WA player I wouldn't consider my nation bound to turn over any documents. However, for purposes of not weaselling out based on semantics, I will pretend the word "demands" here is a magic invisible "requires on pain of invasion and regime change."

My personal opinion is that it's a non-issue. In the absence of any word whatsoever from the WA on a given topic, a nation may act how it pleases (Status A); with an encouragement to do X, it may still do as it pleases but must be lectured at once (Status B); with a requirement to do X, it must do X (Status C). The difference between Status A and Status B is small enough that they amount to the same thing w/r/t roleplay of national behavior; I don't see how such a small difference in those terms can mutate into a full-on contradiction when the WA moves to impose Status C.

Put another way: Status A is the WA remaining silent; Status B is the WA trying to reach a certain outcome, but not hard; and Status C is the WA trying very hard. There is no difference of WA goals between B and C, so there cannot be any contradiction; meanwhile it's not duplication, either, because there's no way a requirement is logically similar to a request.

The only potential problem I see is if Resolution 1 encourages nations to do Y, and then Resolution 2 forbids nations from doing Y. That's a plain contradiction.

1 Not strictly true, he's actually pretty good about things like that. It's the rhetorical flourish that counts

[Glen-Rhodes]

I agree 100% with that, SL.

[Christian Democrats]

I'll quote the Rules:

Contradiction: From the verb 'to contradict' - to state [the] opposite or deny a concept or idea. Proposals which conflict with explicit clauses within an active resolution will be removed.

In my opinion, a requires clause doesn't "state the opposite" or "deny" an encourages clause.