[Draft] Right to Consent

[Umeria]

Modus ponens. Look it up.

So says the ambassador who doesn't recognize modus ponens.

I know very well what modus ponens is, ambassador, but it has nothing to do with what I said. I am not claiming your consequent is false, I am claiming your statement is false. Let's take another look at your argument:

If adults consent, B should be legal.
Adults consent.
Therefore, B should be legal.

You are using this statement to argue that "if adults consent, B should be legal". However, that statement is also your premise. "If adults consent, B should be legal" is not an accepted statement, as it is what you are trying to argue, and you can't have modus ponens without an accepted conditional. Your argument boils down to "because of x therefore x", which is meaningless.

Circular reasoning. Look it up.

[Christian Democrats]

Modus ponens. Look it up.

So says the ambassador who doesn't recognize modus ponens.

I know very well what modus ponens is, ambassador, but it has nothing to do with what I said. I am not claiming your consequent is false, I am claiming your statement is false. Let's take another look at your argument:

If adults consent, B should be legal.
Adults consent.
Therefore, B should be legal.

You are using this statement to argue that "if adults consent, B should be legal". However, that statement is also your premise. "If adults consent, B should be legal" is not an accepted statement, as it is what you are trying to argue, and you can't have modus ponens without an accepted conditional. Your argument boils down to "because of x therefore x", which is meaningless.

Circular reasoning. Look it up.

You're missing the point.

Our earlier examples of A and B were a portrayal of our opponents' argument. Our response: If you accept A, then you must accept B on the same grounds. Otherwise, your argument isn't a good one. The ambassador from Sierra Lyricalia replied by adding to the first premise: If A is consensual and non-harmful, then A should be legal. Our response: There are other consensual, non-harmful acts (B) to which this argument could apply. Do you accept those other acts? If not, your argument isn't a good one.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

You're misusing the term "affect." Yes, subminimum wages affect others. So does sexual promiscuity. If you're going to apply the harm principle with any degree of evenhandedness, however, you must limit regulation to direct effects. Otherwise, it's virtually indistinguishable from the doctrines of traditional legal-moral thinkers. Let's use the minimum wage and fornication as examples.

If Amber and Bob agree to a subminimum wage in the private employment of Amber's business, it depresses the labor market. Chris, an employee of Amber, is affected by Amber and Bob's conduct. He might lose his higher wage or his job. Thus, the state may legitimately regulate wages.

If Amber (a virgin) and Bob agree to fornicate in the privacy of Amber's bedroom, it pollutes the moral ecology. Chris, an admirer of Amber, is affected by Amber and Bob's conduct. He has lost his opportunity to deflower Amber. Thus, the state may legitimately regulate sexual conduct.

Hint: Both of these arguments are bad arguments.

OOC: Now I know you know better than this. These two examples have the same apparent form, but their plausibility or lack thereof stem from two completely different sources. You can't just lay them out with identical sentence structure and assume the arguments themselves are therefore identically good or bad. Employment is a categorically different thing from sex (for example, unlike Vulcans, people don't die if they don't have sex; whereas without a job you're unable to fully participate in society, and must either accept charity, steal, or starve). The only thing the two arguments have in common is that it's true that *Amber* is not obligated to do anything for Chris; but that's a far cry from proving that the state has no business regulating Bob's wages, or the wages of any of Amber's other employees. You rightly dismiss any such thing as "the moral ecology," but the labor market is a thing that (though abstract as all economic concepts necessarily are) can nevertheless be measured, quantified, forecasted to a degree, and affected by people's actions.

Things like drug use have an increasingly complex calculus between individual rights, moral imperatives, wasted tax money/the futility of enforcement, a different set of moral imperatives, harm reduction, public health costs, burgeoning prison populations, and probably a few other considerations I'm forgetting.

With sexual activity among consenting adults, the considerations are individual rights, moral imperatives (which in the US are rendered moot by the First Amendment, I would argue, though as yet no court has seen fit to rule this way ), the consequences of pregnancy, the availability of contraception and abortion, and (again) probably some other things. A consistent weighting of all of these factors can yield the view that using certain drugs ought to be illegal, while most consensual sexual activity should be legal.

Alternatively, it can lead to the conclusion that certain drugs ought to be illegal or regulated and that certain sexual practices ought to be illegal or regulated.

Right. This is why the resolution at vote explicitly allows for regulation of certain sexual practices.

There is no logical contradiction, only a different view of how each facet of the question should be weighted. That's why someone can't just say, "Well, such and so ideology gives us the answer that... (insert blanket statement here)" and expect to get anywhere.

"A different view," yes. We're not dealing with a human right; we're dealing with different views on the proper regulation of a particular area of human conduct. Accepting the plausibility of other views, we should advocate that the WA not involve itself in this area.

Accepting the plausibility of other views requires that the state not involve itself in people's bedrooms, with some obvious exceptions. A libertarian might argue that minimum wage laws are an infringement on a human right, but it's clear that even if that is true, the infringement is necessary to protect the ability of countless third parties to make a living. Where participants in sex are legally competent consenting adults acting in private, it's not clear how their actions affect others at all, let alone negatively.

[Umeria]

You're missing the point.

Our earlier examples of A and B were a portrayal of our opponents' argument. Our response: If you accept A, then you must accept B on the same grounds. Otherwise, your argument isn't a good one. The ambassador from Sierra Lyricalia replied by adding to the first premise: If A is consensual and non-harmful, then A should be legal. Our response: There are other consensual, non-harmful acts (B) to which this argument could apply. Do you accept those other acts? If not, your argument isn't a good one.

So, your argument should have been:

If anything is consensual and non-harmful, it should be legal.
A, and B, are consensual and non-harmful.
Therefore, A and B should be legal.

Your wording appeared to justify B being legal by the fact that B is legal. So, now that we've cleared that up:

Do you accept those other acts?

I'd have to see some examples, but, yes, I would accept the other things that are truly consensual and non-harmful.

[Bears Armed]

Where participants in sex are legally competent consenting adults acting in private, it's not clear how their actions affect others at all, let alone negatively.

OOC: There are probably nations in NS whose governments worry that allowing certain acts might lead to an angry deity smiting their cities. Bearing in mind the diversity of RP canon, in some cases they might even be right!

[Christian Democrats]

The only thing the two arguments have in common is that it's true that *Amber* is not obligated to do anything for Chris

Correct! Earlier, you said, "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?" Chris is the only "other" in the above scenarios. If we admit that Amber doesn't have obligations toward Chris, then her activities (payment of Bob or sex with Bob) can't directly affect Chris. If her activities don't directly affect Chris, the state doesn't have the authority to regulate them.

but that's a far cry from proving that the state has no business regulating Bob's wages

But Bob is not an "other" in the first scenario or the second scenario. "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?"

Accepting the plausibility of other views requires that the state not involve itself in people's bedrooms, with some obvious exceptions. A libertarian might argue that minimum wage laws are an infringement on a human right, but it's clear that even if that is true, the infringement is necessary to protect the ability of countless third parties to make a living. Where participants in sex are legally competent consenting adults acting in private, it's not clear how their actions affect others at all, let alone negatively.

In the above example, Chris's heart was broken. Is heartbreak not a harm?

Also, it's not clear how Amber's paying Bob a subminimum wage affects others at all. How does Amber's agreement with Bob directly affect the conduct of other employers?

You're missing the point.

Our earlier examples of A and B were a portrayal of our opponents' argument. Our response: If you accept A, then you must accept B on the same grounds. Otherwise, your argument isn't a good one. The ambassador from Sierra Lyricalia replied by adding to the first premise: If A is consensual and non-harmful, then A should be legal. Our response: There are other consensual, non-harmful acts (B) to which this argument could apply. Do you accept those other acts? If not, your argument isn't a good one.

So, your argument should have been:

If anything is consensual and non-harmful, it should be legal.
A, and B, are consensual and non-harmful.
Therefore, A and B should be legal.

We're not clairvoyant.

[Umeria]

We're not clairvoyant.

What does being clairvoyant have to do with what I said? You stated one thing and meant another, and I was pointing it out.

[Christian Democrats]

We're not clairvoyant.

What does being clairvoyant have to do with what I said? You stated one thing and meant another, and I was pointing it out.

No, I didn't. I repeat:

Our earlier examples of A and B were a portrayal of our opponents' argument. Our response: If you accept A, then you must accept B on the same grounds. Otherwise, your argument isn't a good one. The ambassador from Sierra Lyricalia replied by adding to the first premise: If A is consensual and non-harmful, then A should be legal. Our response: There are other consensual, non-harmful acts (B) to which this argument could apply. Do you accept those other acts? If not, your argument isn't a good one.

What's unclear to you?

[Umeria]

I was talking about this argument:

If adults consent, B should be legal.
Adults consent.
Therefore, B should be legal.

I was not referring to your most recent argument.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

The only thing the two arguments have in common is that it's true that *Amber* is not obligated to do anything for Chris

Correct! Earlier, you said, "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?" Chris is the only "other" in the above scenarios. If we admit that Amber doesn't have obligations toward Chris, then her activities (payment of Bob or sex with Bob) can't directly affect Chris. If her activities don't directly affect Chris, the state doesn't have the authority to regulate them.

but that's a far cry from proving that the state has no business regulating Bob's wages

But Bob is not an "other" in the first scenario or the second scenario. "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?"

Amber's actions toward Chris do not admit of state regulation (assuming a vacuum in which the only differences between Bob and Chris are personality, and Chris's insistence on earning enough to live on). Amber's actions toward Bob do admit of state regulation, as discussed below:

Accepting the plausibility of other views requires that the state not involve itself in people's bedrooms, with some obvious exceptions. A libertarian might argue that minimum wage laws are an infringement on a human right, but it's clear that even if that is true, the infringement is necessary to protect the ability of countless third parties to make a living. Where participants in sex are legally competent consenting adults acting in private, it's not clear how their actions affect others at all, let alone negatively.

In the above example, Chris's heart was broken. Is heartbreak not a harm?

Also, it's not clear how Amber's paying Bob a subminimum wage affects others at all. How does Amber's agreement with Bob directly affect the conduct of other employers?

Not a harm that affects him sufficiently to justify forcing Amber to have sex with him. Nor would his lack of employment constitute sufficient harm to force someone to hire him. You're conflating the indirect harm suffered by Chris, Cal, Connie, Cuthbert, Cadwalladr, etc. as a result of the statistical mass actions of Alice and Ben, Amber and Bob, Angie and Bill, Alex and Biff, etc., with the alleged "direct harm" Chris suffers as a result of Amber not consenting to sexual or economic intercourse with him. They are different kinds of "harm" entirely. Not consenting to interact with one person is a different thing from agreeing to actions with another person which, if copied by your peers, would harm third parties by making it impossible for them to interact and still pay rent.

In order for your sexual scenario to actually be equivalent to your employment scenario, you would have to posit that Bob is underage or in some other way "consenting" to sex in a way that would be better for him if he held out for increased maturity or some other form of "better deal;" and that all adults with A names would go out of their way to also try to have sex with underage partners if they could (incidentally leaving mature partners out in the cold). In neither case does Chris or Cadwalladr have a direct, actionable grievance against Amber or Alex; but in both cases the state has an undeniable interest in enforcing regulations or laws about whom the A class may employ or have sex with and in what manner.

In the case of sex, the just limits of those regulations reach age, legal competence, consent, location, and certain restrictions aimed at maximizing public health and child welfare; in the case of employment, there's fair wages, occupational safety and health, workplace atmosphere, hiring practices, other discrimination concerns, and some other things that I could list off the top of my head if I were a labor attorney. The principle of harm in this case protects the sexual privacy of most consenting adults in a way that cannot simply be copied and pasted onto employment practices.

The main point is that there is a fundamental difference between your two examples: in the scenarios as you gave them, Amber having sex with Bob instead of Chris is something that can only affect the three of them, and anyway can't affect Chris as badly as if he couldn't find a job. While there may not be many other paying jobs available, there are plenty of other fish in the sea - and Amber's rejection doesn't have any effect on his ability to find other romantic partners. Whereas Amber hiring Bob only because he agrees to a shitty wage is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate. Amber hiring Bob at a sub-minimum wage actively reduces the number of well-paying jobs.

Thus the state has an interest in regulating employment practices that goes beyond its interest in regulating sex.

[Christian Democrats]

I was talking about this argument:

If adults consent, B should be legal.
Adults consent.
Therefore, B should be legal.

I was not referring to your most recent argument.

There, our delegation was giving "a portrayal of our opponents' argument." Then, "[t]he ambassador from Sierra Lyricalia replied by adding to the first premise." What are you having trouble understanding?

Correct! Earlier, you said, "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?" Chris is the only "other" in the above scenarios. If we admit that Amber doesn't have obligations toward Chris, then her activities (payment of Bob or sex with Bob) can't directly affect Chris. If her activities don't directly affect Chris, the state doesn't have the authority to regulate them.

But Bob is not an "other" in the first scenario or the second scenario. "The standard to apply is, does the activity affect others?"

Amber's actions toward Chris do not admit of state regulation (assuming a vacuum in which the only differences between Bob and Chris are personality, and Chris's insistence on earning enough to live on). Amber's actions toward Bob do admit of state regulation, as discussed below:

In the above example, Chris's heart was broken. Is heartbreak not a harm?

Also, it's not clear how Amber's paying Bob a subminimum wage affects others at all. How does Amber's agreement with Bob directly affect the conduct of other employers?

Not a harm that affects him sufficiently to justify forcing Amber to have sex with him.

The hypothetical was for a state that would ban her from having sex with Bob.

Nor would his lack of employment constitute sufficient harm to force someone to hire him. You're conflating the indirect harm suffered by Chris, Cal, Connie, Cuthbert, Cadwalladr, etc. as a result of the statistical mass actions of Alice and Ben, Amber and Bob, Angie and Bill, Alex and Biff, etc., with the alleged "direct harm" Chris suffers as a result of Amber not consenting to sexual or economic intercourse with him. They are different kinds of "harm" entirely. Not consenting to interact with one person is a different thing from agreeing to actions with another person which, if copied by your peers, would harm third parties by making it impossible for them to interact and still pay rent.

You're starting to sound like a moral traditionalist.

"Fornication, if copied by your peers, would harm third parties by making communal life much less happy. Widespread fornication, if practiced, would lead to a society full of betrayal, heartbreak, and loneliness, not to mention unplanned pregnancy, abortion, fatherless homes, and venereal disease. It would make it impossible for third parties to have civilized, satisfying lives."

In order for your sexual scenario to actually be equivalent to your employment scenario, you would have to posit that Bob is underage or in some other way "consenting" to sex in a way that would be better for him if he held out for increased maturity or some other form of "better deal;" and that all adults with A names would go out of their way to also try to have sex with underage partners if they could (incidentally leaving mature partners out in the cold).

Any person who would accept a subminimum wage is a child, really?

In the case of sex, the just limits of those regulations reach age, legal competence, consent, location, and certain restrictions aimed at maximizing public health and child welfare; in the case of employment, there's fair wages, occupational safety and health, workplace atmosphere, hiring practices, other discrimination concerns, and some other things that I could list off the top of my head if I were a labor attorney. The principle of harm in this case protects the sexual privacy of most consenting adults in a way that cannot simply be copied and pasted onto employment practices.

If both parties in a wage deal meet "age, legal competence, consent, [and] location" requirements and if the business is following public health and safety regulations, what concern does the state have in controlling wages under your principles?

The main point is that there is a fundamental difference between your two examples: in the scenarios as you gave them, Amber having sex with Bob instead of Chris is something that can only affect the three of them, and anyway can't affect Chris as badly as if he couldn't find a job. While there may not be many other paying jobs available, there are plenty of other fish in the sea

So you think it's more difficult to find a job that pays one enough to live than it is to find a person who'd make a suitable spouse?

and Amber's rejection doesn't have any effect on his ability to find other romantic partners.

Amber's agreement with Bob doesn't have any effect on Chris's ability to find another job.

Whereas Amber hiring Bob only because he agrees to a shitty wage is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate.

"Amber sleeping with Bob only because he's a stud is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate."

Amber hiring Bob at a sub-minimum wage actively reduces the number of well-paying jobs.

Actually, it just reduces the pay of one job -- the job that Bob took.

[Umeria]

There, our delegation was giving "a portrayal of our opponents' argument."

That portrayal, even with the added premise, is incorrect.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

Amber's actions toward Chris do not admit of state regulation (assuming a vacuum in which the only differences between Bob and Chris are personality, and Chris's insistence on earning enough to live on). Amber's actions toward Bob do admit of state regulation, as discussed below:

Not a harm that affects him sufficiently to justify forcing Amber to have sex with him.

The hypothetical was for a state that would ban her from having sex with Bob.

Heh. Well, nor that neither then.

Nor would his lack of employment constitute sufficient harm to force someone to hire him. You're conflating the indirect harm suffered by Chris, Cal, Connie, Cuthbert, Cadwalladr, etc. as a result of the statistical mass actions of Alice and Ben, Amber and Bob, Angie and Bill, Alex and Biff, etc., with the alleged "direct harm" Chris suffers as a result of Amber not consenting to sexual or economic intercourse with him. They are different kinds of "harm" entirely. Not consenting to interact with one person is a different thing from agreeing to actions with another person which, if copied by your peers, would harm third parties by making it impossible for them to interact and still pay rent.

You're starting to sound like a moral traditionalist.

"Fornication, if copied by your peers, would harm third parties by making communal life much less happy. Widespread fornication, if practiced, would lead to a society full of betrayal, heartbreak, and loneliness, not to mention unplanned pregnancy, abortion, fatherless homes, and venereal disease. It would make it impossible for third parties to have civilized, satisfying lives."

One difference is that contraception and the empathy one hopefully learns as a social animal are far more effective at preventing those ills, than charity and underfunded social programs are at alleviating mass poverty. Another is that with the exception of outright adultery, any government intrusion into the bedroom is doomed from the beginning to find no "right answer" or uniquely aggrieved party who must be compensated; and even in the event of outright adultery, there may still be no sorting through the mess. Meanwhile, the state itself (or properly, its investigators) must soon get sick of working and working with no hope of truly achieving justice. This simply isn't the case with employment concerns.

In order for your sexual scenario to actually be equivalent to your employment scenario, you would have to posit that Bob is underage or in some other way "consenting" to sex in a way that would be better for him if he held out for increased maturity or some other form of "better deal;" and that all adults with A names would go out of their way to also try to have sex with underage partners if they could (incidentally leaving mature partners out in the cold).

Any person who would accept a subminimum wage is a child, really?

Obviously not literally; but acceptance of subminimum wages is a symptom of perceived powerlessness not unlike that of a child begging an adult for a small allowance, rather than two grown adults negotiating a fair price for one's employment. It happens all over the place, unfortunately, much more so in these dark days of labor-movement lassitude and disorganization. When people see themselves as agents of their own destiny, they tend to demand fair compensation for their labor.

But beyond that, your scenario as written can only justify treating the labor and sex cases as truly equivalent if you impose that sort of squicky creepiness on the sex case. It doesn't have to be statutory rape, it can be something else, but there does have to be some illegitimate exploitation of Bob happening in order to treat the cases the same. Otherwise it's just, sure, she banged one not the other, what's the point. While the labor case actually demands state action.

In the case of sex, the just limits of those regulations reach age, legal competence, consent, location, and certain restrictions aimed at maximizing public health and child welfare; in the case of employment, there's fair wages, occupational safety and health, workplace atmosphere, hiring practices, other discrimination concerns, and some other things that I could list off the top of my head if I were a labor attorney. The principle of harm in this case protects the sexual privacy of most consenting adults in a way that cannot simply be copied and pasted onto employment practices.

If both parties in a wage deal meet "age, legal competence, consent, [and] location" requirements and if the business is following public health and safety regulations, what concern does the state have in controlling wages under your principles?

An ebbing tide sinks all boats. The state has an interest in ensuring the water level doesn't sink too low for general navigability. To get away from metaphors, the state has an interest in preventing the degeneration of the labor force into a beeswarm of desperate workers who can't make ends meet no matter how many jobs or hours they work. An action in the marketplace affects the rest of the marketplace in a way that a sex act inherently cannot.

The main point is that there is a fundamental difference between your two examples: in the scenarios as you gave them, Amber having sex with Bob instead of Chris is something that can only affect the three of them, and anyway can't affect Chris as badly as if he couldn't find a job. While there may not be many other paying jobs available, there are plenty of other fish in the sea

So you think it's more difficult to find a job that pays one enough to live than it is to find a person who'd make a suitable spouse?

Given the number of families (both one- and two-parent) that live in poverty, I would say this is obvious.

and Amber's rejection doesn't have any effect on his ability to find other romantic partners.

Amber's agreement with Bob doesn't have any effect on Chris's ability to find another job.

Sure it does. A drunk driver who makes it home safely doesn't have any effect on anyone else, either. The reason drunk driving is illegal is because of the aggregate effects. Amber being able to employ Bob at subminimum wages means her business is more likely to succeed, and outcompete others in the same industry not through producing a better product but because her workforce is underpaid. Other companies have to cut costs in order to stay afloat and soon most workers will have to accept inadequate wages or find work elsewhere. That is a direct harm to Chris's long-term prospects. That it may not be felt until months later is immaterial.

Whereas Amber hiring Bob only because he agrees to a shitty wage is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate.

"Amber sleeping with Bob only because he's a stud is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate."

Amber's sexual desire for Bob doesn't make Chris less studly. Amber's action in hiring Bob for low wages makes Chris less likely to find adequate work.

Amber hiring Bob at a sub-minimum wage actively reduces the number of well-paying jobs.

Actually, it just reduces the pay of one job -- the job that Bob took.

See above.

[Christian Democrats]

We're getting off track . . .

with the exception of outright adultery, any government intrusion into the bedroom is doomed from the beginning to find no "right answer" or uniquely aggrieved party who must be compensated; and even in the event of outright adultery, there may still be no sorting through the mess.

On the other hand, one could argue that a regime of sex regulation that permits adultery and fornication is much more likely to see a lot of sexual assaults go unpunished. (Fewer survivors of sexual assault see their attackers penalized.)

An interesting note about the enforcement of fornication laws in the Plymouth Colony:

A curious characteristic of several convictions in the early 1640s was the unequal sentencing given to men and women. In each of the cases, the man suffered corporal punishment while the woman either sat in the stocks or stood by watching (PCR 1:162 and 2:37, 85-86). After June of 1645, the distribution of punishments was more equal. However, some cases emerge where only the male appears to have been punished. In these cases, the woman's name is not mentioned and the fine paid was half the amount it should have been.

http://www.histarch.illinois.edu/plymouth/Lauria1.html#VI

there does have to be some illegitimate exploitation of Bob happening in order to treat the cases the same. Otherwise it's just, sure, she banged one not the other, what's the point. While the labor case actually demands state action.

You've abandoned your previous argument. Earlier, you said that state regulation should happen only when conduct harms others. Now, you say that the state should regulate Amber's and Bob's private, consensual agreement because Amber's conduct is intrinsically exploitative.

I hope you see how much this smacks of traditional arguments for fornication laws:

For this is the will of God, your sanctification: that you abstain from fornication; that each one of you know how to control your own body in holiness and honor, not with lustful passion, like the Gentiles who do not know God; that no one wrong or exploit a brother or sister in this matter, because the Lord is an avenger in all these things, just as we have already told you beforehand and solemnly warned you. For God did not call us to impurity but in holiness. Therefore whoever rejects this rejects not human authority but God. (1 Thessalonians 4:3-8, NRSV)

One person can take advantage of another, or two people can take advantage of each other.

To get away from metaphors, the state has an interest in preventing the degeneration of the labor force into a beeswarm of desperate workers who can't make ends meet no matter how many jobs or hours they work. An action in the marketplace affects the rest of the marketplace in a way that a sex act inherently cannot.

I'm not so sure. The state, one could argue, has an interest in preventing the degeneration of the population into a hookup culture where people can't find contentment no matter how many sexual partners they have. An act of extramarital intercourse affects the whole population insofar as it devalues sexuality and objectifies human beings.

So you think it's more difficult to find a job that pays one enough to live than it is to find a person who'd make a suitable spouse?

Given the number of families (both one- and two-parent) that live in poverty, I would say this is obvious.

The number of people who want to be married but aren't is higher than the number of people who want to be employed but aren't.

Amber's agreement with Bob doesn't have any effect on Chris's ability to find another job.

Sure it does. A drunk driver who makes it home safely doesn't have any effect on anyone else, either. The reason drunk driving is illegal is because of the aggregate effects. Amber being able to employ Bob at subminimum wages means her business is more likely to succeed, and outcompete others in the same industry not through producing a better product but because her workforce is underpaid. Other companies have to cut costs in order to stay afloat and soon most workers will have to accept inadequate wages or find work elsewhere. That is a direct harm to Chris's long-term prospects. That it may not be felt until months later is immaterial.

Again, the same argument could be made for the criminalization of certain sexual acts. In the aggregate, allowing X will lead to A, B, and C.

"Amber sleeping with Bob only because he's a stud is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate."

Amber's sexual desire for Bob doesn't make Chris less studly. Amber's action in hiring Bob for low wages makes Chris less likely to find adequate work.

Minus one job if Amber chooses Bob. Minus one potential spouse if Amber chooses Bob.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

We're getting off track . . .

Possibly. I don't believe the proposal as written is salvageable...

...but if it is, it'll be because the author decides to look at it from something close to one of the two perspectives you and I are arguing. Much like with Wallenburg's sex education proposal, I actually think our "little digression" is helpful in both drafting, and helping voters decide where they stand. I've been out of formal classroom settings for over a decade now, but I always liked the so-called "digressions" best - no, dear classmates, this isn't on the exam, but give it a shot: the point of this "pointless" historical anecdote is that it illustrates some facet of the subject matter in a way that would give you real context and understanding if you could be bothered to stop worrying exclusively about your grades for ten seconds. I blame standardized tests, though that discussion really would be off-topic.

with the exception of outright adultery, any government intrusion into the bedroom is doomed from the beginning to find no "right answer" or uniquely aggrieved party who must be compensated; and even in the event of outright adultery, there may still be no sorting through the mess.

On the other hand, one could argue that a regime of sex regulation that permits adultery and fornication is much more likely to see a lot of sexual assaults go unpunished. (Fewer survivors of sexual assault see their attackers penalized.)

One problem with enforcing moral law through the state is that of deciding whose morals are enforced. In the absence of any objective standard of what the moral law should be, the only thing the state has to go on is asking who is hurt. What harm to others if two* unmarried people engage in sex? What harm is there to themselves? In the absence of quantifiable harm, the state is now tasked with interpreting the definition of sin, which is a labyrinth with a million rooms and only one exit. The only winning move is not to play. Once you've added in some of the thornier questions around adultery, it becomes clear that any social benefit from state intervention is vastly outweighed by the arbitrariness and intrusiveness necessary to make it effective (to say nothing of the cost in time and money).

Then, it's not clear to me that intrusive state regulation of sexual activity would actually make a big difference in the prosecution or conviction rates for sexual assault. The same questions would be in play, with the same excuses and/or defenses, and nothing suggests to me that sticking police noses into all reports of sex would improve the results for victims. The Plymouth example of men being punished universally (or at least disproportionally to women) is premised, I would argue, on a lack of female agency that is obsolete and unjustifiable for other reasons; but even if we wanted to reinstate it, the state would then be more or less obligated to punish the victims of sexual assault to the degree that there is any possibility that consent was ever given even if it was later withdrawn. That's no way to run a justice system.

*(Let's keep it to two, though the actual number of consenting adult participants is utterly irrelevant)

there does have to be some illegitimate exploitation of Bob happening in order to treat the cases the same. Otherwise it's just, sure, she banged one not the other, what's the point. While the labor case actually demands state action.

You've abandoned your previous argument. Earlier, you said that state regulation should happen only when conduct harms others. Now, you say that the state should regulate Amber's and Bob's private, consensual agreement because Amber's conduct is intrinsically exploitative.

No, I'm (perhaps clumsily?) pointing out the steps required to make the two cases equivalent w/r/t state intervention. The labor case harms Bob, but the actions of the two parties are not sufficient to warrant intervention; it's the effect on all other job-seekers that crosses the threshold. In the sex case, there is no quantifiable third-party harm as you laid it out; therefore in order to justify intervention, one of the original parties must be exploited. If there is no sexual exploitation, there should be no intervention.

I hope you see how much this smacks of traditional arguments for fornication laws:

For this is the will of God, your sanctification: that you abstain from fornication; that each one of you know how to control your own body in holiness and honor, not with lustful passion, like the Gentiles who do not know God; that no one wrong or exploit a brother or sister in this matter, because the Lord is an avenger in all these things, just as we have already told you beforehand and solemnly warned you. For God did not call us to impurity but in holiness. Therefore whoever rejects this rejects not human authority but God. (1 Thessalonians 4:3-8, NRSV)

One person can take advantage of another, or two people can take advantage of each other.

All of my arguments are premised on divine apathy (or at least divine non-intervention) or non-existence. People (and by extension the state) must be responsible for defining what counts as exploitation; and intervene when there is harm to third parties, or where one of the parties cannot be held legally competent to consent to the exploitation. But even before that, there is nothing about "lustful passion" by itself that is inherently exploitative.

To get away from metaphors, the state has an interest in preventing the degeneration of the labor force into a beeswarm of desperate workers who can't make ends meet no matter how many jobs or hours they work. An action in the marketplace affects the rest of the marketplace in a way that a sex act inherently cannot.

I'm not so sure. The state, one could argue, has an interest in preventing the degeneration of the population into a hookup culture where people can't find contentment no matter how many sexual partners they have. An act of extramarital intercourse affects the whole population insofar as it devalues sexuality and objectifies human beings.

How does extramarital intercourse do these things? There cannot be a "devaluation" of sexuality without first having an agreed-on value... but people value different things differently. Even the "currency" they are willing to use is vastly different: some will not share sex without a lifetime exclusive commitment; others share it for money (far fewer of these solely by force of circumstance than the traditionalist/establishment-feminist axis of received wisdom says, though again that would be a huge digression); still others believe it simply another facet of friendship. Extramarital intercourse very often devalues a marriage commitment; but absent a clear commitment or quantifiable harm, nothing indicates this devaluation is happening other than that you say it is. The gist of this applies to objectification also: at most the aggrieved spouse (the only conceivable victim here) has a right to divorce on favorable financial terms. Criminal charges would be absurd.

Given the number of families (both one- and two-parent) that live in poverty, I would say this is obvious.

The number of people who want to be married but aren't is higher than the number of people who want to be employed but aren't.

One of us is going to have to find statistics, I think. For myself, I am very happily married, and it wasn't nearly as long of a search as finding a job that I can stand to do while getting paid enough to justify staying in it. I understand my experience may not be universal. On the other hand I think this is a very minor facet of the argument. Besides which, the original question wasn't about spouses, it was about sex partners and Chris's desire to "deflower" Amber. Amber's rejection of Chris for sex is, as we've already agreed, immaterial to the question of whether Amber and Bob's employment contract is free from legitimate state interference.

(quote)Amber's agreement with Bob doesn't have any effect on Chris's ability to find another job.(/quote)
Sure it does. A drunk driver who makes it home safely doesn't have any effect on anyone else, either. The reason drunk driving is illegal is because of the aggregate effects. Amber being able to employ Bob at subminimum wages means her business is more likely to succeed, and outcompete others in the same industry not through producing a better product but because her workforce is underpaid. Other companies have to cut costs in order to stay afloat and soon most workers will have to accept inadequate wages or find work elsewhere. That is a direct harm to Chris's long-term prospects. That it may not be felt until months later is immaterial.

Again, the same argument could be made for the criminalization of certain sexual acts. In the aggregate, allowing X will lead to A, B, and C.

The As, Bs, and Cs that you have given are not inevitable consequences of X the way the quantifiable across-the-board wages reductions are. Sex, once again, is a different thing from employment; one human activity cannot be simply plugged into the role of another and expected to yield the same logical results. Closer examination is required.

"Amber sleeping with Bob only because he's a stud is an action that Alice etc. will want to copy, and this affects Chris, Cal, etc. in the aggregate."

Amber's sexual desire for Bob doesn't make Chris less studly. Amber's action in hiring Bob for low wages makes Chris less likely to find adequate work.

Minus one job if Amber chooses Bob. Minus one potential spouse if Amber chooses Bob.[/quote]

I'd respond to this, but I fear we'd simply be talking past each other now. The causal chains of the effects on Chris are different in each case, but you keep telling me they must be treated exactly the same. This being the case, we may indeed now be getting too far off the justifiable path of discussion...

[Araraukar]

*scims through the debate*

...so nobody should have sex with Bob¹?

There was probably something else that was important, but it was kinda lost in that flood of logics debate.

¹OOC: "Bob" is shorthand for "battery-operated boyfriend"...

[Christian Democrats]

One problem with enforcing moral law through the state is that of deciding whose morals are enforced. In the absence of any objective standard of what the moral law should be, the only thing the state has to go on is asking who is hurt.

Harm is a moral idea. Any definition of harm necessarily forces somebody's morality on the public.

My point earlier was basically this: If we're going to embrace a harm principle for the purposes of law, then we should embrace a harm principle that is bare-bones (think of John Stuart Mill or the modern-day libertarian). Otherwise, the same sort of discretion that you excoriate will occur -- i.e., value judgments about the rightness and wrongness of certain, not-directly-harmful conduct.

What harm to others if two* unmarried people engage in sex? What harm is there to themselves? In the absence of quantifiable harm, the state is now tasked with interpreting the definition of sin, which is a labyrinth with a million rooms and only one exit. The only winning move is not to play. Once you've added in some of the thornier questions around adultery, it becomes clear that any social benefit from state intervention is vastly outweighed by the arbitrariness and intrusiveness necessary to make it effective (to say nothing of the cost in time and money).

There's nothing arbitrary about adultery. Either someone has sex with a person other than his spouse, or he doesn't.

As I've said, I don't think fornication laws are a good idea; but my reasons for this position are practical. Theoretically, there'd be nothing objectionable about a fornication law. If we use your aggregate effects criterion, widespread fornication undermines the public good. How? We could talk about numerous effects -- out-of-wedlock pregnancy, venereal disease, objectification, exploitation, etc.

But even before that, there is nothing about "lustful passion" by itself that is inherently exploitative.

You don't think it's common for A to have sex with B just for sex and for B to feel hurt afterwards?

(Usually, though not always, A is the male and B is the female.)

The number of people who want to be married but aren't is higher than the number of people who want to be employed but aren't.

One of us is going to have to find statistics, I think.

The middle-aged people are obviously the relevant ones.

I hope we can agree that it's harder for people to find spouses in a sexually liberal society.