NS Military Realism Consultancy Thread Mk X Purps Safe Space

[Laritaia]

There are no kebabs in Frisia.

Neither food nor Muslims.

A gigantic slab of herring, onions, and bread is all you get.

what will soldiers eat at 1am on Saturday morning?

[Gallia-]

Fish.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Fish.

Then why don't you have a mobile, combat fish truck?

[Laritaia]

Tactical Fish and Chips

[Gallia-]

Fish.

Then why don't you have a mobile, combat fish truck?

Because I haven't drawn it yet.

It'd just be a truck with a container on the back.

[Laywenrania]

mobile angling shop

[Dostanuot Loj]

Then why don't you have a mobile, combat fish truck?

Because I haven't drawn it yet.

It'd just be a truck with a container on the back.

You will, of course, have the half track combat saunas right?

[Gallia-]

Probably not.

There will be 4x4 sleeper cabins though, so the unionized army can work only in their maximum 12-hour shifts.

[Austrasien]

I've been wondering whether a return to something like a WW2-style army is something that would happen in the future, at least among potential belligerents in major conventional armed conflicts. Corps with 3-4 infantry divisions (supported by say a tank battalion or two each), a few brigades of artillery and one or two brigades of armour. Armies with 3-4 corps and an operational maneouvre group containing half a dozen armoured brigades. Perhaps not surprisingly this is how the army of North Korea is structured, and the ROK's land forces are also not dissimilar. Where AT fire is extremely lethal, dense and beyond the horizon, whether cluster or guided- artillery munitions or stuff like Spike-NLOS, and all but the most modern MBTs are vulnerable, and conflicts are getting increasingly protracted, maybe this is the structure which makes sense.

MBTs have played a very big role in all recent conflicts. Though there is a significant premium on tanks which can survive: The appearance of T-90s in the Donbas was quite traumatic for the Ukrainians because they could not engage them head on except with direct artillery fire. Similarly when the Merkava was deployed with the Trophy to Gaza in 2014 it was largely invulnerable to Hamas anti-tank tactics. What role indirect AT fire will play in future conflicts is uncertain because one of the notable new features of modern conflicts is the emergence of means to disrupt communications - it is known beyond any doubt network/electronic and hard kill attacks can be used to disable an air defense network so it is no longer capable of tracking and engaging aircraft, there doesn't seem to be a technical reason why similar kinds of tools cannot be employed against a fire direction radio network so it can no longer respond to calls for fire.

Tanks are definitely going the way of combat aircraft, especially attack helicopters, in terms of relying more on sensors and electronic countermeasures to ensure survival. But they will remain indispensable for overcoming obstacles that otherwise would halt the infantry.

[Gallia-]

massed tank attacks

battalion strength or bust

[Arthurista]

So are we looking at a fancier, more technologically-advanced WWI as the future of war, in the sense that defense > offense and victory is determined by who can afford to keep supplies flowing?

The US Army doesn't fully appreciate the utility of light infantry, or indeed infantry at all, but the US Cavalry can roll over anything that's on the defensive, in pretty much any terrain. The USMC is almost the opposite in that it has no understanding of mechanized warfare and is really good at using light role infantry.

How do you use light infantry in a conventional war, aside from holding cities/rough terrain, or clearing them?

I was going to add 'vertical envelopment', but the viability of such ops against a major enemy is questionable.

The Falklands was I guess an example of light infantry operations done right in a conventional war, but the entirety of the islands can be classified as 'rough terrain'. Both sides were also operating at the end of their logistical tethers and the Argentinians didn't have any means of disrupting British helicopter movements.

[Gallia-]

The US Army doesn't fully appreciate the utility of light infantry, or indeed infantry at all, but the US Cavalry can roll over anything that's on the defensive, in pretty much any terrain. The USMC is almost the opposite in that it has no understanding of mechanized warfare and is really good at using light role infantry.

How do you use light infantry in a conventional war, aside from holding cities/rough terrain, or clearing them?

Rough terrain, yes. Cities are good, too.

Theoretically they could be used as replacements for mechanized troops but this is kind of a goofy idea. Viky did it once for that reason.

Also deep air assaults against bridges/river crossings and attacking HVTs like command posts and nuclear weapon or reconnaissance-strike complexes. They're quite useful because they're fast to move, they can be used to block positions as well, forming an anvil that enemy troops can be smashed against by a mechanized hammer. Or a pivot/hinge, depending on how you view the analogy.

I was going to add 'vertical envelopment', but the viability of such ops against a major enemy is questionable.

Not everyone is mechanized and not all wars have mechanized troops predominantly.

But it's true that paratroopers would get anally demolished by motor troops.

The Falklands was I guess an example of light infantry operations done right in a conventional war, but the entirety of the islands can be classified as 'rough terrain'. Both sides were also operating at the end of their logistical tethers and the Argentinians didn't have any means of disrupting British helicopter movements.

The British also had mechanized vehicles.

What you're really asking is "how do light infantry fight tanks", though. The answer is they don't.

[Laritaia]

The Falklands was I guess an example of light infantry operations done right in a conventional war, but the entirety of the islands can be classified as 'rough terrain'. Both sides were also operating at the end of their logistical tethers and the Argentinians didn't have any means of disrupting British helicopter movements.

you know that how the land phase of the Falklands war went was complete improvisation right?

the plan was literally to establish a FOB then air cav around Argentine positions in Chinooks, that went in the bin with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor.

[Austrasien]

How do you use light infantry in a conventional war, aside from holding cities/rough terrain, or clearing them?

But that is the essence of modern war.

The USMC was still conducting attacks with a line of dismounted infantry following behind the tanks in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq. Though the APCs were following the infantry and the force density was much lower it otherwise not that different from what has been done since tanks were first introduced on the battlefield.

[-Celibrae-]

By giving a brigade enough CS and CSS to operate independently of the division, does it adversely effect the brigade's mobility?

[Gallia-]

It improves it. The brigade can be deployed piecemeal of the division without needing to take a divisional slice with it.

[-Celibrae-]

So really, allocating CS and CSS to brigades is just integrating the divisional slice into the manoeuvre units. Makes sense.

Edit: In your opinion, which is better? 3 or 4 manoeuvre brigades?

[Gallia-]

Triangles are the strongest shape.

They also allow you to have the most polygons.

[Greater Allidron]

Why is three better?

[-Celibrae-]

The power of three applies to divisions within corps also?

[Taihei Tengoku]

Why is three better?

Control breaks down once you go over three subordinates. True for fireteams, true for divisions.

[Husseinarti]

*on average

A really smarto-dudeo can do anything from three to five.

[Gallia-]

Why is three better?

Two up, one back. A larger formation is possible. Square and pentagonal divisions have been done IRL and been successful, albeit squares are the most common. Triangles just let you have more divisions, though.

The granularity afforded by a triangle is valuable when you can have four divisions instead of three with a similar quantity of manpower and subunits, and you value mechanized maneuver.

Why is three better?

Control breaks down once you go over three subordinates. True for fireteams, true for divisions.

Not necessarily. I'd say that three subunits is actually too much for a rifle squad while four to five subunits is ideal for a division, brigade, or battalion, but I digress.

The US Army has been controlling square units for decades and both the British and Americans found that the most successful organizations in WW2 were balanced squares. BCTs are also squares, after being triangles for so many years. I'm not sure what the USMC does, but squares seem to work alright for the Army in practice.

Triangular formations are more driven by an economic/austerity measure than anything else TBH.

*on average

A really smarto-dudeo can do anything from three to five.

It's not about smarts. Above three subunits just tends to break down on the small tactical level because they become redundant. You can only fix and flank in so many directions. Two to three for a squad is fine and anything more is generally unnecessary. Platoons can get bigger.

A division or brigade can have a much greater freedom of movement, so anything from five to ten subunits is acceptable or even minimum. Above ten is about when a large unit starts to break down, at least in battalions. Divisions typically plan down to battalion level (at least AOE divisions did), so they actually have something around 20 major subunits to control, not three or four brigades.

Brigades in the US Army are probably near the sweet spot for a unit their size. A BCT commander has to worry about seven major subunits, which is halfway between five and ten. Any more and you will have a really big headquarters company, or need to chop up the brigade into multiple commands. AOE divisions were probably fine for a division though. Even though they generally had about 11 maneuver battalions and 10-11 CS/CSS battalions to worry about, they did alright.

Staffs help a lot in dealing with the information digestion. Computers, too.

[North Arkana]

Tactical Fish and Chips

The British armed forces terms are OBUA (operations in built-up areas), FIBUA (fighting in built-up areas), or sometimes (colloquially) FISH (fighting in someone's house),[1] or FISH and CHIPS (fighting in someone's house and causing havoc in people's streets).[2]

[Albynau]

It's the mid-1990s, and our nation's air force is seeking a replacement for our extremely tired out fleet of modernized Hawker Hunter aircraft to serve in the ground attack role with a secondary role as air defence. They will be in the support role to our modernized F-4 Phantoms.

Our navy has recently transitioned over to operating AV-8B Harrier II off our lone aircraft carrier which will end up operating ~20 airframes.

Would it be reasonable for a budget-oriented country to also consider replacing our Hunters with Harriers?

On one hand, there has to be some savings in operating one type of airframe for both the air force and navy versus two separate airframes, but on the other hand the Harrier is a pretty complicated piece of kit, and I would assume would require more extensive and costly maintenance over a more traditional airframe. The accident rate is also pretty bad, and I'd imagine a bean-counting nation wouldn't look kindly upon that. The navy operates it out of a lack of any other options to launch off a small carrier, though the question here is whether it would make sense for the air force to also adopt it.

We would be looking into acquiring ~60-80 aircraft, and I'm not quite sure at what point it stops being cost effective to operate the same airframe.

I guess I would be looking at other possible aircraft like the AMX, Hawk, Jaguar, and F-5, though I guess the latter two would be getting a bit long in the tooth at this time period.

Thanks.