Clarifying The Demand For Green Lights

[The Empire of Pretantia]

Why the fuck does looking up "pragmatarianism" on Google leads me to ALL of your internet history on the subject, Xeno?

Is this just an invented word and invented theorems based around bad economic sense?! Because let me tell you, I have seen enough the last 10 minutes to convince me that you don't know what you're talking about, including discussions with other people about your so-called "valid economics" that not even they can make sense out of.

I did the exact same thing with the same results. Xerographica confirmed for fail.

[Stoic Melancholics]

Honestly, I don't mind. If I'm driving at 4am, which happens more often than it should, I just run reds if the streets are deserted.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Just in case you're under the assumption that my basic premise is free-market propaganda... it really isn't. It's from the most widely paper on the topic.... which was written by a Nobel Prize liberal economist...

The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure

Your OP is best classified as (an impractical example of) auction theory. The auction theory literature is huge, both with theoretical and empirical papers. It's also a field that economics does really, really well. The problem with many of your threads is that you're ignorant of much of this literature, evidenced by a 1954 paper by Samuelson being your go-to theoretical reference. If you want this green light auction to dynamically reflect demand for green lights, you need to ask under what conditions will such an auction be strategyproof? You might also want to ask under what conditions will the bidding strategies be efficient? I think a sequential auction like you described is locally, but not globally, strategyproof, but I haven't done much rigorous auction theory yet. And if it isn't strategyproof, the bids may not necessarily be a reflection of actual demand.

[Xerographica]

Voting is not intrinsically cost-free. This is actually one of the major issues involved with voting - it involves a non-trivial burden in terms of time, effort, opportunity costs, etc. Realistic utility appraisals run into what's known as the "paradox of voting" for exactly that reason.

But it's incoherent to say.... "Jump through hoops to cast your vote". As in... do something that's costly in order to do something that's costless. Well... are we interested in demonstrated preference or stated preference?

Imagine if Home Depot made customers complete a rigorous obstacle course in order to pay for their items. Customers would essentially be required to demonstrate their preference to demonstrate their preference. Clearly this would be stupid for Home Depot to do. Home Depot should make it easier rather than harder for you to give them your money. Amazon makes it too easy to give them money. One click spending!

In all cases the goal should be to make payment as frictionless as possible. Let's say right this second I have the desire to give you $5 dollars. How many hoops would I have to jump through in order to give you $5 dollars? Too many! Right?

Reducing "payment costs" helps to clarify demand.

Mind you, any system you choose is, in a realistic implementation, going to have some exemptions involving emergency or official vehicles, and vehicles owned / operated by things that aren't private individuals are attached to other accounts. Barack Obama not only has popularity, but his official transportation has a substantial operating budget. He gets special treatment at red lights even if you completely privatize the bid process.

Maybe in an initial implementation... but certainly not in an ideal implementation. Obama should have to bid on green lights just like everyone else. Same thing with emergency vehicles. Of course... by an ideal implementation I'm referring to a pragmatarian system (FAQ).

An internal credit system produces real opportunity costs. The credits you spend trying to get through red lights faster on this trip are lost for other trips.

Right... and I agree that a traffic currency would be incredibly better than the current system. But I'm not quite sure why you'd want to use a traffic currency rather than the regular currency. It would be like having a fruit currency. It's money that you can only spend on fruit. Or a pet currency. It's money that you can only spend on pets. These would only be improvements if the current system for fruit and pets was as stupid as our current traffic system.

Let's say that I have $1,000 earmarked for a vacation. But then there's a problem with the plumbing. Clearly it makes sense if I can tap into the money that I've earmarked for a vacation in order to pay the plumber. Just like it would make sense to tap into my vacation money to pay for green lights if I'm really late for an important meeting with a potential client. Most of the opportunity cost (valuation) goodness goes down the drain when people can't decide whether it's worth it to sacrifice X for Y.

A while back I brainstormed a civic currency. Again... it's an initial implementation rather than an ideal implementation. But given that you appreciate the idea of a traffic currency... I'm guessing that you'll also appreciate the idea of a civic currency.

Two problems.

First, information. People don't generally know about specific traffic conditions all that well. Some do; many don't.

Eh? The point of prices is to convey the essence of conditions. In the absence of minimum wages... wages would give you a pretty good idea of labor conditions in any given area. If the wages of unskilled workers are $1/hour in Texas... then they have a surplus of unskilled workers. Not the best place to go if you're an unskilled worker. But a great place to go if you want to start a factory. When there's a labor surplus.... we want wages to repel workers and attract producers. When there's a labor shortage... we want wages to attract workers and repel producers.

Given that we don't have a system of prices for traffic... it's a given that people are largely going to be ignorant of traffic conditions.

Second, incentives do not align, either universally or in this particular case.

For example, suppose if Bob leaves work at 5:00, he gets home at, on average, 5:45. If he leaves work at 5:30, he gets home at, on average, 5:55. From Bob's perspective, there are both good and bad things about leaving work at 5:00, and he probably doesn't care that much. Getting home ten minutes earlier vs spending some extra time (and a little bit of extra gas) on the road may very well leave Bob completely indifferent, and being in a state of indifference, he just does what is habitual and hits the road at 5:00.

In terms of social cost, however, it's crystal clear what the rest of us would like Bob to do - leave work later so that he's not contributing to the snarl of commuter traffic. If you have a traffic credit app that rewards Bob in a visible way for doing the "right" thing, it communicates that social cost / benefit to Bob and plays a role in his decision.

Sure... Bob isn't omniscient. But the relevant traffic prices would tell him what society wants him to do. Just like high gas prices tell Bob to drive less, take public transportation, carpool, walk more, work from home more and/or seriously think about buying a hybrid. The pricing system is extremely beautiful when it's allowed to freely do its job. People are given the proper incentives to behave in ways that benefit society as a whole.

[Xerographica]

Just in case you're under the assumption that my basic premise is free-market propaganda... it really isn't. It's from the most widely paper on the topic.... which was written by a Nobel Prize liberal economist...

The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure

Your OP is best classified as (an impractical example of) auction theory. The auction theory literature is huge, both with theoretical and empirical papers. It's also a field that economics does really, really well. The problem with many of your threads is that you're ignorant of much of this literature, evidenced by a 1954 paper by Samuelson being your go-to theoretical reference.

The post where I referenced Samuelson's paper was largely about the free-rider problem. Why would I reference auction literature when discussing the free-rider problem? I'm guessing that you didn't actually read the post where I shared Samuelson's paper. So you jumped to the wrong conclusion.

If you want this green light auction to dynamically reflect demand for green lights, you need to ask under what conditions will such an auction be strategyproof? You might also want to ask under what conditions will the bidding strategies be efficient? I think a sequential auction like you described is locally, but not globally, strategyproof, but I haven't done much rigorous auction theory yet. And if it isn't strategyproof, the bids may not necessarily be a reflection of actual demand.

You started off saying that the OP is an impractical example of auction theory. But now it sounds like you want me to work out the details. Are you assuming that, all else being equal, it would be beneficial to clarify the demand for green lights?

[Neutraligon]

Your OP is best classified as (an impractical example of) auction theory. The auction theory literature is huge, both with theoretical and empirical papers. It's also a field that economics does really, really well. The problem with many of your threads is that you're ignorant of much of this literature, evidenced by a 1954 paper by Samuelson being your go-to theoretical reference.

The post where I referenced Samuelson's paper was largely about the free-rider problem. Why would I reference auction literature when discussing the free-rider problem? I'm guessing that you didn't actually read the post where I shared Samuelson's paper. So you jumped to the wrong conclusion.

If you want this green light auction to dynamically reflect demand for green lights, you need to ask under what conditions will such an auction be strategyproof? You might also want to ask under what conditions will the bidding strategies be efficient? I think a sequential auction like you described is locally, but not globally, strategyproof, but I haven't done much rigorous auction theory yet. And if it isn't strategyproof, the bids may not necessarily be a reflection of actual demand.

You started off saying that the OP is an impractical example of auction theory. But now it sounds like you want me to work out the details. Are you assuming that, all else being equal, it would be beneficial to clarify the demand for green lights?

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

[Galloism]

The post where I referenced Samuelson's paper was largely about the free-rider problem. Why would I reference auction literature when discussing the free-rider problem? I'm guessing that you didn't actually read the post where I shared Samuelson's paper. So you jumped to the wrong conclusion.


You started off saying that the OP is an impractical example of auction theory. But now it sounds like you want me to work out the details. Are you assuming that, all else being equal, it would be beneficial to clarify the demand for green lights?

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

Or me sitting on a mostly unused side street snoring while my app continuously puts forth token bids against the busy thoroughfare so I take in the cash.

[Xerographica]

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

With the initial implementation... I'm guessing that emergency vehicles would still have the right of way. But in an ideal implementation... the ambulance drivers would spend the hospital's money to bid on the lights. The less urgent the patient was.... the less they would bid. The more urgent the patient was... the more they would bid.

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

With an ideal implementation... the firemen would decide how urgently they needed to get to the fire... and the paramedics would decide how urgently they needed to get the patient to the hospital. Their bids would communicate their respective urgencies. Whoever was willing to pay more would get the green light. And, after they went through the intersection... the light would quickly change and the slightly less urgent emergency vehicle would go through the intersection.

If the fire emergency was more urgent... then the fire department would essentially be paying the hospital for the right of way.

But what if there was a police car on the same street as the ambulance... but going in the opposite direction? The policemen are responding to a bank robbery with hostages involved. Their bid would be included with the ambulances bid. They would be crowdfunding the same green light. Would they outbid the firemen?

Of course... it's doubtful that these three vehicles would be the only three vehicles at the intersection. Maybe there are around 4 or 5 civilian vehicles. One vehicle contains a bunch of frat girls on their way to a bar. Another vehicle contains a mother about to pick her daughter up from ballet. Another vehicle contains a businessman on the way to an important meeting. Another vehicle contains two friends about to go see a movie.

Allowing everybody at the intersection to bid for the green light would add up all the different urgencies of all the people at that one intersection. The green light would be given to whichever side has the greatest urgency. All the money that they paid to get the green light would be transferred to the side with the red light.

[The Foxes Swamp]

it changes quicker than you think back to green.

[Galloism]

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

With the initial implementation... I'm guessing that emergency vehicles would still have the right of way. But in an ideal implementation... the ambulance drivers would spend the hospital's money to bid on the lights. The less urgent the patient was.... the less they would bid. The more urgent the patient was... the more they would bid.

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

With an ideal implementation... the firemen would decide how urgently they needed to get to the fire... and the paramedics would decide how urgently they needed to get the patient to the hospital. Their bids would communicate their respective urgencies. Whoever was willing to pay more would get the green light. And, after they went through the intersection... the light would quickly change and the slightly less urgent emergency vehicle would go through the intersection.

If the fire emergency was more urgent... then the fire department would essentially be paying the hospital for the right of way.

But what if there was a police car on the same street as the ambulance... but going in the opposite direction? The policemen are responding to a bank robbery with hostages involved. Their bid would be included with the ambulances bid. They would be crowdfunding the same green light. Would they outbid the firemen?

Of course... it's doubtful that these three vehicles would be the only three vehicles at the intersection. Maybe there are around 4 or 5 civilian vehicles. One vehicle contains a bunch of frat girls on their way to a bar. Another vehicle contains a mother about to pick her daughter up from ballet. Another vehicle contains a businessman on the way to an important meeting. Another vehicle contains two friends about to go see a movie.

Allowing everybody at the intersection to bid for the green light would add up all the different urgencies of all the people at that one intersection. The green light would be given to whichever side has the greatest urgency. All the money that they paid to get the green light would be transferred to the side with the red light.

This is even worse.

Since the hospital has a duty of care, they MUST spend the money or they can be sued by the family for not taking all necessary efforts to ensure the survival of the patient.

It would be an absolute dick move, but if I were an absolute dick, I could drop $100,000 on a light every time I see an ambulance approaching, knowing the hospital MUST pay it or risk being sued for a million or two.

[Northwest Slobovia]

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

I'm going to make a radical assumption here: the drivers of both emergency vehicles are rational, trained adults, both interested in saving lives. Thus, facing this unlikely situation, one driver would wave the other on and wait a second or two for them to cross the intersection. Problem solved.

[Galloism]

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

I'm going to make a radical assumption here: the drivers of both emergency vehicles are rational, trained adults, both interested in saving lives. Thus, facing this unlikely situation, one driver would wave the other on and wait a second or two for them to cross the intersection. Problem solved.

Usually, ambulance drivers and firetruck drivers have a common emergency frequency when needed for cross-communication (police too). When they realize they're on an intercept course, one would likely call the other and slow down ever so slightly so they're no longer on an intercept course, but barely change the amount of time needed to get there.

[Northwest Slobovia]

I'm going to make a radical assumption here: the drivers of both emergency vehicles are rational, trained adults, both interested in saving lives. Thus, facing this unlikely situation, one driver would wave the other on and wait a second or two for them to cross the intersection. Problem solved.

Usually, ambulance drivers and firetruck drivers have a common emergency frequency when needed for cross-communication (police too). When they realize they're on an intercept course, one would likely call the other and slow down ever so slightly so they're no longer on an intercept course, but barely change the amount of time needed to get there.

That too. Either way, informal methods are more than adequate to solve the "problem".

[Galloism]

Usually, ambulance drivers and firetruck drivers have a common emergency frequency when needed for cross-communication (police too). When they realize they're on an intercept course, one would likely call the other and slow down ever so slightly so they're no longer on an intercept course, but barely change the amount of time needed to get there.

That too. Either way, informal methods are more than adequate to solve the "problem".

Besides, I think that would be pretty fuckin' rare.

[Soldati Senza Confini]

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

With the initial implementation... I'm guessing that emergency vehicles would still have the right of way. But in an ideal implementation... the ambulance drivers would spend the hospital's money to bid on the lights. The less urgent the patient was.... the less they would bid. The more urgent the patient was... the more they would bid.

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

With an ideal implementation... the firemen would decide how urgently they needed to get to the fire... and the paramedics would decide how urgently they needed to get the patient to the hospital. Their bids would communicate their respective urgencies. Whoever was willing to pay more would get the green light. And, after they went through the intersection... the light would quickly change and the slightly less urgent emergency vehicle would go through the intersection.

If the fire emergency was more urgent... then the fire department would essentially be paying the hospital for the right of way.

But what if there was a police car on the same street as the ambulance... but going in the opposite direction? The policemen are responding to a bank robbery with hostages involved. Their bid would be included with the ambulances bid. They would be crowdfunding the same green light. Would they outbid the firemen?

Of course... it's doubtful that these three vehicles would be the only three vehicles at the intersection. Maybe there are around 4 or 5 civilian vehicles. One vehicle contains a bunch of frat girls on their way to a bar. Another vehicle contains a mother about to pick her daughter up from ballet. Another vehicle contains a businessman on the way to an important meeting. Another vehicle contains two friends about to go see a movie.

Allowing everybody at the intersection to bid for the green light would add up all the different urgencies of all the people at that one intersection. The green light would be given to whichever side has the greatest urgency. All the money that they paid to get the green light would be transferred to the side with the red light.

This is a stupid idea.

To begin with, do you know how public goods and services work?!

[Northwest Slobovia]

Allowing everybody at the intersection to bid for the green light would add up all the different urgencies of all the people at that one intersection. The green light would be given to whichever side has the greatest urgency. All the money that they paid to get the green light would be transferred to the side with the red light.

This is a stupid idea.

To begin with, do you know how public goods and services work?!

I think the interesting question is "why is it a stupid idea?". I'm not sure if "if your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" is a formal logical fallacy, but it seems to be the error in reasoning in the thread. Yes, bidding systems are one way of allocating goods and services between contesting parties. But so are technical means (the solutions proposed to the OPs late-night stop-light problem, such as flashing yellow/red lights and sensors at intersections), political policy (emergency vehicles have the right of way over others as a matter of law), and informal methods (drivers of emergency vehicles figure out who goes first in these unlikely scenarios).

[Soldati Senza Confini]

This is a stupid idea.

To begin with, do you know how public goods and services work?!

I think the interesting question is "why is it a stupid idea?". I'm not sure if "if your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" is a formal logical fallacy, but it seems to be the error in reasoning in the thread. Yes, bidding systems are one way of allocating goods and services between contesting parties. But so are technical means (the solutions proposed to the OPs late-night stop-light problem, such as flashing yellow/red lights and sensors at intersections), political policy (emergency vehicles have the right of way over others as a matter of law), and informal methods (drivers of emergency vehicles figure out who goes first in these unlikely scenarios).

The problem is that the bidding system OP is resorting to basically breaks down day-to-day actions as a system of micro-transactional gambling.

As a thought experiment this is a good idea. As a realistic possibility it is unrealistic, and impractical. Nobody is that fond of gambling to begin with, and further under current inequality you can rig the game in your favor once this system is in place because either you'll have more money than everyone else at one point due to them outbidding you and you bidding low, or by outspending everyone else at low bids.

Monetizing day-to-day actions is a bad way to prioritize things. Sure, time is money, and you can monetize your time, but I don't believe gambling is the solution to our current woes.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Your OP is best classified as (an impractical example of) auction theory. The auction theory literature is huge, both with theoretical and empirical papers. It's also a field that economics does really, really well. The problem with many of your threads is that you're ignorant of much of this literature, evidenced by a 1954 paper by Samuelson being your go-to theoretical reference.

The post where I referenced Samuelson's paper was largely about the free-rider problem. Why would I reference auction literature when discussing the free-rider problem? I'm guessing that you didn't actually read the post where I shared Samuelson's paper. So you jumped to the wrong conclusion.

No, I didn't. Every time you've been pressed to reference an economics paper, in any context, that's the one you manage to bring up. If it isn't that one, it's some other antiquated paper from the 1950s or 1960s. I was quoting it because I knew I'd find it in this thread somewhere, not because of whatever conversaton it was involved in. My point is that I'm almost completely sure that you're ignorant of the auction theory literature, many papers in which tackle the fundamental question in your OP, which is the conditions under which an auction will induce bidders to reveal their true preferences.

You started off saying that the OP is an impractical example of auction theory. But now it sounds like you want me to work out the details. Are you assuming that, all else being equal, it would be beneficial to clarify the demand for green lights?

It's an interesting question, since there is an obvious inefficiency there. It's your approach to it that irks me. You've managed to produce 10 - 15 paragraphs of drivel, without even skirting near the substantial questions you'd want to work through, even before you begin thinking about how it would work in practice.

[Neutraligon]

So again, what are you going to do for the patient who is unconscious and is thus unable to bid?

With the initial implementation... I'm guessing that emergency vehicles would still have the right of way. But in an ideal implementation... the ambulance drivers would spend the hospital's money to bid on the lights. The less urgent the patient was.... the less they would bid. The more urgent the patient was... the more they would bid.

Imagine an "emergency intersection". On one street is an ambulance taking a patient to the hospital. On the cross street is a firetruck on its way to a fire. Who should have the right of way? Well... with the current system they would both have the right of way... which is of course technically impossible. So somebody has to decide to slow down... but who?

With an ideal implementation... the firemen would decide how urgently they needed to get to the fire... and the paramedics would decide how urgently they needed to get the patient to the hospital. Their bids would communicate their respective urgencies. Whoever was willing to pay more would get the green light. And, after they went through the intersection... the light would quickly change and the slightly less urgent emergency vehicle would go through the intersection.

If the fire emergency was more urgent... then the fire department would essentially be paying the hospital for the right of way.

But what if there was a police car on the same street as the ambulance... but going in the opposite direction? The policemen are responding to a bank robbery with hostages involved. Their bid would be included with the ambulances bid. They would be crowdfunding the same green light. Would they outbid the firemen?

Of course... it's doubtful that these three vehicles would be the only three vehicles at the intersection. Maybe there are around 4 or 5 civilian vehicles. One vehicle contains a bunch of frat girls on their way to a bar. Another vehicle contains a mother about to pick her daughter up from ballet. Another vehicle contains a businessman on the way to an important meeting. Another vehicle contains two friends about to go see a movie.

Allowing everybody at the intersection to bid for the green light would add up all the different urgencies of all the people at that one intersection. The green light would be given to whichever side has the greatest urgency. All the money that they paid to get the green light would be transferred to the side with the red light.

That does not answer the question of what should be done once at the hospital. Two emergency patients, one is awake and able to bid, the other is unconscious and in more severe situation. How do you deal with that?

[Xerographica]

No, I didn't. Every time you've been pressed to reference an economics paper, in any context, that's the one you manage to bring up. If it isn't that one, it's some other antiquated paper from the 1950s or 1960s. I was quoting it because I knew I'd find it in this thread somewhere, not because of whatever conversaton it was involved in. My point is that I'm almost completely sure that you're ignorant of the auction theory literature, many papers in which tackle the fundamental question in your OP, which is the conditions under which an auction will induce bidders to reveal their true preferences.

Here's what I wrote in the OP...

I think the most relevant economist in this situation is Ronald Coase... The Problem of Social Cost.

You could have replied to it and said, "Hey Moron! Coase isn't the most relevant economist! Wicksell is!!!..."

It is impossible for anyone, even if he be a statesman of genius, to weigh the whole community's utility and sacrifice against each other. - Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation

Then I would have replied, "Hey that's rude! But good lookin out!!!"

Wicksell is just a not-so random example. I'm guessing that you wouldn't have mentioned him since he's even more antiquated than Samuelson. You're right though that I frequently cite that paper by Samuelson. Samuelson actually starts that paper by citing Wicksell. I cite that paper by Samuelson because it's the most widely cited paper on the topic of the problem of preference revelation. In that paper Samuelson said, "Hey! People would have an incentive to lie about their valuations of public goods... therefore... taxation + omniscience". And there have been a gazillion papers that followed that have attempted to replace the "omniscience" with a far more rational solution. And I've probably read around half of them.

But hands down, this is by far the biggest economic problem there is. And Samuelson's paper is the root of this problem. So whenever I cite his paper... I'm attempting to strike at the root of the problem.

In any case... I'm certainly happy to read whichever paper you think is truly the most relevant to the topic of clarifying the demand for green lights. Assuming of course that I haven't already read it.

It's an interesting question, since there is an obvious inefficiency there.

You agree that there's an obvious inefficiency there. Well guess what... you're in a very small boat. It consists of you, Tahar Joblis and me. Nobody else in this thread thinks that there's anything obviously inefficient about traffic signals. In fact, at least one guy is pretty sure that demand isn't a real thing.

It's your approach to it that irks me. You've managed to produce 10 - 15 paragraphs of drivel, without even skirting near the substantial questions you'd want to work through, even before you begin thinking about how it would work in practice.

You're trash-talking my attempt to convince members of this forum that there is an inefficiency. Which is fine... trash-talk away. I'll be the first to admit that anything I write has infinite room for improvement. But if you think that you can do a better job of convincing the members of this forum that there actually is an inefficiency worth eliminating... then please... by all means... be my guest. School the members of this forum. If you successfully manage to enlighten even half of them... then I will be the first to bow down and worship you and sing your praises. Because, as far as I would be concerned... you would have just performed a miracle. Not a minor miracle... but a major miracle.

To be honest though... based on our past interactions... it's usually right around this time that you bravely run away. Maybe this time will be different. But I wouldn't bet on it.

[Soldati Senza Confini]

No, I didn't. Every time you've been pressed to reference an economics paper, in any context, that's the one you manage to bring up. If it isn't that one, it's some other antiquated paper from the 1950s or 1960s. I was quoting it because I knew I'd find it in this thread somewhere, not because of whatever conversaton it was involved in. My point is that I'm almost completely sure that you're ignorant of the auction theory literature, many papers in which tackle the fundamental question in your OP, which is the conditions under which an auction will induce bidders to reveal their true preferences.

Here's what I wrote in the OP...

I think the most relevant economist in this situation is Ronald Coase... The Problem of Social Cost.

You could have replied to it and said, "Hey Moron! Coase isn't the most relevant economist! Wicksell is!!!..."

It is impossible for anyone, even if he be a statesman of genius, to weigh the whole community's utility and sacrifice against each other. - Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation

Then I would have replied, "Hey that's rude! But good lookin out!!!"

Wicksell is just a not-so random example. I'm guessing that you wouldn't have mentioned him since he's even more antiquated than Samuelson. You're right though that I frequently cite that paper by Samuelson. Samuelson actually starts that paper by citing Wicksell. I cite that paper by Samuelson because it's the most widely cited paper on the topic of the problem of preference revelation. In that paper Samuelson said, "Hey! People would have an incentive to lie about their valuations of public goods... therefore... taxation + omniscience". And there have been a gazillion papers that followed that have attempted to replace the "omniscience" with a far more rational solution. And I've probably read around half of them.

But hands down, this is by far the biggest economic problem there is. And Samuelson's paper is the root of this problem. So whenever I cite his paper... I'm attempting to strike at the root of the problem.

In any case... I'm certainly happy to read whichever paper you think is truly the most relevant to the topic of clarifying the demand for green lights. Assuming of course that I haven't already read it.

It's an interesting question, since there is an obvious inefficiency there.

You agree that there's an obvious inefficiency there. Well guess what... you're in a very small boat. It consists of you, Tahar Joblis and me. Nobody else in this thread thinks that there's anything obviously inefficient about traffic signals. In fact, at least one guy is pretty sure that demand isn't a real thing.

It's your approach to it that irks me. You've managed to produce 10 - 15 paragraphs of drivel, without even skirting near the substantial questions you'd want to work through, even before you begin thinking about how it would work in practice.

You're trash-talking my attempt to convince members of this forum that there is an inefficiency. Which is fine... trash-talk away. I'll be the first to admit that anything I write has infinite room for improvement. But if you think that you can do a better of convincing the members of this forum that there actually is an inefficiency worth eliminating... then please... by all means... be my guest. School the members of this forum. If you successfully manage to enlighten even half of them... then I will be the first to bow down and worship you and sing your praises. Because, as far as I would be concerned... you would have just performed a miracle. Not a minor miracle... but a major miracle.

To be honest though... based on our past interactions... it's usually right around this time that you bravely run away. Maybe this time will be different. But I wouldn't bet on it.

All of us already know there is an inefficiency in many systems of public goods and service. This is not "elementary economic 101". We KNOW.

Our problem with your attempt at efficiency is that it is unrealistically unfeasible. Not only does it not address the inefficiency, it makes it worse under a system where strategic foul play can be easily rigged depending on how much do you desire a certain thing in the long run. My personal problem with it is that it approaches the same kind of stakes-taking than you would at gambling. In any system where there is a high risk to lose, people tend to try and minimize said risk.

Your system hardly makes anything permanent, with everything being a temporal decision until you have a higher bidding power than they do, the most strategic solution to your system to rig it to someone else's favor is bid low and then turn around and bid big once you have milked your competition out of their money and they can't possibly compete against you. In other words, while the system may be designed to see the real value of an idea, good, or service, this system can also be rigged by a smart player to make strategically sound moves to make their voice count more by losing against other bidders on purpose since it punishes the winning bidders by giving away all of their pot to the ones who lost. Once you milk your competition out of their money all you have to do is simply outbid them with lower stakes and you keep most of your money while they have to struggle incredibly hard to keep up with the one person who has consistently lost in the last several rounds of bidding, hence giving one player (or a group of players) and incredibly low-stakes risk and therefore a very ludicrous advantage at the system if you are patient enough and bid low, or significantly lower than your competition.

You may not have thought through the system's strategy to make it flawed and corruptible against smart players who can beat the system you are proposing. I have, because this is literally what I do with every game I play, chance-based or not, whether there is gambling involved or not; I try to find the most optimal way to win on said system. This is an inherent flaw in the gambling system you propose to which you haven't provided a concise answer to, despite the several pages and paragraphs you have devoted to it by now. Before you can continue on further, you have to make this system of yours strategy-proof, because as it stands even a schmuck like myself -- someone who has no in-depth knowledge of economics or game theory but merely strategizes by pure intuition -- can beat your system with ease.

[Xerographica]

That does not answer the question of what should be done once at the hospital. Two emergency patients, one is awake and able to bid, the other is unconscious and in more severe situation. How do you deal with that?

Ehhhh???? What's going on here? What, exactly, would be up for bid at the hospital? Obviously the traffic signals are off the table.

To be clear... the traffic signals were only on the table because the right of way is mutually exclusive. Two streets that cross each other can't both have the right of way at the same time. At least as far as traffic signals are concerned.

So what's mutually exclusive at the hospital that requires bidding? Beds? There are two patients and one bed? And they can't share the bed? I'm pretty sure that the nursers/doctors would decide which patient needed the bed the most. Do nurses/doctors make the most informed decisions?

You have a broken leg. The president has a broken leg. Who do the nurses/doctors give the bed to? Obviously the president. They know who the president is... but they don't know who you are. And even if they did know who you are... they would probably still give the bed to the president. Obama's position in society would obviously be a factor in the decision. Should it be? Or should all patients be treated equally entirely regardless of their value to society? Should some mass murderer be given the same priority as Obama? If their injuries are identical... should the nurses/doctors simply flip a coin to see who gets the bed? Should the nurses/doctors flip a coin to determine which patient they treat first?

In order for doctors/nurses to make the most valuable decisions... they have to know how valuable their patients are to society. And that could only occur with some system of crowdfunding the patients. Family, friends, coworkers would all easily be able to chip in to help clarify a patient's value to society. All else being equal... the most valuable patient would be treated first... and the least valuable patient would be treated last. Or... you can argue that Obama shouldn't be given priority over a mass murderer. Which would be a pretty stupid thing to argue.

Here's a passage that I shared in a recent blog entry (The Economics of Law and Order)...

On June 13, 1915, Moseley shipped out to Turkey and two months later he was killed at Gallipoli as part of a thoroughly useless and badly bungled campaign, his death having brought Great Britain and the world no good (except for what cold comfort could be obtained out of the fact that he had willed his money to the Royal Society). In view of what he might still have accomplished (he was only twenty-seven when he died), his death might well have been the most costly single death of the war to mankind generally. - Isaac Asimov

Clearly it was stupid for Henry Moseley to have been assigned a position which increased, rather than decreased, his chances of being killed in combat.

I developed a sort of many-worlds scenario where Moseley survives the war but ends up on trial for the murder of his wife.

One of the central tenets of our legal system is impartiality. This is why lady justice is blindfolded. This is why potential jurors with obvious bias are rejected. In Moseley's case... it would have been impossible for his position in society not to have been a factor. But the goal of the current system is to try and minimize it as a factor. And I think that's absolutely moronic. It's just as moronic as Moseley being assigned anywhere near the front lines. The only way that the most valuable decision could possibly have been made in Moseley's trial is if nearly every aspect of it had been crowdfunded. I fleshed out the details in my blog entry... but the point is that it's extremely detrimental to ignore or disregard people's value to society.

Limited resources can't be efficiently allocated when their value to society is unknown. Hence the value of clarifying demand.

[Soldati Senza Confini]

That does not answer the question of what should be done once at the hospital. Two emergency patients, one is awake and able to bid, the other is unconscious and in more severe situation. How do you deal with that?

Ehhhh???? What's going on here? What, exactly, would be up for bid at the hospital? Obviously the traffic signals are off the table.

To be clear... the traffic signals were only on the table because the right of way is mutually exclusive. Two streets that cross each other can't both have the right of way at the same time. At least as far as traffic signals are concerned.

So what's mutually exclusive at the hospital that requires bidding? Beds? There are two patients and one bed? And they can't share the bed? I'm pretty sure that the nursers/doctors would decide which patient needed the bed the most. Do nurses/doctors make the most informed decisions?

You have a broken leg. The president has a broken leg. Who do the nurses/doctors give the bed to? Obviously the president. They know who the president is... but they don't know who you are. And even if they did know who you are... they would probably still give the bed to the president. Obama's position in society would obviously be a factor in the decision. Should it be? Or should all patients be treated equally entirely regardless of their value to society? Should some mass murderer be given the same priority as Obama? If their injuries are identical... should the nurses/doctors simply flip a coin to see who gets the bed? Should the nurses/doctors flip a coin to determine which patient they treat first?

In order for doctors/nurses to make the most valuable decisions... they have to know how valuable their patients are to society. And that could only occur with some system of crowdfunding the patients. Family, friends, coworkers would all easily be able to chip in to help clarify a patient's value to society. All else being equal... the most valuable patient would be treated first... and the least valuable patient would be treated last. Or... you can argue that Obama shouldn't be given priority over a mass murderer. Which would be a pretty stupid thing to argue.

Here's a passage that I shared in a recent blog entry (The Economics of Law and Order)...

On June 13, 1915, Moseley shipped out to Turkey and two months later he was killed at Gallipoli as part of a thoroughly useless and badly bungled campaign, his death having brought Great Britain and the world no good (except for what cold comfort could be obtained out of the fact that he had willed his money to the Royal Society). In view of what he might still have accomplished (he was only twenty-seven when he died), his death might well have been the most costly single death of the war to mankind generally. - Isaac Asimov

Clearly it was stupid for Henry Moseley to have been assigned a position which increased, rather than decreased, his chances of being killed in combat.

I developed a sort of many-worlds scenario where Moseley survives the war but ends up on trial for the murder of his wife.

One of the central tenets of our legal system is impartiality. This is why lady justice is blindfolded. This is why potential jurors with obvious bias are rejected. In Moseley's case... it would have been impossible for his position in society not to have been a factor. But the goal of the current system is to try and minimize it as a factor. And I think that's absolutely moronic. It's just as moronic as Moseley being assigned anywhere near the front lines. The only way that the most valuable decision could possibly have been made in Moseley's trial is if nearly every aspect of it had been crowdfunded. I fleshed out the details in my blog entry... but the point is that it's extremely detrimental to ignore or disregard people's value to society.

Limited resources can't be efficiently allocated when their value to society is unknown. Hence the value of clarifying demand.

You have no idea how hospitals work.

In your case, yes, Obama would get the bed first. However, let's put it in another way: two people come to you, one is the governor of your state who, apparently, was doing stuff that day and suddenly fractures their leg. Bad fracture too, but there's no hemorrage after performing a series of questions on them. Suddenly the door opens and you see a man in a bed being performed stabilizing operations because he apparently got cut badly and his guts were spilling out and the paramedics were lucky enough to be nearby and be able to stabilize them; upon further observation you notice that his clothes are those of someone who just escaped from prison. You are the only trauma-specialized doctor on call. Do you keep treating the governor, or do you hand them over to a nurse while you tend to the patient that just came in?

[Xerographica]

Before you can continue on further, you have to make this system of yours strategy-proof, because as it stands even a schmuck like myself -- someone who has no in-depth knowledge of economics or game theory but merely strategizes by pure intuition -- can beat your system with ease.

I decided to stop replying to you after this interaction...

This is making a shit ton of assumptions on people's wealth and their impulses to gambling.

Right now you're gambling. Any time you allocate/use/spend any resources... you're gambling that you're going to benefit from doing so. The only time you don't gamble is when you have a crystal ball that actually works.

No, I am not gambling on anything.

You completely fail to understand that every allocation is a gamble. So I decided to stop replying to you. But you sure didn't stop replying to me. I'm almost tempted to count how many times you replied to me since I stopped replying to you entirely. According to you... you're not gambling on anything. Evidently, from your perspective, you're not gambling on whether or not I'll reply to you. You're not at all expecting me to reply to your replies. You're not at all interested in what the outcome of your efforts will be. Therefore, you have absolutely no interest in what I think about your thoughts. So... why should I bother making the effort to share them with you? You could care less about the outcome of your replies.

Here I am though. When you said that you can beat my system with ease... it made me think of the heavenly Infactum. I failed to clarify my demand for him and now he's gone. Here's what I replied to him in this thread... Are Congresspeople Omniscient?

You trick 300 million people by giving money to the NSF rather than to the highway? Not once do you consider the possibility that somebody might inadvertently cancel out your trickery by making the opposite allocation? You're an ant, an elephant is bearing down on you...so you play chicken with it. At the last second the elephant swerves...and you think you won. It doesn't enter into your mind that the elephant saw a Cussonia spicata and changed course to enjoy one of his favorite foods. We're talking about half the economy here. A billionaire decides to give all his taxes and then some to the NSF. Is is because you gave $100 to the DoE? You're going to claim all the credit for the billionaire's decision? You got him on video chat and he blinked first? Your mad chicken skills are going to make you the conductor of this orchestra? If so, then I don't know why you're so opposed to it.

Before you can continue on further, you have to make this system of yours strategy-proof, because as it stands even a schmuck like myself -- someone who has no in-depth knowledge of economics or game theory but merely strategizes by pure intuition -- can beat your system with ease.

You don't realize it... but right now you're Infactum's puppet. If it makes you feel any better...so am I. We're ALL his puppets. All our decisions reflect his designs.

[Soldati Senza Confini]

Before you can continue on further, you have to make this system of yours strategy-proof, because as it stands even a schmuck like myself -- someone who has no in-depth knowledge of economics or game theory but merely strategizes by pure intuition -- can beat your system with ease.

I decided to stop replying to you after this interaction...

This is making a shit ton of assumptions on people's wealth and their impulses to gambling.

Right now you're gambling. Any time you allocate/use/spend any resources... you're gambling that you're going to benefit from doing so. The only time you don't gamble is when you have a crystal ball that actually works.

No, I am not gambling on anything.

You completely fail to understand that every allocation is a gamble. So I decided to stop replying to you. But you sure didn't stop replying to me. I'm almost tempted to count how many times you replied to me since I stopped replying to you entirely. According to you... you're not gambling on anything. Evidently, from your perspective, you're not gambling on whether or not I'll reply to you. You're not at all expecting me to reply to your replies. You're not at all interested in what the outcome of your efforts will be. Therefore, you have absolutely no interest in what I think about your thoughts. So... why should I bother making the effort to share them with you? You could care less about the outcome of your replies.

Here I am though. When you said that you can beat my system with ease... it made me think of the heavenly Infactum. I failed to clarify my demand for him and now he's gone. Here's what I replied to him in this thread... Are Congresspeople Omniscient?

You trick 300 million people by giving money to the NSF rather than to the highway? Not once do you consider the possibility that somebody might inadvertently cancel out your trickery by making the opposite allocation? You're an ant, an elephant is bearing down on you...so you play chicken with it. At the last second the elephant swerves...and you think you won. It doesn't enter into your mind that the elephant saw a Cussonia spicata and changed course to enjoy one of his favorite foods. We're talking about half the economy here. A billionaire decides to give all his taxes and then some to the NSF. Is is because you gave $100 to the DoE? You're going to claim all the credit for the billionaire's decision? You got him on video chat and he blinked first? Your mad chicken skills are going to make you the conductor of this orchestra? If so, then I don't know why you're so opposed to it.

Before you can continue on further, you have to make this system of yours strategy-proof, because as it stands even a schmuck like myself -- someone who has no in-depth knowledge of economics or game theory but merely strategizes by pure intuition -- can beat your system with ease.

You don't realize it... but right now you're Infactum's puppet. If it makes you feel any better...so am I. We're ALL his puppets. All our decisions reflect his designs.

Not all allocations are gambles though. Gambling is the wagering of money or something of value (referred to as "the stakes") on an event with an uncertain outcome with the primary intent of winning additional money and/or material goods. Gambling thus requires three elements be present: consideration, chance and prize. The outcome of the wager is often immediate, such as a single roll of dice or a spin of a roulette wheel, but longer time frames are also common, allowing wagers on the outcome of a future sports contest or even an entire sports season.¹

In that sense, the only thing of value I am wagering is my time and energy to type replies to you. I am not, on the other hand, expecting to win anything from it. I know I am not going to win absolutely anything from this exchange except maybe entertainment value. I might learn something new, I might change my mind, but I am not winning anything that will make my life easier other than get entertained with your posts. At the end of the day, life goes on, your system doesn't exist, and so there's nothing for you or I to win here in regards of ideologies or material goods. It is a purely intellectual exchange. If you wish not to engage in it that's fine. But let's not pretend that this exchange is a gamble, because neither of us is changing their mind, therefore neither of us are "winning" anything and therefore any semblance of gambling is invalid because there is neither a price, nor a consideration (or prediction); there is only a wager of my time to reply to your posts, but that's pretty much something I do already, waste my time on other things.

What strikes me as odd when you say that I am gambling on whether or not I will reply to you is that you believe I am replying for your benefit. I am not replying to your posts for your own benefit. I am replying to your posts so that other people who read it can judge for themselves what is, and isn't, the right answer. In my opinion your system of gambling is flawed. In your opinion, it isn't. Evidently, after a day or so of actually exchanging messages with other people, it should be self-evident neither of us are going to change our minds. You believe your system can work, and if it works, you should at least have a simulation of a real-life scenario at hand that makes sense. So far, you do not. You make very simplistic assumptions about the nature of allocation of resources, public goods and services, and a myriad of other economic concepts which you fail to grasp. Whether this is an intentional argumentation device on your part, or not, is a major consideration. However, I don't think you are here to argue about your ideas for the sake of arguing them, or even improving them. I think that you are here to argue about your ideas and push your agenda from both what I have seen here, the logs on NSG, and the Google search I performed hours ago in trying to find a mainstream definition of "pragmatarianism", to see if at least there were some major thinkers who back the idea.

And the point you just cut off from the rest of my reply was cute, indeed. But in the end, the snippet you took from my prior post -- the one where I said I could beat the system proposed by you -- was talking specifically about your system of gambling. Your system of gambling actually punishes the winner by giving away their money to the loser. There is also no foresight over the strategy I laid out to you, one which, if implemented by a savvy player, will put everyone else who gambles at a disadvantage. Under your half-baked conception of a system I can keep replying, not expecting to be replied to, and still create an effective teardown of your arguments and an absolute monopoly of arguments that are exhaustive and well-thought out to where if you try to reply to any of them -- as you just attempted, you'd have to reply to a lot of objections simply because I decide to not ground any expectations on your immediate replies, and as I am the "low bidder" in this, you, as the "high bidder" has to reply to all my objections to your system. The reason why I am the "low bidder" in this circumstance is because I don't give a lot of value to my time spent replying to your post. You apparently do give a lot of value to your time spent replying. Therefore, in a value-estimated wager, you win, and therefore you have to reply to my posts eventually, after making so many posts that make your head spin even if they are shitposts.

Also, you are not the only one who is reading this post, but also multiple other people in this thread, and eventually people who are not in this thread will stumble across these pages.

1. Wikipedia's definition of "Gambling".