Infantry Discussion Thread part 11: Gallas Razor edition.

[Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502]

Germany did indeed take on more enemies than it could possibly defeat. But under Nazi leadership, the Germans successfully brought almost the entire European continent to heel while successfully forestalling the formation of a sufficiently powerful coalition of the remaining great powers. If this is bad strategy it is once again unclear what good strategy is.

Question: While Germany (or the Axis powers as a whole, really) did do incredibly well at the operational and tactical levels of war, I figure that they failed at the strategic level, especially when it comes to sizing up their opponents prior to war. There's the infamous Hitler quote wrt CCCP, "we need only kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down." And especially America, who none of the Axis powers seemed to give much credence to in 1940, yet America ended up coming out as a world superpower. Any strategic thinker/writer in history has devoted much time to how nations perceive one another, yet the allies seem to have done much better than the Axis, possibly because of the Axis leaders' fascist ideologies? Is this true, or do I need to reevaluate?

[Dostanuot Loj]

Germany did indeed take on more enemies than it could possibly defeat. But under Nazi leadership, the Germans successfully brought almost the entire European continent to heel while successfully forestalling the formation of a sufficiently powerful coalition of the remaining great powers. If this is bad strategy it is once again unclear what good strategy is.

Question: While Germany (or the Axis powers as a whole, really) did do incredibly well at the operational and tactical levels of war, I figure that they failed at the strategic level, especially when it comes to sizing up their opponents prior to war. There's the infamous Hitler quote wrt CCCP, "we need only kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down." And especially America, who none of the Axis powers seemed to give much credence to in 1940, yet America ended up coming out as a world superpower. Any strategic thinker/writer in history has devoted much time to how nations perceive one another, yet the allies seem to have done much better than the Axis, possibly because of the Axis leaders' fascist ideologies? Is this true, or do I need to reevaluate?

You need to reevaluate, you're not looking at it from the right frame of reference.

Take the German attitude to the USSR for example. the Soviets had just come out of a major (and draining) purge of military leaders, series of mass famines, and though forcing itself to modernize was still far behind any Western European power. But they were catching up. Germany, and yes Hitler, was aware that they had the advantage and could pull it off. The USSR was rotting from the inside in their view, and it was getting more and more a case of "now or never". If conflict with the Soviets was inevitable (And for the Nazis it was), 1941 was the best time to do it for Germany, any other time would have been foolish.

On America, the issue is far more complicated. People tend to forget the public sentiment against getting involved in another European war. But likewise, people tend to forget the ability for the US to ramp up war production as well.

The simple explanations, especially the reductionist "Germany only had horse drawn logistics lol" or "Murican production ho" or whatever else, is little more than History-channel poor historiography. There are a lot of reasons Germany lost the war, and being stupid is not on that list.

[Taihei Tengoku]

The Wages of Destruction is recommended reading here

[The Akasha Colony]

Question: While Germany (or the Axis powers as a whole, really) did do incredibly well at the operational and tactical levels of war, I figure that they failed at the strategic level, especially when it comes to sizing up their opponents prior to war. There's the infamous Hitler quote wrt CCCP, "we need only kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come tumbling down." And especially America, who none of the Axis powers seemed to give much credence to in 1940, yet America ended up coming out as a world superpower. Any strategic thinker/writer in history has devoted much time to how nations perceive one another, yet the allies seem to have done much better than the Axis, possibly because of the Axis leaders' fascist ideologies? Is this true, or do I need to reevaluate?

The Germans were fairly familiar with the USSR and the performance of its military. In the interwar era both powers had cooperated in a range of industrial and military fields due to their mutual status as something resembling pariah states. Thus, the Germans had something of an inside look at the USSR, and then got an external look when the USSR tried to invade Finland and when it invaded Poland.

Throughout that period they were aware the USSR would be the single largest threat to the Reich if allowed to survive given its rapid industrialization and significant investments in military development. The USSR was still a bit unstable given the military purges, mass famines, and industrial/scientific missteps. If there was a right time to strike, it would be as soon as possible.

But the Germans were wise enough to realize that taking on the entire USSR right off the bat would have been foolish if they could not at least attempt to secure their other borders. So they held the USSR at bay with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and went west first. Knocking over Western and Northern Europe provided the Germans with a significant windfall in equipment to supply their enlarged and now battle-tested forces. To the Germans, war was coming, and in typical German fashion the best plan was to strike first and seize the initiative, hoping for a quick, decisive blow. Given their fantastic success in Western Europe with similar objectives, this probably seemed to be a reasonable expectation in a nation as unstable as the USSR in 1941.

The expectation regarding the USA was that it would be slow to mobilize and uninterested in getting too involved. Public anti-war sentiment would make it a battle to raise new formations in any significant numbers and logistics issues would make deploying a sizable mechanized force abroad prohibitive. American reinforcements in WWI had arrived in a relative trickle and had been woefully underequipped upon arrival, relying heavily on local French equipment to outfit themselves for the battlefield. The US could not rely on French industry this time around and the British couldn't even supply their own forces without US assistance.

Obviously, these expectations were erroneous. Many of the more senior German leaders expected it would be difficult for the US to retool its industrial economy for war as quickly as it did. After all, the Germans themselves had spent years slowly preparing for war and then spent the war years themselves slowly ramping up production further. This is probably not surprising given that until this point, the US arms industry was tiny in every field except shipbuilding and small arms production. They underestimated the experience and motivation of American industrialists to retool and ramp up weapons production much more quickly than the Germans themselves did.

[Spirit of Hope]

I would also point out that the suitability of the USSR without the aid given by the US and UK is slightly questionable. The US supplied vast amounts of vehicles, fuel, food, and ammo without which the USSR would have had a difficult time engaging the Germans.

[Isilanka]

(long post nullified because after an in-depth discussion with a few knowledgeable friends it clearly appears I wasn't getting what I wanted to say right and got carried away. Apologies for the inconvenience, though I do think what I said about german commanders being first and foremost technicians was rather accurate.)

[The Manticoran Empire]

I would also point out that the suitability of the USSR without the aid given by the US and UK is slightly questionable. The US supplied vast amounts of vehicles, fuel, food, and ammo without which the USSR would have had a difficult time engaging the Germans.

America won the Logistics War thanks to Detroit.

[Dostanuot Loj]

I would also point out that the suitability of the USSR without the aid given by the US and UK is slightly questionable. The US supplied vast amounts of vehicles, fuel, food, and ammo without which the USSR would have had a difficult time engaging the Germans.

The moat amazing thing abiut WW2 is how the US essentially supplied four major armies all their supporting material and vehicles, and a large chunk of munitions and combat vehicles.

Also im gonna tear down some terribad historiography when i get home.

[Isilanka]

Also im gonna tear down some terribad historiography when i get home.

If it's my post you're referring to, don't bother, I nullified it. Turns out I shouldn't make definitive assertions with an outdated bibliography. I don't think most of what I said was objectively false, but I got several key points...not quite right.

That being said I do think the points about german generals not getting the bigger picture and giving priority to the tactical side of things to the detriment of the rest, which in turn is due to how they were trained and taught isn't blatantly false.

I would also point out that the suitability of the USSR without the aid given by the US and UK is slightly questionable. The US supplied vast amounts of vehicles, fuel, food, and ammo without which the USSR would have had a difficult time engaging the Germans.

A quick look at a generic WWII atlas shows that the US send 17.5 million tons of equipment to the USSR in total, which represents 80% of what was sent to the US forces in western europe (roughly 22 million tons). This represents, among other things, 400,000 trucks and jeeps. I don't have the figures of soviet truck production for this time period right here, but I'm ready to bet it represents a sizable percentage of it. It's rather impressive.

[Reorganized Soviet Union]

Also im gonna tear down some terribad historiography when i get home.

If it's my post you're referring to, don't bother, I nullified it. Turns out I shouldn't make definitive assertions with an outdated bibliography. I don't think most of what I said was objectively false, but I got several key points...not quite right.

That being said I do think the points about german generals not getting the bigger picture and giving priority to the tactical side of things to the detriment of the rest, which in turn is due to how they were trained and taught isn't blatantly false.

I would also point out that the suitability of the USSR without the aid given by the US and UK is slightly questionable. The US supplied vast amounts of vehicles, fuel, food, and ammo without which the USSR would have had a difficult time engaging the Germans.

A quick look at a generic WWII atlas shows that the US send 17.5 million tons of equipment to the USSR in total, which represents 80% of what was sent to the US forces in western europe (roughly 22 million tons). This represents, among other things, 400,000 trucks and jeeps. I don't have the figures of soviet truck production for this time period right here, but I'm ready to bet it represents a sizable percentage of it. It's rather impressive.

Don't forget that a lot trains used by the USSR were sent by lend lease.

[Dostanuot Loj]

If it's my post you're referring to, don't bother, I nullified it.

It was. And I was looking forward to writing a long rant about what you got wrong, how, and why, and what the reality was. I have the time, energy, and motivation. But I guess I'll just go mow my lawn or something instead.

Turns out I shouldn't make definitive assertions with an outdated bibliography. I don't think most of what I said was objectively false, but I got several key points...not quite right.

My largest single criticism (Which all else derives from) was that you essentially fell into the "history channel trap" of hilariously oversimplified and poorly understood memes masquerading as history. It's an easy trap to fall into though, after a;; real professional historians do it too.

That being said I do think the points about german generals not getting the bigger picture and giving priority to the tactical side of things to the detriment of the rest, which in turn is due to how they were trained and taught isn't blatantly false.

It is false though, for the reason I mentioned above as my main criticism.

A quick look at a generic WWII atlas shows that the US send 17.5 million tons of equipment to the USSR in total, which represents 80% of what was sent to the US forces in western europe (roughly 22 million tons). This represents, among other things, 400,000 trucks and jeeps. I don't have the figures of soviet truck production for this time period right here, but I'm ready to bet it represents a sizable percentage of it. It's rather impressive.

A quick and dirty google search gives me around 160k-200k total non-combat vehicle production for the soviets for the war. Which puts is just above Japan, and on par (or better) than Germany. Or, less than 7% of US production.

[Isilanka]

If it's my post you're referring to, don't bother, I nullified it.

It was. And I was looking forward to writing a long rant about what you got wrong, how, and why, and what the reality was. I have the time, energy, and motivation. But I guess I'll just go mow my lawn or something instead.

Turns out I shouldn't make definitive assertions with an outdated bibliography. I don't think most of what I said was objectively false, but I got several key points...not quite right.

My largest single criticism (Which all else derives from) was that you essentially fell into the "history channel trap" of hilariously oversimplified and poorly understood memes masquerading as history. It's an easy trap to fall into though, after a;; real professional historians do it too.

That being said I do think the points about german generals not getting the bigger picture and giving priority to the tactical side of things to the detriment of the rest, which in turn is due to how they were trained and taught isn't blatantly false.

It is false though, for the reason I mentioned above as my main criticism.

A quick look at a generic WWII atlas shows that the US send 17.5 million tons of equipment to the USSR in total, which represents 80% of what was sent to the US forces in western europe (roughly 22 million tons). This represents, among other things, 400,000 trucks and jeeps. I don't have the figures of soviet truck production for this time period right here, but I'm ready to bet it represents a sizable percentage of it. It's rather impressive.

A quick and dirty google search gives me around 160k-200k total non-combat vehicle production for the soviets for the war. Which puts is just above Japan, and on par (or better) than Germany. Or, less than 7% of US production.

1) Well, sorry. It's just that it was indeed garbage. I had a long (and very interesting) discussion on the topic and felt like I really couldn't leave that here. I usually pride myself on being capable of admitting I was wrong, and in hindsight I was kinda ashamed of posting such sweeping generalisations.

2) Yeah. I guess it's a common theme to try to use sweeping generalizations as an explanation. WWII isn't really my cup of tea when it comes to history, or rather I have some very detailed knowledge about some parts of it and tend to overextend these parts to the rest of the war. To my (poor) defense, even theoritically well-taught historians do preach that kind of view. (That being said, there has been other memes thrown in the last few posts as well, like the meme that german units always out-performed allied units tactically, which is just not true).

3) I was reading an article about Fall Blau recently and I was under the impression, after reading it, that it was a good example of german unit commanders not grasping the full strategic picture and instead going for pure tactical gain, as exemplified by several divisions trying to perform encirclements to destroiy retreating soviet units to the detriment of going after strategic goals, and generally speaking operations being rather confuse on the operational level despite the tactical prowess displayed by unit commanders. What would be your input on that ? Does it correspond to the historical truth or would it be more of a reconstruction after the fact ?

I was also wondering if german generals insisting after the war that the defeat on the East was only caused by Hitler's strategic errors and Stalin drowning them in bodies was due to them trying to justifiy themselves at the cost of honesty, or german generals simply not understanding what the war in the east had been about.

4) It would mean lend-lease represents more than 200% of the soviet production of non-combat vehicles ? It's staggering, if the data is to be trusted.

[Dostanuot Loj]

1) Well, sorry. It's just that it was indeed garbage. I had a long (and very interesting) discussion on the topic and felt like I really couldn't leave that here. I usually pride myself on being capable of admitting I was wrong, and in hindsight I was kinda ashamed of posting such sweeping generalisations.

Cest la vie. That's par for the course for amateur military history. So no need to be worried.

2) Yeah. I guess it's a common theme to try to use sweeping generalizations as an explanation. WWII isn't really my cup of tea when it comes to history, or rather I have some very detailed knowledge about some parts of it and tend to overextend these parts to the rest of the war. To my (poor) defense, even theoritically well-taught historians do preach that kind of view. (That being said, there has been other memes thrown in the last few posts as well, like the meme that german units always out-performed allied units tactically, which is just not true).

The biggest issue is that German commanders were not uniform, and the actions/abilities/styles/whatever are different on an individual level to such a degree that you can't make sweeping generalizations without focusing only on the framework training. And when you do that, you still have a lot of variety between the states, even in WW2. So it is not only untrue to say that, for example, German officers were great tactical thinkers but ignored logistics, but a great misunderstanding of the basic frameworks from which each officer was developed. For Germany this is far more a problem than any other country in WW2 for a multitude of reasons. It is also why we see such variation between generals like Rommel and Model.

3) I was reading an article about Fall Blau recently and I was under the impression, after reading it, that it was a good example of german unit commanders not grasping the full strategic picture and instead going for pure tactical gain, as exemplified by several divisions trying to perform encirclements to destroiy retreating soviet units to the detriment of going after strategic goals, and generally speaking operations being rather confuse on the operational level despite the tactical prowess displayed by unit commanders. What would be your input on that ? Does it correspond to the historical truth or would it be more of a reconstruction after the fact ?

It would be an independent case study. The variation in commander capabilities means you really have to look at them individually and not apply blankets across capabilities for others. So for Fall Blau you're looking at the operations involved in isolation, and they are unrelated to other operations except as comparatives (so not drawing blankets across them). This approach is basically good historigraphy anyway, but is is even more important when discussing military operations. The motives and actions of tactical commanders, in that situation, are independent to them.

Likewise, it is easy in hindsight to think of the "strategic picture" and say what the commanders should have done, but that is disingenuous and unfair to the people directly involved. You need to understand the real situation facing the commanders on the ground at the time to draw analysis of their actions in more than a superficial 'history channel" way. So the question is: what was the argument of the author of that article for why the German commanders "ignored" strategic goals for tactical? It's about critically reading that, unless you want to do the research yourself on the actual primary sources.

I was also wondering if german generals insisting after the war that the defeat on the East was only caused by Hitler's strategic errors and Stalin drowning them in bodies was due to them trying to justifiy themselves at the cost of honesty, or german generals simply not understanding what the war in the east had been about. There was a lot of post-war face-saving from German generals. It is more and more studied in depth too, and is an interesting read. Different men had different reasons and aims, but I personally think a lot of it involved passing blame off to Hitler so as to secure their career, or at least reputation, when Germany was rearmed. But you also see that coming from the allies (BHLH for example), directed at themselves but also at the Germans to save their face as new allies against the Soviets. Two of my favorite examples of this are how BHLH essentially fabricated testimony to get himself recognized, and how Rommel is not being recognized as a bad commander.

4) It would mean lend-lease represents more than 200% of the soviet production of non-combat vehicles ? It's staggering, if the data is to be trusted.

I read the real data long long ago, and a quick google doesn't seem too far off. The Red Army was moved by American trucks and feed by American food, that is well known. But keep in mind that one of the reasons the Soviets could build 80,000 T-34s was because they didn't have to build the trucks to support them. Those factories could be focused on tanks and artillery, which is exactly what the Soviets did.

[Republic of Penguinian Astronautia]

Does the amount of extra water necessary for rehydration negate the weight savings of freeze dried meals of mres?

[The Akasha Colony]

Does the amount of extra water necessary for rehydration negate the weight savings of freeze dried meals of mres?

MREs are not freeze-dried. They do not require any water for rehydration. In fact, they are designed so that they can be eaten immediately without any preparation or heating even though they come with chemical heaters. The heaters are just so that if troops have the time, they can heat up their meals if they so choose in order to make them a bit more palatable.

[The Manticoran Empire]

Does the amount of extra water necessary for rehydration negate the weight savings of freeze dried meals of mres?

MREs are not freeze-dried. They do not require any water for rehydration. In fact, they are designed so that they can be eaten immediately without any preparation or heating even though they come with chemical heaters. The heaters are just so that if troops have the time, they can heat up their meals if they so choose in order to make them a bit more palatable.

Or make a bomb for shits and giggles in the barracks.

[Questers]

reee

Logistics isn't a word in the same way blitzkrieg isn't a word. It's a catchall used by people to describe "things you don't see in Hollywood." Hold this thought.

Germany's advantage in WWII was that it was able to catch its opponents off-balance and off-guard. When it was able to do so, by acting earlier than them, on a strategic level with a strategic ooda loop, it was able to decisively win. Poland, France, Barbarossa. When it wasn't able to do that, it did not win: later operations in Russia, the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Second Battle of France.

Military outcomes are related to civilian technology, not (rarely) direct military technology. The first major civilian technology to affect war in a major war was the social technology of levee en-masse. Then it was the industrial technology of the railway. Then it was the assemby line. The social technology of 1939 was that people were scared about fighting wars. Traumatised, in fact: in Britain and France for obvious reasons. Even Stalin was scared of a repeat of WWI in which Russia was humiliated and lost most of its useful territory.

Wars happen fast. The last really long war was the Thirty Years War. The side with better civilian technology - industrial and social - usually wins. Germany had the social technology of being able to outmaneouvre its opponents politically, which is why it won a lot, and why it was able to keep inertia. It was also a developed country - not as much as the US or Britain - that was able to produce a lot of high quality military products.

But in peacetime there's no space for civilian investment and it's civilian investment that produces the required technical power for war. Britain and the US had superior civilian industry to Germany which resulted in a whole host of minor superiorities that collected themselves into one big superiority known as "logistics." We could just manufacture more and better useful things than Germany, and Germany couldn't touch us. So when their inertia from their social technology wore off, eventually they lost.

Wars happen in contexts, and the context of a war is always related to the context of the war before it, because leaders must draw on historical parallels. World War One was fought with the later wars of the 19th-century in mind. The ACW was fought with Napoleonic decisive battle in mind. Napoleonic wars recalled the Seven Years War and et cetera. But war is fast and brutal. The side best prepared before the war almost always wins: and by prepared I mean prepared in every sense.

Why did France win WWII despite losing its whole country? Because its diplomatic preparations allowed it to recover quickly as a sovereign power. Why did Poland lose WWII? Because despite being "liberated" strategic circumstances dictated its surrender to the USSR. There are no useful "what ifs" in warfare history, and there are no useful "this country did this thing better." There's just contextual analysis. And it's boring. War is boring. That's what some people say anyway.

[Questers]

There's a kind of schelling point about war which is that most people believe that the side with the best weapons will win the war, so the schelling point of WWII is that Germany had the best weapons but it was outnumbered and had bad logistics. Now unlike Sumer and Kyiv I actually agree that Germany had "bad logistics." But that's just not the point. The point is this schelling point is dumb.

It's dumb because in wartime you have a reaaaaaally limited window to improve your weapons. Ability to produce good weapons is based on good civilian scientific-technical-industrial infrastructure and you simply can't improve that while you're simultaneously mobilising for war. That takes decades. And in wartime hindsight's a luxury you can't much afford. Arguing about Tiger vs Sherman is a silly argument: each side built the thing they could build the best with the resources utilised in the best way.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Now unlike Sumer and Kyiv I actually agree that Germany had "bad logistics."

To be fair, you and I are actually in agreement.
I just think most people (especially here) don't understand any of it, and dislike the horrid attempts at explaining it.

[Sick Jumps]

Does the amount of extra water necessary for rehydration negate the weight savings of freeze dried meals of mres?

MREs are not freeze-dried. They do not require any water for rehydration. In fact, they are designed so that they can be eaten immediately without any preparation or heating even though they come with chemical heaters. The heaters are just so that if troops have the time, they can heat up their meals if they so choose in order to make them a bit more palatable.

I assume he's talking about "MRE" in a generic sort of way, like how people talk about "Googling" something.

Penguinian Astronautia, if you're talking about stuff like the LRP/MCW, RCW, and IRP-BS, the main advantage is that you don't have to carry all of the water needed to re-hydrate all of your rations. You could be carrying a week's worth of rations and just carry enough water to prepare your next meal. Additional water would be acquired as needed. You can also eat freeze-dried meals dry if you need to, but it's not highly recommended.

Freeze-dried entrees tend to be a bit more palatable than retort pouch ones (like in the MRE), but that's just my opinion.

[Republic of Penguinian Astronautia]

Does the amount of extra water necessary for rehydration negate the weight savings of freeze dried meals of mres?

MREs are not freeze-dried. They do not require any water for rehydration. In fact, they are designed so that they can be eaten immediately without any preparation or heating even though they come with chemical heaters. The heaters are just so that if troops have the time, they can heat up their meals if they so choose in order to make them a bit more palatable.

I'm sorry, that was a typo, of should have read "over" as in, are freeze dried meals still lighter than mres counting the water that must be carried.

[The Akasha Colony]

I'm sorry, that was a typo, of should have read "over" as in, are freeze dried meals still lighter than mres counting the water that must be carried.

That doesn't really change the question. Actual MREs along with most other combat rations are not freeze dried in the first place. They do not require any water, except perhaps if one wishes to use the included powdered drink mix. This is intentional because it means the meals can be eaten immediately with no need for rehydration or heating, and the slightly increased weight of the meal is acceptable because most troops are not expected to ever carry more than a day or two's worth of MREs in the first place because they are always being resupplied.

Some specialist rations designed for reconnaissance troops or special forces are dehydrated and require rehydration before consumption. These are generally only used when troops are expected to spend multiple days away from regular resupply and thus weight and volume are at an absolute premium. These troops would also likely be carrying water filtration gear to be able to replenish their own water supplies while on the march, unlike regular troops who refill their canteens and hydration bladders at trailers that are themselves filled at industrial water purification stations that are usually carried around at the brigade or division level. Long-distance hikers and outdoorsmen also use freeze dried meals for these reasons. In these cases, minimizing the weight and volume of the rations is a higher priority than spending a bit more time hunting for water sources and replenishing water supplies.

[Palmyrion]

Why aren't we using electric motors (yet) to cycle a gun's operating sequence from loading to firing and back?

[The Akasha Colony]

Why aren't we using electric motors (yet) to cycle a gun's operating sequence from loading to firing and back?

We are.

But it provides zero useful benefit for pistols, rifles, shotguns, etc. and a lot of drawbacks, which is why there are no electric rifles except in airsoft.

[Crookfur]

Why aren't we using electric motors (yet) to cycle a gun's operating sequence from loading to firing and back?

As Akasha said we already do where its appropriate.