[PASSED] Religious Freedom Protection

[The Swaggerlands]

Poorly defined and at worst clerically lazy, The Swaggerlands will be voting against Religious Freedom Protection and prays for a swift drafting of a repeal.

[Bentho]

Bentho will be voting against, it due its low religious values and it os poorly described.

[The Arab Vatican]

-snip-

The truth was arrived at upon the preservation and examination of the ancient rites bourne by Pope Chad I from time immemorial. From the Chaos of the fifth resource war, we were the first society to band back together under the banner of our glorious leader Mecha-Bashaar. His elimination of dissident faith was not without mercy, out of respect to the survivors of his former nation colonies were established with ample food and shelter and open, free borders that they may find new homes more amicable to their stubborn ways. Those who remained knew full well the penalties, were given every opportunity and second chance to leave, and entirely willingly entered into their trials by ordeal. Even with the most generous arms on offer, none were spared by the Good Lord for their profligacy. These antisocial persons stayed only to infringe upon the public good and spread their wicked ways. We did not go door to door searching them out, spying on the privacy of their homes. They revealed themselves publicly. What else could be done?

As far as the difference between wars of dissent and wars of conquest, the difference is clear. A war of conquest is when one nation's good infringes upon the liberal ideals of the assembly. A war of dissent is when the liberal wing seeks conquest unopposed. The Arab Vatican joined this assembly with the intent to aid the common good of the many impoverished states whom depend upon the aid of this assembly. As such, we participate in this distasteful process of pushing back against those who seek to use this assembly as a cudgel to push an anti-faith agenda by way of promoting moral relativism. It is not relative morality that drives the charity of our people, who represent a fair share of this assembly's aid, it is unity in Faith that compels this charity unbidden. Our morally confused brethren can be seen to do far less by comparison. We cannot risk losing this unique treasure of our culture because some greedy outsider demands that their way be recognized in our nation at the expense of our own. As an autarky, we welcome any sanctions the World Assembly may try to impose upon us. We are strong in our faith and will not relent to the bullying of imperialists. And we offer shelter and aid to any nation under threat by such open aggression.

[Aelyria]

"I offer no defense of any other claims so presented, but on the subject of moral relativism, there is the extremely serious charge of refusal to address moral problems." Ambassador Forrest-Drake clears her throat. "A key fault for all morally-relativist theories of ethics is that they explicitly deny that persons of differing sociocultural origin may be judged by common standards. Hence, the moral relativist has two unpalatable options. First, accept the heinous acts of others—including a great many acts forbidden by this body, such as slavery or discrimination on the basis of gender identity or orientation—because the persons commiting such violations can simply say, 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' That, for most sophonts, is an unacceptable abandonment of all moral structure. Which leaves the second unpalatable option: to assert that, despite the fact that morality is relative to culture, somehow this restriction, this judgment is universal. This second option is quite reasonable for the non-relativist, and is indeed the usual stance of both primary alternatives to relativism, that being moral sentimentalism, the idea that morality is rooted in the common sentiments of all sapient beings, and moral realism, the idea that moral values actually exist in whatever sense is relevant and are thus independent of culture and sapient sentiments. But to accept this is to become a hypocrite, if one claims to support relativism, unless one can somehow explain why morality is socially relative while still allowing moral judgments to occur across socio-ethnic divides. Given the extreme importance of, for example, things like international law, which is literally the purpose of this body, moral relativism is an extremely difficult stance to defend."
She offers a wan smile. "It is literally our job, ladies, gentlemen, and sophonts of all identities, to tell other societies what is and is not permissible. We are here to make moral evaluations of other societies. How can one espouse fundamental relativism under such circumstances?"

[Kenmoria]

Lewitt has been silent for a time, mulling over the proposal. After some debate, strictly with himself, he rises to speak. “I’ve written my analysis of the resolution-at-vote. In all honesty, my viewpoint changed while I was in the middle of writing it, for this has been a difficult proposal to analyse. It does have flaws, but it is nonetheless a positive step for the General Assembly. I therefore must recommend a vote in favour of it, to all delegations present and voting.”

Poorly defined and at worst clerically lazy, The Swaggerlands will be voting against Religious Freedom Protection and prays for a swift drafting of a repeal.

“The delegation of the Swaggerlands, though possibly not intending their pun about clericalism in a proposal about religiosity, should be commended for it.” Lewitt chuckles to himself. “However, on a more serious note, I would not term the proposal as lazy. It seems that much effort went into its drafting, which is true for the majority of proposals that reach the voting stage. Such charged language as that can only obscure intellectual debate. There certainly is a problem in the definition of one term: ‘positive harm’, but this does not, in my view, invalidate the very well-defined first clause.”

“I would also contend, in contraposition to many other delegations, that religion requires no definition. There might be a controversy over where spirituality ends and religiosity begins, but both require protection, so there is no harm if spirituality is either included or excluded. For the suggestion of get-a-job-ism, that is patently not a genuine religious belief, but one made for the purposes of securing employment.”

Bentho will be voting against, it due its low religious values and it os poorly described.

“The delegation from Bentho is correct insofar as this proposal is not particularly religious in itself. However, that is a positive. It is the nature of the General Assembly to stand outside any particular system of belief, to impose neutral and fair rules upon all of them. By this proposal, the General Assembly can ensure a degree of secularity in national governance, which would be very difficult to do if the proposal itself were religious.”

The truth was arrived at upon the preservation and examination of the ancient rites bourne by Pope Chad I from time immemorial. From the Chaos of the fifth resource war, we were the first society to band back together under the banner of our glorious leader Mecha-Bashaar. His elimination of dissident faith was not without mercy, out of respect to the survivors of his former nation colonies were established with ample food and shelter and open, free borders that they may find new homes more amicable to their stubborn ways. Those who remained knew full well the penalties, were given every opportunity and second chance to leave, and entirely willingly entered into their trials by ordeal. Even with the most generous arms on offer, none were spared by the Good Lord for their profligacy. These antisocial persons stayed only to infringe upon the public good and spread their wicked ways. We did not go door to door searching them out, spying on the privacy of their homes. They revealed themselves publicly. What else could be done?

As far as the difference between wars of dissent and wars of conquest, the difference is clear. A war of conquest is when one nation's good infringes upon the liberal ideals of the assembly. A war of dissent is when the liberal wing seeks conquest unopposed. The Arab Vatican joined this assembly with the intent to aid the common good of the many impoverished states whom depend upon the aid of this assembly. As such, we participate in this distasteful process of pushing back against those who seek to use this assembly as a cudgel to push an anti-faith agenda by way of promoting moral relativism. It is not relative morality that drives the charity of our people, who represent a fair share of this assembly's aid, it is unity in Faith that compels this charity unbidden. Our morally confused brethren can be seen to do far less by comparison. We cannot risk losing this unique treasure of our culture because some greedy outsider demands that their way be recognized in our nation at the expense of our own. As an autarky, we welcome any sanctions the World Assembly may try to impose upon us. We are strong in our faith and will not relent to the bullying of imperialists. And we offer shelter and aid to any nation under threat by such open aggression.

“I would first like to commend the delegation from the Arab Vatican for its eloquent response to the questioning of the Juansonian delegation. If I may respond, I would call attention to the very national nature of this speech. Your exposition of the history of the Arab Vatican was interesting, and I thank you for it, but it is the history of only one nation, on one world, out of the hundreds of thousands of nations upon thousands of worlds. The General Assembly cannot be limited to one truth, when it must govern millions of competing ones. How Pope Chad I bore ancient Rights is evidently a bedrock of the society of the Arab Vatican, but there are surely other such religious leaders who bound similarly ancient rights from their own societies. A strict focus upon one nation is misleading. Furthermore, I speak of a discourse not only between nations, but within them. In Kenmoria, one can find Christians speaking one truth, and Muslims speaking another. Jews with an ancient history, and Hindus with another. Just as the General Assembly cannot choose one truth, for Kenmoria to choose between them would be unjust. It would be unjust for any nation, to select truth for its citizens. No nation has the right to do so.”

“As for the question of imposition of beliefs, that is rather the precise problem which the resolution-at-vote aims to address. Catholics, to use your nation’s beliefs as exemplar, are protected in their religion whether in the Arab Vatican or in a state supporting the worship of Klyprer. This is the purpose of this proposal. It universalises the acceptability, legality, and possibility of holding belief in Catholicism across the entire General Assembly. Surely this is the form of universal truth that your nation can support? However, it is an impossibility for the assembly to recognise one truth, for it plainly lacks the power or knowledge to do so. Even in an assembly of multiverses, there is not enough authority to recognise almighty truth. Therefore, it is all religions that must be protected. The World Assembly will not offer sanctions, but fines, taking irrepressibly and automatically, until compliance is ensured. These fines can be very, very harsh, for they are whatever will coerce compliance. This is a necessary evil.” Lewitt briefly looks down at his radio, which no longer receives any signal from the main nation of Kenmoria. “Those who do not wish to partake in the General Assembly’s legislation, cannot have a voice in deciding its affairs.”

"I offer no defense of any other claims so presented, but on the subject of moral relativism, there is the extremely serious charge of refusal to address moral problems." Ambassador Forrest-Drake clears her throat. "A key fault for all morally-relativist theories of ethics is that they explicitly deny that persons of differing sociocultural origin may be judged by common standards. Hence, the moral relativist has two unpalatable options. First, accept the heinous acts of others—including a great many acts forbidden by this body, such as slavery or discrimination on the basis of gender identity or orientation—because the persons commiting such violations can simply say, 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' That, for most sophonts, is an unacceptable abandonment of all moral structure. Which leaves the second unpalatable option: to assert that, despite the fact that morality is relative to culture, somehow this restriction, this judgment is universal. This second option is quite reasonable for the non-relativist, and is indeed the usual stance of both primary alternatives to relativism, that being moral sentimentalism, the idea that morality is rooted in the common sentiments of all sapient beings, and moral realism, the idea that moral values actually exist in whatever sense is relevant and are thus independent of culture and sapient sentiments. But to accept this is to become a hypocrite, if one claims to support relativism, unless one can somehow explain why morality is socially relative while still allowing moral judgments to occur across socio-ethnic divides. Given the extreme importance of, for example, things like international law, which is literally the purpose of this body, moral relativism is an extremely difficult stance to defend."
She offers a wan smile. "It is literally our job, ladies, gentlemen, and sophonts of all identities, to tell other societies what is and is not permissible. We are here to make moral evaluations of other societies. How can one espouse fundamental relativism under such circumstances?"

To Ambassador Forrest-Drake, Lewitt looks next. “I am not a moral relativist, Ambassador.” He states simply. “I am a diplomat.”

[Juansonia]

--snip--

The truth was arrived at upon the preservation and examination of the ancient rites bourne by Pope Chad I from time immemorial. From the Chaos of the fifth resource war, we were the first society to band back together under the banner of our glorious leader Mecha-Bashaar. His elimination of dissident faith was not without mercy, out of respect to the survivors of his former nation colonies were established with ample food and shelter and open, free borders that they may find new homes more amicable to their stubborn ways. Those who remained knew full well the penalties, were given every opportunity and second chance to leave, and entirely willingly entered into their trials by ordeal. Even with the most generous arms on offer, none were spared by the Good Lord for their profligacy. These antisocial persons stayed only to infringe upon the public good and spread their wicked ways. We did not go door to door searching them out, spying on the privacy of their homes. They revealed themselves publicly. What else could be done?

"I can tell that you genuinely believe the actions of the Arab Vatican to be justifiable. However, you have yet to justify it, and your points about foreign aid are tangential at best."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

As far as the difference between wars of dissent and wars of conquest, the difference is clear. A war of conquest is when one nation's good infringes upon the liberal ideals of the assembly. A war of dissent is when the liberal wing seeks conquest unopposed.

"There is no such thing as a war of dissent. I was referring to dissent itself, and pointing out that you described it as a war of conquest. Also, your definition of 'war of conquest' is false, as a war of conquest is of intent to conquer, regardless of ideals of either beligerent."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

As an autarky, we welcome any sanctions the World Assembly may try to impose upon us. We are strong in our faith and will not relent to the bullying of imperialists. And we offer shelter and aid to any nation under threat by such open aggression.

"Have you considered that leaving the World Assembly removes all legal obligation to comply with the laws thereof?"
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

---

The World Assembly will not offer sanctions, but fines, taking irrepressibly and automatically, until compliance is ensured. These fines can be very, very harsh, for they are whatever will coerce compliance. This is a necessary evil.

"My mistake. I forgot that most sanctions are in the form of tariffs and partial embargoes instead of fines."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

---

"I offer no defense of any other claims so presented, but on the subject of moral relativism, there is the extremely serious charge of refusal to address moral problems." Ambassador Forrest-Drake clears her throat. "A key fault for all morally-relativist theories of ethics is that they explicitly deny that persons of differing sociocultural origin may be judged by common standards. Hence, the moral relativist has two unpalatable options. First, accept the heinous acts of others—including a great many acts forbidden by this body, such as slavery or discrimination on the basis of gender identity or orientation—because the persons commiting such violations can simply say, 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' That, for most sophonts, is an unacceptable abandonment of all moral structure. Which leaves the second unpalatable option: to assert that, despite the fact that morality is relative to culture, somehow this restriction, this judgment is universal. This second option is quite reasonable for the non-relativist, and is indeed the usual stance of both primary alternatives to relativism, that being moral sentimentalism, the idea that morality is rooted in the common sentiments of all sapient beings, and moral realism, the idea that moral values actually exist in whatever sense is relevant and are thus independent of culture and sapient sentiments. But to accept this is to become a hypocrite, if one claims to support relativism, unless one can somehow explain why morality is socially relative while still allowing moral judgments to occur across socio-ethnic divides. Given the extreme importance of, for example, things like international law, which is literally the purpose of this body, moral relativism is an extremely difficult stance to defend."
She offers a wan smile. "It is literally our job, ladies, gentlemen, and sophonts of all identities, to tell other societies what is and is not permissible. We are here to make moral evaluations of other societies. How can one espouse fundamental relativism under such circumstances?"

"I believe that you are mistaken. Nothing about moral relativism states that judgements can only be made if they are universal. Instead, it is simply the position that morality is not inherently universal, and is only universal if everyone happens to have the same moral axioms. In fact, it is moral relativism that makes judgement possible, because otherwise everyone would follow the same axioms. Countless people acknowledge that no stance of morality is inherently universal, but also that moral debate and judgement still has its purpose. Cliches such as 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' do not work on relativists universally, since many of us can, may, and will judge by our differing moralities."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

[Aelyria]

"I believe that you are mistaken. Nothing about moral relativism states that judgements can only be made if they are universal. Instead, it is simply the position that morality is not inherently universal, and is only universal if everyone happens to have the same moral axioms. In fact, it is moral relativism that makes judgement possible, because otherwise everyone would follow the same axioms. Countless people acknowledge that no stance of morality is inherently universal, but also that moral debate and judgement still has its purpose. Cliches such as 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' do not work on relativists universally, since many of us can, may, and will judge by our differing moralities."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

"On what basis? You have said morality is relative. If I declare my axioms differ from yours, by definition you cannot judge me based on yours. That is, quite literally, what moral relativism means. If you invoke some concept of shared axioms--axioms that would allow you to judge across cultural boundaries--then you are by definition either invoking the 'common sentiments of mankind,' as Hume and his colleagues would have put it, or you must be laying claim to some superior faculty of observing or determining that which is moral, which is by definition moral realism of one form or another. You claim to reject these arguments as sophistry, but do not actually address them. How is it that you can pass judgment on a society that, for instance, permits 'honor killings' to preserve the 'moral purity' of a father's daughters, or a society which permits sophont slavery? Assuming, of course, that you do actually oppose such things and wish to make others follow suit, even those who do not belong to your culture."

"To be clear, I am not arguing against such judgments. I am very much in favor of pursuing a just, merciful, egalitarian, liberty-rich world. As a famous man once said, 'We must do this, not because it is economically advantageous—although it is; not because the laws of God command it—although they do; not because people in other lands wish it so. We must do it for the single and fundamental reason that it is the right thing to do.'"

"Such a statement is senseless in a context of moral relativism. For how can any action ever be the right action, when morality or lack thereof is exclusively a function of the culture from which one grew? And if it is not exclusively a function thereof, then one is committed to the idea that some part of morality is not derived from cultural factors, and is instead independent."

[Juansonia]

"I believe that you are mistaken. Nothing about moral relativism states that judgements can only be made if they are universal. Instead, it is simply the position that morality is not inherently universal, and is only universal if everyone happens to have the same moral axioms. In fact, it is moral relativism that makes judgement possible, because otherwise everyone would follow the same axioms. Countless people acknowledge that no stance of morality is inherently universal, but also that moral debate and judgement still has its purpose. Cliches such as 'this is my society's morality; you cannot judge me by YOUR morality.' do not work on relativists universally, since many of us can, may, and will judge by our differing moralities."
- Maria-Fernanda Novo, ambassador

"On what basis? You have said morality is relative. If I declare my axioms differ from yours, by definition you cannot judge me based on yours. That is, quite literally, what moral relativism means. If you invoke some concept of shared axioms--axioms that would allow you to judge across cultural boundaries--then you are by definition either invoking the 'common sentiments of mankind,' as Hume and his colleagues would have put it, or you must be laying claim to some superior faculty of observing or determining that which is moral, which is by definition moral realism of one form or another. You claim to reject these arguments as sophistry, but do not actually address them. How is it that you can pass judgment on a society that, for instance, permits 'honor killings' to preserve the 'moral purity' of a father's daughters, or a society which permits sophont slavery? Assuming, of course, that you do actually oppose such things and wish to make others follow suit, even those who do not belong to your culture."

"To be clear, I am not arguing against such judgments. I am very much in favor of pursuing a just, merciful, egalitarian, liberty-rich world. As a famous man once said, 'We must do this, not because it is economically advantageous—although it is; not because the laws of God command it—although they do; not because people in other lands wish it so. We must do it for the single and fundamental reason that it is the right thing to do.'"

"Such a statement is senseless in a context of moral relativism. For how can any action ever be the right action, when morality or lack thereof is exclusively a function of the culture from which one grew? And if it is not exclusively a function thereof, then one is committed to the idea that some part of morality is not derived from cultural factors, and is instead independent."

"Moral relativism means that moral axioms, and therefore moral conclusions, differ between persons. To state that moral relativism prevents judgement is absurd, as it does no such thing. Shared axioms are not necessary in order to make judgement. While I do not pass judgement onto society, as collective guilt makes no sense, I do morally pass judgement onto those who engage in honor killings and slavery, because those actions are wrong according to my sense of morality. Frankly, I know that they disagree, and I don't give a shit - so much for a 'common sense of morality' or 'moral realism' being necessary. On the other hand, it doesn't mean much anyway, since I prioritise reparation and rehabilitation over punishment."

"If, on the other hand, a 'common sentiment' was present, atrocities could not exist, as nobody could redefine the universally unjustifiable to justify it. Allow me to put it this way - if everyone innately believes that x is morally unjustifiable, person y - or anyone else for these purposes - would not be able to justify x, and therefore would not commit x. If person y does not engage in x, x does not happen, and it is impossible to judge y for committing x, and judgement of x itself is purely theoretical. Many other forms of realism - those which state that everyone inherently knows the moral truth, as many religions claim - face the same flaw. Forms of moral realism which don't claim to be universally known, on the other hand, are effectively moral relativism - Moral disagreement still occurs, but one side knows that they are right, while the other only believes it."

[Aelyria]

"On what basis? You have said morality is relative. If I declare my axioms differ from yours, by definition you cannot judge me based on yours. That is, quite literally, what moral relativism means. If you invoke some concept of shared axioms--axioms that would allow you to judge across cultural boundaries--then you are by definition either invoking the 'common sentiments of mankind,' as Hume and his colleagues would have put it, or you must be laying claim to some superior faculty of observing or determining that which is moral, which is by definition moral realism of one form or another. You claim to reject these arguments as sophistry, but do not actually address them. How is it that you can pass judgment on a society that, for instance, permits 'honor killings' to preserve the 'moral purity' of a father's daughters, or a society which permits sophont slavery? Assuming, of course, that you do actually oppose such things and wish to make others follow suit, even those who do not belong to your culture."

"To be clear, I am not arguing against such judgments. I am very much in favor of pursuing a just, merciful, egalitarian, liberty-rich world. As a famous man once said, 'We must do this, not because it is economically advantageous—although it is; not because the laws of God command it—although they do; not because people in other lands wish it so. We must do it for the single and fundamental reason that it is the right thing to do.'"

"Such a statement is senseless in a context of moral relativism. For how can any action ever be the right action, when morality or lack thereof is exclusively a function of the culture from which one grew? And if it is not exclusively a function thereof, then one is committed to the idea that some part of morality is not derived from cultural factors, and is instead independent."

"Moral relativism means that moral axioms, and therefore moral conclusions, differ between persons. To state that moral relativism prevents judgement is absurd, as it does no such thing. Shared axioms are not necessary in order to make judgement. While I do not pass judgement onto society, as collective guilt makes no sense, I do morally pass judgement onto those who engage in honor killings and slavery, because those actions are wrong according to my sense of morality. Frankly, I know that they disagree, and I don't give a shit - so much for a 'common sense of morality' or 'moral realism' being necessary. On the other hand, it doesn't mean much anyway, since I prioritise reparation and rehabilitation over punishment."

"If, on the other hand, a 'common sentiment' was present, atrocities could not exist, as nobody could redefine the universally unjustifiable to justify it. Allow me to put it this way - if everyone innately believes that x is morally unjustifiable, person y - or anyone else for these purposes - would not be able to justify x, and therefore would not commit x. If person y does not engage in x, x does not happen, and it is impossible to judge y for committing x, and judgement of x itself is purely theoretical. Many other forms of realism - those which state that everyone inherently knows the moral truth, as many religions claim - face the same flaw. Forms of moral realism which don't claim to be universally known, on the other hand, are effectively moral relativism - Moral disagreement still occurs, but one side knows that they are right, while the other only believes it."

OOC: I'm not going to continue this line of discussion IC any further, but OOC...you are mistaken about what "relativism" means. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (which is freely accessible, but written and edited by accredited experts and subject to some degree of peer review), there are two core definitions of relativism when it comes to ethics. You have Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR) which says, "As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be." In simpler terms: different social groups disagree on what is moral, and these disagreements outweigh the agreements. This is purely descriptive in nature, not normative, but it is generally understood to imply certain weak normative things (e.g., anthropologists should strive to be as unbiased as possible while reviewing the cultural practices of foreign cultures, even if they disapprove of those practices.)

The position you are advocating, however, is the second type, Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR), which says, "The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons." In simpler terms: statements like "abortion is immoral" can be true in one culture, and false in another culture. As a direct and necessary consequence of this claim, one is forced to say that a society which bans abortion cannot judge a society which permits it, and conversely a society which permits abortion cannot judge one that bans it. The two have fundamentally irreconcilable understandings of what is true about morality, and that irreconcilable (in formal terms, "incommensurate") status prevents any and all moral judgments across or between two societies that do not have a common moral framework. Anywhere and everywhere that such disagreements occur, it is a logical contradiction to both uphold MMR and attempt to pass judgment on a society with differing moral beliefs. Under moral relativism in this sense, there is not, and cannot be, a fact-of-the-matter when it comes to morality: all claims about moral truth are completely determined by the culture in which the claim is made, and thus claims which are made between cultures are definitionally invalid. In that way, morality effectively gains the same structure as legislation: what is legal in jurisdiction A may be illegal in jurisdiction B, and at the level of distinct nation-states, one cannot apply the laws of jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B because the laws of A have zero validity in B and vice-versa. It is then impossible to pass moral judgments on cultures which differ from one's own in precisely the same way that an Aelyrian judge cannot pass sentence in Juansonia.

Further, your response in the final paragraph is quite lacking, for the simple reason that people may be accidentally mistaken, or may embrace things they know to be false or erroneous. Consider, for example, a person (call them Pat) who accepts a bribe paid to secure false testimony in a criminal courtroom. Pat then, later, is subject to their own criminal court proceeding, and discovers that the prosecution has bribed a witness. It would, most certainly, be incredibly hypocritical for Pat to decry this action as immoral--but it is also perfectly possible for Pat to do so, because hypocrisy and irrationality are perfectly possible for human beings. By the logic you've given, the fact that many humans incorrectly believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects near Earth's surface, or fail to understand that sound cannot propagate in space where there is no gaseous medium to transmit the pressure waves, would imply that physics itself is not "real" and that physical truth is relative to the social group to which one belongs.

[Juansonia]

"Moral relativism means that moral axioms, and therefore moral conclusions, differ between persons. To state that moral relativism prevents judgement is absurd, as it does no such thing. Shared axioms are not necessary in order to make judgement. While I do not pass judgement onto society, as collective guilt makes no sense, I do morally pass judgement onto those who engage in honor killings and slavery, because those actions are wrong according to my sense of morality. Frankly, I know that they disagree, and I don't give a shit - so much for a 'common sense of morality' or 'moral realism' being necessary. On the other hand, it doesn't mean much anyway, since I prioritise reparation and rehabilitation over punishment."

"If, on the other hand, a 'common sentiment' was present, atrocities could not exist, as nobody could redefine the universally unjustifiable to justify it. Allow me to put it this way - if everyone innately believes that x is morally unjustifiable, person y - or anyone else for these purposes - would not be able to justify x, and therefore would not commit x. If person y does not engage in x, x does not happen, and it is impossible to judge y for committing x, and judgement of x itself is purely theoretical. Many other forms of realism - those which state that everyone inherently knows the moral truth, as many religions claim - face the same flaw. Forms of moral realism which don't claim to be universally known, on the other hand, are effectively moral relativism - Moral disagreement still occurs, but one side knows that they are right, while the other only believes it."

OOC: I'm not going to continue this line of discussion IC any further, but OOC...you are mistaken about what "relativism" means. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (which is freely accessible, but written and edited by accredited experts and subject to some degree of peer review), there are two core definitions of relativism when it comes to ethics. You have Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR) which says, "As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be." In simpler terms: different social groups disagree on what is moral, and these disagreements outweigh the agreements. This is purely descriptive in nature, not normative, but it is generally understood to imply certain weak normative things (e.g., anthropologists should strive to be as unbiased as possible while reviewing the cultural practices of foreign cultures, even if they disapprove of those practices.)

The position you are advocating, however, is the second type, Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR), which says, "The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons." In simpler terms: statements like "abortion is immoral" can be true in one culture, and false in another culture. As a direct and necessary consequence of this claim, one is forced to say that a society which bans abortion cannot judge a society which permits it, and conversely a society which permits abortion cannot judge one that bans it. The two have fundamentally irreconcilable understandings of what is true about morality, and that irreconcilable (in formal terms, "incommensurate") status prevents any and all moral judgments across or between two societies that do not have a common moral framework. Anywhere and everywhere that such disagreements occur, it is a logical contradiction to both uphold MMR and attempt to pass judgment on a society with differing moral beliefs. Under moral relativism in this sense, there is not, and cannot be, a fact-of-the-matter when it comes to morality: all claims about moral truth are completely determined by the culture in which the claim is made, and thus claims which are made between cultures are definitionally invalid. In that way, morality effectively gains the same structure as legislation: what is legal in jurisdiction A may be illegal in jurisdiction B, and at the level of distinct nation-states, one cannot apply the laws of jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B because the laws of A have zero validity in B and vice-versa. It is then impossible to pass moral judgments on cultures which differ from one's own in precisely the same way that an Aelyrian judge cannot pass sentence in Juansonia.

Further, your response in the final paragraph is quite lacking, for the simple reason that people may be accidentally mistaken, or may embrace things they know to be false or erroneous. Consider, for example, a person (call them Pat) who accepts a bribe paid to secure false testimony in a criminal courtroom. Pat then, later, is subject to their own criminal court proceeding, and discovers that the prosecution has bribed a witness. It would, most certainly, be incredibly hypocritical for Pat to decry this action as immoral--but it is also perfectly possible for Pat to do so, because hypocrisy and irrationality are perfectly possible for human beings. By the logic you've given, the fact that many humans incorrectly believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects near Earth's surface, or fail to understand that sound cannot propagate in space where there is no gaseous medium to transmit the pressure waves, would imply that physics itself is not "real" and that physical truth is relative to the social group to which one belongs.

OOC: I will also continue this OOC, but anyone is free to address it as IC, as I happen to agree with Maria-Fernanda Novo, WA Ambassador for the Armed Republic of Juansonia.

I am genuinely a bit confused, but I think that I understand what you are saying. Of course, descriptive moral relativism is the position that, morally, people disagree more than they agree, while metaethical moral relativism is the position that there is no universal 'moral truth'. I think that you may have messed up by failing to distinguish between the two when you said "On what basis? You have said morality is relative. If I declare my axioms differ from yours, by definition you cannot judge me based on yours."

Personally, I believe that, regardless of whether "moral truth" exists, there is no "moral truth" that everyone innately agrees on, be it divine mandate or common sentiment. While I acknowledge the possibility of a "moral truth" that is not universal, I believe that it's irrelevant during discussion, as only those who agree with it claim that it's the moral truth, while it's just as easy for another morality to be labeled true.

As for the matter of claiming that Metaethical Moral Relativism makes cross-axiom judgement impossible to do honestly, your use of legal norms as an analogy highlights that, in both cases, there are exceptions. For example, military actors are often punished for violating international law that they didn't ratify. Similarly, the United States claims universal jurisdiction whenever it deploys military assets to capture or kill suspected terrorists within neutral territory. Furthermore, an Aelyrian judge could pass judgement onto a Juansonian citizen for actions within Juansonia (barring Aelyrian law barring such), but said judgement, in addition to making Aelyria into the WA's laughingstock, would be unenforceable, as Aelyria is not permitted to exercise police or military powers in Juansonia, and civil arrest is only valid as a way to deal with serious violations of domestic law caught in the act. Technically, Aelyria could invade Juansonia to enforce its law, but (checks Aelyria's defense forces statistics) that would be impossible even if the multiversal link wasn't controlled. However, such an invasion is not necessary for an Aelyrian judge to call the Juansonian's actions illegal, just like how axiomatic consistency is not necessary to call an act immoral. Declarations, by lacking enforcement altogether, need not worry about matters such as jurisdiction, enforcement funds, and logistics.

As for your points of the last paragraph, your point about mistakenness seems to be mistaken, as I was, when talking about a "common sentiment", clearly referring to claims of moral realism that do not allow for mistakenness or ignorance. If a set of morals is universally known to be true, ignorance is impossible. I persume that moral systems, by dictating what is right and wrong, imply that people have a duty to act right and to not act wrong. In the case of a universally-agreed morality, those who are hypocrites by violating their duty to obey the set of morals, are proving that they don't believe that they have a moral duty to be good per the moral standards, and therefore they prove that the set of morals is not universally held.

Your decision to compare morality to physics is flawed for two reasons. First of all, Physics is a science, and therefore accepts the scientific method as an axiom. Second of all, physics is descriptive of what is observed around the world, so physical laws are descriptive of what is observed. Therefore, physics is consistent with what is observed, and physics is only as relative as observable reality is. It would be a good idea to avoid that can of worms.

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

I am on the record as having opposed this action. I believed the prior law was more protective of religious freedom, and I liked that better.

I do believe that this is not an ultimately bad faith or malicious law. My reason tells me that the author who repealed stronger protections for religion in favor of weaker protections for religion probably is not the best ambassador for the concept of religious freedom.

But I think it on net would do good. Mustn’t let the enemy of good be best. And therefore I am happy to announce the Princess’s vote FOR.

Well done, in your effort to modestly reduce freedom.

[Yxnadalsoxl]

Congratulations on the successful passage of this resolution!

[Kenmoria]

Religious Freedom Protection was passed 11,849 votes to 4,422.

(OOC: Congratulations, Magecastle!)

[Heidgaudr]

"We applaud the World Assembly in further legitimizing our practice of ousting exploitative and propagandistic religions within our borders."

[Floofybit]

Congrats on passage!

[West Barack and East Obama]

Dr Justin Obama, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: We concur with our fellow ambassadors in applauding this repeal and replace effort for allowing us to more easily rid of manipulative and corrosive religions from our society, so that people can only concentrate on the true Obramahamic faiths.

[Contrarian Extraordinaire]

"Unfortunately, the Strange Reality is unable to comply with this resolution. Contrarians who believe in the one true deity literally explode alive if they have to pay taxes, while other Contrarians do not so explode upon having to pay taxes. We therefore cannot tax members of the one true religion, and accordingly cannot comply with 1c."

"Your resolution has been officially wanked."