[DEFEATED] Habeas Corpus Act

[Quelesh]

Here is the previous drafting thread for this proposal.

(Human Rights / strong)

The World Assembly,

ALARMED by the practice of arbitrary or indefinite detention of individuals;

DISTURBED by the continued detention of individuals after being cleared of wrongdoing or after serving their criminal sentences;

RESOLVED to prevent such practices and to grant relief to individuals being unjustly detained;

hereby MANDATES the following, subject to any limitations existing in prior international law:

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime, but who has not been convicted of that crime, for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law. If the charge is dismissed prior to the conclusion of the trial, member states shall no longer detain the individual on that charge, unless the charge is lawfully refiled;

5. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense after that individual has been acquitted of that criminal offense;

6. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense in excess of the individual's lawful criminal sentence for that offense;

7. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial arbiter; should the arbiter deem the individual's detention to be in violation of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual.

Character count: 2,286

Prior drafts:

(Human Rights / strong)

The World Assembly,

ALARMED by the practice of arbitrary or indefinite detention of individuals;

DISTURBED by the continued detention of individuals after being cleared of wrongdoing or after serving their criminal sentences;

RESOLVED to prevent such practices and to grant relief to individuals being unjustly detained;

hereby MANDATES the following, subject to any limitations existing in prior international law:

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime, but who has not been convicted of that crime, for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law;

5. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense after that individual has been acquitted of that criminal offense;

6. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense in excess of the individual's lawful criminal sentence for that offense;

7. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial adjudicator; should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual;

8. Member states that dispense transactional immunity, defined as a legal immunity granted to a witness in which the witness cannot be prosecuted for offenses relating to their testimony, shall not retract the immunity post-testimony; furthermore, member states may not violate plea bargains given to individuals for their testimony under any circumstance, with exceptions made for perjury.

Co-Author: [nation=short]Connopolis[/nation]

Character count: 2,543

(Human Rights / strong)

The World Assembly,

ALARMED by the practice of arbitrary or indefinite detention of individuals;

DISTURBED by the continued detention of individuals after being cleared of wrongdoing or after serving their criminal sentences;

RESOLVED to prevent such practices and to grant relief to individuals being unjustly detained;

The World Assembly therefore RESOLVES:

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime but who has not been convicted of that crime for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law;

5. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense after that individual has been acquitted of that criminal offense;

6. Member states may vacate an individual's conviction of a crime and either release the individual or grant the individual a new trial for that crime. If the individual is again convicted of the crime, the new sentence shall not be more severe than the old sentence, and any conditions of the old sentence that have been met shall count toward the completion of the new sentence;

7. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense in excess of the individual's lawful criminal sentence for that offense;

8. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial adjudicator; should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual;

9. Member states that dispense transactional immunity, defined as a legal immunity granted to a witness in which the witness cannot be prosecuted for offenses relating to their testimony, shall not retract the immunity post-testimony; furthermore, member states may not violate plea bargains given to individuals for their testimony under any circumstance, with exceptions made for perjury.

Co-Author: [nation=short]Connopolis[/nation]

Character count: 2,865

(Human Rights / strong)

The General Assembly,

ALARMED by the practice of arbitrary or indefinite detention of individuals;

DISTURBED by the continued detention of individuals after being cleared of wrongdoing or after serving their criminal sentences;

APPALLED by the practice of double jeopardy, or trying an individual more than once for the same offense;

RESOLVED to prevent such practices and to grant relief to individuals being unjustly detained;

The World Assembly therefore RESOLVES:

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime but who has not been convicted of that crime for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law;

5. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense after that individual has been acquitted of that criminal offense;

6. Once an individual has been acquitted of a crime, member states shall not try that individual for the same alleged criminal act again;

7. Member states may vacate an individual's conviction of a crime and either release the individual or grant the individual a new trial for that crime. If the individual is again convicted of the crime, the new sentence shall not be more severe than the old sentence, and any conditions of the old sentence that have been met shall count toward the completion of the new sentence;

8. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense in excess of the individual's lawful criminal sentence for that offense;

9. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial adjudicator; should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual;

10. Member states that dispense transactional immunity, defined as a legal immunity granted to a witness in which the witness cannot be prosecuted for offenses relating to their testimony, shall not retract the immunity post-testimony; furthermore, member states may not violate plea bargains given to individuals for their testimony under any circumstance, with exceptions made for perjury.

Co-Author: [nation=short]Connopolis[/nation]

Character count: 3,110

Alexandria Yadoru
Quelesian WA ambassador

[Southron]

Perhaps define "member states" as being that government, and all its judicial and security departments, and any 3rd party businesses and organizations in service to that government or its departments?

[Cowardly Pacifists]

My government had instructed me to hold off on criticizing this. Frankly, I don't know why. Perhaps something about the enormity of the "Great Writ" and it's role in preventing government abuses. But no longer; here's what I think about the current draft:

ALARMED by the practice of arbitrary or indefinite detention of individuals;

DISTURBED by the continued detention of individuals after being cleared of wrongdoing or after serving their criminal sentences;

APPALLED by the practice of double jeopardy, or trying an individual more than once for the same offense;

RESOLVED to prevent such practices and to grant relief to individuals being unjustly detained;

This is quite good. Everything one would expect a Habeas Corpus Act to be concerned with.

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

You'll pardon my saying so, but given the principles Your Honors have described in the preamble, I don't know why it is tolerable to detain someone for even one minute without at least "suspecting" that individual of a criminal offense. I would like to see this reworded so that a person who demands to terminate an encounter with police must immediately be released if the police do not have at least a good faith basis for suspecting that person of a crime.

I suspect that the reason for the (admittedly arbitrary) time limits of this provision is to ensure police may stop individuals to ask questions about a crime. But "detention" implies something more than that. It implies that one is not free to go. And as much as police may like to detain folks for two hours just for questioning, I don't see why they should be able to if they don't at least suspect that person of a crime. Police could still ask non-suspects to come down to the station for questioning (ask nicely, I should think). But a non-suspect shouldn't be "detained" against their will for even a brief time.

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

This is fine and dandy in principle. But I cannot agree with the arbitrary deadlines. Consider the long deadline of 132 hours. 132 hours may be a long time to wait for a formal charge of jaywalking. On the other hand, police may strongly suspect (i.e. have solid evidence) that a person committed a murder, but be unable to obtain a "formal" indictment after five-and-a-half days (perhaps the key witness to the murder is presently in another nation and needs to be transported back to testify to the grand jury). It's not right to require that the police let a (likely) murderer out of custody simply because they have not obtained an indictment within a week.

I would prefer a "reasonable time" standard, coupled with a right to challenge a term of pre-indictment detention as unreasonable. That should keep police from indefinitely detaining folks without charge, while also giving flexibility for situations where detaining a person beyond 132 hours would be just.

(Edit: whoops, that says 96 additional hours. I don't think going from 96 hours to 132 hours really defeats the argument I've made, so I just updated the previous paragraphs with the correct times and left the same content.)

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

So police can't "let someone out" after 24 hours, then immediately pick them up again for another 24 hours ad infinitum. Sounds reasonable.

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime but who has not been convicted of that crime for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law;

Again, reasonable. Perhaps a right to challenge? That's what Habeas Corpus really means. "Bring the body," i.e. "Mr. Jailer, you have Mr. Good in your jail. He wrote us a letter saying that his detention is unjust. Please bring his body (alive) before this Court so that we may hear what he has to say."

5. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense after that individual has been acquitted of that criminal offense;

Indeed.

6. Once an individual has been acquitted of a crime, member states shall not try that individual for the same alleged criminal act again;

Indeed.

7. Member states may vacate an individual's conviction of a crime and either release the individual or grant the individual a new trial for that crime. If the individual is again convicted of the crime, the new sentence shall not be more severe than the old sentence, and any conditions of the old sentence that have been met shall count toward the completion of the new sentence;

This was once a favored practice in my nation as well. Unfortunately, it clogged our courts - as convicts would contest otherwise fair trials just to put financial pressure on the state. Sometimes, a state's resources would be overwhelmed and guilty folks would get a more favorable deal than they really deserved. We decided that it would cut down on non-meritorious appeals if we made the convicts live with the full effects of their decision to appeal. If they want a new trial - they got a new trial; new sentencing and all. Though we did (and still do) give them credit for time served.

But that's a personal anecdote. Suffice to say, I don't know why we need to tell nations to do this. Nations already have the power to vacate an individual's conviction and order a new trial if they so choose. Why then restrict what they can do with that new trial? If a prisoner says "my trial was unjust, I want a new one" why should the WA say "you may or may not have one, depending on the nation you're in. But if they give you one, we'll make sure they cannot fully reevaluate the propriety of your sentence."

8. Member states shall not detain any individual for a particular criminal offense in excess of the individual's lawful criminal sentence for that offense;

Okay, back on track. This is great.

9. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial adjudicator; should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual;

I guess this is that challenge I was talking about earlier. To the extent that this applies to all phases of the criminal process, it is just fine and makes some of my earlier criticisms moot. Though may I suggest the following revision: "should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must either immediately cure the illegality, or else immediately release the individual." That way, if the problem is "they didn't charge me in a reasonable time" the state may "cure" rather than release (say, by immediately charging them and giving them credit toward their sentence/some restitution damages if they are acquitted).

10. Member states that dispense transactional immunity, defined as a legal immunity granted to a witness in which the witness cannot be prosecuted for offenses relating to their testimony, shall not retract the immunity post-testimony; furthermore, member states may not violate plea bargains given to individuals for their testimony under any circumstance, with exceptions made for perjury.

This is completely fine. I would imagine Member Nations that allow transactional immunity would not retract that immunity post-testimony for practical reasons, and I'm not sure they need to be told. Nations that got their testimony then immediately prosecuted the testifying witness (without very good cause) would find they quickly ran out of witnesses willing to cooperate with them. But I don't see any harm in just making sure...

Best Regards.

[Moronist Decisions]

Like we said before, we need to be able to detain people for psychiatric evaluation. Two hours is not long enough to find a psychiatrist.

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

What if someone was held in suspicion of one carjacking, released, and then was held again in suspicion of an unrelated carjacking?

[Connopolis]

Like we said before, we need to be able to detain people for psychiatric evaluation. Two hours is not long enough to find a psychiatrist.

Ambassador, I don't see your point. If an individual commits a crime, don't you charge them with the crime, and then contact a psychiatrist? I don't see how the clause in question is even relevant.

What if someone was held in suspicion of one carjacking, released, and then was held again in suspicion of an unrelated carjacking?

The same criminal charges, dear ambassador, not the same criminal offense.

Ex.

Bob robbed the first Bank of Nationville on December 7, 2012
Bob is held in detention, and is subsequently released
Bob is again detained for robbing the Bank of Nationville on December 7, 2012.

This would be illegal under the current wording.

Bob robbed the first Bank of Nationville December 7, 2012
Bob is held in detention, and is subsequently released
Bob robbed the first Bank of Nationville December 8, 2012
Bob is held in detention, and is subsequently released.

This, however, would be legal under the current resolution.

Yours,

[Libraria and Ausitoria]

We're in favour of this, but we have a small problem with it:

6. Once an individual has been acquitted of a crime, member states shall not try that individual for the same alleged criminal act again;

What about if there's new evidence?

Other than that, we fully agree with all of the points raised by Cowardly Pacifists.

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

What if someone was held in suspicion of one carjacking, released, and then was held again in suspicion of an unrelated carjacking?

Presumably, he'd be detained for the first carjacking, and then detained for the second carjacking; which are separate criminal charges?

[Quelesh]

Perhaps define "member states" as being that government, and all its judicial and security departments, and any 3rd party businesses and organizations in service to that government or its departments?

That's implicit, though. If a member state can't do something, then it can't pay a "private" company to do it either. GAR2 requires member states to comply in good faith with resolutions, and trying to end-run it that way doesn't sound like good faith compliance to me. Besides, it would unnecessarily inflate the character count.

1. Member states shall not detain any individual, without either formally charging or suspecting that individual of a criminal offense, for more than two hours in any seven-day period, four hours in any 30-day period or 24 hours in any 365-day period;

You'll pardon my saying so, but given the principles Your Honors have described in the preamble, I don't know why it is tolerable to detain someone for even one minute without at least "suspecting" that individual of a criminal offense. I would like to see this reworded so that a person who demands to terminate an encounter with police must immediately be released if the police do not have at least a good faith basis for suspecting that person of a crime.

I suspect that the reason for the (admittedly arbitrary) time limits of this provision is to ensure police may stop individuals to ask questions about a crime. But "detention" implies something more than that. It implies that one is not free to go. And as much as police may like to detain folks for two hours just for questioning, I don't see why they should be able to if they don't at least suspect that person of a crime. Police could still ask non-suspects to come down to the station for questioning (ask nicely, I should think). But a non-suspect shouldn't be "detained" against their will for even a brief time.

First, thank you very much for your intelligent critique.

You make a good point here. I may be open to changing this, but I'm not quite convinced. Ideally, only actual suspects should be detained against their will, but there are a few circumstances that may justify exceptions. The stop-for-questioning circumstance that you bring up is one of them. Another possibility is a public safety issue - say, police suspect there's a bomb in a building, and they briefly detain everyone in the building so they can make them evacuate and possibly briefly question and/or search them (this proposal doesn't go into reasonable search requirements).

The time limits are arbitrary, but I didn't want to open it up to further loopholes by saying "reasonable time" or something similar in this case. I'm also afraid that outright banning even very short suspicionless detention under all circumstances with no exceptions could have some negative unintended consequences.

2. Member states shall not detain any individual, solely on the suspicion that the individual has committed a criminal offense, for more than 36 hours without formally charging the individual with the offense. Periods of time in which the authorities responsible for formally charging the individual with a crime are not available to do so may be added to the aforementioned 36 hour time limit, to a maximum of 96 additional hours;

This is fine and dandy in principle. But I cannot agree with the arbitrary deadlines. Consider the long deadline of 132 hours. 132 hours may be a long time to wait for a formal charge of jaywalking. On the other hand, police may strongly suspect (i.e. have solid evidence) that a person committed a murder, but be unable to obtain a "formal" indictment after five-and-a-half days (perhaps the key witness to the murder is presently in another nation and needs to be transported back to testify to the grand jury). It's not right to require that the police let a (likely) murderer out of custody simply because they have not obtained an indictment within a week.

I would prefer a "reasonable time" standard, coupled with a right to challenge a term of pre-indictment detention as unreasonable. That should keep police from indefinitely detaining folks without charge, while also giving flexibility for situations where detaining a person beyond 132 hours would be just.

(Edit: whoops, that says 96 additional hours. I don't think going from 96 hours to 132 hours really defeats the argument I've made, so I just updated the previous paragraphs with the correct times and left the same content.)

I'll think about changing this. I'm definitely concerned that changing the time limit to "reasonable time" would create a significant loophole, even though the proposal does allow detainees to legally challenge their detention. I could keep the time limit, but allow an exception in "exceptional circumstances," subject to judicial review, but even then I'm not sure that would be stringent enough.

4. Member states shall not detain any individual who has been formally charged with a crime but who has not been convicted of that crime for any longer than is necessary to provide that individual with a speedy trial in accordance with international law;

Again, reasonable. Perhaps a right to challenge? That's what Habeas Corpus really means. "Bring the body," i.e. "Mr. Jailer, you have Mr. Good in your jail. He wrote us a letter saying that his detention is unjust. Please bring his body (alive) before this Court so that we may hear what he has to say."

This clause basically works in concert with GAR37 and its speedy trial requirement ("reasonable speed" is what that resolution says). This proposal itself does not actually require a speedy trial, but if a nation detains someone pre-trial for an "unreasonable" length of time, they could challenge their detention and be released. As far as this proposal is concerned, the nation could still proceed with the (non-speedy) trial after releasing the person, but GAR37 has something to say about that.

7. Member states may vacate an individual's conviction of a crime and either release the individual or grant the individual a new trial for that crime. If the individual is again convicted of the crime, the new sentence shall not be more severe than the old sentence, and any conditions of the old sentence that have been met shall count toward the completion of the new sentence;

This was once a favored practice in my nation as well. Unfortunately, it clogged our courts - as convicts would contest otherwise fair trials just to put financial pressure on the state. Sometimes, a state's resources would be overwhelmed and guilty folks would get a more favorable deal than they really deserved. We decided that it would cut down on non-meritorious appeals if we made the convicts live with the full effects of their decision to appeal. If they want a new trial - they got a new trial; new sentencing and all. Though we did (and still do) give them credit for time served.

But that's a personal anecdote. Suffice to say, I don't know why we need to tell nations to do this. Nations already have the power to vacate an individual's conviction and order a new trial if they so choose. Why then restrict what they can do with that new trial? If a prisoner says "my trial was unjust, I want a new one" why should the WA say "you may or may not have one, depending on the nation you're in. But if they give you one, we'll make sure they cannot fully reevaluate the propriety of your sentence."

My main concern here is nations punishing someone for appealing their conviction by sentencing them to a worse sentence if they're convicted again. It's possible that a sentence could be unreasonably lenient, then the person appeals the conviction, then they're convicted again and the state legitimately reevaluates the initial sentence as too lenient, but I don't think that would happen very frequently, and I don't see a way of allowing for that without opening up the possibility of punishing people for appealing. I also don't think it's fair for a person to be legitimately sentenced for a crime, and then to later have that sentence extended just because the state says that the initial sentence was "too lenient."

(This proposal itself doesn't actually require that member states give people the right to appeal a conviction at all, though it does require that people have the right to challenge the legality of the detention.)

9. Member states must allow all detained individuals to formally challenge the legality of their detention before an impartial adjudicator; should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must immediately release the individual;

I guess this is that challenge I was talking about earlier. To the extent that this applies to all phases of the criminal process, it is just fine and makes some of my earlier criticisms moot. Though may I suggest the following revision: "should the individual's detention be deemed in contravention of either the member state's domestic law or international law, the member state must either immediately cure the illegality, or else immediately release the individual." That way, if the problem is "they didn't charge me in a reasonable time" the state may "cure" rather than release (say, by immediately charging them and giving them credit toward their sentence/some restitution damages if they are acquitted).

That sounds reasonable, but the "immediately cure the illegality" language wouldn't actually require member states to give them the additional time-served credit towards their sentence or restitution upon acquittal. The state could just immediately charge the person (and that's after however long the habeas case lasted) with no restitution at all for the length of time they were wrongly detained, and the illegality would have been "cured" because they're no longer being detained without charge.

Like we said before, we need to be able to detain people for psychiatric evaluation. Two hours is not long enough to find a psychiatrist.

If someone is just walking down the street talking to herself about government agents reading her thoughts, but isn't bothering anyone, I don't see why you would need to detain her at all. If you suspect she's committed a crime, and she seems mentally ill, then you can find her a psychiatrist, but there's no reason why you shouldn't still have to abide by the time limits (36 hours before being charged, then a speedy trial after being charged).

That said, though, this proposal doesn't address psychiatric commitment. It addresses "detention," which I would say is sufficiently different from psychiatric commitment to alleviate your concerns.

3. Multiple separate detentions on suspicion of the same criminal charges shall cumulatively count towards the time limit in clause 2;

What if someone was held in suspicion of one carjacking, released, and then was held again in suspicion of an unrelated carjacking?

As Conn said, this only applies to repeated detentions on the same charges, not additional detentions for again allegedly violating the same statute in the future.

We're in favour of this, but we have a small problem with it:

6. Once an individual has been acquitted of a crime, member states shall not try that individual for the same alleged criminal act again;

What about if there's new evidence?

I'm sorry, but exceptions to the anti-double-jeopardy clause are unacceptable and cannot be entertained. There's no way to grant an exception without opening up a loophole can-of-worms. The state should ensure that it has adequate evidence to win a conviction before going to trial, and if it doesn't and the person is acquitted, the state is out of luck. It's unfair to subject an acquitted person to a second trial for the act of which she was acquitted. Once she's been acquitted, she should know that it's over; she shouldn't have to live in fear that the state is going to bring back the charges and put her on trial again.

[Ossitania]

No, no, no. If someone gets acquitted for a crime they committed because we do not have the technology necessary to find the evidence necessary to convict them, then later develop the technology and find the evidence, we reserve the right to appeal the earlier decision and try them again. If the defendant hides key evidence, the state is not culpable for the failure to convict and so the state should not be shackled further if that evidence is discovered later and they now have the necessary evidence to secure the conviction they missed out on initially. If the disputed clause is not going to be changed, we will feel obliged to both campaign against this resolution and draft our own counter-resolution to prevent this absurd castration of the natural systems of truth and justice.

[Quelesh]

No, no, no. If someone gets acquitted for a crime they committed because we do not have the technology necessary to find the evidence necessary to convict them, then later develop the technology and find the evidence, we reserve the right to appeal the earlier decision and try them again. If the defendant hides key evidence, the state is not culpable for the failure to convict and so the state should not be shackled further if that evidence is discovered later and they now have the necessary evidence to secure the conviction they missed out on initially. If the disputed clause is not going to be changed, we will feel obliged to both campaign against this resolution and draft our own counter-resolution to prevent this absurd castration of the natural systems of truth and justice.

My response to Lib's objection applies here as well. A prohibition of double jeopardy is not a "castration" of anything; rather, double jeopardy itself is a castration of fairness and justice. We will not allow any exceptions.

[Ossitania]

No, no, no. If someone gets acquitted for a crime they committed because we do not have the technology necessary to find the evidence necessary to convict them, then later develop the technology and find the evidence, we reserve the right to appeal the earlier decision and try them again. If the defendant hides key evidence, the state is not culpable for the failure to convict and so the state should not be shackled further if that evidence is discovered later and they now have the necessary evidence to secure the conviction they missed out on initially. If the disputed clause is not going to be changed, we will feel obliged to both campaign against this resolution and draft our own counter-resolution to prevent this absurd castration of the natural systems of truth and justice.

My response to Lib's objection applies here as well. A prohibition of double jeopardy is not a "castration" of anything; rather, double jeopardy itself is a castration of fairness and justice. We will not allow any exceptions.

Allowing the prohibition of double jeopardy to prevent justice running its course is just as bad as allowing double jeopardy itself to do the same thing. If your repeal passes, we will be taking a strong stance against the moral extremism of this proposal and will campaign ruthlessly to quash it.

[Quelesh]

I've submitted my repeal proposal. Delegates, please approve it. The sooner it passes, the sooner we can have real habeas corpus protections for everyone under WA jurisdiction.

[Quelesh]

My response to Lib's objection applies here as well. A prohibition of double jeopardy is not a "castration" of anything; rather, double jeopardy itself is a castration of fairness and justice. We will not allow any exceptions.

Allowing the prohibition of double jeopardy to prevent justice running its course is just as bad as allowing double jeopardy itself to do the same thing. If your repeal passes, we will be taking a strong stance against the moral extremism of this proposal and will campaign ruthlessly to quash it.

Double jeopardy is not justice. It is the failure of justice. I will certainly not be intimidated into abandoning the pursuit of justice for all just because one nation wants to be able to put people on trial repeatedly for the same alleged act.

[Ossitania]

Allowing the prohibition of double jeopardy to prevent justice running its course is just as bad as allowing double jeopardy itself to do the same thing. If your repeal passes, we will be taking a strong stance against the moral extremism of this proposal and will campaign ruthlessly to quash it.

Double jeopardy is not justice. It is the failure of justice. I will certainly not be intimidated into abandoning the pursuit of justice for all just because one nation wants to be able to put people on trial repeatedly for the same alleged act.

I do not want to repeatedly put people on trial, but if I can't get someone the first time due to lack of evidence, I am not going to stand for having my ability to retry that person at a later date should new and more conclusive evidence emerge completely destroyed by the insane moral extremism of the Queleshi delegation. If Quelesh is okay with letting known murderers and child rapists walk around in its country even when evidence exists that conclusively proves their guilt just because that evidence wasn't available the first time they were tried, then that's Quelesh's affairs and Quelesh is welcome to them. However, there is no way in hell I am letting Quelesh force its absurd moral ideas on to my nation at the cost of the justice and safety of my people and I doubt I'm the only nation who will take a stand against this ridiculous piece of legislation.

I don't expect you to be intimidated out of abandoning your insidious and morally bankrupt campaign to undermine the justice systems of all WA member-states; that's not what one generally expects out of extremists. Understand me, that was not a threat, it was a promise; I will kill this proposal in the water if I can and will leave the WA if I can't. Either way, I will not have my justice system wrecked by the absurd and dangerous brand of "morality" that you've chosen to peddle on the international stage

[Quelesh]

Double jeopardy is not justice. It is the failure of justice. I will certainly not be intimidated into abandoning the pursuit of justice for all just because one nation wants to be able to put people on trial repeatedly for the same alleged act.

I do not want to repeatedly put people on trial, but if I can't get someone the first time due to lack of evidence, I am not going to stand for having my ability to retry that person at a later date should new and more conclusive evidence emerge completely destroyed by the insane moral extremism of the Queleshi delegation. If Quelesh is okay with letting known murderers and child rapists walk around in its country even when evidence exists that conclusively proves their guilt just because that evidence wasn't available the first time they were tried, then that's Quelesh's affairs and Quelesh is welcome to them. However, there is no way in hell I am letting Quelesh force its absurd moral ideas on to my nation at the cost of the justice and safety of my people and I doubt I'm the only nation who will take a stand against this ridiculous piece of legislation.

I don't expect you to be intimidated out of abandoning your insidious and morally bankrupt campaign to undermine the justice systems of all WA member-states; that's not what one generally expects out of extremists. Understand me, that was not a threat, it was a promise; I will kill this proposal in the water if I can and will leave the WA if I can't. Either way, I will not have my justice system wrecked by the absurd and dangerous brand of "morality" that you've chosen to peddle on the international stage

How often do people in Ossitania commit murder or child rape and then get acquitted for lack of evidence, only for conclusive proof of guilt to turn up after the trial's over? If that happens frequently in your country, I would submit that there's something wrong with your justice system that has nothing to do with double jeopardy.

We can't allow Ossitania to retry these rogue murderers or child rapists who are amazingly good at hiding evidence until after the trial's over without possibly subjecting innocent acquitted people to an unfair retrial. The finality of an acquittal is a fundamental feature of any fair justice system.

[Ryouese Black Islands]

Against this stupid Proposal.

[Ossitania]

How often do people in Ossitania commit murder or child rape and then get acquitted for lack of evidence, only for conclusive proof of guilt to turn up after the trial's over? If that happens frequently in your country, I would submit that there's something wrong with your justice system that has nothing to do with double jeopardy.

We can't allow Ossitania to retry these rogue murderers or child rapists who are amazingly good at hiding evidence until after the trial's over without possibly subjecting innocent acquitted people to an unfair retrial. The finality of an acquittal is a fundamental feature of any fair justice system.

The finality of a just acquittal. All realistic justice systems are also fitted with safeguards to account for the fact that people are imperfect and can make mistakes. Quelesh's idea of a fair justice system seems to be one that is shackled to the point of being unable to adequately deliver justice to its people. You're more than welcome to your irrational and paranoid distrust of the judiciary, but when your personal vendetta against the justice system threatens the safety of my kinsmen, we have a problem. Your insane crusade against the injustice of double jeopardy is leading you to creating a whole other brand of injustice all of your own.

You claim you can't allow us to retry criminals when new evidence emerges without subjecting innocent people to unfair retrial. So is the injustice delivered to the victims of these criminals a worthy price to pay to avoid the injustice delivered to the other group? Has your nation never heard the old adage "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere"? How can you say it's okay to allow one kind of injustice but not another? Why not try and reach a middle ground between the two? What's wrong with a stipulation allowing retrial if significant evidence is presented that the original verdict was wrong?

I hardly know why I'm bothering to argue with the Queleshi delegation anymore. They've demonstrated repeatedly that they are unwilling to compromise even slightly on their extremist libertarian philosophy. I can only assume you live in some sort of anarcho-communist utopian paradise and have forgotten what the real world outside your borders is like.

[Paper Flowers]

How often do people in Ossitania commit murder or child rape and then get acquitted for lack of evidence, only for conclusive proof of guilt to turn up after the trial's over? If that happens frequently in your country, I would submit that there's something wrong with your justice system that has nothing to do with double jeopardy.

We would suggest that it does not need to happen frequently for it to be worth keeping the possibility open, by all means place tight restrictions on the circumstances that one may be re-tried, require that there be 100% fool-proof evidence that the person being re-tried is obviously guilty but to remove the option all together is simply idiotic and serves no purpose other than to undermine the legal systems of the WA.

We can't allow Ossitania to retry these rogue murderers or child rapists who are amazingly good at hiding evidence until after the trial's over without possibly subjecting innocent acquitted people to an unfair retrial. The finality of an acquittal is a fundamental feature of any fair justice system.

You can keep using that word "fair" as much as you wish, that does not make it any more true.

I will kill this proposal in the water if I can and will leave the WA if I can't.

We would hate to see this happen and would suggest that careful reading of the proposal as it stands may offer certain solutions that would allow one to remain in compliance with the proposal without restricting law enforcement officials from carrying out their duties.

[Connopolis]

The argument that double jeopardy should not be restricted due to the possibility of post-trial findings of conclusive evidence is absolutely ridiculous, as well as an extremely irresponsible policy. I should hope that Ossitania does not attempt to try criminals without already having concluded that their evidence is solid; I think it is extremely poor form to oppose a proposal on the grounds that one's judicial system is ineffective, or that the slipshod quality of their trials necessitate instances of double jeopardy. However, we do not think the aforementioned of Ossitania - to the contrary, we are confident in the quality of their justice system. Rather, it seems to be paranoia and misconception that cloud your Excellency's judgement. Whatever the case may be, my delegation (and I am sure that his Excellency of Quelesh would share this opinion) hopes to see your Excellency carefully consider the injustice of double jeopardy, and why its only effective use is that of inequitable punishment.

Yours in hope,

[Sanctaria]

The Ambassadors from Quelesh and Connopolis are being disingenuous in their responses to the good Ambassador from Ossitania. They are naive in their thinking if they believe that the justice system is as black and white as they make it out to be.

The Ambassadors must be aware that it is not inconceivable that new evidence may come to light after the fact. I agree, it's not a common occurrence, and if it never happens in either of the Ambassadors' home nations, well done to them. But the fact is not every nation's justice system may be the same quality as the Queleshi or Connopolitan one where there is a solid 100% chance of every case being so well and thoroughly investigated that even the theory of new evidence coming to light is immediately dismissed.

[Connopolis]

The Ambassadors from Quelesh and Connopolis are being disingenuous in their responses to the good Ambassador from Ossitania. They are naive in their thinking if they believe that the justice system is as black and white as they make it out to be.

The Ambassadors must be aware that it is not inconceivable that new evidence may come to light after the fact. I agree, it's not a common occurrence, and if it never happens in either of the Ambassadors' home nations, well done to them. But the fact is not every nation's justice system may be the same quality as the Queleshi or Connopolitan one where there is a solid 100% chance of every case being so well and thoroughly investigated that even the theory of new evidence coming to light is immediately dismissed.

That is not what we have been arguing, Doctor Ferguson. We are arguing that any instance of double jeopardy, or scenarios in which double jeopardy is possible, an injustice is being done to the acquitted. A legitimate, impartial state judiciary deemed the individual innocent - it is both unjust, and loathsome to retract their decision due to their inability to adequately convict the individual the first time. Connopolis acutely believes that no individual deserves to live in the fear of facing a second trial, and I will echo this sentiment until the end of time.

Yours hiding conclusive evidence,

[Sanctaria]

The Ambassadors from Quelesh and Connopolis are being disingenuous in their responses to the good Ambassador from Ossitania. They are naive in their thinking if they believe that the justice system is as black and white as they make it out to be.

The Ambassadors must be aware that it is not inconceivable that new evidence may come to light after the fact. I agree, it's not a common occurrence, and if it never happens in either of the Ambassadors' home nations, well done to them. But the fact is not every nation's justice system may be the same quality as the Queleshi or Connopolitan one where there is a solid 100% chance of every case being so well and thoroughly investigated that even the theory of new evidence coming to light is immediately dismissed.

That is not what we have been arguing, Doctor Ferguson. We are arguing that any instance of double jeopardy, or scenarios in which double jeopardy is possible, an injustice is being done to the acquitted. A legitimate, impartial state judiciary deemed the individual innocent - it is both unjust, and loathsome to retract their decision due to their inability to adequately convict the individual the first time. Connopolis acutely believes that no individual deserves to live in the fear of facing a second trial, and I will echo this sentiment until the end of time.

Yours hiding conclusive evidence,

The impartial, state judiciary you reference, Ambassador, made their decision based on the evidence they had at the time. If an individual is acquitted due to that evidence not holding up, then I'm not going to argue. However, for example, if a video tape appears 10 years later of that person committing the same crime (s)he was acquitted of, I see no reason why the safety of the public should be continued to be put at risk due to the previous mistakes of the nation's prosecution and investigatory services.

[Ossitania]

Ah, I was wondering when the delegation from Connopolis would show up to argue against things that no one ever said with their own special brand of sophistry and rhetoric. I am not arguing that double jeopardy should not be restricted at all. Double jeopardy needs to be restricted. But it should not be restricted to such an extent that it creates just as much injustice as the restrictions are attempting to prevent. Have the ambassadors considered a scenario where there was evidence but it was not convincing enough for the jury - and then the later evidence is sufficiently convincing? Not all wrongful acquittals are the fault of the legal system and unless one of the delegations can show some evidence themselves to back this "argument" up, we will not entertain this baseless argument further.

There is no negotiation to be had. Unless there is some capacity for retrial motivated by new evidence, we will do everything in our power to oppose this resolution. We will not see justice undone by the moral extremism of a handful of radical nations.

[Connopolis]

Ah, I was wondering when the delegation from Connopolis would show up to argue against things that no one ever said with their own special brand of sophistry and rhetoric. I am not arguing that double jeopardy should not be restricted at all. Double jeopardy needs to be restricted. But it should not be restricted to such an extent that it creates just as much injustice as the restrictions are attempting to prevent. Have the ambassadors considered a scenario where there was evidence but it was not convincing enough for the jury - and then the later evidence is sufficiently convincing? Not all wrongful acquittals are the fault of the legal system and unless one of the delegations can show some evidence themselves to back this "argument" up, we will not entertain this baseless argument further.

There is no negotiation to be had. Unless there is some capacity for retrial motivated by new evidence, we will do everything in our power to oppose this resolution. We will not see justice undone by the moral extremism of a handful of radical nations.

OOC:

IC:

Ambassador, I cannot speak for Quelesh, but as co-author, I do hope my suggestions carry some weight; would a provision that allows prosecutors to appeal to acquittals, and challenge their validity be a sufficient medium through which we can circumvent your dilemma?

Yours,

[Ossitania]

OOC:

IC:

Ambassador, I cannot speak for Quelesh, but as co-author, I do hope my suggestions carry some weight; would a provision that allows prosecutors to appeal to acquittals, and challenge their validity be a sufficient medium through which we can circumvent your dilemma?

Yours,

That would be precisely what we are asking for, but we will not be jumping to change our position until we see the change in the draft and that requires the agreement of the Queleshi delegation.

[Cowardly Pacifists]

I've been following this debate about double jeopardy for a while. I think I understand the concerns of both sides, and I've drafted a provision which I think might satisfy everyone (or piss everyone off):

New test in red:

6. Once an individual has been acquitted of a crime, member states shall not try that individual for the same alleged criminal act again - except, in cases involving very serious offenses, member states may try an individual after acquittal if the state first proves to an impartial tribunal that new evidence has come to light which strongly indicates the individual's guilt, and which could not reasonably have been known or obtained at the time of the original trial;

What do you think?