NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Type 08

[Gallia-]

1) The 75mm was specifically chosen because it was good at killing tanks. Please stop repeating baseless myths and read the actual doctrinal manual about the employment of the Medium Tank. This is almost as bad as saying the 5.56x45mm is "designed to wound" because "casualties consume more resources/takes two guys to carry one/bleeding friends screaming hurts morale".

2) One Tiger hit a mine. The rest were destroyed by anti-tank guns, artillery fire, bad weather, and close air support from Allied troops. Minefields didn't stop the attacks, incompetence on part of the Germans and superiority of Allied artillery and anti-tank guns did. Mostly the latter.

25-pounders inflicted far more casualties, and far more catastrophic kills, on German armour than any piddly minefield in Tunisia.

3) The Germans were always incompetent tankers, incompetent generals, or both. Shermans beat Panthers because Panthers were poorly operated, by poorly trained crews, lacking a coherent support structure and understanding of combined arms. The fact that the Germans got as far as they did in the war is mostly a fluke due to luck of geography in the West and political parlour games in the East. Very few things happened strategically that were directly influenced by the Germans in their favour, most was a result of mistakes and fumbles on part of the Allies.

The performance of the German Army in May 1940 was in no small part due to the Allied armies being out of position, which was essentially the whole reason France fell. For a variety of reasons, the French government was unwilling to give Gamelin permission to use the Eschaut river as a staged area for his armoured reserves, so he had to push deeper into Belgium. Even if he'd assumed the attack would have come from Gembloux and Hannut, the positioning of the French Seventh Army on the Eschaut would have destroyed Kleist's divisions at worst. Facing armour, and more importantly tankers, more competent than their own in a strong defensive position would be a huge challenge to overcome.

At best, they would be forced to move southwards and assume the secondary objective of the Manstein Plan in the event the grand flanking was unsuccessful: taking Paris. It would be precarious, to say the least, for Kleist and Rundstedt.

By the time D-Day and ETO got started, this was keenly obvious to the most bone-headed German general. It would have been noticeable in North Africa, too, since Rommel was a rather poor performer against the likes of Monty, but you could chalk this up to Rommel's own personal incompetence rather than a structural failing of the German training system and Prussian officer culture. The strategic situation of the Germans wasn't merely reflected in their tactical ability, it was a direct result of it.

Tanks, ideally, have no real "specialization" of the sort that you seem to be implying. They should be useful in open and closed terrain. Tiger and Panther were marginal in both due to their poor automotive reliability and lack of sophisticated gunnery systems comparable to Allied armour. Allied equipment was superior to the Germans by '43, being generous, and by D-Day their equipment was hopeless against a combination of superior training and technology the Western Allies had mustered between the Fall of France and the landing.

4) A "rushed design" is shit, sorry. Panzer IV was the only decent tank the Nazis built during the entire war, unfortunately for them they disagreed. Fortunately for the Allies, they wasted large quantities of steel on making Tigers and Panthers and probably shortened the war by a month as a result.

A good Tiger or Panther crew could beat a Sherman tank, sure. What about a Tiger platoon? Or a Panther platoon? Maybe the Panther is better, it could actually self-deploy reasonable distances before breaking down and needing to be abandoned. Considering the US Army specifically fought Tiger tanks in ETO less than five times, and 75mm Shermans were able to defeat similar quantities of German Panthers with a comparable loss ratio, it's safe to say that the 75mm was more than sufficient for like 99.99% of tank battles.

Unfortunately the report has escaped me at the moment, but the US Army found the Sherman several times more effective on defense and attack than German tanks, specifically "Mark V" Panthers. I believe it was something like 2x and 5x respectively. Unfortunately this disparity can't be contributed solely to crew training, the Sherman was just more effective.

5) They also knew it probably wouldn't matter significantly, because Tiger tanks were a one-in-a-million and Panther tanks weren't especially threatening. Royal Tiger might have made an appearance once ever in ETO, and Sherman was superior to every other German tank fielded. 76mm, regardless, was not a conspiracy to keep the 76mm from happening by AGF or McNair or Devers or whatever. It was the tank division commanders deciding on D-Day they simply didn't want to complicate ammunition supply with a new type of round and new turret/gun just prior to an incredibly huge invasion where it might go poorly.

They just wanted something better to put the M1 on that wasn't a M4 Medium, so they fucked around with a lot of weird and broken ass experimental tanks before resigning themselves to Sherman.

6) Well specifically I meant the Firefly. Comet was great, Crusader was alright, Matilda II was great, etc. It only fell on its face when it used American engines or tanks or whatever and tried to fit weird British things into it. British guns being designed for TARDIS and American engines built for small tractors, it didn't work very well. Cromwell was the only good result of Anglo-American engineering.

7) Look it up?

Krajina Express rocked a Hellcat in one of the railcars. F-15s reported multiple M18s destroyed on bombing runs in Serbia in BDA imagery. Pak 43s were used by all sides, along with Flak 37s and modified mounts using rocket launchers instead of the 88mm. Pak 43s in JNA service had modern ammunition made, using tungsten cores, in the late '80s. Would have cracked an Abrams or Leopard 2 from the side or rear flank and killed an engine I guess.

The US even bought M36s from the Croats after the war because 1) Croats are baller motherfuckers; 2) Museums.

[Tundrastan]

snip

Then conversely, it's far too much artillery, at 600 pieces for the division. Really, the number of tanks and artillery pieces you have is the equivalent of an entire corps of 50,000+ personnel, not a ponderous division of 27,000. And that's aside from the anemic supporting units. 200 trucks is not enough to supply a thousand tanks, six hundred howitzers, over seven hundred mortars, and an entire aviation brigade (plus the infantry and other sections). Nor is what amounts to a platoon of signals personnel adequate to manage the hilarious complexity of such a unit's communications network.

I think you should really sit back and take a look at a real world division and its proportions, which exist as they do for very good reasons. There's plenty of information readily available on US, British, Russian/Soviet, and a host of other armies and their organizations. But most of it needs to be heavily rebalanced and reproportioned.

The supportive units are per brigade, so you get 5 times that in a division. I might do better putting those supportive units for a whole division, all amouns times 5 then instead of per brigade.
To reply on the amounts of arty and tanks. I wanted to make the tundrastanian forces as versatile as possible. Not a single unit will ever feel like fighting alone. Every action will be under the cover of artillery shells and UAV surveillance, and the troops in the action will consist of an equal mix of armor and infantry( unless when the location doesn't suit that style) with attack helicopters ready to support as well. That's also why I put 2 mortar squads in every Infantry company, for high speed reaction to threats. Indeed if I want such a close connection between units the signal group could
use an upgrade. If I double the amount to 500, thats one signaler for every 54 men(also note every soldier has his own headset in their helmet so signalers only make sure all connections are maintained, and the right information is relayed from point A to B, while protecting the network from cyber attacks)

[The Kievan People]

3) The Germans were always incompetent tankers, incompetent generals, or both. Shermans beat Panthers because Panthers were poorly operated, by poorly trained crews, lacking a coherent support structure and understanding of combined arms. The fact that the Germans got as far as they did in the war is mostly a fluke due to luck of geography in the West and political parlour games in the East. Very few things happened strategically that were directly influenced by the Germans in their favour, most was a result of mistakes and fumbles on part of the Allies.

The performance of the German Army in May 1940 was in no small part due to the Allied armies being out of position, which was essentially the whole reason France fell. For a variety of reasons, the French government was unwilling to give Gamelin permission to use the Eschaut river as a staged area for his armoured reserves, so he had to push deeper into Belgium. Even if he'd assumed the attack would have come from Gembloux and Hannut, the positioning of the French Seventh Army on the Eschaut would have destroyed Kleist's divisions at worst. Facing armour, and more importantly tankers, more competent than their own in a strong defensive position would be a huge challenge to overcome.

At best, they would be forced to move southwards and assume the secondary objective of the Manstein Plan in the event the grand flanking was unsuccessful: taking Paris. It would be precarious, to say the least, for Kleist and Rundstedt.

By the time D-Day and ETO got started, this was keenly obvious to the most bone-headed German general. It would have been noticeable in North Africa, too, since Rommel was a rather poor performer against the likes of Monty, but you could chalk this up to Rommel's own personal incompetence rather than a structural failing of the German training system and Prussian officer culture. The strategic situation of the Germans wasn't merely reflected in their tactical ability, it was a direct result of it..

You need to relax a bit bro.

Pointing out there are a lot of myths about the Sherman is fine and good. But now you are wrapping around and becoming a wanker.

[Atomic Utopia]

So, I was thinking of tanks. Regardless of weather they are nuclear powered or powered by pathetic chemical engines I will need radiation shielding from nuclear weapons. So naturally I have come up with an idea. The outer layer of the shielding (which would be under almost all the armor) would be 4 cm of lithium-hydride. This is because lithium-hydride is a good neutron moderator. Next would be about 1cm of cadmium. After that would be around 16 cm of depleted uranium. So would this be a reasonable layout?

Tanks in advance for the assistance.

[Gallia-]

3) The Germans were always incompetent tankers, incompetent generals, or both. Shermans beat Panthers because Panthers were poorly operated, by poorly trained crews, lacking a coherent support structure and understanding of combined arms. The fact that the Germans got as far as they did in the war is mostly a fluke due to luck of geography in the West and political parlour games in the East. Very few things happened strategically that were directly influenced by the Germans in their favour, most was a result of mistakes and fumbles on part of the Allies.

The performance of the German Army in May 1940 was in no small part due to the Allied armies being out of position, which was essentially the whole reason France fell. For a variety of reasons, the French government was unwilling to give Gamelin permission to use the Eschaut river as a staged area for his armoured reserves, so he had to push deeper into Belgium. Even if he'd assumed the attack would have come from Gembloux and Hannut, the positioning of the French Seventh Army on the Eschaut would have destroyed Kleist's divisions at worst. Facing armour, and more importantly tankers, more competent than their own in a strong defensive position would be a huge challenge to overcome.

At best, they would be forced to move southwards and assume the secondary objective of the Manstein Plan in the event the grand flanking was unsuccessful: taking Paris. It would be precarious, to say the least, for Kleist and Rundstedt.

By the time D-Day and ETO got started, this was keenly obvious to the most bone-headed German general. It would have been noticeable in North Africa, too, since Rommel was a rather poor performer against the likes of Monty, but you could chalk this up to Rommel's own personal incompetence rather than a structural failing of the German training system and Prussian officer culture. The strategic situation of the Germans wasn't merely reflected in their tactical ability, it was a direct result of it..

You need to relax a bit bro.

Pointing out there are a lot of myths about the Sherman is fine and good. But now you are wrapping around and becoming a wanker.

Wehraboo is triggering. ):

[Gallia-]

So, I was thinking of tanks. Regardless of weather they are nuclear powered or powered by pathetic chemical engines I will need radiation shielding from nuclear weapons. So naturally I have come up with an idea. The outer layer of the shielding (which would be under almost all the armor) would be 4 cm of lithium-hydride. This is because lithium-hydride is a good neutron moderator. Next would be about 1cm of cadmium. After that would be around 16 cm of depleted uranium. So would this be a reasonable layout?

Tanks in advance for the assistance.

Real tanks just use borated polyethylene or some other plastic lining the crew compartment(s).

[Atomic Utopia]

So, I was thinking of tanks. Regardless of weather they are nuclear powered or powered by pathetic chemical engines I will need radiation shielding from nuclear weapons. So naturally I have come up with an idea. The outer layer of the shielding (which would be under almost all the armor) would be 4 cm of lithium-hydride. This is because lithium-hydride is a good neutron moderator. Next would be about 1cm of cadmium. After that would be around 16 cm of depleted uranium. So would this be a reasonable layout?

Tanks in advance for the assistance.

Real tanks just use borated polyethylene or some other plastic lining the crew compartment(s).

Yeah, about that, that would be utter shit against gammas due to it being made of low z number elements, though I think that would be better than the lithium-hydride against high energy neutrons by nature of being relatively easy to handle.

[San Benedict e San Francesco]

Question, from the perspective of realism.

I'm a member of a region that's currently desperately trying to avoid our WWII analogue. As a nation that was historically almost entirely disarmed for the last X centuries of an ill-defined history, a previous, interwar-era conflict now has us looking for an actual army. Being a banking power (owing to our neutrality), I'm less concerned about cost than speed.

Is it still reasonable, however, to press as much surplus equipment as I can get my hands on into service, and worry about standardizing on locally-produced hardware a decade down the line, circa the late 40s? Or would training-lag mean that it's actually easier for local production to outpace the growth of an army that's growing from about 6000 to 60,000?

Yes, I realize a tenfold increase in ten years is... extreme.

[The Kievan People]

Yeah, about that, that would be utter shit against gammas due to it being made of low z number elements, though I think that would be better than the lithium-hydride against high energy neutrons by nature of being relatively easy to handle.

The steel hull already provides decent gamma ray protection (10-20 fold reduction). Neutron shielding was introduced to bring neutron protection in line with gamma protection because bare tanks only reduced neutron dose by a factor of 2-3.

[The Akasha Colony]

The supportive units are per brigade, so you get 5 times that in a division. I might do better putting those supportive units for a whole division, all amouns times 5 then instead of per brigade.

You might also consider using NATO standard TO&E guidelines.

To reply on the amounts of arty and tanks. I wanted to make the tundrastanian forces as versatile as possible. Not a single unit will ever feel like fighting alone. Every action will be under the cover of artillery shells and UAV surveillance, and the troops in the action will consist of an equal mix of armor and infantry( unless when the location doesn't suit that style) with attack helicopters ready to support as well. That's also why I put 2 mortar squads in every Infantry company, for high speed reaction to threats.

Having that many tanks or artillery pieces is not what makes a division flexible. It's what makes it slow, unwieldy, and nigh impossible to coordinate and control because the logistics and management are so complex. Versatility isn't about having more, it's about having the right proportions of men and materiel needed to do a series of jobs organized in a way that makes command and control possible.

If you look at IRL units that are designed to be versatile, you will notice that none have even proposed such hilarious numbers of fighting vehicles. US Army armored brigades mix tanks and mechanized infantry at the battalion level and include integrated fires at the brigade level, making them very versatile even though they don't have extreme numbers of either. Stryker brigades mix infantry with self-propelled mortar support at the company level, while also avoiding such excessively large formations. They combine the tools they need, without getting ridiculously huge.

The very notion of a "do everything division" in this regard is a bit extreme, and unnecessary. For one, this division will have close to zero strategic mobility, it's simply too large and heavy. It likewise has no real strengths aside from being big. There are good reasons why units are focused around either infantry, or tanks, or such. It makes them far more cost effective at providing specific capabilities, and allows them to be more focused toward a particular role. This is not a bad thing. There is a reason why militaries do it. It's the difference between using a single swiss army knife for a job versus a set of dedicated tools.

None of what you wrote or have said is an actual justification for a "division" with more tanks and artillery than a corps. 27,000 men for that many fighting vehicles is simply a pipe dream. It doesn't solve the command issues either (the US tried pentomic formations, it was not successful). Against an opposing force with a similar number of fighting vehicles (which would be several independent divisions), it would be quickly defeated.

Indeed if I want such a close connection between units the signal group could
use an upgrade. If I double the amount to 500, thats one signaler for every 54 men(also note every soldier has his own headset in their helmet so signalers only make sure all connections are maintained, and the right information is relayed from point A to B, while protecting the network from cyber attacks)

But those are the parts that make it complicated. Military communications networks are extremely complicated things, and that's aside from the question of end-user hardware. I was never talking about whether your troops have headsets, but the manpower required to maintain the number of communications nodes such a force would require is significant.

[Husseinarti]

Question, from the perspective of realism.

I'm a member of a region that's currently desperately trying to avoid our WWII analogue. As a nation that was historically almost entirely disarmed for the last X centuries of an ill-defined history, a previous, interwar-era conflict now has us looking for an actual army. Being a banking power (owing to our neutrality), I'm less concerned about cost than speed.

Is it still reasonable, however, to press as much surplus equipment as I can get my hands on into service, and worry about standardizing on locally-produced hardware a decade down the line, circa the late 40s? Or would training-lag mean that it's actually easier for local production to outpace the growth of an army that's growing from about 6000 to 60,000?

Yes, I realize a tenfold increase in ten years is... extreme.

The US went from 450,000 troops in their armed forces to over 12,000,000 in just 5 years.

[Hurtful Thoughts]

Question, from the perspective of realism.

I'm a member of a region that's currently desperately trying to avoid our WWII analogue. As a nation that was historically almost entirely disarmed for the last X centuries of an ill-defined history, a previous, interwar-era conflict now has us looking for an actual army. Being a banking power (owing to our neutrality), I'm less concerned about cost than speed.

Is it still reasonable, however, to press as much surplus equipment as I can get my hands on into service, and worry about standardizing on locally-produced hardware a decade down the line, circa the late 40s? Or would training-lag mean that it's actually easier for local production to outpace the growth of an army that's growing from about 6000 to 60,000?

Yes, I realize a tenfold increase in ten years is... extreme.

As long as you kep things standardized platoon-levels and down you'll be fine, if the company quartermaster fowls-up a supply-run then only a couple of platoons get SOL and get issued shovels.

But make sure everyone's on the same page of tactics and limitations of their comrades. ye?

That way you can field some up-gunned bob-semples:

[Galba Dea]

Question, from the perspective of realism.

I'm a member of a region that's currently desperately trying to avoid our WWII analogue. As a nation that was historically almost entirely disarmed for the last X centuries of an ill-defined history, a previous, interwar-era conflict now has us looking for an actual army. Being a banking power (owing to our neutrality), I'm less concerned about cost than speed.

Is it still reasonable, however, to press as much surplus equipment as I can get my hands on into service, and worry about standardizing on locally-produced hardware a decade down the line, circa the late 40s? Or would training-lag mean that it's actually easier for local production to outpace the growth of an army that's growing from about 6000 to 60,000?

Yes, I realize a tenfold increase in ten years is... extreme.

As long as you kep things standardized platoon-levels and down you'll be fine, if the company quartermaster fowls-up a supply-run then only a couple of platoons get SOL and get issued shovels.

But make sure everyone's on the same page of tactics and limitations of their comrades. ye?

Supply chain nightmare, too. You might want to at least make a deal with one particular partner nation for one particular weapon of each role, otherwise you're going to have multiple rounds for, say, your standard rifle.

[The Soodean Imperium]

I feel like everyone's been posting their Divisions lately, so I might as well finish work on my own. Still WIP but all the basics are there.

Soodean Motorized Infantry Division

To provide a little background, this is a unit intended to fight as part of a large-scale conventional conflict against a parity neighbor. Expeditionary warfare is only a minor concern for the Soodean Military, to the point that I might leave it exclusively to the Marine Infantry, and Counter-Insurgency would only consist of making sure that enemy militia don't harass my supply lines. As some of you may notice, this Division is built on the Soviet 3:1:1 model, but is a little bit beefier as a result of some changes I've made in the front-line and supporting units. I don't yet consider it a completed work, which is why I've posted it here to get feedback before I start finalizing it and figuring out the subunits.

A few questions and concerns I have so far, in addition to any other problems anyone finds:

1. Do my intelligence and C4I assets look sufficient? I'm currently aiming for the "middle ground" of an army that was previously technologically inferior, but is now trying to catch up with the help of electronics imported from allies. This would represent an "ideal" unit, in practice not all would have the full EW Battalion.

2. It seems I'm a little heavy on AA, particularly SPAAGs and IR-SAMs. This is partly to make up for the relative weakness of Soodean Military Aviation, and partly in anticipation of massive A-10 spam on the part of my opponent, but have I overdone it to the point that I'm needlessly straining my budget and logistics?

3. Re: helicopters: Right now my Division has a "transport squadron" with 12 each of "Medium" (Mi-8/Ch-47 class) and "Light" (Ka-60/Z-9 class) helicopters. Is this all right, or should I go for all Light/all Medium?

4. Is my Divisional Artillery sufficient to crush incompetent questrians or should I add another SPG or MLRS battalion? Or, alternatively, expand from 18-gun to 24-gun battalions?

[Schwere Panzer Abieltung 502]

big words

Okay this numbering thing is really starting to annoy me, so I'll get back to the original point, that the 75mm M3 was not as good an AT gun as other weapons available.

From a numbers standpoint, the 75mm APCBC has 88mm of penetration vs RHA at 100m. That's enough to penetrate the Pz III and IV, but not the Panther or Tigers from the front. The Panther's very thin side armor made flanking shots very deadly, but the Tiger's very thick side and rear armor meant that Shermans had to close in to knife-fighting range to kill them. Yes, Tigers were not common - but they were there. More so on the Eastern Front.

Most German guns, meanwhile(for example the KwK 40 L/48 used on all post-43 Pz IVs) had much better penetration. To continue using the KwK 40 as an example, it had 106mm of penetration vs RHA at 100m - better than the 75mm gun, and enough to kill most versions of the Sherman; as far as the guns go, the KwK 40's higher muzzle velocity(790m/s vs 619m/s) meant that the German gun remained effective much farther out. The 75mm M3 was, after all, based off the old French field gun.

The Sherman-equipped armies were able to win in most cases because they had much better support and, frankly, being on the offense is much better than being on the defense. You get to pick all parameters of the battles. The Germans before the Kurskgrad failures were able to achieve their victories partially through Soviet incompetence, but also because they kept the Soviets on the defensive, always reacting. This situation was totally reversed when the Allies landed in Normandy, and this shows. The last blitzkrieg-style operation of the war, the Ardennes offensive, put the Germans back on the offensive, and this shows as well; the Battle of the Bulge was the costliest battle (for the US at least) of the war, and though the Germans didn't have a chance of achieving their objectives, it showed they were not shitty when they were put on the offensive.

[Imperializt Russia]

Why MBT in recon battalion ?

Recce in force. Works like this: Pick fight (MBTs), see what comes out.

Surprisingly effective.

Was it a tactic WarPac forces were particularly interested in?

Where would they go in the platoon?

You aren't one of those odd folks with a weapons squad are you?

The actual producers issue them at a company level (i assume as part of a weapons platoon, i'm not that familiar with how they do things).

Im not quite familiar with how squad and platoon level stuff is issued, although I seem to remember USMC platoons get Carl Gs?

As for what you are saying, it makes sense. I have weapons companies with ATGMs, and weapons platoons with PF-98s. Sound good?

Carl Gustav is a general-purpose grenadier weapon that can deal damage to tanks and kill most lightly armoured vehicles. Much the same with the RPG-7, though its anti-tank properties are quite high up the priority list.

PF-98 is very heavy system whose primary purpose is as an anti-tank piece, which can also throw HE long distances (supposedly 1800m, well beyond any reasonable expectation of a platoon's capabilities).

Real tanks just use borated polyethylene or some other plastic lining the crew compartment(s).

Yeah, about that, that would be utter shit against gammas due to it being made of low z number elements, though I think that would be better than the lithium-hydride against high energy neutrons by nature of being relatively easy to handle.

It would not be "utter shit", it would be less effective than, say, lead.
We know it is not "utter shit" because tanks have sufficed without novel radiation protection measures throughout the entire cold war.

Tanks have two major advantages against nuclear attack. They're full of metal and they're unlikely to be at or near the centre of a burst where the radiation flux is strongest. If it's at or near the burst centre, the crew will likely be killed anyway by various means so radiation protection is irrelevant.

When I was interning at a nuclear engineering company three years ago, I was working on data analysis for sample sources using a lead castle. The project supervisor pointed out that technically, DU would be a better shield because higher Z, despite being a gamma emitter itself.
The lead was still entirely sufficient. It doesn't mean that using DU is suddenly practical, certainly not necessary.

[The Akasha Colony]

big words

Okay this numbering thing is really starting to annoy me, so I'll get back to the original point, that the 75mm M3 was not as good an AT gun as other weapons available.

The thing is, whether better guns are available is irrelevant. The question is whether the gun in question does its job adequately. And it did. It was sufficient to engage and destroy the vast majority of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles the US encountered and expected to encounter. This is what the Sherman with the M3 was expected to do. And this is what it did.

By your own logic, there were better weapons available than KwK 36, so clearly the Tiger was underarmed!

[Celibrae]

The PF-98 launcher has a weight of under 10kg, compared to the Carl Gs 9.5 kg. I assume your referring to its capabilities rather than weight when you say heavy?

[Imperializt Russia]

The CG fires an 83mm shell, the RPG-7 fires a number of warheads which are all sub-105mm and are simply warheads fitted to 40mm rocket engines with booster charges.

PF-98 is not only newer than either launcher, but fires a 120mm shell. It stands to reason this ammunition is substantially heavier and heftier than most grenadier-useful launchers.

[Padnak]

-snip snip snip-

I can't really speak to any of your questions with any degree of authority, but I think the number of air defense units you have is perfectly reasonable given the size of the divisions first line units

I'd add a long range MLRS platoon myself, preferably armed with your nations equivalent of the BM-27, to support your forces from the divisions rear area. Assuming that your division is intended to fight in soviet style where the divisions area of operation is extremely deep but fairly narrow

[The Soodean Imperium]

I'd add a long range MLRS platoon myself, preferably armed with your nations equivalent of the BM-27, to support your forces from the divisions rear area. Assuming that your division is intended to fight in soviet style where the divisions area of operation is extremely deep but fairly narrow

I already have an equivalent to the BM-27 - the Rakyet-Balsa RB 23-24 - but it would be assigned at the Corps (or Soviet Army) level, with the even lulzier RB 40-8 at the Army (or Soviet Front) level.

I have occasionally thought about moving the RB 23-24 to the Divisional level, but my main concern there is that this would leave me nowhere to assign the Grad-equivalent. Or is it not worth having a Grad equivalent at all?

[Padnak]

I'd add a long range MLRS platoon myself, preferably armed with your nations equivalent of the BM-27, to support your forces from the divisions rear area. Assuming that your division is intended to fight in soviet style where the divisions area of operation is extremely deep but fairly narrow

I already have an equivalent to the BM-27 - the Rakyet-Balsa RB 23-24 - but it would be assigned at the Corps (or Soviet Army) level, with the even lulzier RB 40-8 at the Army (or Soviet Front) level.

I have occasionally thought about moving the RB 23-24 to the Divisional level, but my main concern there is that this would leave me nowhere to assign the Grad-equivalent. Or is it not worth having a Grad equivalent at all?

You could have both the grad-equivalent and the BM-27 equivalent at divisional level, given that they fill sufficiently different roles (or so I would imagine)

[Kazarogkai]

Well since everyone else seems to care about these things here is some info on my actual nation Rp military. Technology wise I am PT(fantasy) set somewhere in the early modern period with Afro-Asiatic and European Influences.

Chain of command
10 men = 1 Section
2 Section = 1 Platoon
3 Platoon = 1 Company
4 Company = 1 Battalion
5 Battalion = 1 Regiment

TO&E: Land Regiment(1200)

A. IN Battalion(240)
1. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
2. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
3. HI Company(60)
a. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
b. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
c. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
4. MM Company(60)
a. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
b. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
c. GM Platoon(20)
- GM Section(10)
- GM Section(10)
B. IN Battalion(240)
1. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
2. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
3. HI Company(60)
a. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
b. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
c. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
4. MM Company(60)
a. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
b. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
c. GM Platoon(20)
- GM Section(10)
- GM Section(10)
C. IN Battalion(240)
1. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
2. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
3. HI Company(60)
a. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
b. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
c. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
4. MM Company(60)
a. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
b. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
c. GM Platoon(20)
- GM Section(10)
- GM Section(10)
D. IN Battalion(240)
1. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
2. LI Company(60)
a. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
b. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
c. LI Platoon(20)
- LI Section(10)
- LI Section(10)
3. HI Company(60)
a. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
b. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
c. HI Platoon(20)
- HI Section(10)
- HI Section(10)
4. MM Company(60)
a. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
b. BM Platoon(20)
- BM Section(10)
- BM Section(10)
c. GM Platoon(20)
- GM Section(10)
- GM Section(10)
E. AR Battalion(240)
1. AR Company(60)
a. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
b. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
c. PI Platoon(20)
- PI Section(10)
- PI Section(10)
2. AR Company(60)
a. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
b. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
c. PI Platoon(20)
- PI Section(10)
- PI Section(10)
3. AR Company(60)
a. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
b. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
c. PI Platoon(20)
- PI Section(10)
- PI Section(10)
4. AR Company(60)
a. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
b. AC Platoon(20)
- AC Section(10)
- AC Section(10)
c. PI Platoon(20)
- PI Section(10)
- PI Section(10)

Basic Uniform
Regular Uniform
-Zischagge Helmet
-Wool Cloak w/ Hood
-Linen Shirt
-Linen Trousers
-Sash
-Rawhide Sandals
Officer Uniform
-Burgonet Helmet
-War Mask
-Wool Cloak w/ Hood
-Banner Carrier
-Linen Shirt
-Linen Trousers
-Sash
-Leather Combat Boots

Land Unit types

HEAVY INFANTRY(HI)
-Primary: Pike
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: N/A
-Other: Grenade
-Armour: Gambeson, Plated Mail hauberk
LIGHT INFANTRY(LI)
-Primary: Javelin
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: Round-Shield
-Other: N/A
-Armour: Gambeson

BOW MAN(BM)
-Primary: Bow
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: Pavisse
-Other: N/A
-Armour: Gambeson

GUN MAN(GM)
-Primary: Hand Cannon
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: Buckler
-Other: N/A
-Armour: Gambeson

PIONEER(PI)
-Primary: Great Axe
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: N/A
-Other: N/A
-Armour: Gambeson

ARTILLERY-CREW(AC)
-Primary: N/A
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: N/A
-Other: Siege Engine
-Armour: Gambeson

OFFICER(OF)
-Primary: Great Sword
-Secondary: Bush Knife
-Shield: N/A
-Other:
-Armour: Gambeson, Plated Mail hauberk, Steel Cuirass

[Gallia-]

Real tanks just use borated polyethylene or some other plastic lining the crew compartment(s).

Yeah, about that, that would be utter shit against gammas due to it being made of low z number elements, though I think that would be better than the lithium-hydride against high energy neutrons by nature of being relatively easy to handle.

Gamma is stopped by density and thickness.

Tank armour likes being dense and thick.

What makes you think it would be "utter shit" really?

big words

Okay this numbering thing is really starting to annoy me, so I'll get back to the original point, that the 75mm M3 was not as good an AT gun as other weapons available.

From a numbers standpoint, the 75mm APCBC has 88mm of penetration vs RHA at 100m. That's enough to penetrate the Pz III and IV, but not the Panther or Tigers from the front. The Panther's very thin side armor made flanking shots very deadly, but the Tiger's very thick side and rear armor meant that Shermans had to close in to knife-fighting range to kill them. Yes, Tigers were not common - but they were there. More so on the Eastern Front.

Most German guns, meanwhile(for example the KwK 40 L/48 used on all post-43 Pz IVs) had much better penetration. To continue using the KwK 40 as an example, it had 106mm of penetration vs RHA at 100m - better than the 75mm gun, and enough to kill most versions of the Sherman; as far as the guns go, the KwK 40's higher muzzle velocity(790m/s vs 619m/s) meant that the German gun remained effective much farther out. The 75mm M3 was, after all, based off the old French field gun.

The Sherman-equipped armies were able to win in most cases because they had much better support and, frankly, being on the offense is much better than being on the defense. You get to pick all parameters of the battles. The Germans before the Kurskgrad failures were able to achieve their victories partially through Soviet incompetence, but also because they kept the Soviets on the defensive, always reacting. This situation was totally reversed when the Allies landed in Normandy, and this shows. The last blitzkrieg-style operation of the war, the Ardennes offensive, put the Germans back on the offensive, and this shows as well; the Battle of the Bulge was the costliest battle (for the US at least) of the war, and though the Germans didn't have a chance of achieving their objectives, it showed they were not shitty when they were put on the offensive.

I'm going to say that 75mm M3 was sufficient to deal with almost all armour in ETO, McNair and Devers were right about never seeing a Tiger in your entire career or whatever, and 75mm was chosen because it had really good AT capacity against other tanks.

US Shermans fought Tigers like literally once or twice in ETO so why is this constantly being mentioned?

Tank battles in ETO were between 900-800 yards. Shermans generally fired around 950 yards and Panthers/Panzer IVs around 850 yards or something. I don't think 75mm had a major disadvantage. It was quite comparable to other medium's guns except the 75mm on Panther, maybe. Again, it doesn't matter if you can pen 100mm RHA or 90mm RHA, whoever shoots first usually wins the engagement. The biggest advantage the Sherman had was probably the stabilized turret that let it lay a gun a bit faster than the other guy, and the hunter-killer setup that let the commander scan sectors and spot targets for the gunner.

That "old French field gun" was a great gun that killed Germans and commies for 50-odd years. They also built the Long Tom and M40 SPH from an "old French field gun" too and no one complains about him.

Being on the offense is worse than defense if Shermans defensive kill ratio is anything to go by, ditto the anti-tank guns' ratio. The adage of "3:1 minimum, 5:1 preferred" is true in World War 2 since that was where it was discovered. Since Shermans had a 1:1 loss against Panther during engagements, it's safe to assume they were at least comparable.

The Battle of the Bulge is where Sherman shined against German armour and why I question the value of German engineering. The Ostfront veterans or whatever were just about as good as the American tank drivers if the engagement ratios speak anything, which is fine considering the Americans just drove across all of France killing anything that moved so they had some experience fighting armour. It's also a testament to the competence that battlefield experience and good training brings to a tank man when he can work with a piece of shit like Panther tbh.

Soz abt Hitlerjungend tey are are all shitters.

To address the actual starting points of the conversation:

1) McNair/Devers/Ordnance/AGF didn't conspire to keep 76mm out of anyone's hands and wanted to replace 75mm M4 with a new tank and gun in like 1942 because tbh it could be better. This wasn't a decision made in light of ~Panther~ or ~Tiger~, the Western Allies didn't know Panthers existed until D-Day and (accidentally?) knew that the Tiger would be a very rare sight in ETO.

2) You may be correct that certain personalities, McNair yes, did not like the idea of tankmen having big tank guns. I don't know what J. Devers thought but he was a big baller so it doesn't matter how shit Pershing did. A prudent choice given the capability of the towed AT gun, which was the most fearsome AT weapon during the entire war. He didn't let this interfere with his IRL job though, and backed M27 and M1 76mm when they were brought to his attention. McNair didn't like M26 not because it was Big Gun Big Tank, but because it was really a Big Piece of Shit that kept breaking down Panther/Tiger style. FWIW, AGF doctrine also stated that Medium Tanks may engage enemy armour deliberately, at chance, and hastily during the course of exploitation.

3) The 75mm was specifically chosen because it was good at killing tanks, had a good velocity, the AT ammunition was capable against other Medium Tanks like the Mark III/IV Panzer, and gun itself was small. They could have put a M101 in the Sherman if they wanted a pure HE thrower, but they didn't obviously. AGF wasn't evil, it just had a really high standard that few equipments could meet reliably. If it didn't work, say the transmission was shit, the armour was Sherman-tier, or the engine couldn't move the tank, better start a new program to get a better Thing.

This is why T20/23/M27, M26, M6 (LOL), and M7 etc. etc. never reached the front. They were all just big shit tanks that didn't work, but M27 looked cool. They only relented when Big Generals like J. Devers went over them to Ordnance and said "I need this" and they said "OK" and that's how Pershing got to put-put around Europe for like a week and constantly breakdown and get passed by Shermans or whatever.

4) AGF had obviously reached the conclusion before the end of the North Africa campaign that the 76mm was going to happen. Tank destroyers, cry! Ordnance bring the 3" from on high and bestow upon the Medium Tank and now Tank Destroyer forever wallow in misery.

Then T23 shat the bed all the time and the turret got slapped on a Sherman and everyone was miserable instead of just the Tank Destroyer.

Besides that, the truth of the matter was that it didn't really matter. A 76mm gun and 75mm gun would not have appreciably affected Allied loss ratios during the ETO, that came down to crew competence. If a Sherman crew knows their strengths and weaknesses, they aren't going to try to drive to the front of a Panther. They'll have three guys in the platoon wailing away a Panther platoon to draw fire and two guys go around to punch through the cardboard side armour.

It might have been like 0.9:1 instead of 1.1:1 which is really not a big difference. Would have been more down to improvements in layout and positioning of components that would allow the tanks to have lower silhouettes and potentially do away with the need for wet storage racks with ammunition placement improvements. Not that it mattered, Sherman's ammo took like 5e10^10 years to brew up and by that time the crew was already halfway across the Channel to get another tank.

5) Offensive is not "initiative". Kursk shows what happens when you lose the initiative on the offense. So does Bulge. That's heavy :1910: "theory".

[Husseinarti]

Gallia is legit right in that whoever fires first wins the battle. Typically.

When you get engaged, you already have lost the element of surprise, and must regain the initiative. Provided you aren't dead already. The enemy will do their best to keep the initiative and will push to keep it.

When you get fired on, you panic, even experienced soldiers can flinch, and will take over. In this time, the attacker will still be firing, will still be engaging in a fairly calm state of mind until he then takes fire from you or allied forces.

Thats why defenses designed by smart commanders are intended to over withhold an enemy attack long enough for the enemy to lost the initiative and to allow the defending force to organize a counter-attack. No war is won on the defensive, its won by attack, attack, and attacking some more until the enemy's ability to make war is crushed.