Moral Objectivism vs. Interpretive Subjectivism: A Conflict?

[36 Camera Perspective]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

So consensus is all that is needed to make something real?

When I refer to "perfectly rational" beings, this is a different concept with different implications than if I was referring to a consensus formed by numbers alone. In my thought experiment, I conceive of perfectly rational beings as theoretical beings who only affirm true propositions, hence the name "perfectly rational". If you imagined the domain of true propositions, this domain would be identical to the domain of true propositions affirmed by perfectly rational beings. Here, the difference between consensus and perfectly rational beings becomes more clear. A consensus can be wrong. We might say that the political consensus about a specific candidate was wrong. However, perfectly rational beings cannot be wrong by definition, as they only affirm true propositions.

I don't want to throw out too many ideas at once, so I'll just start with this and clarify the rest of my statement as the discussion requires it.

[The New Sea Territory]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

I don't agree to your social contract. I didn't sign shit.

[The New Sea Territory]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

So consensus is all that is needed to make something real?

Mass delusion apparently creates objectively delusional reality.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

I don't agree to your social contract. I didn't sign shit.

That's frankly completely irrelevant. I'm concerned with what a perfectly rational being would put in this social contract, because that would constitute a system of objective moral law. In other words, denying the contract is irrational. So yeah, you can ignore what's rational to do and say "I didn't sign shit", but that doesn't make the contract false, just like pressing random buttons to run a nuclear power plant doesn't make the actual instructions false.

[36 Camera Perspective]

So consensus is all that is needed to make something real?

Mass delusion apparently creates objectively delusional reality.

Refer to my response to him.

[Krasny-Volny]

Get a blooooooooog.

[Esternial]

Objectivity is the easy way for people that are incapable of comprehending the mind-boggling fact that there are a lot of people in this world with different opinions, even if everybody you know thinks that dress was blue and not gold.

Wow amazeballs rite?

[36 Camera Perspective]

Objectivity is the easy way for people that are incapable of comprehending the mind-boggling fact that there are a lot of people in this world with different opinions, even if everybody you know thinks that dress was blue and not gold.

Wow amazeballs rite?

Objectivity doesn't mean everybody has the same opinion. Not at all.

[Esternial]

Objectivity is the easy way for people that are incapable of comprehending the mind-boggling fact that there are a lot of people in this world with different opinions, even if everybody you know thinks that dress was blue and not gold.

Wow amazeballs rite?

Objectivity doesn't mean everybody has the same opinion. Not at all.

I meant to say morals but I doubt that changes anything.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Objectivity doesn't mean everybody has the same opinion. Not at all.

I meant to say morals but I doubt that changes anything.

It does, in my opinion. People who believe in objective morality believe so in the prescriptive sense. In other words, there is a set of moral codes that we ought to follow. This is different from the descriptive sense--saying "everybody follows one moral code".

[Esternial]

I meant to say morals but I doubt that changes anything.

It does, in my opinion. People who believe in objective morality believe so in the prescriptive sense. In other words, there is a set of moral codes that we ought to follow. This is different from the descriptive sense--saying "everybody follows one moral code".

Aye, I get what you mean. I was a bit too focused on the example in the OP and tried to apply my ideas about it specifically to the general subject.

Did not go well.

[Conscentia]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

Firstly, that's inter-subjective at best - not objective.
Secondly, reason is value-neutral. What "perfectly rational beings" would agree upon is dependent on their arational biases, which have no relation to an objective moral truth.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Objective moral truths are whatever perfectly rational beings would agree upon in a social contract.

Firstly, that's inter-subjective at best - not objective.
Secondly, reason is value-neutral. What "perfectly rational beings" would agree upon is dependent on their arational biases, which have no relation to an objective moral truth.

Let me start with the first objection.

I understand why you would come to the conclusion that my system is constructed intersubjectively. After all, a perfectly rational being, or multiple perfectly rational beings, determining a moral system code is on its face an intersubjective construction. However, when I think more deeply about intersubjectivity, I realize my system is superficially intersubjective at best. When we talk about intersubjectivity, we are talking, of course, about relationships between conscious subjects. Patriotism, for example, is an intersubjective construct. The citizens of a nation endue the concept with meaning and it takes on an intersubjective reality. In the case of patriotism, one could not "do away" with the conscious aspect of the construct, otherwise patriotism would have no meaning (given that its meaning arises from the actions of conscious beings). We are thus committed to the reality of the conscious beings involved in order for the intersubjective construct to bear on us.

In the case of my system, however, we are not obligated to such a commitment. We are considering "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be true?". Discovering the consequent is the central point here. We are not required to affirm the truth of the antecedent. With intersubjectivity, we are talking about a construct that we cannot have without accepting the conscious creatures that generate it. But in this system, we are free to accept or reject the reality of perfectly rational beings, as long as the conditional holds true.

[Conscentia]

Firstly, that's inter-subjective at best - not objective.
Secondly, reason is value-neutral. What "perfectly rational beings" would agree upon is dependent on their arational biases, which have no relation to an objective moral truth.

Let me start with the first objection.

I understand why you would come to the conclusion that my system is constructed intersubjectively. After all, a perfectly rational being, or multiple perfectly rational beings, determining a moral system code is on its face an intersubjective construction. However, when I think more deeply about intersubjectivity, I realize my system is superficially intersubjective at best. When we talk about intersubjectivity, we are talking, of course, about relationships between conscious subjects. Patriotism, for example, is an intersubjective construct. The citizens of a nation endue the concept with meaning and it takes on an intersubjective reality. In the case of patriotism, one could not "do away" with the conscious aspect of the construct, otherwise patriotism would have no meaning (given that its meaning arises from the actions of conscious beings). We are thus committed to the reality of the conscious beings involved in order for the intersubjective construct to bear on us.

In the case of my system, however, we are not obligated to such a commitment. We are considering "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be true?". Discovering the consequent is the central point here. We are not required to affirm the truth of the antecedent. With intersubjectivity, we are talking about a construct that we cannot have without accepting the conscious creatures that generate it. But in this system, we are free to accept or reject the reality of perfectly rational beings, as long as the conditional holds true.

Alright, although none of that demonstrates that there even is any moral truth to discover. It is possible that the answer to "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be [morally] true?" is "nothing" (ie. that "perfectly rational beings" wouldn't find anything to be morally true).

[36 Camera Perspective]

Let me start with the first objection.

I understand why you would come to the conclusion that my system is constructed intersubjectively. After all, a perfectly rational being, or multiple perfectly rational beings, determining a moral system code is on its face an intersubjective construction. However, when I think more deeply about intersubjectivity, I realize my system is superficially intersubjective at best. When we talk about intersubjectivity, we are talking, of course, about relationships between conscious subjects. Patriotism, for example, is an intersubjective construct. The citizens of a nation endue the concept with meaning and it takes on an intersubjective reality. In the case of patriotism, one could not "do away" with the conscious aspect of the construct, otherwise patriotism would have no meaning (given that its meaning arises from the actions of conscious beings). We are thus committed to the reality of the conscious beings involved in order for the intersubjective construct to bear on us.

In the case of my system, however, we are not obligated to such a commitment. We are considering "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be true?". Discovering the consequent is the central point here. We are not required to affirm the truth of the antecedent. With intersubjectivity, we are talking about a construct that we cannot have without accepting the conscious creatures that generate it. But in this system, we are free to accept or reject the reality of perfectly rational beings, as long as the conditional holds true.

Alright, although none of that demonstrates that there even is any moral truth to discover. It is possible that the answer to "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be [morally] true?" is "nothing" (ie. that "perfectly rational beings" wouldn't find anything to be morally true).

Yes, that is entirely correct. If I posted my entire system, that would have been accounted for, but of course, I don't want to post a massive wall of text. I'll give you the proper response momentarily.

[36 Camera Perspective]

Let me start with the first objection.

I understand why you would come to the conclusion that my system is constructed intersubjectively. After all, a perfectly rational being, or multiple perfectly rational beings, determining a moral system code is on its face an intersubjective construction. However, when I think more deeply about intersubjectivity, I realize my system is superficially intersubjective at best. When we talk about intersubjectivity, we are talking, of course, about relationships between conscious subjects. Patriotism, for example, is an intersubjective construct. The citizens of a nation endue the concept with meaning and it takes on an intersubjective reality. In the case of patriotism, one could not "do away" with the conscious aspect of the construct, otherwise patriotism would have no meaning (given that its meaning arises from the actions of conscious beings). We are thus committed to the reality of the conscious beings involved in order for the intersubjective construct to bear on us.

In the case of my system, however, we are not obligated to such a commitment. We are considering "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be true?". Discovering the consequent is the central point here. We are not required to affirm the truth of the antecedent. With intersubjectivity, we are talking about a construct that we cannot have without accepting the conscious creatures that generate it. But in this system, we are free to accept or reject the reality of perfectly rational beings, as long as the conditional holds true.

Alright, although none of that demonstrates that there even is any moral truth to discover. It is possible that the answer to "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be [morally] true?" is "nothing" (ie. that "perfectly rational beings" wouldn't find anything to be morally true).

Symbolism Key
Ax = “x is affirmed by a perfectly rational being’
Tx= “x is true”
Cx= ‘x is in the perfectly rational social contract”
Sx = “x is a proposition based on the principle of selfishness”


Proof 1
Universe of discourse = “All claims about ethics”
1: (x)(Ax ) Tx) P
2: (x)(Tx ) Cx) P
3: (x)(Cx ) Sx) P
4 : (x)(Ax ) Cx) 1, 2 HS
5: (x)(Ax ) Sx) 1, 2, 3 HS
6: (x)(Tx ) Sx) 2, 3 HS

This is what we're dealing with. I'm taking the "principle of selfishness" to have a peculiar meaning in this context. In this context, the "principle of selfishness" means that humans are innately self-interested, and morality results when we attempt to aggregate between these self-interests to create a functioning society. In my view, morality is a sort of strategic interaction game between self-interested agents who are all trying to actualize the best outcome for themselves given that there are self-interested agents around them trying to accomplish the same goal. For example, my initial self-interested morality might tell me that it's acceptable to rob and steal from others, but in the aggregated morality, these behaviors become prohibited because they logically entail that it's acceptable to rob and steal from me. If everybody stuck to the primal system, we would live in a society where 1) it's ok for everyone else to be stolen from and 2) it's ok for me to stolen from. Clearly, this outcome is bad for everybody. But if we prefer the aggregate system, then it's neither ok to steal from myself or anybody else, which is obviously a better outcome than primal morality would lead to. The basic idea of all this is that morality reduces to an attempt at best aggregating the interests of a group of self-interested creatures, and that might explain why we see disparate moral codes emerging in different cultures across the globe.

Now, if morality reduces to an attempt at best aggregating the interests of a group of self-interested creatures, then what would a "perfectly rational" morality (i.e. 'the social contract") look like. Well, intuitively, it would best aggregate the interests of a group of self-interested creatures. In human society, we do our best to aggregate these interests, but we don't always succeed. That's why we might have manufacturing workers feeling victimized after their jobs are shipped overseas so the consumer class can enjoy lower prices. In contrast, a perfectly rational contract would result in the best aggregation possible of competing interests. Of course, that doesn't mean everyone will be happy. It just means everyone will be as happy as they can be given the selfishness of others.

If a perfectly rational being negated the contract, they would be negating the innate purpose of morality, which would entail a contradiction. It would be like saying "This knife cuts better than any other knife in the universe, so I won't use it." It's not a logically coherent statement given what we know knives are used for. So a perfectly rational being would accept the contract, and they would accept that the best objective moral system is one that aggregates the interests of self-interested creature.

So, in effect, if you are saying "I do not want the contract", then you are saying "I do not want what is best for myself". Since humans want what is best for themselves, you derive a contradiction: "I do not want what is best for myself and I want what is best for myself." To be rational, we must all accept the contract.

[The New Sea Territory]

I don't agree to your social contract. I didn't sign shit.

That's frankly completely irrelevant. I'm concerned with what a perfectly rational being would put in this social contract, because that would constitute a system of objective moral law. In other words, denying the contract is irrational. So yeah, you can ignore what's rational to do and say "I didn't sign shit", but that doesn't make the contract false, just like pressing random buttons to run a nuclear power plant doesn't make the actual instructions false.

"Disagreement with my beliefs must be irrational!"

Frankly, if being "rational" means submitting my desire to any fixed idea, than I embrace irrationality as a means of liberation. The social contract is irrelevant, because I don't consent to it. "A perfectly rational being" seems more like a convenience for your argument rather than any actual existing individual.

[The New Sea Territory]

Objectivity is the easy way for people that are incapable of comprehending the mind-boggling fact that there are a lot of people in this world with different opinions, even if everybody you know thinks that dress was blue and not gold.

Wow amazeballs rite?

Objectivity doesn't mean everybody has the same opinion. Not at all.

But "objectivity", in reality, is just another opinion.

[36 Camera Perspective]

That's frankly completely irrelevant. I'm concerned with what a perfectly rational being would put in this social contract, because that would constitute a system of objective moral law. In other words, denying the contract is irrational. So yeah, you can ignore what's rational to do and say "I didn't sign shit", but that doesn't make the contract false, just like pressing random buttons to run a nuclear power plant doesn't make the actual instructions false.

"Disagreement with my beliefs must be irrational!"

Are you even bothering to understand what I say, or are you just going to offer a false caricature every single time I make efforts to converse with you? The more you post, the more I believe the latter.

Whatever a perfectly rational being affirms is true. Thus, whatever a perfectly rational being affirms about ethics belongs in the social contract, and this social contract would offer a set of prescriptive rules about behavior that one must accept if they want to be rational. This has nothing at all to do with whether or not anyone who disagrees with me is irrational. It means "If you disagree with a perfectly rational being, then you are irrational", and that is true by definition.

Oh, and by the way: Any time you have a belief, you also believe that anyone who disagrees is irrational. That's what it means to believe in something.

[36 Camera Perspective]

The social contract is irrelevant, because I don't consent to it.

The proper instructions for operating a nuclear power plant don't become irrelevant simply because the inebriated operator decides not to consent and press random buttons instead.

[36 Camera Perspective]

"A perfectly rational being" seems more like a convenience for your argument rather than any actual existing individual.

In the case of my system, however, we are not obligated to such a commitment. We are considering "If perfectly rational beings existed, what would they hold to be true?". Discovering the consequent is the central point here. We are not required to affirm the truth of the antecedent. With intersubjectivity, we are talking about a construct that we cannot have without accepting the conscious creatures that generate it. But in this system, we are free to accept or reject the reality of perfectly rational beings, as long as the conditional holds true.

More evidence you are not making a genuine attempt at understanding.

[The New Sea Territory]

"Disagreement with my beliefs must be irrational!"

Are you even bothering to understand what I say, or are you just going to offer a false caricature every single time I make efforts to converse with you? The more you post, the more I believe the latter.

I'm mocking your "rationality" and ethics. There's nothing rational about ethics, or a social contract.

You seem to have missed the point, though.

Whatever a perfectly rational being affirms is true. Thus, whatever a perfectly rational being affirms about ethics belongs in the social contract, and this social contract would offer a set of prescriptive rules about behavior that one must accept if they want to be rational. This has nothing at all to do with whether or not anyone who disagrees with me is irrational. It means "If you disagree with a perfectly rational being, then you are irrational", and that is true by definition.

Prove that "perfectly rational being[s]" exist. I see no such beings, and thus no rational ethics or rational social contracts. They all argue from subjective or assumed positions. For example, your social contract assumes "perfectly rational" affirmations about ethics exist (without proof, which is pretty irrational), and that I should follow these ethical judgments rather than my desire.

Oh, and by the way: Any time you have a belief, you also believe that anyone who disagrees is irrational. That's what it means to believe in something.

Or, you know, I don't think in absolutes. "Your have your way, I have my way..."

[36 Camera Perspective]

Frankly, if being "rational" means submitting my desire to any fixed idea, than I embrace irrationality as a means of liberation.

Final post.

If "I want to be irrational instead of accepting what you just said" is your actual argument, then the conversation pretty much ends here.

[The New Sea Territory]

The social contract is irrelevant, because I don't consent to it.

The proper instructions for operating a nuclear power plant don't become irrelevant simply because the inebriated operator decides not to consent and press random buttons instead.

Equating an abstract concept with operation of a material facility is a weak argument, at best.

There are no ethical instructions that can be proven to be "proper". Even "proper" itself is a subjective assertion.

[The New Sea Territory]

Frankly, if being "rational" means submitting my desire to any fixed idea, than I embrace irrationality as a means of liberation.

Final post.

If "I want to be irrational instead of accepting what you just said" is your actual argument, then the conversation pretty much ends here.

You've clearly missed the " " quotes. I was arguing that, if reality actually was the way you say is it, I would embrace irrationality.

Your "rationality" means the limitation of my most rational functions (selfish ones), and you base this "rationality" more on faith in your ethical assumptions than proof. It's secular piety.