Nuclear Weapons: Your Opinion

[The Intergalactic Universe Corporation]

Well, making North korea give up nukes is possible if you give them enough aid to start their economy, but Pakistan is tricky.

[Olerand]

They are a necessary evil. As long as other States still hold them, they are still necessary for deterrence.

[The Intergalactic Universe Corporation]

Agreed

[Salus Maior]

Well, making North korea give up nukes is possible if you give them enough aid to start their economy, but Pakistan is tricky.

We've actually tried doing that before. They just made more nukes.

[Imperializt Russia]

Necessary evil that we sadly must tolerate for the foreseeable future.

[Imperializt Russia]

Well, making North korea give up nukes is possible if you give them enough aid to start their economy, but Pakistan is tricky.

We've actually tried doing that before. They just made more nukes.

They tried. Until it was threatened that the remainder of the aid programme would be outright cancelled.

There's a 250MWe plutonium-generating reactor in Yongby'on that was never completed because they depend too heavily on the aid programmes. Their entire nuclear programme is limited to the irradiation provided by a single natural-uranium fuelled 5MWe (maybe 12-18MWt?) reactor.

[Infected Mushroom]

Good. They prove that Humans are the Master Race. One of our greatest technological advancements.

[Olerand]

Good. They prove that Humans are the Master Race. One of our greatest technological advancements.

The competition being?

[Imperializt Russia]

Good. They prove that Humans are the Master Race. One of our greatest technological advancements.

The competition being?

Those fucking space fish.

[Bufett and Colbert]

The so-called "nuclear peace" is a fragile one. Most proponents of nuclear deterrence theory make many key assumptions about states in the international system. For one, they assume that states are monolithic entities that operate as individual hive minds. More convincing theories of state behavior, however, point to the many ways in which different branches within government fail to communicate or even have competing interests. Organizational theory tells us that that the military establishment may be too biased or incentivized to effectively prevent miscommunications with regards to nuclear weapons policy. They lead the state as a whole to behave sub-optimally or, in other words, irrationally. The routines that militaries establish adversely the state's ability to implement fail-safes.

At worst, this can lead to international miscommunication resulting in nuclear war. This is especially true in states where there is weaker civilian control over the military establishment. It's important to note also that while political scientists generally believe the military to be less prone to war in the general sense than their civilian counterparts, they are potentially more prone to preventative war, which comes into play in the nuclear discussion.

Scott Sagan has written extensively on this issue, especially in an article titled "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." I hesitate to link to it since I think I can only access it through my university.

For the other side of the coin, Kenneth Waltz has written extensively on the positives of nuclear deterrence. He and Sagan published a book that acts a sort of debate. Worth the read.

[Imperializt Russia]

There is a definite argument to be made there.
Any standing order for launch-on-warning or launch-on-strike policy inherently cuts much of the civil chain out by necessity - they'd take too long to react.
But it's not like this is unknown by the civil chain - they implemented these policies.

[Aterria]

BOOM.

[Indo-Malaysia]

BOOM.

Nippon was not effected.

[Omega America II]

Nuclear Weapons is a deadly weapon that can wipe out millions of lives, and spread radiation out, killing even more. The problem is that when one state has one, then thers must have them in order to stay secure. Which makes it near impossible to limit nuclear stocks to 0.

[Novus America]

There is a definite argument to be made there.
Any standing order for launch-on-warning or launch-on-strike policy inherently cuts much of the civil chain out by necessity - they'd take too long to react.
But it's not like this is unknown by the civil chain - they implemented these policies.

By using submarines and expanding missile defenses we can reduce or eliminate the need for launch on warning. If first stiles cannot destroy all or most of your weapons, you have more time to react. You can take a hit and still shoot back.

[The Novakian Empire]

If the cows ever try to take over,we'll be able to stop them.

[Imperializt Russia]

There is a definite argument to be made there.
Any standing order for launch-on-warning or launch-on-strike policy inherently cuts much of the civil chain out by necessity - they'd take too long to react.
But it's not like this is unknown by the civil chain - they implemented these policies.

By using submarines and expanding missile defenses we can reduce or eliminate the need for launch on warning. If first stiles cannot destroy all or most of your weapons, you have more time to react. You can take a hit and still shoot back.

What's the first target?

Seat of power.

[Mexikotexas]

Good. They prove that Humans are the Master Race. One of our greatest technological advancements.

The competition being?

Mice from "Hitchhiker's Guide" crossed with those in "Of Mice and Men." Great for picking fruit and vegetables.

[Napkiraly]

The competition being?

Those fucking space fish.

This isn't Stellaris, IR.

[Wisconsin9]

If the cows ever try to take over,we'll be able to stop them.

Curses, you've thwarted our evil plan!

[Novus America]

By using submarines and expanding missile defenses we can reduce or eliminate the need for launch on warning. If first stiles cannot destroy all or most of your weapons, you have more time to react. You can take a hit and still shoot back.

What's the first target?

Seat of power.

Yes. But that would not stop retaliation. The nuke subs would still launch even if the government authority is destroyed.

[Imperializt Russia]

What's the first target?

Seat of power.

Yes. But that would not stop retaliation. The nuke subs would still launch even if the government authority is destroyed.

So, we've bypassed the civil chain of command, which was the initial argument brought up.

[Novus America]

Yes. But that would not stop retaliation. The nuke subs would still launch even if the government authority is destroyed.

So, we've bypassed the civil chain of command, which was the initial argument brought up.

Well they still have to follow the chain of command. The issue is not the military launching without authorization, the issue is having to launch too quickly without making an informed decision.

If London or Washington is already destroyed the submarine commanders then have implied authority to launch.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort

[Imperializt Russia]

So, we've bypassed the civil chain of command, which was the initial argument brought up.

Well they still have to follow the chain of command. The issue is not the military launching without authorization, the issue is having to launch too quickly without making an informed decision.

If London or Washington is already destroyed the submarine commanders then have implied authority to launch.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort

Standing orders inherently bypass the chain of command, especially if the chain of command no longer exists to intervene.

I explicitly made the point that the chain of command sets those standing orders up.

[Socialist Tera]

Nuclear weapons determined wars because of the threat of MAD.