Which allocation method do you prefer?

[Aapje]

How you know a question makes sense is simple: context.

You are correct that objectivity is contextual. 299792458 metres per second is objectively the the speed of light, but only within the limits of our universe.

But it's not correct to say that 9.80665 m/s² is gravitational acceleration, not even within the limited context of earth. Every object that can freely move toward a mass, even on earth, will experience a different gravitational acceleration depending on it's position. However, you can still use it as a useful term if you can find a reasonable agreement on a shared context. Once such a shared context exist, the term becomes sensible as a tool of communication. But you cannot assume that this shared context exists for any subjective term.

Luckily, I have been defining what I've meant by fair... balancing the interest and agency of all parties involved.

This is a useless definition. Your definition of a balance of interest is not going to match that of other people. A communist believes that people have different interests than a 100% free market advocate.

The same is true of agency. One person believes that certain self-destructive or semi-destructive behavior are rights that people have (like to use drugs or pollute) and others believe that agency doesn't extend this far. A believer in the rationality of humans is going to judge limitations to agency differently from someone who believes that humans have substantial irrationality.

So you can call something fair, believing it is 'balancing the interest and agency of all parties involved,' while another person disagrees that the same solution does so.

Thus, given your side of the discussion, it is pretty obvious that equitable, as we've been talking about, means respecting human dignity.

'Respecting human dignity' is another useless metric. There are people who believe that helping people takes away their dignity and there are people who believe that not helping people takes away dignity.

Your point is a nonsense... a general rule that has no bearing on the conversation experienced. Hence:

a "linvoid" system is not and cannot be equitable.

And I find your point to be nonsense. An argument that show lacks of understanding of the real question(s).

The question is not what system is and what is not equitable, the question is how we deal with the inherent inequity in nature, which cannot be fully solved by mankind.

Imagine a person that was born without an arm. We do not have the means to grow him an arm. To achieve equity, we could chop off everyone's arm. It would be more fair in the sense that we would have equality and none would suffer more than another. But overall people would still suffer more than if we wouldn't choose this solution. So being completely intolerant of unfairness, requires us to increase suffering and choose a lowest common denominator. As such, we mustn't seek to maximize fairness.

The market system, as we understand it, requires laws.

The way we have set it up and our insistence that some property transfer must only happen through a market system, rather than through violence, does require it. However, our current system also requires non-market elements (like taxes to pay the people who make and enforce market laws).

And a limited form of markets can exist without laws. Or you can have somewhat more advanced markets where laws play less of a role than vigilante enforcement of market behavior.

They are not restrictions, although they can be, they are the equivalent of the domain of a function.

Of course they are restrictions. I cannot take your things at gunpoint without facing the risk of jail, which restricts me. It's a kind of restriction that most people like, though.

and markets do not make sense without laws.

This is false. A market that operates through a balance of power, rather than rules enforced by a government, makes perfect sense.

Union strikes are an example of how a market can be made to operate differently from the basic rules of supply and demand, by improving the power of the workers through collective rational action, rather than individual rational action. Of course, in a modern, Western context those are embedded within the legal system, but this is not a necessity.

Your particular point, that a "linvoid" system would be appropriate for healthcare, was what we have theoretically been disputing... although you apparently disagree with me that the thrust (abstract principle underlying this belief) was that it'd be more equitable this way.

Well, I don't agree that the word equitable is a sensible metric, so I can't discuss in on those terms.

I believe that in a society with a certain level of overall wealth, certain minimum benefits should be provided to anyone. In Western societies, this includes basic healthcare.

I believe that this can be done by buyer-side (giving people money to buy healthcare), supplier-side (artificially making healthcare cheaper) or a mix. Each of these has upsides and downsides. No decision is perfect. So you have to decide between flawed options.

In general, I believe that different goods/services are different in how their markets function. So you cannot necessarily treat basic food like basic healthcare. so that means that it can be perfectly logical to choose option A for good 1 and option B for good 2.

An individual human is not rational, yes?

Both not entirely rational and not having unlimited intelligence, time, etc; the latter creating many of the same problems that a lack of rationality results in. For example, a major flaw in Xerographica's system is that it only works in a reality where people have more time to spend on politics than they do.

It follows that for real people, and real action, there is not necessarily some great rationale**.

There is no goal in life, which means that humans can't be rational, as rationality requires a goal. So the act of choosing a goal (and acting rationally to achieve it) is itself irrational.

However, the appeal of these characters is, in some sense, that they better... that they make the right decision.

Yes, that they are better at handling an imperfect world than us.

Sherlock is more observant: he gathers more/better information than we do.
Sherlock is better at deducing: he takes that information and draws conclusions based on advanced analysis

But it's fake, of course. Sherlock is written to appeal to us this way. In reality, not even the most intelligent and observant person would be able to quickly make all the observations that he makes; nor run through the Bayes model of a complexity that is necessary to draw his conclusions.

The writer clearly worked backwards, starting with the end result of the deduction and describing how Sherlock could deduce that. We don't have the luxury to cheat like that.

The point, then, is that while people might generally not bother making sure a change is better than the base state, if you see a proposal that something should change (i.e. to providing healthcare linvoidally) then you better establish that it is.

The new system may be better at A and worse at B. Then no system is objectively better than the other, as it depends on how you value A and B. System 1 has low wait times, but low number of total treatments. System 2 has high wait times, but higher total treatments. System 1 result in some poor people not getting the treatment they need/want. System 2 results in some people with time-sensitive diseases to get worse treatment than they would get in system 1. Which system is better? For the individual, it really depends on what your circumstances are. Overall, it depends on what problems you prefer/dislike over others.

Although, in reality people generally don't actually weigh actual outcomes, but expected outcomes, which adds a level of potential error and disagreement (based on ideology).

Or, like the person who started this thread, they don't judge outcomes, but the ideological purity of the solution.

[Chestaan]

In fact the market allocation has even worse inefficiencies in that it both overproduces food while also allowing people to starve. Hardly what we could call efficient.

This is an interesting point, incidentally.

10% of food is lost at the retail level - it spoils or is thrown out before ever being purchased by consumers.

http://www.endhunger.org/PDFs/2014/USDA ... ummary.pdf

And yet... people starve to death. We literally throw food away while people starve to death. That's the 'efficient' system.

This system has certain benefits to it, but it's not the holy grail.

Indeed, another example is how, at least where I'm from, we had a massive housing price crash in the last few years. This led to what's known as "ghost estates", whole estates full of houses lying empty. Yet, incredibly, at the same time we also had the worst homelessness crisis in decades. Logic would dictate that we cannot both have too much of something and at the same time not enough, but it seems that this is not the case.

[Chestaan]

The efficient allocation is incorrectly named as its not necessarily that efficient. Such a system should be called market allocation. A truly efficient allocation would be one which maximises utility. As an example of how the market allocation can be inefficient look at the fact that people can starve to death while others cab afford to buy Ferraris. Or the fact that people can die because they lack the means to buy a few cents worth of medicine. In fact the market allocation has even worse inefficiencies in that it both overproduces food while also allowing people to starve. Hardly what we could call efficient.

You see that Bob is starving. I see that you give him food. My assumption is that you derived utility from giving him food. If you don't give him food... then what do I assume?

A. You wouldn't derive utility from Bob being fed. In this case, from your perspective, it's not inefficient for Bob to starve. Maybe because you hate Bob. And if everybody hates Bob, then "we" would call it efficient for Bob to starve. Just imagine that Bob was a serial killer.

B. You would derive utility from Bob being fed. So why didn't you give him food? Well, you were hoping that I would give Bob food. This hope is reasonably rational. If I gave Bob food then you could have the utility of Bob being fed without having to spend any of your own money. Unfortunately for Bob, I was hoping that you would give him food and I could have the utility of him being fed without having to spend any of my own money.

Does "B" sound familiar? It should. It's the free-rider problem. The thing is, the point of the government is to solve the free-rider problem. So if you're arguing that people are currently starving... then you're arguing that the government is failing to solve the free-rider problem. This means that your issue isn't with the market... your issue is with the government. You think that you're criticizing the market but, in reality, you're actually criticizing the government.

But it's not the government's fault. The government isn't a mind-reader. The government can't possibly know how much utility you would derive from preventing people from starving. Without this knowledge the government can't possibly efficiently allocate tax dollars.

What's the solution?

You see that Bob is starving. You also see that Sarah is sick. You have to spend 50% of your income on public goods but you can choose which public goods you spend your taxes on. If you don't give any of your taxes to Bob, then you have to give all of your taxes to Sarah. I see that you give all of your taxes to Sarah and none of your taxes to Bob. What do I guess? I guess that you derived more utility from helping Sarah than you would have from helping Bob. So society's resources were efficiently allocated.

But what about Bob's utility? An efficient system would be one which allocates society's resources in such a way that maximises societal utility, yet the market system destroys massive quantities of food while people remain starving. I disagree that I am critiquing the government. The government, in order to feed the hungry, would need to raise taxes massively, something I would support actually. But whenever we see proposed tax increases they are shot down by those who say that they are unnecessary distortions of the market system.

The role of the market is to allocate society's resources, agreed? So then if society's resources are not being allocated efficiently then it is the fault of the market.

The problem with your tax choice idea is that it ignores the utility of Sarah and Bob. You are assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have money. This is not the case. A truly efficient system will take into account the utility of Bob and Sarah, regardless of their income. The problem with the market is that it uses willingness to pay as a proxy for estimating utility derived from an action. But willingness to pay is not an inherently flawed method of estimating utility to the point of making huge mistakes in allocation of resources by prioritising the needs of the rich over the needs of the poor. The capitalist market system has massive flaws and a better system needs to be found. A good start would be to ensure that everybody has the basics: clothing, housing and food, and also to eliminate wastage. Empty houses should be given to the homeless and we should down in the wastage of food.

[Aapje]

If you've read the pragmatarianism FAQ, then you would know that taxpayers would be free to spend their tax dollars at anytime throughout the year.

This in no way addresses my question. You have just paid your tax, but the next day a horrible war breaks out in Yaddastan. You believe in interventions and want to switch your tax money to fund peace keepers, rather than teddy bears for veterans. Too bad, you have to wait until next year, after many people died.

Oops.

The only way to truly fix this is to match up paying tax with the actual spending, which is an enormous burden for tax payers or....putting this huge burden in the hands of experts, who have the time to do it....which is what every sane country does, because it works.

Do consumers and donors alter their spending decisions as often as politicians do? Well... consumers and donors alter their spending decisions whenever they need to.

This is false. It is a well established fact that many consumers don't alter their spending even when it is rational. A common strategy by companies to take advantage of this is to draw people in with cheap deals and then hike up the price over time, betting on people not switching. It works, because most people dislike making spending decisions (another scientifically established fact).

Your system is inherently flawed because it depends on people behaving in a way that they currently don't and, assuming that you want to introduce your system through democratic means, it requires people to vote for a system that puts a burden on them that they don't want.

The point of organizations is to serve the public... not the other way around. We don't exist to serve Nation States. NS exists to serve us. And if we decide for any reason that it's failing to effectively serve us, then we're free to leave.

Statements like these just show that you are in love with the ideological purity of your system. You have an unrealistic view of it's ability to work.

Your system is used on a small scale, but people don't use it for large systems. Is that because they are stupid or because they understand that the system can't work on such a scale?

Yeah, just like it's delusional to think that consumers can inform themselves sufficiently about all products and services. Just like it's delusional to think that donors can inform themselves sufficiently about all the causes.

I think that you are being sarcastic, but your statements are actually correct, which is why we have market regulation. In Western society, we actively prevent sellers from abusing uninformed consumers in the most egregious ways.

Our society is based on a division of labor. A jack of all trades is a master of none.

Which is a solid argument in favor of politicians making detailed decisions and citizens picking those experts.

But a division of labor is really not an argument against consumer choice.

Actually, it is an argument against making people allocate tax money in a detailed manner, as that requires a level of effort that is not reasonable next to another job.

Like I've said, pragmatarianism would give taxpayers the option to choose where their taxes go.

If your defense of your system relies on not having to use your system, that is not very impressive.

If you want to assume that taxpayers will take the time and make the effort to directly allocate their taxes... then you're assuming that taxpayers are NOT happy with how well they are being served by their elected representatives.

People can be unhappy and not have the time or ability to make that effort! What will happen under your system is that only the unhappy people who also have time and the ability will exercise this option. So your system will empower a small group, especially well-educated pensioners.

Let's use a specific example. I started the Facebook page for the Epiphyte Society. Please explain exactly how I can somehow trick, or manipulate you into making a donation to the Epiphyte Society.

Your comment doesn't address my objection. Don't you understand it?

Again, the point is that the system encourages people to use tricks, rather than accurately express their desires. A system where people are encouraged to play tricks, based on bad information, results in bad outcomes.

But having a job allows you to buy the things that you need to live.

You need more money to give decent jobs than welfare. So if you give a job for 1 person and let 1 person starve, rather than give 2 people welfare, you just let one person die.

Hopefully you can agree that people choosing where their taxes go would result in the widest possible variety of approaches to protecting life.

No, it would result in irrational, but popular ideas being made into policy.

Taxpayers vastly outnumber politicians. Chances are good that you personally know a lot more taxpayers than politicians. Point to any problem on a map and you can bet good money that taxpayers are going to be far closer to that problem than politicians.

Anecdotes are not evidence and observation is not fact, as people's biases change their observations.

Doctors kept doing bleedings because it looked like it worked until some wise ass starting measuring outcomes of bled vs non-bled patients. Then doctors were taught to stop believing their eyes and actually help patients.

Proper decision making doesn't require being close, it requires getting the right information, which often is not available to the people closest to the problem.

Also, taxpayers are the ones who actually earned the money. This means that they have the maximum possible incentive to try and ensure that their hard-earned money isn't wasted.

True, but irrelevant if they can't judge 'waste.'

When we add these two facts together, it should be intuitive that taxpayers are going to apply far more precise pressure on government organizations than politicians can.

Many intuitive things are wrong. Bleeding patients was intuitively correct. Sick people had fevers. Thus fevers are bad. Bleeding reduced fevers. Bleeding helps sick people.

Very intuitive and logical. Also.... wrong.

You are blinded by your intuition, which is because you think that all humans are like you. You are an outlier.

It's hard to really appreciate human diversity.

Yet your system is built to serve one (rare) kind of person. You keep claiming to value diversity, but your system doesn't actually value it.

In school it pays to do your homework. Well, not literally... but the more you study, the better your grade. In a market, it literally pays to do your homework. If you do your homework then you save money. If you fail to do your homework... then you run the risk of flushing your money down the toilet.

So people without the intelligence or time to participate in your system deserve to be badly governed. Noted (and rejected).

[Xerographica]

The problem with your tax choice idea is that it ignores the utility of Sarah and Bob. You are assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have money.

Please give me $100 dollars. Why? Well... because it would provide me with utility. So are you going to give me $100 dollars? Probably not. Why not? Because doing so would not provide YOU with utility.

Your choices are pretty limited...

A. Give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does not reflect/communicate/embody your utility.
B. Don't give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does reflect/communicate/embody your utility.

It should be a no-brainer that most people expect some utility in exchange for their money. So paying attention to the utility of people who have money is the same thing as paying attention to the people who gave them that money.

Watch...

I'm a millionaire, I'm a multi-millionaire. I'm filthy rich. You know why I'm a multi-millionaire? 'Cause multi-millions like what I do. That's pretty good, isn't it? - Michael Moore

Am I assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of Michael Moore? What I'm actually assuming is that paying attention to the utility of Moore is the same thing as paying attention to the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore. So if you are assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of Moore, you're assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore.

This shouldn't be a difficult concept. You're assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have votes. Well yeah, duh. It's called representative democracy. Disregarding the utility of Elizabeth Warren is the same thing as disregarding the utility of all the people who voted for her.

The issue is whether dollar votes more effectively reflect/communicate/embody utility than ballot votes. Lots of people don't even bother voting but everybody spends money.

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Right now you're thinking superficially. You can see that Michael Moore is rich. Yeah, anybody can see that. Even blind people can see that he's rich. It doesn't take very deep thinking to understand that he's rich because he's used society's resources to benefit lots of people. It shouldn't take very deep thinking to understand that subverting his will is the same thing as subverting the will of millions of people.

Would allowing Moore to choose where his taxes go provide him with more influence in the public sector than you or I would have? Of course. And if you're unhappy with this disparity then you'd be more than welcome to figure out how you can use society's resources to benefit lots of people. Incentives matter. You want more influence? Then create more benefit.

[Galloism]

The problem with your tax choice idea is that it ignores the utility of Sarah and Bob. You are assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have money.

Please give me $100 dollars. Why? Well... because it would provide me with utility. So are you going to give me $100 dollars? Probably not. Why not? Because doing so would not provide YOU with utility.

Your choices are pretty limited...

A. Give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does not reflect/communicate/embody your utility.
B. Don't give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does reflect/communicate/embody your utility.

It should be a no-brainer that most people expect some utility in exchange for their money. So paying attention to the utility of people who have money is the same thing as paying attention to the people who gave them that money.

Watch...

I'm a millionaire, I'm a multi-millionaire. I'm filthy rich. You know why I'm a multi-millionaire? 'Cause multi-millions like what I do. That's pretty good, isn't it? - Michael Moore

Am I assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of Michael Moore? What I'm actually assuming is that paying attention to the utility of Moore is the same thing as paying attention to the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore. So if you are assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of Moore, you're assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore.

This shouldn't be a difficult concept. You're assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have votes. Well yeah, duh. It's called representative democracy. Disregarding the utility of Elizabeth Warren is the same thing as disregarding the utility of all the people who voted for her.

The issue is whether dollar votes more effectively reflect/communicate/embody utility than ballot votes. Lots of people don't even bother voting but everybody spends money.

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Right now you're thinking superficially. You can see that Michael Moore is rich. Yeah, anybody can see that. Even blind people can see that he's rich. It doesn't take very deep thinking to understand that he's rich because he's used society's resources to benefit lots of people. It shouldn't take very deep thinking to understand that subverting his will is the same thing as subverting the will of millions of people.

Would allowing Moore to choose where his taxes go provide him with more influence in the public sector than you or I would have? Of course. And if you're unhappy with this disparity then you'd be more than welcome to figure out how you can use society's resources to benefit lots of people. Incentives matter. You want more influence? Then create more benefit.

Once again you presume that "has more money" means "provided more benefit".

You haven't proven this. Look at Donald Trump - he inherited his wealth and would be wealthier if he had put the money in an index fund and not touched it, yet he would still have more influence than me having provided society with less net benefit than if he had basically ignored his wealth.

[Quokkastan]

Please give me $100 dollars. Why? Well... because it would provide me with utility. So are you going to give me $100 dollars? Probably not. Why not? Because doing so would not provide YOU with utility.

Your choices are pretty limited...

A. Give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does not reflect/communicate/embody your utility.
B. Don't give me $100 dollars. This would provide some evidence that your spending does reflect/communicate/embody your utility.

It should be a no-brainer that most people expect some utility in exchange for their money. So paying attention to the utility of people who have money is the same thing as paying attention to the people who gave them that money.

Watch...


Am I assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of Michael Moore? What I'm actually assuming is that paying attention to the utility of Moore is the same thing as paying attention to the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore. So if you are assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of Moore, you're assuming that it would be beneficial to disregard the utility of the millions of people who give their money to Moore.

This shouldn't be a difficult concept. You're assuming that we should only pay attention to the utility of those who have votes. Well yeah, duh. It's called representative democracy. Disregarding the utility of Elizabeth Warren is the same thing as disregarding the utility of all the people who voted for her.

The issue is whether dollar votes more effectively reflect/communicate/embody utility than ballot votes. Lots of people don't even bother voting but everybody spends money.

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Right now you're thinking superficially. You can see that Michael Moore is rich. Yeah, anybody can see that. Even blind people can see that he's rich. It doesn't take very deep thinking to understand that he's rich because he's used society's resources to benefit lots of people. It shouldn't take very deep thinking to understand that subverting his will is the same thing as subverting the will of millions of people.

Would allowing Moore to choose where his taxes go provide him with more influence in the public sector than you or I would have? Of course. And if you're unhappy with this disparity then you'd be more than welcome to figure out how you can use society's resources to benefit lots of people. Incentives matter. You want more influence? Then create more benefit.

Once again you presume that "has more money" means "provided more benefit".

You haven't proven this. Look at Donald Trump - he inherited his wealth and would be wealthier if he had put the money in an index fund and not touched it, yet he would still have more influence than me having provided society with less net benefit than if he had basically ignored his wealth.

Meanwhile Jonas Salk refused to patent his vaccine, and lost out on as much as 7 billion dollars while saving millions of lives.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Your premise is incorrect. "Sacrifice" only makes sense in terms of utility. How much I'm "sacrificing" by giving up $100 depends on how much I value those $100. The problem with your approach is that there is going to significant heterogeneity in how people value money, and this will distort the degree to which your method is able to reveal the strength of preferences. For example, there's a good body of empirical evidence to suggest that marginal utility is diminishing in income (and, even it if isn't, the following example will work using any functional form other than strictly linear utility). This is a problem for you. Suppose there are two people, Alice and Bob, who need to "vote" on two mutually exclusive policies, X and Y, using your spending method. Suppose that Alice would derive the exact same utility from policy X as Bob would derive from policy Y. But also suppose that Alice has $100,000 in her bank account and Bob only has $10,000. Since marginal utility is decreasing in income, Alice is going to spend more on policy X than Bob will spend on policy Y, and thus policy X will win. But since they would both derive the same utility from their respective policies, your method is actually skewing the vote toward the richest person. It's not communicating preference strength, just differing marginal utilities of income.

I get your idea. You want a decision mechanism that allows preference strength to come into play. The problem is that there is no feasible system that's going to allow that to happen.

[Forsher]

How you know a question makes sense is simple: context.

You are correct that objectivity is contextual. 299792458 metres per second is objectively the the speed of light, but only within the limits of our universe.

But it's not correct to say that 9.80665 m/s² is gravitational acceleration, not even within the limited context of earth. Every object that can freely move toward a mass, even on earth, will experience a different gravitational acceleration depending on it's position. However, you can still use it as a useful term if you can find a reasonable agreement on a shared context. Once such a shared context exist, the term becomes sensible as a tool of communication. But you cannot assume that this shared context exists for any subjective term.

No, you can.

As I pointed out, there is a base context. I talk about fags IRL and people know I mean smokes. I talk about fags here and people don't. Why? Because the shared norms and values (the cultural context) of where I live do not extend elsewhere. That someone IRL may not share an understanding of the cultural context does not mean it is inappropriate to make the assumption it exists. We could call this a reasonable person test... and, like I just told you, that does not true on NSG, which is why I proceeded to explain how a shared context was generated.

Moral: don't tell me what I already know and do so in a paternalistic manner.

Luckily, I have been defining what I've meant by fair... balancing the interest and agency of all parties involved.

This is a useless definition. Your definition of a balance of interest is not going to match that of other people. A communist believes that people have different interests than a 100% free market advocate.

The same is true of agency. One person believes that certain self-destructive or semi-destructive behaviour are rights that people have (like to use drugs or pollute) and others believe that agency doesn't extend this far. A believer in the rationality of humans is going to judge limitations to agency differently from someone who believes that humans have substantial irrationality.

So you can call something fair, believing it is 'balancing the interest and agency of all parties involved,' while another person disagrees that the same solution does so.

It was patently obvious what was meant by "interests". I could have said goals or objectives. It doesn't matter that a communist thinks that people are motivated to share and share alike whereas the free-market advocate is very much motivated by greed. That's simply not relevant in this case. What I am saying works with some very simple logic. Namely, we know person A has motive X. We know that person B has motive Y. We simply need to find some arrangement that balances the known motives of these individual persons. Motive meaning "what each wants from the arrangement". We're not making some grand statement about Human Nature... that was, very clearly, not what was meant by interests.

Agency is essentially the ability to pursue one's motives. Also note that we're discussing balance and we have the known motives* of individual persons. Imagine that John wants to kill George. Imagine that George doesn't want to die. Now, technically we could suppose complete agency in the sense that John has a loaded gun placed on George's temple. John kills George. You tell us that I say this is a fair outcome. Anyone can see that's bollocks. We have not considered the agency of George... therefore, there is no balancing... hence, bollocks.

Where you have a point is that it could be possible that George belongs to some class which is recognised to have no agency. You balance the agencies and George has to die: what he wants is irrelevant. It could also be possible that John's agency is restricted... maybe murder is illegal (George wants to live so this is not assisted suicide, nor is it manslaughter as John wants George dead). The trouble is that we're not talking about some Huge Concept... this was an applied discussion and in the context of any economy we know that there is a shared context. In fact, there has to be. In other words, we are given a concept of agency.

Nice try, though.

*Known-ness is a bit iffy. Basically, what we know is that A wants to buy and B wants to sell. We know that B wants something and that A has some reason to buy... what those are we may not know for sure, but this is actually all we need. In some sense, we actually just need to know that each is willing to do some part... as indicated by their being in a place to negotiate.

Thus, given your side of the discussion, it is pretty obvious that equitable, as we've been talking about, means respecting human dignity.

'Respecting human dignity' is another useless metric. There are people who believe that helping people takes away their dignity and there are people who believe that not helping people takes away dignity.

Is that you MFI?

And, anyway, we are not discussing some abstract conversation, we're discussing our conversation and in our conversation there were two parties here: me and you. If this is relevant, one of us has to believe that basic human dignity does not include a basic level of healthcare. As neither of us argued about this... and indeed my argument are premised on the fact that your posts extolled such a belief*... we can take it as given.

And, no, I am not just conjuring these ideas in our to give you the runaround... notice just there, yeah, "as we've been talking about". If I thought you and I would not understand "human dignity" differently then I would have explained what I meant.

*Which is true. If you disagree, sorry but your posts were very misleading.

Your point is a nonsense... a general rule that has no bearing on the conversation experienced. Hence:

a "linvoid" system is not and cannot be equitable.

And I find your point to be nonsense. An argument that show lacks of understanding of the real question(s).

The question is not what system is and what is not equitable, the question is how we deal with the inherent inequity in nature, which cannot be fully solved by mankind.

Imagine a person that was born without an arm. We do not have the means to grow him an arm. To achieve equity, we could chop off everyone's arm. It would be more fair in the sense that we would have equality and none would suffer more than another. But overall people would still suffer more than if we wouldn't choose this solution. So being completely intolerant of unfairness, requires us to increase suffering and choose a lowest common denominator. As such, we mustn't seek to maximise fairness.

Firstly, you present an argument that relies on a different, very very different, conception of fairness to any present in our conversation. It also relies on a very, very different conception of equity.

Secondly, the question is as you say, and the answer is, you said, why not use "linvoid" (for some things) because, as I have shown repeatedly, "linvoid" allocation does sweet FA toward dealing with that.

Thirdly, yes that means we're discussing the answer. I have not presented an alternative answer to the question (although insofar as I have not disagreed that the logic that explains the issue with "linvoid" allocation is irrelevant in a non-user pays healthcare system) and have, in fact, repeatedly told you to stop trying to talk about irrelevant Big Points. There is only one point... I want you to agree that there is a reason to not use "linvoid" allocation to answer your implicit question.

For someone so keen on responding only to sections of posts, you seem completely unwilling to grasp that is how I responded to your initial post.

The market system, as we understand it, requires laws.

The way we have set it up and our insistence that some property transfer must only happen through a market system, rather than through violence, does require it. However, our current system also requires non-market elements (like taxes to pay the people who make and enforce market laws).

And a limited form of markets can exist without laws. Or you can have somewhat more advanced markets where laws play less of a role than vigilante enforcement of market behavior.

I was mulling this over as I went to bed. You don't need laws... you do need, however, something like laws.

Imagine, John is 6'6", he is three times as heavy as Jane and John is competent in the use of violence. Jane is not competent in the use of violence and, in short, can do absolutely nothing to stop John from killing/maiming her if he so wished. She can't kill him in his sleep, because she doesn't know where he sleeps. However, Jane has something John wants: a mango. John can have faith that if Jane sells him the mango (say, for a lesson in competent use of violence), Jane will not be able to compromise John's mango. Were it the other way around, with Jane buying the mango with a shell say, Jane cannot have faith in this and so probably would try and find some alternative way of buying the mango.

Anyway, over time with many of these trades of mangos for lessons, Jane reaches a state where maybe John couldn't kill Jane if he wanted. However, attempting to kill Jane still has low cost. John is still confident in his ability to make sure the mango is his. Three weeks later and this dynamic has changed (Jane's a quick learner)... now if John tried to kill Jane or vice versa there would be heavy costs to both parties. Pretend, for instance, that John'd have both eyes poked out and Jane would have both thumbs bitten off. This is also cool. After all, neither John nor Jane value self-harm/injury (which they've picked up on from their many dealings with each other), so both knowing this reality they are confident that if John buys a mango, the mango can remain his. In effect, we have a basis for faith in the integrity of negotiated outcomes in this shared understanding.

However, if Jane is a quick learner, she may be over-confident. Thus, Jane underestimates the ability of her tutor (John) and believes that she can kill John at low cost. This is destabilising... maybe Jane gets a shell off John for the mango and then tries to take the mango back herself. The terrible costs aren't experienced as both manage to disentangle from each other and escape largely unharmed. Their relationship is quite the opposite... things are, if not irreparable, certainly ruined for the foreseeable future and there is no mutual basis for faith anymore. Or, maybe, they don't need to fight because when Jane tries to sell the mango she's got some sort of swagger or whatever that John picks up and realises the meaning of. This would also ruin that relationship.

Here there were no laws. In fact, it is not even clear that John and Jane know anyone else (so in some fashion it doesn't even make sense to conceive of law). However, some market type structure was able to arise because something functioned like laws... and like you I chose violence. The point though is the basis of faith. In general, we think some sort of monopolised use of violence (by the state, typically) is a great way of providing that kind of faith. John and Jane could have had a different basis, maybe something like a mutual obsession with "honour and respect" and I feel equally complex forms of markets (as in, of the kind we understand) could arise from such a basis, because the penalty of dishonourable behaviour (not the same as unethical behaviour) would mean functional equivalence with law.

So, in that sense, wherever I say law read "basis of faith". And I don't think we disagree here... although my logic from beforehand is somewhat deflated by the above. After all, if law is not required then it all really matters as is as a "throttle"... although whether it restricts or makes available is another matter.*

*For instance, gaining some sort of compensation for emotional loss/harm in contract (as in Jarvis v Swan Tours). That's an important thing to consider behaviourally but without law this dynamic, in a market, could not exist... it's not restricting behaviour here, but rather, adding an aspect to it.

They are not restrictions, although they can be, they are the equivalent of the domain of a function.

Of course they are restrictions. I cannot take your things at gunpoint without facing the risk of jail, which restricts me. It's a kind of restriction that most people like, though.

Read the whole sentence "although they can be".

and markets do not make sense without laws.

This is false. A market that operates through a balance of power, rather than rules enforced by a government, makes perfect sense.

Union strikes are an example of how a market can be made to operate differently from the basic rules of supply and demand, by improving the power of the workers through collective rational action, rather than individual rational action. Of course, in a modern, Western context those are embedded within the legal system, but this is not a necessity.

Unions don't alter supply and demand. They, in theory, mean you can have one cartel (the union/s) versus another (the monopoly/employer... which means it is a monopsony). Unions correct (or, if you so choose to believe, create) imbalances in market power. You could think of a union as a monopoly, getting choose one of price/quantity. I don't personally believe this moves beyond supply and demand but I don't think it matters how we describe this.

However, as noted, markets don't make sense without some basis of faith... in this case for the union to have any market power it needs faith in its own integrity... that, for instance, the employer/monopsony cannot send goons to kill union bosses, break up meetings and leverage union members. Balance of power in the sense of MAD, sure, balance of market power... nope. And I am not sure which you mean.

Your particular point, that a "linvoid" system would be appropriate for healthcare, was what we have theoretically been disputing... although you apparently disagree with me that the thrust (abstract principle underlying this belief) was that it'd be more equitable this way.

Well, I don't agree that the word equitable is a sensible metric, so I can't discuss in on those terms.

I believe that in a society with a certain level of overall wealth, certain minimum benefits should be provided to anyone. In Western societies, this includes basic healthcare.

...Aside.

You see, there's the problem. You walk like a duck, you quack like a duck, but you argue that being a duck makes no sense.

What is the probability that a person with belief profile A, rejects the concept that belief profile A is described as B? All information we have is based on previous experience, and in previous experience, belief profile A is called B, so therefore I would say 0% (insofar as I never considered it at all).

Anyway, back to the conversation...

I believe that this can be done by buyer-side (giving people money to buy healthcare), supplier-side (artificially making healthcare cheaper) or a mix. Each of these has upsides and downsides. No decision is perfect. So you have to decide between flawed options.

In general, I believe that different goods/services are different in how their markets function. So you cannot necessarily treat basic food like basic healthcare. so that means that it can be perfectly logical to choose option A for good 1 and option B for good 2.

Yes, we agree. The problem is that you suggested that if option B were "linvoid" that it is still logical. That's where we disagree. It's quite possible that the only other thing we disagree on (aside from the bit where I ask if you're MFI, which is new) is how to characterise your position (see the aside).

An individual human is not rational, yes?

Both not entirely rational and not having unlimited intelligence, time, etc; the latter creating many of the same problems that a lack of rationality results in. For example, a major flaw in Xerographica's system is that it only works in a reality where people have more time to spend on politics than they do.

Don't even bother with what Xero says. Here's a quote:

"I will not trust thee, Templar," said Rebecca; "thou has taught me better how to estimate the virtues of thine Order. The next Preceptory would grant thee absolution for an oath, the keeping of which concerned nought but the honour or the dishonour of a miserable Jewish maiden."

If my argument doesn't make sense to you, you must not have read enough. Have another quote and all will be clear:

The very words hard labour, or forced labour, indicate that the man has lost his freedom; and when he spends his money he is merely satisfying a natural craving.

Now, go read my blog.

It follows that for real people, and real action, there is not necessarily some great rationale**.

There is no goal in life, which means that humans can't be rational, as rationality requires a goal. So the act of choosing a goal (and acting rationally to achieve it) is itself irrational.

There are many goals in life. I think we disagree fundamentally philosophically, however, I don't think you disagree with the point of this sentence, i.e. that an act may not have had some underlying goal behind it, so we'll ignore this disagreement.

However, the appeal of these characters is, in some sense, that they better... that they make the right decision.

Yes, that they are better at handling an imperfect world than us.

Sherlock is more observant: he gathers more/better information than we do.
Sherlock is better at deducing: he takes that information and draws conclusions based on advanced analysis

But it's fake, of course. Sherlock is written to appeal to us this way. In reality, not even the most intelligent and observant person would be able to quickly make all the observations that he makes; nor run through the Bayes model of a complexity that is necessary to draw his conclusions.

The writer clearly worked backwards, starting with the end result of the deduction and describing how Sherlock could deduce that. We don't have the luxury to cheat like that.

On the other hand, part of the appeal of these characters or, at least, of House (and contemporary adaptations of Holmes, e.g. Sherlock) is that they are massively flawed... or worse.

I wonder, did I mean better decisions or they're... they better in context made no sense. You seem to have grasped the point regardless of the typo.

The point, then, is that while people might generally not bother making sure a change is better than the base state, if you see a proposal that something should change (i.e. to providing healthcare linvoidally) then you better establish that it is.

The new system may be better at A and worse at B. Then no system is objectively better than the other, as it depends on how you value A and B. System 1 has low wait times, but low number of total treatments. System 2 has high wait times, but higher total treatments. System 1 result in some poor people not getting the treatment they need/want. System 2 results in some people with time-sensitive diseases to get worse treatment than they would get in system 1. Which system is better? For the individual, it really depends on what your circumstances are. Overall, it depends on what problems you prefer/dislike over others.

True, there is a tradeoff.

In the specific instance of the now wizened healthcare example, your "linvoid" proposal didn't propose any new kind of tradeoff... it was merely the same system, but a different currency. We are not asked to make a tradeoff, we're asked to make a change with exactly the same problems as originally.

Although, in reality people generally don't actually weigh actual outcomes, but expected outcomes, which adds a level of potential error and disagreement (based on ideology).

Or, like the person who started this thread, they don't judge outcomes, but the ideological purity of the solution.

I did try to warn you:

Xero has this habit of presenting what looks like some kind of economic system whilst actually presenting a different question. Xero's threads are actually about different ways of voting and thus what his questions explore, practically always, is whether or not system X is a better way of considering how much some individual values object Y than some other system Z.

I haven't been reading any of this thread except our posts, but I would be surprised if your conversation didn't look like that.

[Forsher]

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Your premise is incorrect. "Sacrifice" only makes sense in terms of utility. How much I'm "sacrificing" by giving up $100 depends on how much I value those $100. The problem with your approach is that there is going to significant heterogeneity in how people value money, and this will distort the degree to which your method is able to reveal the strength of preferences. For example, there's a good body of empirical evidence to suggest that marginal utility is diminishing in income. This is a problem for you. Suppose there are two people, Alice and Bob, who need to "vote" on two mutually exclusive policies, X and Y, using your spending method. Suppose that Alice would derive the exact same utility from policy X as Bob would derive from policy Y. But also suppose that Alice has $100,000 in her bank account and Bob only has $10,000. Since marginal utility is decreasing in income, Alice is going to spend more on policy X than Bob will spend on policy Y, and thus policy X will win. But since they would both derive the same utility from their respective policies, your method is actually skewing the vote toward the richest person. It's not communicating preference strength, just differing marginal utilities of income.

I get your idea. You want a decision mechanism that allows preference strength to come into play. The problem is that there is no feasible system that's going to allow that to happen.

Just to make sure I am following, Bob spends some amount of money M, but to Alice that amount of money M doesn't mean so much so she will spend some amount of money M + m... and based on Xero's voting system, as m is positive, policy X is chosen?

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Your premise is incorrect. "Sacrifice" only makes sense in terms of utility. How much I'm "sacrificing" by giving up $100 depends on how much I value those $100. The problem with your approach is that there is going to significant heterogeneity in how people value money, and this will distort the degree to which your method is able to reveal the strength of preferences. For example, there's a good body of empirical evidence to suggest that marginal utility is diminishing in income. This is a problem for you. Suppose there are two people, Alice and Bob, who need to "vote" on two mutually exclusive policies, X and Y, using your spending method. Suppose that Alice would derive the exact same utility from policy X as Bob would derive from policy Y. But also suppose that Alice has $100,000 in her bank account and Bob only has $10,000. Since marginal utility is decreasing in income, Alice is going to spend more on policy X than Bob will spend on policy Y, and thus policy X will win. But since they would both derive the same utility from their respective policies, your method is actually skewing the vote toward the richest person. It's not communicating preference strength, just differing marginal utilities of income.

I get your idea. You want a decision mechanism that allows preference strength to come into play. The problem is that there is no feasible system that's going to allow that to happen.

Just to make sure I am following, Bob spends some amount of money M, but to Alice that amount of money M doesn't mean so much so she will spend some amount of money M + m... and based on Xero's voting system, as m is positive, policy X is chosen?

If the voting is sequential, then yes, you'd get a variant of Bertrand pricing where Alice will push Bob to his upper limit (where the utility of the income he's giving up is equal to the utility he gains from policy Y), and Alice will spend some minimal amount above that. If the voting is simultaneous, you'd probably get some variant of Cournot pricing. We should probably model it out in order to be more precise, but the bottom line is that, as long as Alice and Bob have the same concave utility of income function (this is just an all-else-equal assumption) and value their respective policies the same, Alice will always win under Xero's system. In fact, there is a range in which Alice will win even if she values her policy X less than Bob values his policy Y.

Edit: Just to make my point very clear, Xero's voting system will accurately reveal preference strength if and only if everyone has the same utility of income function and that the function itself is strictly linear. That's one almighty assumption.

[Galloism]

Once again you presume that "has more money" means "provided more benefit".

You haven't proven this. Look at Donald Trump - he inherited his wealth and would be wealthier if he had put the money in an index fund and not touched it, yet he would still have more influence than me having provided society with less net benefit than if he had basically ignored his wealth.

Meanwhile Jonas Salk refused to patent his vaccine, and lost out on as much as 7 billion dollars while saving millions of lives.

And Polio had devastating effects even on those that survived it. In addition to the millions of lives, he also saved millions more from suffering, and, and this is important to Xero, untold billions in our economic system from not having to care for those suffering the devastating effects and aftereffects of polio.

Yet, in Xero's system, his voice would be less than a time-traveling Donald Trump, despite him producing far far more utility than Donald Trump could ever dream of.

[Xerographica]

If you've read the pragmatarianism FAQ, then you would know that taxpayers would be free to spend their tax dollars at anytime throughout the year.

This in no way addresses my question. You have just paid your tax, but the next day a horrible war breaks out in Yaddastan. You believe in interventions and want to switch your tax money to fund peace keepers, rather than teddy bears for veterans. Too bad, you have to wait until next year, after many people died.

What do you mean I just paid my tax? Do you mean that I just spent all of my tax dollars at once? Because that's how I spend my money in the private sector?

I bundled your objections to pragmatarianism...

Too bad, you have to wait until next year, after many people died.

consumers don't alter their spending even when it is rational.

Actually, it is an argument against making people allocate tax money in a detailed manner, as that requires a level of effort that is not reasonable next to another job.

No, it would result in irrational, but popular ideas being made into policy.

Anecdotes are not evidence and observation is not fact, as people's biases change their observations.

Proper decision making doesn't require being close, it requires getting the right information, which often is not available to the people closest to the problem.

True, but irrelevant if they can't judge 'waste.'

So people without the intelligence or time to participate in your system deserve to be badly governed. Noted (and rejected).

According to you, people are uninformed, irrational, biased, don't have the time or intelligence and are incapable of judging "waste". Plus, people wouldn't be able to change their minds and don't even want to change their minds. Therefore?

Which is a solid argument in favor of politicians making detailed decisions and citizens picking those experts.

It's a very fine line. Clearly you want to disparage people enough to demonstrate that pragmatarianism would fail. But if you disparage people too much then you also demonstrate that democracy does fail.

With the current system, citizens can select, and deselect, their representatives. In order to make an informed decision whether to deselect your representative, you have to compare their decisions to your preferences. If you voted for Elizabeth Warren because she promised to support intervention in Yaddastan... then in order to make an informed decision whether to deselect her... you have to know how closely her actions in congress matched your preferences. Monitoring her actions takes time and effort. If her actions closely matched your preferences... then you wouldn't deselect her. If her actions did not closely match your preferences... then you would deselect her.

How is this different from pragmatarianism? If Warren's actions did not closely match your preferences... then you would deselect her. This would involve spending your tax dollars yourself. How would you spend your tax dollars? You would spend your tax dollars like you wanted Warren to spend your tax dollars.

A key premise of democracy is that representatives should spend your tax dollars according to your preferences. We can simplify it to... a premise of democracy is that your tax dollars should be spent according to your preferences. But this is also a key premise of pragmatarianism.

My point is that you need to carefully think about what's required of voters before you attack pragmatarianism. If you fail to do so, then you'll simply shoot yourself in the foot.

[Xerographica]

Even if you could give me 100 votes... I would still choose $100 dollars. I would even choose $1 dollar over 100 votes. Money reflects sacrifice/value.... votes do not. This is why spending more accurately reflects/communicates/embodies utility than voting. This is why voting subverts the true will of the people.

Your premise is incorrect. "Sacrifice" only makes sense in terms of utility. How much I'm "sacrificing" by giving up $100 depends on how much I value those $100. The problem with your approach is that there is going to significant heterogeneity in how people value money, and this will distort the degree to which your method is able to reveal the strength of preferences. For example, there's a good body of empirical evidence to suggest that marginal utility is diminishing in income (and, even it if isn't, the following example will work using any functional form other than strictly linear utility). This is a problem for you. Suppose there are two people, Alice and Bob, who need to "vote" on two mutually exclusive policies, X and Y, using your spending method. Suppose that Alice would derive the exact same utility from policy X as Bob would derive from policy Y. But also suppose that Alice has $100,000 in her bank account and Bob only has $10,000. Since marginal utility is decreasing in income, Alice is going to spend more on policy X than Bob will spend on policy Y, and thus policy X will win. But since they would both derive the same utility from their respective policies, your method is actually skewing the vote toward the richest person. It's not communicating preference strength, just differing marginal utilities of income.

I get your idea. You want a decision mechanism that allows preference strength to come into play. The problem is that there is no feasible system that's going to allow that to happen.

You really don't get my idea. Let's try again...

I'm a millionaire, I'm a multi-millionaire. I'm filthy rich. You know why I'm a multi-millionaire? 'Cause multi-millions like what I do. That's pretty good, isn't it? - Michael Moore

When Moore hires a writer for his documentaries... does the amount of money he spends on a writer only reflect the strength of Moore's preferences? NO! The amount of money that Moore can and does spend on a writer also reflects the preference strength of all the people who've given their money to Moore for his previous documentaries.

Let's say that I super duper want to film a documentary about epiphytes. Unfortunately, I suck at writing. So I'd like to hire somebody to help me write the script for my documentary.

If we're solely comparing my preference strength to Moore's preference strength... and we assume that my preference is stronger... then a better writer should be allocated to my project. But even if my preference for a better writer is stronger than Moore's... what would happen if Moore and I were bidding on a better writer? Obviously he's going to get the better writer because he has a lot more money than I do.

In other words, Moore's ability to pay (ATP) is a function of his fans' willingness to pay (WTP). His fans' ATP is a function of their fans' WTP and so on and so on and so on.

If, despite the fact that my writer wasn't the best, lots of people were willing to pay for my epiphyte documentary, then my ATP would increase accordingly. This would allow me to hire a better writer for my next documentary.

So no, you don't get my idea. You haven't even attempted to address my argument that your ATP is a function of your fans' WTP.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Your premise is incorrect. "Sacrifice" only makes sense in terms of utility. How much I'm "sacrificing" by giving up $100 depends on how much I value those $100. The problem with your approach is that there is going to significant heterogeneity in how people value money, and this will distort the degree to which your method is able to reveal the strength of preferences. For example, there's a good body of empirical evidence to suggest that marginal utility is diminishing in income (and, even it if isn't, the following example will work using any functional form other than strictly linear utility). This is a problem for you. Suppose there are two people, Alice and Bob, who need to "vote" on two mutually exclusive policies, X and Y, using your spending method. Suppose that Alice would derive the exact same utility from policy X as Bob would derive from policy Y. But also suppose that Alice has $100,000 in her bank account and Bob only has $10,000. Since marginal utility is decreasing in income, Alice is going to spend more on policy X than Bob will spend on policy Y, and thus policy X will win. But since they would both derive the same utility from their respective policies, your method is actually skewing the vote toward the richest person. It's not communicating preference strength, just differing marginal utilities of income.

I get your idea. You want a decision mechanism that allows preference strength to come into play. The problem is that there is no feasible system that's going to allow that to happen.

You really don't get my idea. Let's try again...

I'm a millionaire, I'm a multi-millionaire. I'm filthy rich. You know why I'm a multi-millionaire? 'Cause multi-millions like what I do. That's pretty good, isn't it? - Michael Moore

When Moore hires a writer for his documentaries... does the amount of money he spends on a writer only reflect the strength of Moore's preferences? NO! The amount of money that Moore can and does spend on a writer also reflects the preference strength of all the people who've given their money to Moore for his previous documentaries.

Let's say that I super duper want to film a documentary about epiphytes. Unfortunately, I suck at writing. So I'd like to hire somebody to help me write the script for my documentary.

If we're solely comparing my preference strength to Moore's preference strength... and we assume that my preference is stronger... then a better writer should be allocated to my project. But even if my preference for a better writer is stronger than Moore's... what would happen if Moore and I were bidding on a better writer? Obviously he's going to get the better writer because he has a lot more money than I do.

In other words, Moore's ability to pay (ATP) is a function of his fans' willingness to pay (WTP). His fans' ATP is a function of their fans' WTP and so on and so on and so on.

If, despite the fact that my writer wasn't the best, lots of people were willing to pay for my epiphyte documentary, then my ATP would increase accordingly. This would allow me to hire a better writer for my next documentary.

So no, you don't get my idea. You haven't even attempted to address my argument that your ATP is a function of your fans' WTP.

You've just reiterated what I already understand about your idea. My example wasn't about preferences feeding into other preferences, or any other extension of your idea. It was a simple example of how your system fails to reveal preference strength even under the simplest of circumstances where there are only two voters who are equal in every way except for their fixed income endowments. If your system doesn't perform as expected under the most basic conditions, then it's pointless to talk about these extensions.

[Galloism]

You really don't get my idea. Let's try again...


When Moore hires a writer for his documentaries... does the amount of money he spends on a writer only reflect the strength of Moore's preferences? NO! The amount of money that Moore can and does spend on a writer also reflects the preference strength of all the people who've given their money to Moore for his previous documentaries.

Let's say that I super duper want to film a documentary about epiphytes. Unfortunately, I suck at writing. So I'd like to hire somebody to help me write the script for my documentary.

If we're solely comparing my preference strength to Moore's preference strength... and we assume that my preference is stronger... then a better writer should be allocated to my project. But even if my preference for a better writer is stronger than Moore's... what would happen if Moore and I were bidding on a better writer? Obviously he's going to get the better writer because he has a lot more money than I do.

In other words, Moore's ability to pay (ATP) is a function of his fans' willingness to pay (WTP). His fans' ATP is a function of their fans' WTP and so on and so on and so on.

If, despite the fact that my writer wasn't the best, lots of people were willing to pay for my epiphyte documentary, then my ATP would increase accordingly. This would allow me to hire a better writer for my next documentary.

So no, you don't get my idea. You haven't even attempted to address my argument that your ATP is a function of your fans' WTP.

You've just reiterated what I already understand about your idea. My example wasn't about preferences feeding into other preferences, or any other extension of your idea. It was a simple example of how your system fails to reveal preference strength even under the simplest of circumstances where there are only two voters who are equal in every way except for their fixed income endowments. If your system doesn't perform as expected under the most basic conditions, then it's pointless to talk about these extensions.

I think you misunderstand.

The basic premise is that rich people deserve to run the world because they're rich, and poor people can suck it. If they want to run things, then they can get rich.

That's every Xero thread forever.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

You've just reiterated what I already understand about your idea. My example wasn't about preferences feeding into other preferences, or any other extension of your idea. It was a simple example of how your system fails to reveal preference strength even under the simplest of circumstances where there are only two voters who are equal in every way except for their fixed income endowments. If your system doesn't perform as expected under the most basic conditions, then it's pointless to talk about these extensions.

I think you misunderstand.

The basic premise is that rich people deserve to run the world because they're rich, and poor people can suck it. If they want to run things, then they can get rich.

That's every Xero thread forever.

*sigh* And yet I keep finding myself in them.

[Xerographica]

You really don't get my idea. Let's try again...


When Moore hires a writer for his documentaries... does the amount of money he spends on a writer only reflect the strength of Moore's preferences? NO! The amount of money that Moore can and does spend on a writer also reflects the preference strength of all the people who've given their money to Moore for his previous documentaries.

Let's say that I super duper want to film a documentary about epiphytes. Unfortunately, I suck at writing. So I'd like to hire somebody to help me write the script for my documentary.

If we're solely comparing my preference strength to Moore's preference strength... and we assume that my preference is stronger... then a better writer should be allocated to my project. But even if my preference for a better writer is stronger than Moore's... what would happen if Moore and I were bidding on a better writer? Obviously he's going to get the better writer because he has a lot more money than I do.

In other words, Moore's ability to pay (ATP) is a function of his fans' willingness to pay (WTP). His fans' ATP is a function of their fans' WTP and so on and so on and so on.

If, despite the fact that my writer wasn't the best, lots of people were willing to pay for my epiphyte documentary, then my ATP would increase accordingly. This would allow me to hire a better writer for my next documentary.

So no, you don't get my idea. You haven't even attempted to address my argument that your ATP is a function of your fans' WTP.

You've just reiterated what I already understand about your idea. My example wasn't about preferences feeding into other preferences, or any other extension of your idea. It was a simple example of how your system fails to reveal preference strength even under the simplest of circumstances where there are only two voters who are equal in every way except for their fixed income endowments. If your system doesn't perform as expected under the most basic conditions, then it's pointless to talk about these extensions.

Preference strength? Both of us are flat broke. Would I give my left nut for pragmatarianism? Sure. Would I also give my right nut for pragmatarianism? Eh. How many nuts would you be willing to give for our current system? None? Then we should have a pragmatarian system. One nut? Then we can flip a coin. Two nuts? Ok, you win. We should keep the current system.

Of course neither of us is flat broke. Therefore, we don't need to sacrifice our nuts in order to decide which system we should have. Instead, we can simply spend our money. Whoever is willing to spend the most money gets their preferred system. Of course, I'm sure that we don't have exactly the same amount of money. Does this mean that our respective WTPs are meaningless? Of course not. Our ATPs reflect our fans' WTP.

Right now Elizabeth Warren has far more ATP in the public sector than you and I combined. Is this fair? Well... she has more "fans" than we do. She received more votes than us.

You say that it's pointless to talk about these "extensions" but your system already has these extensions. They aren't exactly the same as my extensions but the logic is close enough. Warren has more power in the public sector than we do because she has more "fans" than us. Clearly you agree with this logic. The issue is whether voting fans should be able to trump consumer fans.

Clearly I believe that voting fans should not be able to trump consumer fans. A vote is worthless. Even though people value a dollar differently... most people do value dollars. This means that consumer fans are infinitely superior to voting fans. Therefore, taxpayers should have the option to directly allocate their taxes if they are dissatisfied with their representatives for any reason.

[Galloism]

I think you misunderstand.

The basic premise is that rich people deserve to run the world because they're rich, and poor people can suck it. If they want to run things, then they can get rich.

That's every Xero thread forever.

*sigh* And yet I keep finding myself in them.

Interestingly, a system of preference voting with instant runoffs could be used as a preference intensity measurement after a fashion.

If you have candidate A, B, and C who have similar policy methods but different focuses, IE, the food supply, energy, and the military, a preference voting system where candidates are ranked could provide some probative albeit indirect preference strength revelations about the voting public who ranked those candidates.

It also isn't plagued by disparities in wealth that plague preference revelation systems setup on money. It still is, at best, an approximation with an interpretive conclusion, but then, when it comes to preference revelation, what isn't?

[Galloism]

You've just reiterated what I already understand about your idea. My example wasn't about preferences feeding into other preferences, or any other extension of your idea. It was a simple example of how your system fails to reveal preference strength even under the simplest of circumstances where there are only two voters who are equal in every way except for their fixed income endowments. If your system doesn't perform as expected under the most basic conditions, then it's pointless to talk about these extensions.

Preference strength? Both of us are flat broke. Would I give my left nut for pragmatarianism? Sure. Would I also give my right nut for pragmatarianism? Eh. How many nuts would you be willing to give for our current system? None? Then we should have a pragmatarian system. One nut? Then we can flip a coin. Two nuts? Ok, you win. We should keep the current system.

Of course neither of us is flat broke. Therefore, we don't need to sacrifice our nuts in order to decide which system we should have. Instead, we can simply spend our money. Whoever is willing to spend the most money gets their preferred system. Of course, I'm sure that we don't have exactly the same amount of money. Does this mean that our respective WTPs are meaningless? Of course not. Our ATPs reflect our fans' WTP.

Right now Elizabeth Warren has far more ATP in the public sector than you and I combined. Is this fair? Well... she has more "fans" than we do. She received more votes than us.

You say that it's pointless to talk about these "extensions" but your system already has these extensions. They aren't exactly the same as my extensions but the logic is close enough. Warren has more power in the public sector than we do because she has more "fans" than us. Clearly you agree with this logic. The issue is whether voting fans should be able to trump consumer fans.

Clearly I believe that voting fans should not be able to trump consumer fans. A vote is worthless. Even though people value a dollar differently... most people do value dollars. This means that consumer fans are infinitely superior to voting fans. Therefore, taxpayers should have the option to directly allocate their taxes if they are dissatisfied with their representatives for any reason.

A vote is not in any way worthless. You only get one of them (per office) every two years, regardless of wealth, station, creed, or sexual orientation. They cannot be bought. It is something intrinsic to you as a citizen in a democratic society.

It's like saying your freedom is worthless, your rights are worthless, your very body is worthless, and your life is worthless.

No. Votes are not worthless. In society, your vote is one of the most valuable things you possess. Acting with others, you can effect real change. This is different than money, which most people do not have enough of to cause real change, no matter how they spend it.

Don't carelessly toss out something as worthless just because you don't fucking understand it.

And incidentally, Warren doesnt have a position of power in the red because she has fans. She has a position of power in the red because we made an economic decision to pay her to do a job. That's right we, collectively, hired her to do a job and are paying her for her work. When her contract is up, we can choose to fire her, removing her authority and stop paying her, or hire her again. She can even apply for other positions, and we can choose to hire her for those of not.

This is not significantly different than shareholders electing a board of directors. The difference is each shareholder has only one vote, unlike corporate shareholders who may cast millions of votes individually.

When we hired Warren we made an economic decision and collectively paid money to do that, just as corporate shareholders do. Don't cheapen it.

[The Joseon Dynasty]

Clearly I believe that voting fans should not be able to trump consumer fans. A vote is worthless. Even though people value a dollar differently... most people do value dollars. This means that consumer fans are infinitely superior to voting fans. Therefore, taxpayers should have the option to directly allocate their taxes if they are dissatisfied with their representatives for any reason.

This reasoning doesn't hold. From what I've understood from trawling through your countless threads is that, in your ideal world, decisions would be made according to a voting system where votes are weighted according to each voter's cardinal "preference strength". This means that not all votes are weighted equally, such that the votes of those who most strongly want their preferred policy are given more weight, and the votes of those who only marginally want their preferred policy are weighted less. This is a fair idea in principle; I'm not disputing that. But what you've done is decided that spending is going to adequately represent preference strength, and therefore votes should be weighted according to how much each individual is willing to pay for the preferred policy. The problem, as I've brought up before, is that spending as a proxy for preference strength falls apart when there are non-linearities in the utility function of money, and when there are heterogeneous utility functions of money. Basically, when there is no uniform value assigned to money across voters, your system cannot disentangle a voter's preference for the policy from their preference over money, which is, as you should understand, an irrelevant input in any decision mechanism.

The system we currently have is one where each vote is given the same weight. That clearly won't reflect preference strength either. But by assigning each vote an equal weight, we prevent other characteristics of voters from affecting their influence over the vote (ex. how much money they have). Each vote has value to the extent that we value the thing that's being voted on. Its value only exists in the context of the vote, and in many ways that's important for a functioning democracy.

[Xerographica]

The system we currently have is one where each vote is given the same weight. That clearly won't reflect preference strength either. But by assigning each vote an equal weight, we prevent other characteristics of voters from affecting their influence over the vote (ex. how much money they have). Each vote has value to the extent that we value the thing that's being voted on. Its value only exists in the context of the vote, and in many ways that's important for a functioning democracy.

However you spin it, Elizabeth Warren has more power in the public sector than I do. Why does she have more power? Because she received more votes than I did. I already explained this pretty clearly and you failed to even address it. I'm guessing that you're incapable of addressing it.

[Galloism]

Clearly I believe that voting fans should not be able to trump consumer fans. A vote is worthless. Even though people value a dollar differently... most people do value dollars. This means that consumer fans are infinitely superior to voting fans. Therefore, taxpayers should have the option to directly allocate their taxes if they are dissatisfied with their representatives for any reason.

This reasoning doesn't hold. From what I've understood from trawling through your countless threads is that, in your ideal world, decisions would be made according to a voting system where votes are weighted according to each voter's cardinal "preference strength". This means that not all votes are weighted equally, such that the votes of those who most strongly want their preferred policy are given more weight, and the votes of those who only marginally want their preferred policy are weighted less. This is a fair idea in principle; I'm not disputing that. But what you've done is decided that spending is going to adequately represent preference strength, and therefore votes should be weighted according to how much each individual is willing to pay for the preferred policy. The problem, as I've brought up before, is that spending as a proxy for preference strength falls apart when there are non-linearities in the utility function of money, and when there are heterogeneous utility functions of money. Basically, when there is no uniform value assigned to money across voters, your system cannot disentangle a voter's preference for the policy from their preference over money, which is, as you should understand, an irrelevant input in any decision mechanism.

The system we currently have is one where each vote is given the same weight. That clearly won't reflect preference strength either. But by assigning each vote an equal weight, we prevent other characteristics of voters from affecting their influence over the vote (ex. how much money they have). Each vote has value to the extent that we value the thing that's being voted on. Its value only exists in the context of the vote, and in many ways that's important for a functioning democracy.

Curious question for you. You're clearly more schooled on economics itself than I am (my knowledge is largely towards government workings and public revenue/spending). How would one go about accurately and reliably measuring preference intensity for public policies?

Money, obviously, isn't going to work for reasons gone over ar nauseam. Voting is flat, as you've noted. A system where number of tallied votes depended on your preference strength based on self-response is doomed to system gaming (IE, 10 for every issue forever by every voter). How would one go about it?

[Galloism]

The system we currently have is one where each vote is given the same weight. That clearly won't reflect preference strength either. But by assigning each vote an equal weight, we prevent other characteristics of voters from affecting their influence over the vote (ex. how much money they have). Each vote has value to the extent that we value the thing that's being voted on. Its value only exists in the context of the vote, and in many ways that's important for a functioning democracy.

However you spin it, Elizabeth Warren has more power in the public sector than I do. Why does she have more power? Because she received more votes than I did. I already explained this pretty clearly and you failed to even address it. I'm guessing that you're incapable of addressing it.

Why does the CEO of Wal-Mart have more power over Wal-Mart than the person shopping in baby clothes?

Same reason.

[Xerographica]

A vote is not in any way worthless. You only get one of them (per office) every two years, regardless of wealth, station, creed, or sexual orientation. They cannot be bought. It is something intrinsic to you as a citizen in a democratic society.

If a vote isn't worthless, then it's valuable. Therefore, according to your logic, it's meaningful that people were willing to give their votes to Elizabeth Warren. Yet, on the other hand, you strongly oppose giving people the option to directly choose where their taxes go. If people who voted for Warren decided to directly allocate their taxes... then it would seem to indicate that their decision to vote for Warren was not meaningful. Or it was meaningful at the time... but, based on her behavior, the people who voted for her realized that their decision to vote for her was a mistake.