Ukrainian War Thread III: The Horrors

[The Lone Alliance]

Except the Mainstream media didn't push the Ghost of Kyiv as anything more "There's a bunch of Rumors about the ghost of Kyiv guy, it's likely bullshit but everyone wants to believe it."
Meanwhile the Pro-Russian press and Pro-Russian sources has been a beacon of honesty when they....

Claimed that the Russian army was strong enough to reach Berlin within 48 hours.
Claimed that the Russian army was strong enough to reach Kyiv within 48 hours.
Claimed that they wouldn't invade Ukraine.
Claimed that claims that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine was a NATO false flag.
Claimed that the Ukrainian army wouldn't fight back and they'd only face scattered resistance from Nazis.
Claimed that the Ukrainian airforce was destroyed completely on the first day.
Claimed that NATO forced Russia to attack Ukraine.
Claimed that NATO was planning an invasion of Russia through Ukraine.
Claimed that the Kyiv Regime was going to surrender in February
Claimed that Russia would nuke the west if the west sent Ukraine Aid.
Claimed that they have won the war and Ukraine will now be part of Russia.... three days in.
Claimed that Zelensky had fled to Poland.
Claimed that Russia was about to Cauldron the entire Ukrainian army in the east in March.
Claimed that Russia would nuke the west if the west sent Ukraine military aid.
Claimed that Mariupol was taken.... in February.
Claimed that Mariupol was taken.... in March.
Claimed that Mariupol was taken.... in April.
Claimed that the Russian economy wasn't suffering.
Claimed that Russia would bring consequences if NATO invited Finland and Sweden to join NATO.
Claimed that the proof of the lack of victory is evidence that everyone in Ukraine is a Nazi who needs 30 years of forced rehabilitation and gulaging.
Claimed they were not killing civilians.
Claimed that Bucha was done by British Soldiers.
Claimed that Bucha was done by Azov Neo Nazis.
Claimed that Bucha was done by Ukrainian Artillery.
Claimed that Bucha never happened all the bodies were brought in.
Claimed that Russia was about to Cauldron the entire Ukrainian army in the east in April.
Claimed that Ukraine lost all their Bayraktars in April.
Claimed that Russia would bring consequences if Finland and Sweden agreed to join NATO.
Claimed that Ukraine was being invaded to stop secret NATO Biolabs that were being used to create superweapons that can kill Russians and\or COVID and Monkeypox.
Claimed that the Hospital in Mariupol was full of Azov
Claimed that the theatre full of children in Mariupol were full of Azov.
Claimed that the entire Kyiv offensive was a feint.
Claimed that the entire Sumy offensive was a feint.
Claimed that the Kharkov offensive was a feint before turning around and trying to go back.
Claimed the Ukrainian defensive lines in Donbass were routed in March.
Claimed the Ukrainian defensive lines in Donbass were routed in April.
Claimed the Ukrainian defensive lines in Donbass were routed in May.
Claimed that Ukraine lost all their Bayraktars in May.
Claimed that Russia was about to Cauldron the entire Ukrainian army in the east in May.
Claimed that Belarus was going to join the invasion in March.
Claimed that Belarus was going to join the invasion in April.
Claimed that Belarus was going to join the invasion in May.
Claimed that Ukraine attacked Transnistria in an obvious false flag.
Claimed that Russia didn't take massive losses in a failed River crossing.
Claimed that taking massive losses in a failed river crossing is completely normal and it happens to everyone.
Claimed that Ukraine launched an attack on Snake Island with helicopters, Ships and NATO commandos and Russia killed all of them.... before trying to claim that the dead Russian soldiers were actually NATO officers before blurring them out when people noticed that they were wearing Russian issued military clothing.
Claimed that there was a NATO Admiral in Mariupol leading Azov.... yet never produced Admiral.
Claimed that Russia was about to Cauldron all of the Ukrainians located in the Luhansk district in May.
Claimed that Ukrainians were not being taken from Ukraine and deported to locations inside Russia.
Claimed that an old computer from 2006 covered in crude "Property of NATO stickers" all over were a top secret NATO computer that Russia captured from Nazis.
Claimed that there was a secret plot by Ukrainian Nazis to kill a Russian propagandist that required Green wigs, unworn Swastika T-shirts, and three copies of the SIMs 3 in the place of SIM cards.
Claimed that Poland was going to invade West Ukraine.
Claimed that the Moskva was fine.
Claimed the Moskva had an internal fire not related to war.
Claimed that the Moskva safely made it back to harbor,
Claimed that the Moskva was sunk in an accident.
Claimed the Ukrainian defensive lines in Donbass were routed in June.
Claimed that Russia had Cauldroned all of the Ukrainians located in the Luhansk district in June.
Claimed the Ukrainian defensive lines in Donbass were routed in July.
Claimed that the Ukrainians are Genetically enhanced supersoldiers with STDs.
Claimed that Ukrainians were selling them Western artillery... failed to produce any.
Claimed a logging truck was a destroyed HIMARs.
Claimed a supply truck was a destroyed HIMARs.
Claimed an Ambulance was a destroyed HIMARs.
Claimed another civilian truck was a destroyed HIMARs.
Claimed that a second story room in an old factory was a destroyed HIMARs.
Claimed Ukraine has lost more drones than Ukraine has ever owned.
Claimed that Ukraine has lost more aircraft than they ever owned.
Claimed Ukraine has lost all their HIMARs.
Claimed they weren't going to bomb Odessa after agreeing to a trade deal.... before bombing Odessa.
Claimed that a Ukrainian HIMARs killed the Azov POWs who were clearly set on fire.
Claimed the Kherson bridge was not hit.
Claimed the Kherson bridge was hit but damage was mild.
Claimed the Kherson bridge was hit but the damage wasn't to the point that the bridge wasn't usable despite traffic at the bridge stopping and Russians being forced to use ferries to cross the water.
Claimed that no aircraft were destroyed in the Crimea explosion.

I have 75 cases of "Pro-Russian" sources lying and that's not even going into detail, there are countless ones I missed.

Versus your "Ghost of Kyiv".

Is the "Cauldroning" idiom from like chucking them into a boiling cauldron? or crushing them under a heavy ass cast iron Cauldron? genuine curiosity.

No it's the Russian term for an encirclement that was part of Soviet Battle Doctrine.
Russia kept trying to encircle large portions of the Ukrainian army early in the war only to fail and then to try again to encircle smaller and smaller portions of the Ukrainian army, closest they actually got to succeeding in that tactic was in Mariupol and even then it still took months for it to work and they almost did it in Lisichansk but Ukraine was still able to retreat in time.
Since then Russia doesn't have any real way of enacting a Cauldron battle.

[Tarsonis]

Is the "Cauldroning" idiom from like chucking them into a boiling cauldron? or crushing them under a heavy ass cast iron Cauldron? genuine curiosity.

No it's the Russian term for an encirclement that was part of Soviet Battle Doctrine.
Russia kept trying to encircle large portions of the Ukrainian army early in the war only to fail and then to try again to encircle smaller and smaller portions of the Ukrainian army, closest they actually got to succeeding in that tactic was in Mariupol and even then it still took months for it to work and they almost did it in Lisichansk but Ukraine was still able to retreat in time.
Since then Russia doesn't have any real way of enacting a Cauldron battle.

Neat. Learned something new today.

[Hurtful Thoughts]

Is the "Cauldroning" idiom from like chucking them into a boiling cauldron? or crushing them under a heavy ass cast iron Cauldron? genuine curiosity.

Military term for encircling and wiping out the area in detail. I believe wikipedia breifly touches on the concept of a "fire cauldron" in soviet/german doctrine. Americans just call them pockets and bulges.

Police use the term, tho

[Picairn]

Russia kept trying to encircle large portions of the Ukrainian army early in the war only to fail and then to try again to encircle smaller and smaller portions of the Ukrainian army, closest they actually got to succeeding in that tactic was in Mariupol and even then it still took months for it to work and they almost did it in Lisichansk but Ukraine was still able to retreat in time.
Since then Russia doesn't have any real way of enacting a Cauldron battle.

It's dumb because encirclement and pincer attacks aren't the Russian Army's specialties. Their doctrine and force structure predominantly rely on artillery to destroy the enemy, and Putin tried to use this army to blitzkrieg Ukraine with predictably disastrous results in the North. When the Russian Army was finally allowed to switch back to its artillery specialty in the Donbass however, it gained generally positive results and forced the Ukrainians to slowly retreat to the West.

Artillery is the Russians' greatest advantage, but their logistics is poor. They are heavily dependent on railways to transport ammunition, and they reportedly lack palletized load-lifting equipment. When their ammunition depots were destroyed by HIMARS, the artillery's firepower became paralyzed and decreased significantly. Their command structure is top-down, their artillery formations are jealously kept by brigade and division commanders in centralized "artillery tactical groups" instead of being integrated into flexible combined arms BTGs, which means artillery officers on the field must go through the chain of command to seek their senior commander's approval before doing anything. This effectively hampers their counter-battery fire speed, which usually takes 30 minutes to hours to answer against Ukrainian fire. In contrast, Ukrainian counter-battery fire only takes minutes to respond thanks to the NATO's doctrine revolving around the need for a strong NCO corps trained in mission-type tactics.

Some bright Russian soldier pointed this out: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/stat ... -PdGQ&s=19

More detail here: https://www.businessinsider.com/how-rus ... ine-2022-7

[Picairn]

More journalists have been coming out and exposing Donatella Rovera, the lead author of the disastrous Amnesty report, of her ignorance in urban warfare and her bizarre behavior:

Tom hit this one on the head, the only bit that I’ll add is that when we met Rovera and her research colleague in Kramatorsk, they insisted that Ukrainians fighting in urban terrain must relocate to a forested area. Not too sure how you do that in a city 1/

Rovera was very concerned about how she was perceived by the other journos in the hotel. She argued with former French Foreign Legionnaires and Royal Marines that she had been to more conflict zones than them — combat veterans — and was more knowledgeable 2/

She also refuted our own accounts of what we had seen during our reporting in the field, insisting that what we saw couldn’t possibly be true. At one point she clearly mixed up mortars and artillery — a shock for a conflict researcher with decades of experience 3/

Neil Hauer expanded on his encounter:

At one point we described a van we had seen that same day that had clearly taken small arms fire and was pockmarked with bullet holes. @DRovera *insisted* that we must have been mistaken and that it was mortar fire instead. She wasn't even there! Absolutely bizarre.

[Adamede]

Alright, so a lot more evidence just came out that proves Amnesty International's "report" was very poorly researched and rushed, including statements from field reporters who interacted with their report team and legal professors on this matter. I'll compile it here for NSG's benefit. Government sources are obviously excluded to prevent any accusation of bias.

1. Out-of-context claims

Tom Mutch, a New Zealander reporter who personally met and discussed the report with Donatella Rovera, the lead author of the report and Amnesty International’s Senior Crisis researcher, and the Amnesty staff in Kramatorsk:

I was sat around a table with Donatella Rovera, Amnesty International’s Senior Crisis researcher predicting their upcoming report would land like a lead balloon. We were in the kitchen of our hotel in Kramatorsk, the administrative capital of Ukrainian controlled Donetsk and we could hear the boom of artillery outside our windows every hour.

Rather than expressing shock at the relentless Russian bombardment, the Amnesty staff seemed much more concerned with the fact that a Ukrainian army unit had taken refuge in the basement of a college building.

We’d all been to the building: an abandoned language school in the frontline town of Bakhmut which had been turned into a temporary barracks for a Ukrainian unit. This is not a war crime. A military is perfectly entitled to set up in an evacuated educational institution, although of course that building can no longer claim civilian protection and there was a mainly abandoned civilian apartment block over the road, which had not been fully evacuated.

But Rovera was insistent that this military presence in a populated area was a “violation of international humanitarian law”’. When I pressed her on how the Ukrainian Army was supposed to defend a populated area, she said that it was irrelevant.

By that logic, I continued, Ukraine would have to abandon the major locations such as the city of Kharkiv. “Well, they must avoid as far as possible taking positions in a populated area,” she replied. “International humanitarian law is very clear on this.”

I suggested her coming Amnesty International report would be received badly if it failed to differentiate between defensive and offensive operations in urban areas. But it appeared the authors’ minds had been made up: Ukraine was endangering its own civilians by the mere act of attempting to defend its cities.

[...] I was in one of the locations mentioned in the Amnesty report, a school block in the under-fire city of Lysychansk, with Ukrainian soldiers as they offered an evacuation ride to any civilian residents who wished to leave. Three did, and we traveled with them as we returned to safer locations. I had reported this all at the time.

If what Tom Mutch said is true, Amnesty committed an egregious error by omitting critical context that some of the buildings occupied by Ukrainian soldiers were already abandoned or evacuated at the time of research.

Bakhmut, one of the cities which Amnesty accused Ukraine of failing to evacuate, was in fact the subject of one of APNews' articles on Ukrainian evacuations.

“The Russians are right over there, and they’re closing in on this location,” Mark Poppert, an American volunteer working with British charity RefugEase, said during an evacuation in the town of Bakhmut on Friday.

“Bakhmut is a high-risk area right now,” he said. “We’re trying to get as many people out as we can in case the Ukrainians have to fall back.”

He and other Ukrainian and foreign volunteers working with the Ukrainian charity Vostok SOS, which was coordinating the evacuation effort, were hoping to get about 100 people out of Bakhmut on Friday, Poppert said.

[...] Most people have already fled Bakhmut: only around 30,000 remain from a pre-war population of 85,000. And more are leaving each day.

Amnesty saying they have no info or were not aware of Ukrainian evacuations of civilians from the frontline is horribly wrong and ignorant. This isn't even a contest.

Russian attacks halt plans to evacuate Ukrainian civilians | March 6

Civilians in eastern Ukraine told to evacuate as Russian forces regroup | April 6

Ukraine Rushes to Evacuate Civilians in East as Russia’s Offensive Pushes Forward | April 19

Third Humanitarian Convoy Under Way to Evacuate Civilians from Besieged Ukraine City, Secretary-General Tells Security Council | May 6

All civilians evacuate Mariupol’s Azovstal | May 8

Ukraine struggles to evacuate civilians from devastated eastern city | June 14

Ukraine evacuates civilians from Sloviansk as Russian troops advance | July 6

Zelensky orders civilians to evacuate Donetsk region | July 31

2. Misrepresentations of international law

Amnesty's claim on this subject is maximalist.

We have documented a pattern of Ukrainian forces putting civilians at risk and violating the laws of war when they operate in populated areas.

In other words, Ukrainians are committing war crimes.

Here is what the International Red Cross says about criminal liability under international law:

In fact, it is generally recognized that the defender’s obligations do not create individual criminal liability.

A current imbalance in individual criminal responsibility exists, where an attacker can commit a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions in at least five different ways, but the defender who is in the best position to protect civilians in urban environments faces no such liability.

As the Red Cross publishes, it is legally impossible for Ukraine to have committed war crimes in this context. They may, however, have other obligations.

In Article 58 and 59 of Additional Protocol I, the defender's obligations are detailed.

It is important to underline that a party is not required to evacuate civilians or civilian objects from any built-up area as such, but only to remove them from the vicinity of military objectives.

A defending party may go further and evacuate civilians in accordance with Article 17 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—a point reinforced by the reference to Article 49 of the Convention made in Article 58(a)—but it is not obliged to do so.

And Article 58 either does not apply to urban warfare or gives plenty of leeway for the defenders due to its wording around feasibility:

Article 58(b) directs the parties to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. At the diplomatic conference, several states voiced concerns that this obligation could curtail their right to take the most efficient measures necessary for the defence of their national territory. Since the precautionary duties under Article 58 apply only to the maximum extent feasible, France suggested in the case of densely populated territories such as those of metropolitan France, Article 58(b) “could not really become operative” at all (Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference, Vol 6, 213). Italy declared that “it is clear that a State with a densely populated territory could not allow that provision to hamper the organization of its defence” (ibid, 235).

... as France emphasized, the obligation extends only to what is feasible—which is generally understood to demand only measures that are “practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances existing at the relevant time, including those circumstances relevant to the success of military operations” (ibid, 232).

Parties to the conflict will have to weigh whether they can avoid placing military objectives within or near densely populated areas without compromising the successful defense of the area. This decision has more to do with a judgment as to what is practicable—all things considered—rather than what is practically possible. Factors that should feed into this assessment include the nature of the military objectives involved, the military significance of the populated area, the hostile action expected from an adversary and the extent and nature of the civilian harm that the placement of military objectives would pose, as well as the availability and effect of any mitigating measures.

In short, Ukrainians can't be criminally liable for placing civilians near military objectives, and they have no legal obligation to move their military units if the military objective is important enough.

Amnesty attempted to address this with two sentences in their report:

Most residential areas where soldiers located themselves were kilometres away from front lines. Viable alternatives were available that would not endanger civilians – such as military bases or densely wooded areas nearby, or other structures further away from residential areas.

They provide no other evidence as to what viable alternatives were available. They neglected to mention that these built-up areas were military objectives precisely because they were civilian areas that the Russians wanted to take. And they did not make an assessment that balances the military objective with the risk to civilians in those situations. How could they? They're not experts on the Ukrainian military.

Here's what Jack Watling, Senior Research Fellow - Land Warfare, says about that:

The Amnesty report demonstrates a weak understanding of the laws of armed conflict, no understanding of military operations, and indulges in insinuations without supplying supporting evidence.

It is not a violation of IHL for Ukrainian military personnel to situate themselves in the terrain they are tasked to defend rather than in some random piece of adjacent woodland where they can be bypassed.

The Ukrainian military has regularly urged civilians to leave areas of fighting and facilitated them doing so. Forcing displacement is itself a violation of IHL and throughout history many civilians have chosen to remain in areas where there are ongoing military operations.

In setting unattainable expectations of civilian protection, Amnesty trivialises an important issue.

Here is what UN war crimes investigator Marc Garlasco says:

They got the law wrong. Protocol 1 states militaries shall to the maximum extent feasible AVOID locating military objects near populated areas.

Ukraine can place forces in areas they are defending - especially in urban warfare. There is no requirement to stand shoulder to shoulder in a field - this isn’t the 19th century. Ukraine still has an OBLIGATION to protect civilians - but they are taking steps to do so like helping civilians relocate.

And here is what Distinguished Professor of International Law Michael Schmitt says:

Amnesty International’s allegation of unlawful conduct by Ukraine is unconvincing. IHL is a nuanced body of law because it must carefully balance two sometimes competing interests – military necessity and humanitarian considerations.

In my estimation, Amnesty International has acted irresponsibly by making the claim without providing supporting evidence, citing the specific rules that it believes have been violated, or laying out its legal analysis. These failures have deprived Ukraine of a meaningful opportunity to respond and the international community of an ability to properly assess it.

I urge the organization to immediately remedy the situation by releasing its evidence and explaining the legal basis for its conclusion that the conduct violates IHL. As the entity leveling a charge of unlawful conduct, some of which could qualify as a grave breach of IHL, Amnesty International bears the burdens of persuasion and proof. It has not met that burden.

Given that the entire obligation here hinges on the balance between military and civilian needs, and that the civilian needs are intertwined with military objectives in urban combat, the most important question of whether Ukraine failed to fulfill their obligation went unaddressed in Amnesty's report.

Instead, Amnesty merely claims they failed them. This is poor reporting and worse advocacy.

3. Military units in hospitals

Amnesty claims that Ukraine set up military bases in hospitals. This is one part of their claim which could constitute criminal liability, as it's clear in international law that the misuse of protected symbols such as the red cross is a war crime.

Their report goes:

Amnesty International researchers witnessed Ukrainian forces using hospitals as de facto military bases in five locations. In two towns, dozens of soldiers were resting, milling about, and eating meals in hospitals. In another town, soldiers were firing from near the hospital.

Using hospitals for military purposes is a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

Their claim is factually incorrect. Using hospitals for military purposes is not a clear violation of IHL. There are many permissible military uses for hospitals.

One of them is military hospitals. Many of them exist throughout the world, and there is nothing war criminal about them. Some of them exist in war zones as well. For example, the Egyptian Field Hospital at Bagram Airbase that treated 7,000 patients at its peak (for free) was set up in about as "military objective" a place as could be in Afghanistan. It was located right next to the tarmac where the US Air Force was flying missions out of.

It is also perfectly acceptable that civilian hospitals are used to treat and house military personnel. They have in the past, and there is no specific prohibition against that in IHL, as long as there is no intent to shield the combatants inside from enemies.

Another legal military use for hospitals is for the treatment of captured prisoners of war. In fact, IHL specifically obligates militaries to provide adequate medical treatment for POWs.

As Distinguished Professor of International Law Michael Schmitt writes:

The critical provision with respect to the reported behavior is Article 12(4) of Additional Protocol I. It provides, “Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack.” But the rule is limited. The mere presence of military personnel in or near medical facilities (aside from those guarding the facility or being treated) is not unlawful absent an intent to shield. Amnesty International cites no facts unambiguously demonstrating such an intent, leaving only speculation as to why they were there.

The DoD Law of War Manual provides, “[f]or example, a hospital may not be used as a shelter for able-bodied combatants or fugitives, as an arms or ammunition depot, or as a military observation post” (§ 7.10.3.1). Setting up a base in a medical compound would certainly qualify, but whether “resting, milling about, and eating” would is questionable.

Yet the rule simply removes the special protection medical facilities enjoy; absent intent to shield, there is no IHL violation.

I suspect that the brief nature of this section in the Amnesty report indicates that they KNOW that this is not a real IHL violation because using hospitals to shield military targets from attack is a very serious charge. If there were any validity to this, they would (and should) have spent more ink detailing their accusation.

Bonus: Neil Hauer, a reporter who spent a few days staying with Tom Mutch and Donatella Rovera in the same hotel in Kramatorsk in May, says that the latter has a pre-set agenda:

Donatella stayed in the same hotel as us for several days in Kramatorsk in May. It was quite clear from conversations that she had an agenda already - to be contrarian and 'well akshually Ukraine is just as bad' before she even began her fieldwork there.

Holy shit, this is probably the single greatest comment I have ever seen on NSG.

[Washington Resistance Army]

What is the likelihood that Ukraine would or could, pull off a Mossad? Where the Ukrainian state sends assassination teams/agents into Russia to intentionally try to eliminate everyone behind or connected to pushing war against Ukraine (who are sufficiently high ranking) within Russia?

Considering the fact that Ukraine is kind of collapsing at the moment, and Russia boasts one of the most formidable intelligence services on the planet, I'd say pretty unlikely.

If the early stages of the war are anything to go by it seems like the reputation of Russian intelligence is probably just as overinflated as their military’s was.

[Northern Socialist Council Republics]

If the early stages of the war are anything to go by it seems like the reputation of Russian intelligence is probably just as overinflated as their military’s was.

Ukraine depends on international support, and those international supporters are probably leery of normalising the idea of that you can solve a difficult war by covert operations against the civilian leaders of the enemy states. Whether or not they have the ability to do targetted assassinations of belligerent Russian leaders is entirely secondary to the question of whether or not they would find it in their interests to perform any such operation, to which the answer is obviously "no."

[Finalis]

Considering the fact that Ukraine is kind of collapsing at the moment, and Russia boasts one of the most formidable intelligence services on the planet, I'd say pretty unlikely.

If the early stages of the war are anything to go by it seems like the reputation of Russian intelligence is probably just as overinflated as their military’s was.

russia has not even begun to call upon their reserves or commit their economy to total war.

[Vassenor]

If the early stages of the war are anything to go by it seems like the reputation of Russian intelligence is probably just as overinflated as their military’s was.

russia has not even begun to call upon their reserves or commit their economy to total war.

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

[Finalis]

russia has not even begun to call upon their reserves or commit their economy to total war.

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

[Vassenor]

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Enough to get desperate for more warm bodies.

[Chan Island]

So when do we get to see the huge battle in the south?

I expect both sides will bring their best stuff in.

We went over this before.

The answer is probably never, because it goes against Ukrainian doctrine and capacity.

The closest you'll get is sieges- and Ukraine looks like it might get a chance to do that at Kherson.

[Finalis]

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Enough to get desperate for more warm bodies.

they have plenty of warm bodies in reserve and on active duty. those warm bodies are just a lot more valuable than disposable convicts

[Chan Island]

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Last week there was a report estimating about 75000 dead. Which is a lot of dead, even for Russia.

[The Two Jerseys]

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

15,000 dead, 45,000 wounded.

Or about the same amount of losses the Soviets took in Afghanistan, but in 5% of the time...

[Finalis]

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Last week there was a report estimating about 75000 dead. Which is a lot of dead, even for Russia.

we're talking about a country that only 70 years or so ago lost 20 million people in a war.

this is a raindrop in a lake for them

[Deblar]

Last week there was a report estimating about 75000 dead. Which is a lot of dead, even for Russia.

we're talking about a country that only 70 years or so ago lost 20 million people in a war.

this is a raindrop in a lake for them

75000 casualties is still a lot, doesn’t matter how big you are

[Spirit of Hope]

Wasn't Russia recently reduced to conscripting convicts?

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Russia does not have, nor have they recently had, 1 million active ground troops or 2 million reserve troops. Russia's situation is decidedly complex.

First, Russia's army generally relies upon conscription to provide troops to fill out its armed forces, however unless a war is declared conscripts may not be deployed outside of Russia. Remember for Russia this is a Special Military Operation and not a war, so conscripts legally can not be ordered into Ukraine. Russia is twisting the arms of conscripts to get them to sign contracts so they can be sent, or just outright ordering some, but this is does not allow them to send their full force of conscripts without causing issues at home.

Second, Russia doesn't have a robust reserves as most people would understand it from a western perspective. Once soldiers complete their service time they are not required to drill or receive refresher training. Russia was working on building out such a system, but it hadn't gotten that far. However Russia does have a lot of people who do have prior service experience, these will take longer to mobilize than reserves, but less time than new conscripts. To some extent Russia is tapping into this, both through thins I discuss below and by offering new incentives to prior service people to rejoin the armed forces, which is partially why Russia has raised the age gap for joining the armed forces.

Third, a number of combatants that Russia is relying upon are not Russian Army, but instead come from the LPR, DPR, and Wagner Group. LPR and DPR have been conducting mass conscription to raise forces to fight against Ukraine and have been doing so for some time now. While Wagner group is a little more nebulous and to some extent appears to be raising forces from outside of Russia, paying for Russians to fight for them and not be tied to the Russian Army and its issues, and some recruitment of criminals .

Forth, Russia is raising new units sort of outside the normal process of raising new units. With the Federal Subjects fundraising and creating units that will train and then be given to the Russian Army for fighting in Ukraine. Some of these units appear to be recruiting from prisons/criminals. A lot of this appears to be targeted at prior service personnel to get them to re join and fight in Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... bilization
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... battalions
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-c ... ping-point

[Chan Island]

Last week there was a report estimating about 75000 dead. Which is a lot of dead, even for Russia.

we're talking about a country that only 70 years or so ago lost 20 million people in a war.

this is a raindrop in a lake for them

Yeah- an utterly devastating war that continues to hobble demographics to this day.

That's like saying a person should not be feeling pain from a punch because they got shot once.

And even with that- consider who those 75k are. Russia hasn't mobilised. These are trained soldiers (in theory), and elites. These are support staff, specialists, pilots... waves of conscripts will not easily replace them. Assuming Russia has the will in capability to fully gear up for a formal war.

[Finalis]

russia has a population of over 100 million and an army with over 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve troops.

exactly how many loses do you think they've taken in ukraine?

Russia does not have, nor have they recently had, 1 million active ground troops or 2 million reserve troops. Russia's situation is decidedly complex.

First, Russia's army generally relies upon conscription to provide troops to fill out its armed forces, however unless a war is declared conscripts may not be deployed outside of Russia. Remember for Russia this is a Special Military Operation and not a war, so conscripts legally can not be ordered into Ukraine. Russia is twisting the arms of conscripts to get them to sign contracts so they can be sent, or just outright ordering some, but this is does not allow them to send their full force of conscripts without causing issues at home.

Second, Russia doesn't have a robust reserves as most people would understand it from a western perspective. Once soldiers complete their service time they are not required to drill or receive refresher training. Russia was working on building out such a system, but it hadn't gotten that far. However Russia does have a lot of people who do have prior service experience, these will take longer to mobilize than reserves, but less time than new conscripts. To some extent Russia is tapping into this, both through thins I discuss below and by offering new incentives to prior service people to rejoin the armed forces, which is partially why Russia has raised the age gap for joining the armed forces.

Third, a number of combatants that Russia is relying upon are not Russian Army, but instead come from the LPR, DPR, and Wagner Group. LPR and DPR have been conducting mass conscription to raise forces to fight against Ukraine and have been doing so for some time now. While Wagner group is a little more nebulous and to some extent appears to be raising forces from outside of Russia, paying for Russians to fight for them and not be tied to the Russian Army and its issues, and some recruitment of criminals .

Forth, Russia is raising new units sort of outside the normal process of raising new units. With the Federal Subjects fundraising and creating units that will train and then be given to the Russian Army for fighting in Ukraine. Some of these units appear to be recruiting from prisons/criminals. A lot of this appears to be targeted at prior service personnel to get them to re join and fight in Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... bilization
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... battalions
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-c ... ping-point

interesting information. i will go through this stuff accordingly

[Gallia-]

we're talking about a country that only 70 years or so ago lost 20 million people in a war.

this is a raindrop in a lake for them

Yeah- an utterly devastating war that continues to hobble demographics to this day.

What are you talking about? Russia has almost as many people today as the Soviet Union had in 1939, so what "hobbling" are you referring to? Some mythical number that never existed? Yeah I guess if all those young men hadn't died fighting Nazis there wouldn't be any Russians (or Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, etc.) left, but the losses of the Great Patriotic War were completely recovered by 1965. Russian women just had more kids lol. Russia's actual demographic crisis, like every other FSU country, was the collapse of the USSR in the 1990's, which destroyed their healthcare and childcare system.

Bear in mind, Russia among suffered the least of all countries from this, in terms of demographics challenges, whereas Ukraine suffered the worst by far. Ukraine's TFR is one of the lowest in the world. It's down there with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Russia's TFR is one of the highest in Europe, comparable to UK or Norway. None of these are particularly great, but Russia's demography is sunshine and rainbows compared to Ukraine's. That's without getting into the issue of emigration or various rates of childhood cancers and disease.

[Chan Island]

Yeah- an utterly devastating war that continues to hobble demographics to this day.

What are you talking about? Russia has almost as many people today as the Soviet Union had in 1939. What "hobbling" are you referring to? The losses of the Great Patriotic War were completely recovered by 1965. Russia's actual demographic crisis, like every other FSU country, was the collapse of the USSR in the 1990's. Russia among suffered the least of all countries from this, in terms of demographics challenges, whereas Ukraine suffered the worst by far.

Ukraine's TFR is one of the lowest in the world. It's down there with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Russia's TFR is one of the highest in Europe, comparable to UK or Norway. None of these are particularly great, but Russia's demography is sunshine and rainbows compared to Ukraine's. That's without getting into the issue of emigration or various rates of childhood cancers and disease...

I'm talking about the visible effect on the population pyramid- which expands and contracts in predictable, regular waves due to the sheer loss of young life the country suffered in ww2.

Hobble was an incorrect word- impacts would have been better.

[Gallia-]

What are you talking about? Russia has almost as many people today as the Soviet Union had in 1939. What "hobbling" are you referring to? The losses of the Great Patriotic War were completely recovered by 1965. Russia's actual demographic crisis, like every other FSU country, was the collapse of the USSR in the 1990's. Russia among suffered the least of all countries from this, in terms of demographics challenges, whereas Ukraine suffered the worst by far.

Ukraine's TFR is one of the lowest in the world. It's down there with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Russia's TFR is one of the highest in Europe, comparable to UK or Norway. None of these are particularly great, but Russia's demography is sunshine and rainbows compared to Ukraine's. That's without getting into the issue of emigration or various rates of childhood cancers and disease...

I'm talking about the visible effect on the population pyramid- which expands and contracts in predictable, regular waves due to the sheer loss of young life the country suffered in ww2.

What visible effect? The surplus females are all Ukrainian...

Hobble was an incorrect word- impacts would have been better.

What impacts? Compared to what? Replacement rate? The USSR had a replacement rate TFR basically through the 1980's until it collapsed: https://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/i ... moFig2.png

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... 1.2021.png

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... C_2022.png

Now, these might be hard to see, but if you look closely you can see that the number of people who are in their 90's is very small, and the number of people in their 50's and 60's is very big, on either graph. However, the number of people in young age brackets, where the dreaded double trumpet is, are larger for Russia than for Ukraine.

Russia has more young people, but especially very young children (in their childhood and teenage years, thus future fighting age a decade from now) than Ukraine has, proportionately speaking. Ukraine has more female pensioners in their mid- to late-70's for some reason. The big constriction isn't 1944 (why on earth would this matter lol) but rather 1991, when the USSR collapsed, and FSU fertility rates TANKED completely.

Before it collapsed the USSR was a pretty nice place to live and raise a family, probably because they had well funded, capable childcare and healthcare services that met the needs of the families fairly well for what it was. Russia, being the biggest and most economically diversified of the SSRs, was able to maintain a higher standard of living than any other FSU country besides maybe Belarus, which is still fairly rich, but only because it's essentially run like the USSR was, and besides the Baltic countries, which are a bit richer per person due to things like the EFTA, Russia is the wealthiest per capita FSU state. This makes it a pretty good place to raise a family as far as most people are concerned, since it has had among the higher end of birth rates of the European FSU countries, especially in the last 10 years when it jumped up significantly.

Like I said, neither is great, but Russia is significantly better.

[Austria-Bohemia-Hungary]

These are trained soldiers (in theory), and elites.

Isn't the VDV basically completely gutted?