This proposal has been filed to the General Assembly Repeals Board.
NOTE: at 0147 GMT on the 20th of January 2022, this proposal reached quorum with Copper-9's approval, the 56th all told.
NOTE: at 0147 GMT on the 20th of January 2022, this proposal reached quorum with Copper-9's approval, the 56th all told.
Character count: 4,781
Word count: 776
Kevin Mitchell, third-in-line to the post of Delegate-Ambassador: Our delegation has always believed that the Epidemic Investigation Act's provisions are concerning - not least to mention completely superfluous. I am, however, willing to take our time here.Word count: 776
Repeal "Epidemic Investigation Act"
A resolution to repeal previously passed legislation.Category: RepealTarget: GA#566Proposed by: Tinhampton
General Assembly Resolution #566 “Epidemic Investigation Act” (Category: Health; Area of Effect: Research) shall be struck out and rendered null and void.
The General Assembly finds the following.The GA therefore repeals GA#566 "Epidemic Investigation Act."
- Article 1 of GA#566 "Epidemic Investigation Act" allows the World Health Authority (WHA) to send "inspectors to investigate and report publicly on the origins of, response to, and make recommendations on [an] outbreak" of a disease, where that outbreak is reported by a member state to the WHA, and requires members to "permit the entrance and exit of WHA inspectors."
- While the aforementioned goals of GA#566's first Article may ordinarily be sensible, its Article 1b also requires members to "fully cooperate with such requests for access or information which Inspectors may deliver to member nation authorities" unless the Independent Adjudicative Office (IAO) is satisfied that "the likely harm of release" of "sensitive areas or sensitive information" to WHA inspectors is greater "than the likely harm to international public health interests."
- This means that WHA inspectors can demand that member states share with them any non-sensitive information within their possession. Members may freely share sensitive information with inspectors; alternatively, they could withhold it, but the IAO must review that withholding, and the demand to share will arise in that case if it believes that the likely harm to "international public health interests" from their being withheld - even if those interests are irrelevant to the disease in question - is greater than the likely harm of their being released.
- The demand to share is unconditional. The information to be shared could involve the disclosure of trade secrets (see also GA#396 "Repeal "Open Internet Order""); endanger individual privacy, including doctor-patient confidentiality (i.e. revealing the home address of a third party); or constitute the commission of an illegal or potentially fatal act if followed. It must still be shared with WHA inspectors if they want it, so long as it is not sensitive information which the IAO finds on review should not be disclosed.
- In addition, while Article 3 of GA#566 allows non-member states to invite WHA inspectors to discharge their duties under Article 1 within their jurisdiction, it requires those non-members to "comply with Section 1... as if it were a member" and allows the IAO to "declare appropriate sanctions to be enforced by member nations against the nation" if they do not. The sanctions have no time limit, not even a mootness criterion as seen in Article IV(4) of GA#440 "Administrative Compliance Act." It is therefore hard to see whether they are intended to be an educational tool designed to encourage non-members not to be deceptive in their dealings with the WHA or a punitive tool designed to deter them from disobeying Article 1's provisions when they have opted into them under Article 3.
- Article 2's second half demands that members "collect statistics on transmission of pathogens in healthcare settings and report such statistics to the WHA in a timely manner." Yet there is no requirement that member states disaggregate such statistics by pathogen, explain any mitigations (such as the wearing of personal protective equipment and regular handwashing) that could have affected them, or take any action to actually reduce such transmission. If any benefit is to be gained from this clause, what it is meant to be is not obvious.
- GA#566's assertation that "even with the provisions of GA 53 "Epidemic Response Act", many governments still will downplay epidemics" is also baffling. Whether or not member states believe that complying with its provisions will make them look good, GA#53 still requires them to:
- let WHA inspectors "travel to the affected area to... conduct research... or report the latest developments to the international community" (similarly to Article 1 of GA#566),
- inform the Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response Center (EPARC) of the WHA about a disease outbreak "if [its] incidence rate... in any localized area reaches a level of more than twice that of the same calendar month in the previous year," even if that disease is not apparently communicable (thus improving on the standards of the first half of GA#566's Article 2), and to
- share disease-causing "pathogens samples" with EPARC.
- GA#566 allows WHA inspectors to collect almost any information they like, however private, with few checks and balances and without any requirement that such information be used for or of use to Article 1 investigations; may occasionally require member states to sanction non-members for disobeying its provisions; binds members into sending data to the WHA for no good reason whatsoever; and does little of value which GA#53 does not do. It should be repealed.