Afghan Conflict: Russian Political Leader Meets With Massoud

[Insaanistan]

In addition to the many battles with the Taliban I keep forgetting to report, Ahmad Masssoud Meets With Sergey Mironov, Leader of a Russian Political Party

Ahmad Massoud, leader and founder of the National Resisrance Front, met in Russia with the Chairman of the democratic-socialist party A Just Russia—For Truth, Sergey Mironov. The two discussed Afghanistan and Central Asia at large, “and had detailed, comprehensive and constructive talks” on ways to bring the country out of crisis. Mironov additionally characterized “‏the current resistance of the Afghan people against terrorism and extremism as the continuation of the struggle of martyr Ahmad Shah Massoud.”

[The Panjshir Valley]

Taliban Bans Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin

A good several paragraphs down, but reported by the neocon Institute for the Study of War. Though we all know that the emirate banned official political parties early in its tenure, HiG had always been granted an exemption and allowed to merely exist. This seems to have changed on September 17 when Hekmatyar complained to the emirate over deaths of several of his militant commanders.

Those familiar with Afghanistan's past few decades of history know that there has been one political constant: Hekmatyar endures. He has double crossed seemingly every entity he has merely breathed the same air as, yet always comes into the good graces of them afterwards. He has consistently commanded a Pashtun fighting force of some size, emanating from Nangarhar Province, since the 70's. Now, it seems the Taliban have taken on Hekmatyar and his party as the final extant independent political actor. Truly, this will be a test of whether the emirate can claim to be the legitimate peacemaker of the country, or whether they have now crossed a line in attempting supremacy over all Afghan Pashtuns.

Additionally, I may offer this as another test in the Afghan Unity vs. Khorasani Separation debate. If Hekmatyar can't or won't raise a struggle after this, I consider it doubtful that there will ever be a source of armed Pashtun dissent against the emirate, unless the latter is already being broken apart by other actors.

[The Panjshir Valley]

Afghan Insurgent Groups Step Up Attacks, Political Campaign Against Taliban

Mentions the Afghanistan Freedom Front, National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, Islamic State - Khorasan Province and Afghanistan United Front (new political exile group based in Virginia).

[The Panjshir Valley]

Afghan Rebels Say Four Taliban Fighters Killed In Operation Against Kabul Airport

Posted this only because it got picked up by The Independent. The NRF has been quiet for a long time now; hope for any resistance has mainly been through footage of attacks by the AFF (about once a month or two).

[Corrian]

Afghan Rebels Say Four Taliban Fighters Killed In Operation Against Kabul Airport

Posted this only because it got picked up by The Independent. The NRF has been quiet for a long time now; hope for any resistance has mainly been through footage of attacks by the AFF (about once a month or two).

Hopefully things can kick up again to remove the Taliban.

[The Apollonian Systems]

Afghan Rebels Say Four Taliban Fighters Killed In Operation Against Kabul Airport

Posted this only because it got picked up by The Independent. The NRF has been quiet for a long time now; hope for any resistance has mainly been through footage of attacks by the AFF (about once a month or two).

Hopefully things can kick up again to remove the Taliban.

The Taliban frankly have a better hood on Afghanistan now than they did before the American invasion. I’m going to be honest they won’t be removed easily.

[Kaumudeen]

Afghan Rebels Say Four Taliban Fighters Killed In Operation Against Kabul Airport

Posted this only because it got picked up by The Independent. The NRF has been quiet for a long time now; hope for any resistance has mainly been through footage of attacks by the AFF (about once a month or two).

Hopefully things can kick up again to remove the Taliban.

Only for the Taliban to restart their insurgency, and back to square one.

[The Apollonian Systems]

Hopefully things can kick up again to remove the Taliban.

Only for the Taliban to restart their insurgency, and back to square one.

Also I frankly doubt any group that reliance’s them will be better than them, not to emtjoknthatbit would just fracture the country again.

[The Panjshir Valley]

Only for the Taliban to restart their insurgency, and back to square one.

The big factors by that point will be:

1) Whether the Pakistani Taliban & Baloch separatists have grown enough to wreck the ISI's capacity to support a third Afghan Talib armed struggle, and perhaps even soured the ISI's love for the Afghan wing in light of the current emirate's refusal to resolutely stymie their sanctuaries. Though, there would also be a high probability of the Pakistani Taliban making a truce with the ISI so as to assist their Afghan brethren.

2) Whether Tajikistan, Iran and/or even Uzbekistan would see any self-liberated territory along their borders as an opportunity not to be passed up on, even in the face of Russian timidity with regard to the former and the latter, and pitch in to sustain any momentum. Though, Defense Minister Shoigu did identify Afghanistan as the source of Central Asia's greatest threats, last week.

3) Whether any Pashtun resistance springs up should the emirate start cracking, and how tribal vs. ethnic vs. national it is in its disposition.

4) Whether any non-Pashtun resistance decides to struggle for a more secure future by opting to secede from Afghanistan.

5) Whether any upstart jihadist group challenges the Taliban for title of being the best & toughest Muslims.

[Kaumudeen]

Only for the Taliban to restart their insurgency, and back to square one.

The big factors by that point will be:

1) Whether the Pakistani Taliban & Baloch separatists have grown enough to wreck the ISI's capacity to support a third Afghan Talib armed struggle, and perhaps even soured the ISI's love for the Afghan wing in light of the current emirate's refusal to resolutely stymie their sanctuaries. Though, there would also be a high probability of the Pakistani Taliban making a truce with the ISI so as to assist their Afghan brethren.

Pakistani Taliban has at best stagnated, same with Baloch separtists. As for Pakistan-Afghan Taliban relations I think the Pakistanis have begun to sour on them, although I agree that they will come to some sort of truce which the best outcome for both.

2) Whether Tajikistan, Iran and/or even Uzbekistan would see any self-liberated territory along their borders as an opportunity not to be passed up on, even in the face of Russian timidity with regard to the former and the latter, and pitch in to sustain any momentum. Though, Defense Minister Shoigu did identify Afghanistan as the source of Central Asia's greatest threats, last week.

Out of the three, I think the Tajiks and Uzbeks are most likely since they would want to link up with ethnic brethren in Afghanistan, but I doubt the cost of doing so is even worth it. Iran on the other hand is looking to contain the Taliban and produce a stable Afghanistan in order to stem the flow of refugees into Iran.

3) Whether any Pashtun resistance springs up should the emirate start cracking, and how tribal vs. ethnic vs. national it is in its disposition.

Other than tribal-related, what grievances would Pashtuns have against the Taliban?

4) Whether any non-Pashtun resistance decides to struggle for a more secure future by opting to secede from Afghanistan.

Non-Pashtun resistance is expected, but secession? No.

5) Whether any upstart jihadist group challenges the Taliban for title of being the best & toughest Muslims.

I think other than ISIS-Afghanistan there isn't any Islamist resistance to the Taliban

[The Panjshir Valley]

Pakistani Taliban has at best stagnated, same with Baloch separtists. As for Pakistan-Afghan Taliban relations I think the Pakistanis have begun to sour on them, although I agree that they will come to some sort of truce which the best outcome for both.

True, it's been a decent bit of time since I've seen a rampage by TTP or the Balochs. And for sure, the ISI has only lasted as long as it has over how nimbly it and the two wings of the Taliban can flip between war & peace. This insane plate spinning act has to end someday, however.

Out of the three, I think the Tajiks and Uzbeks are most likely since they would want to link up with ethnic brethren in Afghanistan, but I doubt the cost of doing so is even worth it. Iran on the other hand is looking to contain the Taliban and produce a stable Afghanistan in order to stem the flow of refugees into Iran.

Uzbekistan certainly would be an unlikely case, hence why I listed it last. There's just a steep gradient (to my superficial understanding) between the cultures & material development on both sides of the border. Also because, if we go by the Wikipedia article, the Uzbek-Afghan border is supposedly solidly fortified, is pretty narrow anyways and is undoubtedly the prime focus of Uzbekistan's armed forces & security services.

Iran is obviously preoccupied with its proxies in the Palestinian conflict for the foreseeable future, unless the Taliban do something ridiculous like try to divert all or most of the Helmand River for themselves. On that last point, I think the emirate may be unpredictable enough, and so full of "Graveyard of Empires" hubris to perhaps attempt that, but I wouldn't bet money on it at this time, to be clear.

Tajikistan would, however, have a STRONG interest in backing any self-liberated territory along its border, primarily because of Jamaat Ansarullah (the "Tajik Taliban") maintaining a presence near the border with the emirate's blessing. Secondarily, because it would be easy political points domestically...Ahmad Shah Massoud, afterall, mediated the end to their civil war and the foundation to the current regime. Any resistance which could be portrayed as a successor to him (with or without his son) would earn giant empathy from Tajik civilians.[/quote]

Other than tribal-related, what grievances would Pashtuns have against the Taliban?

Well, that's the big question, haha! I remember posting on this thread, months ago, that Hekmatyar Gulbuddin's party was finally & explicitly disbanded by the emirate.

Call it superstition, but, if there's a subplot to contemporary Afghan history, it is that you cannot count the man out from leading a resistance in Nangarhar Province until the day that we literally see his head separated from his shoulders.

Additionally, let's remember the example of Karzai during the American invasion and leading the "Southern Revolt". If, by way of non-Pashtun resistance hypothetically unraveling the emirate in parts of Afghanistan, I think there's a possibility of some educated Pashtuns (even in the diaspora) coming back to stir things up. They would be a mid-to-late entry in any hypothetically toppling of the emirate, to be clear.

Non-Pashtun resistance is expected, but secession? No.

Here's where I disagree. You're correct that there are not any current (as far the Internet allows us to know) secessionist groups or even movements within "Khorasan". What I can imagine, however, is that if any self-liberated territory (definitely requiring an external border) sustains itself in a stalemate for long enough, folks will naturally start to question whether it is worth it to remain within Afghanistan.

The last time around, Ahmad Shah Massoud was a powerful visionary for a decentralized, but integral, Afghanistan. His defense of northeast Afghanistan's freedom from the first emirate was also kind of short-lived when he was assassinated by al Qaeda and the USA Invaded shortly thereafter.

Had neither 9/11 nor his assassination occurred, I think that invariably there would have been a growing call just treat the Northern Alliance's corner of the country as an independent state...particularly since this would justify solidly fortifying the newly-found border against the first emirate's predations and even garner larger support from the Northern Alliance's extant supporters (Russia & the CIS, Iran & India).

I have a feeling this time around, that, if any contiguous "Khorasani" territories (of reasonable size and linkage to the outside world) could repeat the early 00's stalemate, then we would see such sentiment arise in popular debate quite quickly. Especially without a unique ideologue like Massoud Sr. compelling folks to keep faith and trust in an eventual destruction of the emirate in total.

Especially with a narrative that the Pashtun portion of the country can't or won't be cleansed of the Taliban anyways..."demonstrated" by the flawed NATO war.

I think other than ISIS-Afghanistan there isn't any Islamist resistance to the Taliban

Similar to my Pashtun answer, I think this is a vector of vulnerability to the Taliban if and only if their command over the country as whole is unraveled. I think the Taliban's supremacy over Afghan jihadist sentiment is entirely a matter of "gods don't bleed", and we'd see dissent erupt on an exponential basis, particularly if there is not a foreign invader to rally against.

[The Panjshir Valley]

Kaumudeen

But hey. All of this is moot if and until the AFF, the NRF, ISIS-K, or some emergent group actually shatters the emirate's hold over particular territory (with territory along external borders being most meaningful).

Until then, the AFF seems positioned to be a small but persistent "terrorist" nuisance to the emirate, the NRF capable of an occasional scandalous event (if this latest report is to be believed) and ISIS-K seemingly comatose.

Not great. But, riding on the AFF, not hopeless.

[The Panjshir Valley]

"We Aren't Anti-India or Pro-Pakistan" - Taliban

This is behind a pay wall, but the title says it all...there is a growing detente between the Taliban emirate and Modi's India, despite two generations of Pakistani support for jihadists in Afghanistan precisely to salt the earth of the latter against Indian influence.

I have indeed thought for a long while that, if there would be anything to shakeup the ISI's ironclad allegiance with the emirate, it would happen through a Taliban-Indian detente. Have been periodically surprised to see it develop. It raises questions over whether Directorate S may eventually be substituted by a new directorate engaging "Khorasanis", but also whether jihadist groups may turn against the emirate for working with polytheists against Muslims.

I remember Steve Coll recounting how ANA troops would troll the Taliban troops on the battlefield by calling them stooges of Pakistan, only for the Taliban troops to reply that the Pakistanis were at least Muslims (as opposed to Christian NATO).

[The Panjshir Valley]

Also, if we are to use Twitter as a source, even stronger Indo-Taliban relations are on the way:

https://twitter.com/rtaenglish1/status/ ... 0832051314

[Kaumudeen]

Pakistani Taliban has at best stagnated, same with Baloch separtists. As for Pakistan-Afghan Taliban relations I think the Pakistanis have begun to sour on them, although I agree that they will come to some sort of truce which the best outcome for both.

True, it's been a decent bit of time since I've seen a rampage by TTP or the Balochs. And for sure, the ISI has only lasted as long as it has over how nimbly it and the two wings of the Taliban can flip between war & peace. This insane plate spinning act has to end someday, however.

I think what drove the Pakistani government in the first place into meddling in Afghanistan is Afghanistan's non-recognition of the Durand line as the border and Afghanistan's support for Pashtun separatists in the 1960's and 1970's. If Afghanistan were to recognize the Durand Line as the border that would be a good start to resolving a lot of issues with Pakistani interference. But of course such recognition would have to be backed up by Pakistani guarantees that there will be no more interference.

Tajikistan would, however, have a STRONG interest in backing any self-liberated territory along its border, primarily because of Jamaat Ansarullah (the "Tajik Taliban") maintaining a presence near the border with the emirate's blessing. Secondarily, because it would be easy political points domestically...Ahmad Shah Massoud, afterall, mediated the end to their civil war and the foundation to the current regime. Any resistance which could be portrayed as a successor to him (with or without his son) would earn giant empathy from Tajik civilians.

Would the Massoud's submit to orders from Tajik government though?

Additionally, let's remember the example of Karzai during the American invasion and leading the "Southern Revolt". If, by way of non-Pashtun resistance hypothetically unraveling the emirate in parts of Afghanistan, I think there's a possibility of some educated Pashtuns (even in the diaspora) coming back to stir things up. They would be a mid-to-late entry in any hypothetically toppling of the emirate, to be clear.

Yes I would say that if an strong alternative leader among Pashtuns were to present itself there would be a good challenge.


The issue with any secession movement is international recognition. As of right now, the international states do not want to encourage further instability in Afghanistan, nor a fracture in the Anti-Taliban resistance, so they will support an alternative to the Taliban like Massoud but not a secessionist movement.

[Kaumudeen]

"We Aren't Anti-India or Pro-Pakistan" - Taliban

This is behind a pay wall, but the title says it all...there is a growing detente between the Taliban emirate and Modi's India, despite two generations of Pakistani support for jihadists in Afghanistan precisely to salt the earth of the latter against Indian influence.

I have indeed thought for a long while that, if there would be anything to shakeup the ISI's ironclad allegiance with the emirate, it would happen through a Taliban-Indian detente. Have been periodically surprised to see it develop. It raises questions over whether Directorate S may eventually be substituted by a new directorate engaging "Khorasanis", but also whether jihadist groups may turn against the emirate for working with polytheists against Muslims.

I remember Steve Coll recounting how ANA troops would troll the Taliban troops on the battlefield by calling them stooges of Pakistan, only for the Taliban troops to reply that the Pakistanis were at least Muslims (as opposed to Christian NATO).

This seems like more like a strategic move by the Taliban to discourage potential Indian support for the NRF, which would turn Afghanistan into a proxy war between India and Pakistan.

[The Panjshir Valley]

I think what drove the Pakistani government in the first place into meddling in Afghanistan is Afghanistan's non-recognition of the Durand line as the border and Afghanistan's support for Pashtun separatists in the 1960's and 1970's. If Afghanistan were to recognize the Durand Line as the border that would be a good start to resolving a lot of issues with Pakistani interference. But of course such recognition would have to be backed up by Pakistani guarantees that there will be no more interference.

I certainly concur with that; though we both realize that shall never happen. No Afghan regime, not even the wholly NATO-backed Islamic Republic, has ever entertained recognizing the de facto border, and this emirate would frankly die on this hill. Nor would Pakistan ever relinquish its side of the Pashtun Belt, owing to how that would slim it even further in contrast to India.

Would the Massoud's submit to orders from Tajik government though?

Massoud Jr. frankly doesn't have a reason not to "submit to orders" from Tajikistan. The vision he and his NRF pursue would be the best possible improvement in Tajikistan's eyes,
none of the exiled warlords are interested in lifting a finger to help the NRF or AFF unless their positions in the new Afghanistan's civic, economic and martial affairs are handed to them first (and those folks failed to preserve Afghanistan by even a bit the last time around) and (as far as we can tell as outside observers) even his NRF has become non-existent. I posted the article from The Independent Precisely because it was newsworthy to hear of the NRF doing something...allegedly doing something, anyways.

The issue with any secession movement is international recognition. As of right now, the international states do not want to encourage further instability in Afghanistan, nor a fracture in the Anti-Taliban resistance, so they will support an alternative to the Taliban like Massoud but not a secessionist movement.

I agree that neither the international community, nor any of Afghanistan's neighbors, want to be the first movers in any such civil strife or ideological division of resistance. I do believe, however, that:

- since only armed struggle can alter or nullify Taliban policy
- since any hypothetical armed struggle with momentum & success would emerge in a non-Pashtun territory...and such a group or movement would understand the primacy of liberating a stretch of non-Pakistani external border
- since ISI support for the Taliban shall be constant unless a day comes when Afghanistan & Pakistan become openly at war...and sadly, Directorate S of ISI would advocate for an understanding with this emirate even then

...the international community & the non-Pakistani neighbors have to understand that the only prospect for any improvement would come from a non-Pashtun armed struggle bordering the latter.

What would inspire such native struggle in the first place, however? A prospect for hope. And there can be no hope for an integral Afghanistan throwing off the emirate unless something drastically changes in Pakistan, and no foreign actor would even contemplate an invasion of ALL OF Afghanistan, or support for a resistance with ALL OF Afghanistan in its view, until AT LEAST that occurs.

But a vision of separation by a non-Pashtun community, ideally self-liberating territory of reasonable size along or close to an external Afghan border, could entice the locals to support that vision owing to both the far easier obtainability of a such a "partisan republic" and the far easier feasibility of a foreign actor assisting or even intervening on behalf of such a rebellious territory. No need to compel loyal Taliban districts in the southeast to see the light. Only a need to help, or defend, a community in the north or west to be free from an unsophisticated "Afghan" military.

[The Panjshir Valley]

Instagram Video Of Two NRF-Claimed IED Attacks In Kabul

[The Panjshir Valley]

Twitter Video Of NRF-Claimed IED Attack Against GDI (Tailiban intelligence)

[The Panjshir Valley]

Instagram Video of NRF-Claimed Grenade Attack In Kabul

[The Panjshir Valley]

EXCELLENT And Detailed Paper On The Character And Weaknesses Of The Current Taliban Government By The Institute For The Study Of War (Downloadable PDF)