[PASSED] Resolving WA Trade Disputes

[Damanucus]

Bit of a short-sighted view, especially given you didn't know they existed before I pointed them out to you.

I was aware that private organizations dedicated to resolving trade disputes may exist, but I approached the resolution from the perspective that even if they did exist, they still wouldn't be as useful as one implemented through the WA, for the reasons outlined above. Therefore, regardless of whether they exist or not, this resolution is a good idea.

Okay, time for you to supply some evidence: why would these private organizations not be as useful or effective as this committee?

Stephanie Orman
Representative, Nomadic Peoples of Damanucus

[Cowardly Pacifists]

Furthermore, I think you're missing the point of arbitration. Unlike the criminal justice system, a quick and guaranteed end to the dispute is more important than producing the fairest ruling possible.

I certainly cannot agree with this. Arbitration is not - nor should it be - a speedy path to a less-than-fair ruling. There are tons or reasons to choose arbitration - particularly in the international context where there is no judiciary. But reckless speediness is not one of them.

I agree with Dativa that, strictly speaking, there was no need to limit the grounds for an appeal. That was an authorial preference which has no necessary relationship to the proposal's purpose of establishing "an impartial mediation and arbitration body tasked with resolving international trade disputes." That said, the only harm it does is to limit the number of nations who will consent to use the binding arbitration provisions. Many nations will presumably still benefit from the mediation services provided by this legislation, even if they decide to forgo binding arbitration because the grounds for appeal are too narrow.

Frankly - like Damanucus - I suspect that the number of nations who will consent to binding WA arbitration is probably very small to begin with. For those that do choose it, they will do so because the issue is not a major one and they simply need a third party to give them a straight and final answer. The need and desire to appeal in such circumstances probably wouldn't be an important factor in their decision to arbitrate.

Best Regards.

[Auralia]

Okay, time for you to supply some evidence: why would these private organizations not be as useful or effective as this committee?

As I already stated above:

• they are not necessarily open to all WA nations,
• they may not have established procedures,
• there is no guarantee that the board members will be neutral or possess the required qualifications, and, most importantly
• they do not have the power to enforce binding decisions.

Furthermore, I think you're missing the point of arbitration. Unlike the criminal justice system, a quick and guaranteed end to the dispute is more important than producing the fairest ruling possible.

I certainly cannot agree with this. Arbitration is not - nor should it be - a speedy path to a less-than-fair ruling. There are tons or reasons to choose arbitration - particularly in the international context where there is no judiciary. But reckless speediness is not one of them.

((OOC: Wikipedia states that "arbitration is often faster than litigation in court...in most legal systems there are very limited avenues for appeal of an arbitral award, which is sometimes an advantage because it limits the duration of the dispute and any associated liability." Granted, it's Wikipedia, but the point still stands.))

The inclusion of several avenues of appeal defeats the point of arbitration, since it means that the issue is never truly resolved. As I stated before, this is not a court, which would be obliged to find the truth at all costs (and would therefore have numerous avenues of appeal) since participation in the judicial system is not optional. Arbitration, though, is optional. It can also only occur after any independent negotiations have failed, which means that the only nations using the system will be desperately looking for a way to settle their dispute once and for all so that they get back to business as soon as possible. If we did not limit the grounds for appeal, we would accomplish just the opposite; for instance, if we granted appeals for "new evidence", cases - by definition - could never be truly resolved.

[Delegate Vinage]

I, Lothar Prolark, World Assembly Delegate and Vice-President of Europeia will be voting NAY on this proposal after a 0/7 internal vote decided said actions. Though, at this point, it is unlikely that this will have much effect on the overall outcome.

We don't see why we need the World Assembly to get involved in this.... we don't have them involved in our non-WA nation trades and we resolve any dispute with these nations without the need of an international body. But, alas, this'll pass and we'll move onto the next one.

[Auralia]

We don't see why we need the World Assembly to get involved in this.... we don't have them involved in our non-WA nation trades and we resolve any dispute with these nations without the need of an international body. But, alas, this'll pass and we'll move onto the next one.

I'm happy to hear that you've been able to resolve your trade disputes without external assistance in the past. However, not every WA resolution must directly benefit Europeia in order to be valid...

[Damanucus]

Okay, time for you to supply some evidence: why would these private organizations not be as useful or effective as this committee?

As I already stated above:

1. they are not necessarily open to all WA nations,
2. they may not have established procedures,
3. there is no guarantee that the board members will be neutral or possess the required qualifications, and, most importantly
4. they do not have the power to enforce binding decisions.

(The above is edited to make reference easier.)

1. They do not need to be. As long as they are able to do the job that is required and the nations are able to access the committee and the ruling, that is what matters.
2. Every arbitration committee that exists has established procedures.
3. In order for an arbitration committee to operate, they must maintain neutrality.
4. If they cannot make or enforce binding decisions, then they are not an arbitration committee.

Stephanie Orman
Representative, Nomadic Peoples of Damanucus

[Glen-Rhodes]

I do not honestly believe that, if nations are involved with disputes in trade, and cannot come to an agreement independently or through existing arbitration boards, that this board will make any difference, nor do I see all nations agreeing to undertaking arbitration through this board when they cannot come to agreement outside of it (unless they deliberately stonewall simply so they can get their case brought before the arbitration panel).

I just want to say that this is pretty thin criticism and shows a clear lack of understanding when it comes to international institutions and how they relate to world trade. It's a hallmark of ignorance when somebody says that bilateral or private negotiation or arbitration can do exactly what international organizations do.

The first difference should be obvious: bilateral and private settlement mechanisms are subject to different rules and inherent biases. The more arbitration agreements you sign, more time and money has to be spent hiring competent lawyers and trade specialists who know the arcane rules of all the separate bodies. Domestic institutional design often leads to overly complex institutions, due to political brokering and special interests. That doesn't change when go to the international stage. Indeed, the difficulties and complexities increase, because states often try to write the rules and regulations to benefit their side. Especially in bilateral agreements, the more powerful state tends to reap the most rewards. Small states have little say in international trade regulation as it is; forgoing truly international regimes only compounds their inferiority.

The second difference comes from the inherent characteristic of these types of trade regimes being inter-governmental organizations. The upside to having an IGO over a non-governmental IO with which states interact is that the former demands equality. All states have equal footing. This is the trade-off for less powerful states who may gain more from non-cooperation: if you join the regime and accept universal trade laws, you will get a powerful dispute settlement mechanism that isn't effectively vetoed by strong states, so that you can be assured that the strong states have to follow the same rules as you. Bilateral and private organizations rarely offer this, because they are almost always the product of coercion on some level when we're dealing with disparate power.

The combination of equality and being inter-governmental leads to one of the most interesting aspects of international trading regimes: powerful states comply with decisions contrary to their direct interests, even when by virtue of being powerful they can ignore it and continue with business as normal. While there is more arcane debate on this, people seem to agree that this is because inter-governmental institutions introduce large reputational costs for noncompliance. When the entire international community agrees to abide by a trade regime, violation of that regime and noncompliance with rulings not in your favor are met with large reputational costs.

Inter-governmental organizations are the penultimate institutions, with only political integration rising above. If you aren't willing to follow the rules of IGOs, why should other states trust you to uphold any agreements at all? Bilateral trade agreements and private international laws don't stand on the same pedestal. If you violate a bilateral trade agreement, that may sour relations with the other state, but the overall assumption will be that you have specific reasons for violating that agreement. Violating private international law (which is what would govern the use of a private arbitration body) isn't that serious at all, and would probably incur minor to negligible costs for both parties. But inter-governmental organizations demand better treatment, because it is the international community itself that has agreed that everybody must follow these rules, that there are no legitimate reasons to not follow them, and that noncompliance is an affront to the community itself. There are many examples of strong states complying with adverse decisions by the WTO, even when they would stand to benefit (sometimes quite substantially) from noncompliance without suffering any serious material costs for doing so.

Your suggestion that bilateral agreements and private arbitration groups can be in the same field as inter-governmental bodies should hopefully be laughable by now. Equally laughable is the notion that these bodies are inherently neutral and are not susceptible to bias and corruption. There's a reason why the real world operates under an international trading regime backed by inter-governmental organizations. The previous system of bilateral agreements was wrought with bias and corruption.

Sorry if I sound angry here or if you take offense to anything I've said. It's disheartening to see your arguments being taken seriously, though. I can't expect everybody here to have a degree in international relations. But I can and do expect people who take the time to argue against something to have done some reasonable amount of studying. Your words suggest that you're fairly confident in your assessment that inter-governmental trade organizations are inferior to bilateral and private ones, or at the very least offer no greater benefits, so I feel even more strongly that you should be openly criticized for clearly not researching the topic.

[Knootoss]

While we've voted for this and are glad it is passing, I do hope that this will not lessen the enthusiasm for the free trade rules that this Assembly was supposed to promote. We have the trade referee now but not the trade rules, and that is a sad thing.

Knootoss recommended that the delegation from Auralia push free trade before pushing Another Committee which is beloved by the One World Government types. If those world commies now stab that delegation in the back by opposing the free trade rules I shall be most disappointed.


Ambassador Aram Koopman
World Assembly representative for the Dutch Democratic Republic of Knootoss

[Auralia]

Knootoss recommended that the delegation from Auralia push free trade before pushing Another Committee which is beloved by the One World Government types.

Don't worry; that is exactly what I intend to do.

[Land of novascotia]

We dead set against any expansion of powers of that vile monstrosity called ITA. Give it a different name, and we may talk.

So you're fine with all the authorities this would give the ITA... as long as it's given to a different committee? That's pretty petty. Also completely illogical and wasteful.

What? What's wrong with the ITA?

What's wrong with the ITA is that I created it.

Anyways, I will have some ideas for this at a later point. Unfortunately, there are more pressing issues for me right now. :\

exactly my view why give them this authority

AGAINST!

[Glen-Rhodes]

Knootoss recommended that the delegation from Auralia push free trade before pushing Another Committee which is beloved by the One World Government types. If those world commies now stab that delegation in the back by opposing the free trade rules I shall be most disappointed.

Glen-Rhodes will be equally disappointed, but we must insist that establishing free trade rules without creating dispute settlement mechanisms is an exercise in conflict creation. We are grateful that the delegation of Auralia has first created a body to settle disputes, which should pave the way for effective and fair trade regulations in the future. This is the route we suggested in our counsel.

- Dr. B. Castro