[DRAFT] Asteroid Defence Treaty

[Imperium Anglorum]

International Security: Mild?

The World Assembly finds as follows:

1. Unilateral use of nuclear weapons against an asteroid threat poses unacceptable escalation risks because such use could be mistakenly interpreted as an attack by one nation on another. Moreover, such use should be discouraged except in cases where the chances of success are favourable to avoid interference and false hopes.
   
   
2. It can be difficult for an individual member nation to coordinate an effective response to the impact of a small asteroid when it lacks the requisite materiel. While larger nations could intervene to prevent disaster, an international framework would increase the likelihood of successful action and support successful cooperation.
   
   
3. Home defence is one of the highest duties of government. To the question of what the Assembly wants to protect, one answer must be the lives and livelihoods of its citizens and inhabitants. Enacting a collaborative treaty on asteroid defence would solve both coordination and escalation risk problems.

Now, therefore, the World Assembly hereby enacts as follows:

1. In this resolution,
   
   
   1. A material probability of impact is a probability that indicates an unacceptable risk no less than one per cent that a celestial body will cause, through impact of that body with another, large-scale loss of life or property in any place under WA jurisdiction.
      
      
   2. An asteroid defence strike is the use of nuclear weapons to destroy, disrupt, or divert a celestial body.
2. The Asteroid Defence Treaty Association, hereinafter referred to as the Association, is hereby established with the following mandate:
   
   
   1. The Association will establish a comprehensive monitoring network for space around member nations to detect any object with a material probability of impact. It shall also develop technologies necessary for the successful execution of asteroid defence strikes; it shall conduct exercises and requisition materials for such strikes.
      
      
   2. Upon confirming discovery or reports of an object with a material probability of impact, the Association shall consult with the member nations affected on an appropriate course of action which minimises loss of life and property.
      
      
   3. If an asteroid defence strike, on the balance of probabilities, would eliminate a material probability of impact or otherwise minimise the loss of life or property from such a probability, the Association may order and execute one. When it does so, it shall issue a public announcement of its intention and clearly state the time, location, and flight path of that strike.
3. Member nations must assist the Association in the following goals.
   
   
   1. Member nations with nuclear weapons must disclose an inventory of nuclear warheads to the Association. If the Association orders an asteroid defence strike, the Association shall assume possession of the appropriate warheads from the collective inventories of member nations for use in that strike.
      
      
   2. Each member nation shall make a best effort to calculate the orbital parameters of any unknown and visible celestial object. If that object's orbital parameters indicate that it has a material probability of impact, it must be reported to the Association.
      
      
   3. Upon request, member nations must provide the Association with appropriate launch vehicles for readiness exercise for and execution of asteroid defence strikes. No member nation or person therein may interfere in the exercise or execution of any act or process planned by the Association according to 2(b) above.
4. The value of any materials requisitioned in the course of Association defence activities will be credited against any applicable fees or dues that a member nation owes or may owe to the World Assembly. If the value of such materials is disputed, the Impartial Mediation Foundation may intervene and issue a binding determination of value.

[Imperium Anglorum]

OOC.

"I am ADT. And I'm always there."
"Help protect your family and your home. With ADT!"
"24/7 monitoring for just 1 dollar a day!"
"[Planet name here]. Secured by ADT!"
"What do you want to protect?"
"It's more than just a line in the sky!"

[Honeydewistania]

ADTA

[Imperium Anglorum]

ADTA

Sounded better than "Asteroid Defence Team" or "Asteroid Defence Troupe".

[Hulldom]

RLM: “I believe we can be generally amenable to this idea. However, why not just subordinate the power of the ADTA to the International Aero-Space Administration?”

[Honeydewistania]

We will only support if the ADTA has a provision to direct nuclear warheads to tornadoes and hurricanes as well.

-Benji

[WayNeacTia]

"Support!"

Wayne

[Soveiniesberg]

for some reason I did not expect for Anglorum to draft something like this

great job, I am impressed

[Spiderman]

Swinging in at the speed of a dinosaur-slayer and hoping he isn't nuked with a can of bug spray, says Spiderman, "Cool, but, uh, what of member states who forbid the production and/or use of nuclear weapons, are totally non-militaristic and/or have no such 'launch vehicles' to provide the Association? Other than (for example) calculating orbital parameters, could there be made available to member states any further pacifistic options in the defense of asteroids, as well as exemptions to (or forgiveness for) those which are militaristic? what protections and resources would be available to non-nuclear states as compared to nuclear states?"

[Imperium Anglorum]

I had wanted to define a new term, That H'asteroid Over There, and include a line such as "If a celestial object has a [insert definition of material probability of impact here], it is a THOT"... but thought it perhaps wiser not to do so.

Swinging in at the speed of a dinosaur-slayer and hoping he isn't nuked with a can of bug spray, says Spiderman, "Cool, but, uh, what of member states who forbid the production and/or use of nuclear weapons, are totally non-militaristic and/or have no such 'launch vehicles' to provide the Association? Other than (for example) calculating orbital parameters, could there be made available to member states any further pacifistic options in the defense of asteroids, as well as exemptions to (or forgiveness for) those which are militaristic?"

I don't think you understand the proposal? The proposal wouldn't rely on non-nuclear states to waddle around impotently. In fact, if the asteroid is small, non-nuclear states would fall into the protective umbrella of ADT Association defence actions with resources provided by other member nations.

[Spiderman]

I don't think you understand the proposal? The proposal wouldn't rely on non-nuclear states to waddle around impotently. In fact, if the asteroid is small, non-nuclear states would fall into the protective umbrella of ADT Association defence actions with resources provided by other member nations.

I was about to reword my original phrasing, but I do understand the proposal. Your latter sentence, though, more closely addresses my intended question.

[Tinhampton]

What is the point of Article 2b consultation when it is not explicitly required to take the views expressed in that consultation into account when considering whether to order an Article 2c asteroid strike?

Opposed due to Article 3a, however. If we're going to be hijacking nukes then we might as well just ban them.

[West Barack and East Obama]

Dr Justin Obama, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: What constitutes an inventory? For reasons, we would like to keep our definitely non existent arsenal of WMDs mostly ready for our use, so knowing which amount of nukes to hypothetically lease for asteroid purposes would be great.

[Simone Republic]

Support. Assuming we are all sitting on a blue tinted planet and don't have other planets to go to, potentially getting hit by an extinction-level mass asteriod* is, strictly speaking, a bigger issue than all the other issues previously discussed such as guns, abortion rights, the integrity of DNS, the proper formatting of WA resolutions etc.

*OOC: let's say about 100km wide, I think there is no scientific consensus on this but I'd put this in as a number. If made of the right materials and heavy enough, something like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4942_Munroe 4942 Munroe (3km in diameter) should be enough to wipe us all out, at least that's what Randall Munroe says. I am not a scientist.

[Anne of Cleves in TNP]

We will only support if the ADTA has a provision to direct nuclear warheads to tornadoes and hurricanes as well.

-Benji

[Sarcastic IC Post]
“Um, Ambassador Benji? You do know that hurricanes and tornadoes aren’t really solid objects and thus nuclear weapons would have no effect on them, right? “
-Ms. Charlotte Schafer, WA Ambassador for the Clevesian Empire

[Imperium Anglorum]

inventory | ˈɪnv(ə)nt(ə)ri |
noun (plural inventories)
a complete list of items such as property, goods in stock, or the contents of a building.

[Kaprein]

While the Republic of Kaprein commends this initiative, there are three clauses I find highly problematic.

Clause 3a: The key parts of this clause mandate all WA nations to reveal the entire contents of their nuclear inventories, and forces a nation to relinquish control of some of their likely most powerful weapons into the hands of a WA agency. This would be an unreasonable surrender of sovereignty to force a nation to surrender control of their nuclear weapons to an international organisation. There is no accountability, and no checks to prevent the stealing of any nuclear weapons.

Clause 3a also represents a direct challenge to the Kapreinian government's policy (and all other nations with a similar policy) of not disclosing the existence or lack thereof of WMDs.

Clause 3c: This clause forces nations to give up control of missiles as well, which is problematic for the same reason as clause 3a.

Clause 4: Can this be elaborated on, as what is to gaurantee an unaccountable committee takes far more military equipment than is needed and then fails to give adequate monetary compensation.

As such, I propose the following changes, or making changes with the same effect:
- Clause 3a is reworded to: Member nations with nuclear weapons are requested to disclose their inventory of nuclear warheads to the Association. If the Association orders an asteroid defence strike, the Association shall coordinate with nations that have disclosed possession of nuclear warheads to launch a nuclear strike on the asteroid in question. The Association will provide as much technical data and assistance as is possible without violating the nation in question's laws regarding keeping military secrets confidential, and any nuclear launches will remain under the sole control of the nation which controls the nuclear weapons.

-Clause 3c is reworded to: Upon request, member nations which disclose the ownership of nuclear launch vehicles or vehicles which can act as nuclear launch vehicles (for readiness exercises and asteroid defence strikes) will coordinate with the Association under the same terms as clause 3a. No member nation or person therein may interfere in an Association asteroid defence strike exercise or execution, unless there is valid reasoning (such as violation of airspace or damage to equipment owned in space such as satellites). The Association strongly urges nations to use diplomatic means during the planning of a training exercise or a full nuclear launch before resorting to the use of force.

- Clause 4 is reworded to: The value of any materials requisitioned in the course of Association defence activities will be credited against any applicable fees or dues that a member nation owes or may owe to the World Assembly. If the value of such materials is disputed, the Impartial Mediation Foundation may intervene and issue a determination of value, which the nation in question can examine and challenge.

(For clarity, the key changes I propose are):
- (Clause 3a) Nations are not mandated to disclose nuclear weapon stocks.
- (Clause 3a) The Association is to provide all assistance possible to WA nations in practice exercises or full launches, but the launches will remain in sole control of the nation which owns the nuclear weapons. Further, the nation conducting the launch can turn down help if it would violate national laws.
- (Clause 3c) Nations are not mandated to disclose nuclear launch vehicle (or weapons which can launch nuclear weapons) stocks.
- (Clause 3c) The Association will coordinate with member nations under the same conditions as clause 3a.
- (Clause 3c) A practice drill or full launch can be interfered with on reasonable grounds (such as a violation of airspace, or damage to infrastructure in space).
- (Clause 4) Nations can examine and challenge determinations from the Impartial Mediation Foundation.

[Imperium Anglorum]

While the Republic of Kaprein commends this initiative, there are three clauses I find highly problematic.

Clause 3a: The key parts of this clause mandate all WA nations to reveal the entire contents of their nuclear inventories, and forces a nation to relinquish control of some of their likely most powerful weapons into the hands of a WA agency. This would be an unreasonable surrender of sovereignty to force a nation to surrender control of their nuclear weapons to an international organisation. There is no accountability, and no checks to prevent the stealing of any nuclear weapons.

Clause 3a also represents a direct challenge to the Kapreinian government's policy (and all other nations with a similar policy) of not disclosing the existence or lack thereof of WMDs.

Clause 3c: This clause forces nations to give up control of missiles as well, which is problematic for the same reason as clause 3a.

Clause 4: Can this be elaborated on, as what is to gaurantee an unaccountable committee takes far more military equipment than is needed and then fails to give adequate monetary compensation.

As such, I propose the following changes, or making changes with the same effect:
- Clause 3a is reworded to: Member nations with nuclear weapons are requested to disclose their inventory of nuclear warheads to the Association. If the Association orders an asteroid defence strike, the Association shall coordinate with nations that have disclosed possession of nuclear warheads to launch a nuclear strike on the asteroid in question. The Association will provide as much technical data and assistance as is possible without violating the nation in question's laws regarding keeping military secrets confidential, and any nuclear launches will remain under the sole control of the nation which controls the nuclear weapons.

-Clause 3c is reworded to: Upon request, member nations which disclose the ownership of nuclear launch vehicles or vehicles which can act as nuclear launch vehicles (for readiness exercises and asteroid defence strikes) will coordinate with the Association under the same terms as clause 3a. No member nation or person therein may interfere in an Association asteroid defence strike exercise or execution, unless there is valid reasoning (such as violation of airspace or damage to equipment owned in space such as satellites). The Association strongly urges nations to use diplomatic means during the planning of a training exercise or a full nuclear launch before resorting to the use of force.

- Clause 4 is reworded to: The value of any materials requisitioned in the course of Association defence activities will be credited against any applicable fees or dues that a member nation owes or may owe to the World Assembly. If the value of such materials is disputed, the Impartial Mediation Foundation may intervene and issue a determination of value, which the nation in question can examine and challenge.

(For clarity, the key changes I propose are):
- (Clause 3a) Nations are not mandated to disclose nuclear weapon stocks.
- (Clause 3a) The Association is to provide all assistance possible to WA nations in practice exercises or full launches, but the launches will remain in sole control of the nation which owns the nuclear weapons. Further, the nation conducting the launch can turn down help if it would violate national laws.
- (Clause 3c) Nations are not mandated to disclose nuclear launch vehicle (or weapons which can launch nuclear weapons) stocks.
- (Clause 3c) The Association will coordinate with member nations under the same conditions as clause 3a.
- (Clause 3c) A practice drill or full launch can be interfered with on reasonable grounds (such as a violation of airspace, or damage to infrastructure in space).
- (Clause 4) Nations can examine and challenge determinations from the Impartial Mediation Foundation.

I only have a few minor comments. I'm not at all interested in allowing particularists to undermine collective asteroid defence capabilities. Allowing a national bureaucrat to veto an asteroid defence strike or readiness for such strikes because of something as routine as an airspace violation is absurd and worthy of mockery.

Re security matters. Nuclear deterrence is effected by merely the number of warheads, but the certainty and celerity of a response. The actual matters affecting national security are the locations and dispositions of warheads, not their mere existence. Member nations with nuclear weapons have them to achieve deterrence. Achieving deterrence requires other people to know that you have nuclear weapons and launch vehicles for them. It requires a reporting of them for other people to believe you. The "security" interests that your comment seeks to protect are inherently incompatible with national interests in achieving deterrence. Insofar as they are not things that rational member nations – at least the ones that are not secretly developing first strike capabilities (such a first strike also would almost certainly violate WA law on war crimes) – are interested in protecting, I too am not interested in protecting them.

Re financing. Your suggestion is incompatible with a final and fairly given decision on valuation. If you want nations to have wide jurisdiction to claim whatever fictitious valuations they want on requisitioned materials, say so. I am not interested in giving them such powers.

[Anne of Cleves in TNP]

- (Clause 3a) The Association is to provide all assistance possible to WA nations in practice exercises or full launches, but the launches will remain in sole control of the nation which owns the nuclear weapons. Further, the nation conducting the launch can turn down help if it would violate national laws.

“I will have to disagree on this. The aforementioned committee will most likely have professional astronomers and scientists, thereby they are more likely to make better and intelligent decisions on whether or not to launch. If national governments are in control of launches, then the outcomes could be more risky.”
-Ms. Charlotte Schafer, WA Ambassador for the Clevesian Empire

[The Orwell Society]

I am very much for this proposal, but I am rather upset that you took the idea. I had about half of a very rough draft going that I was hoping to continue once RL gets back on track. If this doesn't pick up much speed, then you might have a competing draft going on.

[Imperium Anglorum]

I am very much for this proposal, but I am rather upset that you took the idea. I had about half of a very rough draft going that I was hoping to continue once RL gets back on track. If this doesn't pick up much speed, then you might have a competing draft going on.

OOC. There are no "dibs" on ideas in the World Assembly. If you want to draft, do so.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

"We suggest a minor change in 3(c)."

"No member nation or person therein may interfere in an Association asteroid defence strike exercise or execution."

...should become something like:

"No member nation or person therein may interfere in the exercise or execution of any act or process planned by the Association according to 2(b) above."

"The ADTA is likely to determine that shooting off nukes would turn a single dinosaur killer into a hundred Krakatoas, and that alternate methods are necessary - landing a series of engines on it, deploying a gravity tractor, whatever - and only protecting the single worst conceivable plan from interference is, at minimum, wildly suicidal."

"Besides that, we find this proposal well-conceived and necessary. Best of luck."

[The Orwell Society]

I am very much for this proposal, but I am rather upset that you took the idea. I had about half of a very rough draft going that I was hoping to continue once RL gets back on track. If this doesn't pick up much speed, then you might have a competing draft going on.

OOC. There are no "dibs" on ideas in the World Assembly. If you want to draft, do so.

It's just that I don't think I can compete with you, and our ideas are much the same

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

If an asteroid defence strike, on the balance of probabilities, would eliminate a material probability of impact or otherwise minimise the loss of life or property from such a probability, the Association may order and execute one. When it does so, it shall issue a public announcement of its intention and clearly state the time, location, and flight path of that strike.

"Launching nuclear weapons into space necessarily creates a substantial risk of nuclear disaster if and when something eventually goes horribly wrong," says Deputy Ambassador Roweina. "Given the obvious risks involved there should at least be a requirement to consider and rule out other possible means of dealing with the problem before the Association may resort to planning a nuclear strike."

Member nations must assist the Association in the following goals.

1. Member nations with nuclear weapons must disclose an inventory of nuclear warheads to the Association. If the Association orders an asteroid defence strike, the Association shall assume possession of the appropriate warheads from the collective inventories of member nations for use in that strike.
   
   
2. Each member nation shall make a best effort to calculate the orbital parameters of any unknown and visible celestial object. If that object's orbital parameters indicate that it has a material probability of impact, it must be reported to the Association.
   
   
3. Upon request, member nations must provide the Association with appropriate launch vehicles for readiness exercise for and execution of asteroid defence strikes. No member nation or person therein may interfere in an Association asteroid defence strike exercise or execution.

"No, we don't think these demands are reasonable as part of a mutual asteroid-impact protection plan. There has never been a recorded need to blow up an asteroid in the history of civilization. Our mages have scried into the future and seen the very edges of time itself! The few who didn't go completely mad think it will be hundreds or thousands of years before we ever face such a threat. It is not reasonable to meet that remote threat by requiring member nations to disclose sensitive information about their national security capabilities. It is even less reasonable to require member nations to turn over their nuclear weapons to the WA! Remember when we used to send blindfolded gnomes teetering off into minefields as part of WA sanctioned 'mine clearing operations'? I do. Oh I shudder to think of the revenge a disgruntled or mistreated gnome might be tempted to take if they suddenly had access to a nuclear payload!

"The offer of 'payment' in the form of WA credits against dues that aren't owed now but might maybe be owed one day is too generous by half. Quite clever wording, of course, it did make me chuckle. But, pass!"

"Member nations should not be required to disclose their weapon stocks and should retain control over their nuclear payloads, subject at most to a condition that they will cooperate with the WA and other nations to accomplish asteroid defense strikes if their cooperation is critical for the mission's odds of success.

"Finally, my delegation agrees with the concerns raised about the overbroad language at the end there. 'No member nation or person therein may interfere in an Association asteroid defence strike exercise or execution.' Maybe I don't understand the limits but what exactly are you worried might occur that this provision is intended to address?

"Overall, we wonder if there are other, better plans for addressing the danger of asteroid strikes than arming WA gnomes at the expense of the security of member nations. Maybe we could just borrow an asteroid disintegrating laser from Tinfect. Or maybe we could arrange to send a rag-tag group of off-shore oil refinery workers into space for some reason..."

[Kaprein]

I only have a few minor comments. I'm not at all interested in allowing particularists to undermine collective asteroid defence capabilities. Allowing a national bureaucrat to veto an asteroid defence strike or readiness for such strikes because of something as routine as an airspace violation is absurd and worthy of mockery.

The aerospace example was just an example, and the key point still stands. Leaving aside that you have proposed nations being forced to give up control of key strategic weapons, how is there any guarantee to ensure proper use of said nuclear weapons? Also, where is the guarantee that WA systems are as protected as military ones from actions like cyber attacks? If nuclear weapons are to be put in control of the Association, what what assurances can be made to ensure that surrounding control of nuclear weapons won't backfire?

Re security matters. Nuclear deterrence is effected by merely the number of warheads, but the certainty and celerity of a response. The actual matters affecting national security are the locations and dispositions of warheads, not their mere existence. Member nations with nuclear weapons have them to achieve deterrence. Achieving deterrence requires other people to know that you have nuclear weapons and launch vehicles for them. It requires a reporting of them for other people to believe you. The "security" interests that your comment seeks to protect are inherently incompatible with national interests in achieving deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence revolves around the the threat of nuclear weapons being used to prevent an attack. For this point, the relevant aspect is the threat of nuclear weapons. That threat is maintained as it is well known (to civilians, as well as military personnel) that Kaprein's government has nuclear weapons to the point that any credible analysis of Kaprein's military includes the understanding that is would have the option to use both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and that it maintains the capability to operate a full nuclear triad (it's obvious Kaprein has nukes, but no-one knows how much, and of what types, and that is a key element of Kaprein's nuclear deterance). Officially maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity is a formality. However, regardless of a nation's nuclear policy, the disclosure of exact nuclear inventories would still pose a significant threat to sovereignty.

Insofar as they are not things that rational member nations – at least the ones that are not secretly developing first strike capabilities (such a first strike also would almost certainly violate WA law on war crimes) – are interested in protecting,

Nearly any nuclear weapon can be used in a first strike capacity - first strike weapons aren't a completely different type of weapon from nukes.

I too am not interested in protecting them.

This is one of the reasons I oppose the planned resolution - it is written without consideration for nations which want control over their own weapons.

Re financing. Your suggestion is incompatible with a final and fairly given decision on valuation. If you want nations to have wide jurisdiction to claim whatever fictitious valuations they want on requisitioned materials, say so. I am not interested in giving them such powers.

I repeat what I said. What can be guaranteed to ensure a fair valuation? Can you elaborate more on the Impartial Mediation Foundation?