The CDC still recommends masking in certain situations.
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by North Washington Republic » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:40 pm
by Neu California » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:41 pm
by Neu California » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:42 pm
Birchland and the NAF wrote:Really mods? I was trying to debate honestly without trolling.
by San Lumen » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:42 pm
North Washington Republic wrote:San Lumen wrote:
If the vaccine doesn;t prevent hospitalization its completely pointless.
The CDC still recommends masking in certain situations.
by Odreria » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:42 pm
Valrifell wrote:
Disregard whatever this poster says
by North Washington Republic » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:43 pm
by Miku the Based » Thu Apr 29, 2021 8:55 pm
Birchland and the NAF wrote:Really mods? I was trying to debate honestly without trolling.
by New haven america » Fri Apr 30, 2021 1:31 am
by Washington Resistance Army » Fri Apr 30, 2021 1:45 am
New haven america wrote:I don't think I've ever really heard a good argument against cities.
Usually all it boils down to it "Liberals!", "Drugs!", and "I want grass!"
Meanwhile, left-wing politics exists in rural areas (I should know, I live in one of those areas. 80% of the voters in the county went with Biden), drugs and addiction are actually a bigger issue in rural areas because they're less capable of getting help for their issues, and oh yeah, yards exist in cities, especially out West.
by Croat-Slavonia » Fri Apr 30, 2021 1:50 am
by Kowani » Fri Apr 30, 2021 3:37 am
In other words: the shifts appear to be among those with the lowest partisan formation. We know enough to say these look like true swing voters. Neither party should assume that a Hispanic voter who cast a ballot for Trump in 2020 is locked in as a Republican going forward. Nor can we assume this shift was exclusive to Trump and will revert back on its own. And if there’s a lesson for the future, it’s to watch the margins and those voters who often remain invisible: the ones who stayed home and the many others aging into the electorate.
In late 2019, children in detention + family separation were top of mind even with conservative Latinos who agreed with Trump on other aspects of immigration
There have been massive changes in the United States since the racial resentment scale was incorporated into the American National Election Studies (ANES) in 1988, but as we show, national aggregate levels of racial resentment seem impervious to the past three decades of change. To be sure, the few scholars who have examined national trends over time provide evidence that racial resentment has become more virulent in effect and has “spilled over” to affect nonracialized policy preferences such as health care, but overall, levels of racial resentment among (White) Americans has largely remained stable in level since the mid-1980s.
On average, the two largest increases in the correlation between racial resentment and any one of the other variables occur between 2008 and 2012 with respect to health care policy and government services attitudes. This is congruent with work demonstrating the Obama-induced "spillover” of racial prejudice to attitudes about seemingly nonracial issues such as health care, though such an effect has not been directly observed with respect to attitudes about government spending and services in general.[...]The correlation between racial resentment and context-dependent political attitudes and behaviors also increase markedly over time. In 1988, differential feelings toward the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates was fairly weakly correlated with racial resentment at .16. By 2016, however, this correlation had nearly quadrupled to .61. A similar, albeit weaker, pattern emerges with respect to (Democratic) vote choice. Here, the value of the correlation with racial resentment doubled from .20 in 1988 to .54 in 2016.
The observed trends when it comes to both affective evaluations of the candidates and vote choice are particularly interesting because they began well before a racial minority of any sort was running for office. Again, our observation runs counter to the narrative of Barack Obama as a lightning rod when it comes to the racialization of politics—these trends harken back to at least the late 1980s, if not earlier. Although we observe relatively large increases in the correlations between 2004 and 2008 for both candidate evaluations and vote choice, the increases were larger moving from 2000 to 2004 with respect to vote choice, or from 2012 to 2016 with respect to candidate evaluations.
To facilitate interpretation of the coefficients associated with the racial resentment–time multiplicative terms, we, once again, graphically present marginal effects in Figure 5. With each dependent variable, the marginal effect of racial resentment increases over time. The absolute value of the marginal effect of racial resentment on the differential evaluation of the major party candidates is 0 in 1988 and increases to approximately 0.18 by 2016. When it comes to voting for the Democratic candidate rather than the Republican candidate, the absolute value of the marginal effect of racial resentment increases from 0.08 in 1988 to 0.12 in 2016. The increase in the marginal effects of racial resentment are even more striking with respect to issue attitudes. The marginal effect of racial resentment of attitudes about health insurance increases from –0.08 in 1988 to 0.17 in 2016, a marked increase from no effect to one rivaling that on affective evaluations or vote choice. The same marginal effect when it comes to attitudes about governmental spending and services increases from –0.06 in 1988 to 0.13 in 2016.
The symbolic, abstract language and imagery of Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign continued during subsequent presidential campaigns that focused on crime and expanding welfare, denigrated the “liberal” label, and argued for the repeal of supposedly antiquated Civil Rights and affirmative action policies. More than use during presidential campaigns, however, the symbolic racial appeals became highlights of the common political rhetoric espoused by elected representatives at all levels of government. The destruction of the policies this rhetoric was used to refer to—governmental services aimed at strengthening social safety nets and reducing the effects of racial discrimination—quickly became the centerpiece of the Republican Party platform. Thus, the new Southern strategy has, over the past 30 years, permeated all forms of political discourse, strategy, and behavior.
Under the guise of a cognitive test, we exposed 600 survey participants who self-identified as white to six pictures: three of the faces of blacks and three of whites. Respondents were asked to assess each person in terms of attractiveness and likeability. We used the pictures employed in the Implicit Association Test (IAT) which have been designed to activate racial attitudes exclusively. It is important to note that unlike implicit racial primes used in much of the literature, this did not involve threatening images, or coded racial messaging. The pictures are calibrated to be emotionally neutral in tone. As such, ours is a relatively weak prime because it lacks negative emotional content. The control group (n=600) did not receive any prime; they were just asked to complete the survey. Following the prime, respondents were asked a series of questions about policy preferences, the three government responsiveness items and two items related to political trust.
As a check to ensure that the prime can activate politically relevant attitudes associated with race, near the end of the survey we included a question that asked people to specify what proportion of the members of Congress were black, white, or other racial minority. Our expectation was that exposure to the prime would lead white respondents to offer a higher proportion of black legislators and lower proportion of white legislators relative to the control. Since the question asked to specify group proportions, the two dependent variables range from 0 to 100. An independent samples means test shows that respondents assigned to the treatment estimated the proportion of blacks in Congress to be 2.2ppts higher, on average, than the control group. The estimate offered for whites in Congress was 4.1ppts lower, on average, than the control group. Both are statistically significant differences (p<0.001). This reassures us that indeed, exposure to an implicit racial prime does influence considerations about racial political representation, leading whites to overestimate the political representation of blacks and underestimate that for their own group. We should note that there was no statistically significant difference in the way racial egalitarians and racial conservatives responded to this question; however, we contend that the two groups associate different meanings and attitudes with perceptions of greater black representation in Congress. For racial conservatives, the activation of racial predispositions should produce a decline in beliefs about government responsiveness, while among racial egalitarians it should either have no effect or increase positivity toward government. Following the prime, respondents were asked a series of questions about policy preferences, the three government responsiveness items and two items related to political trust.[...]Figures 1 and 2 present the result of these interaction models with the public trust variable and the government responsiveness measure, respectively. In both cases, we observe both floor and ceiling effects: the government attitudes of those who are very strongly egalitarian and those who are strong racial conservatives appear unaffected by exposure to the prime. However, we find that the treatment and the three interaction terms are jointly statistically significant (p<0.05). This is evidence that exposure to the prime relative to the control, does suppress public trust and belief in government responsiveness among those who have middling levels of racial resentment, but it does not affect those at the highest or the lowest tiers of racial resentments. It seems that those groups have already very strong attitudes about the relationship between race and government that their views are not malleable.
We find that racial resentment, a measure of anti-black racial prejudice, is a significant predictor of all three types of attitudes about government and the relationship suggests that whites who score high on racial resentment are also likely to believe the government to be unresponsive, harbor less public trust, and even perceive the government as an outright threat to rights. Our survey experiment also shows that priming race activates politically relevant cognitions and it dampens beliefs in government responsiveness among some racial conservatives. First, our analyses suggest that among white Americans’ negative attitudes about government may not be tied only to government policy performance or the personality of office holders, but to perceptions of value incongruence between government and its citizens. The increase in black representation, which racial conservatives may overestimate given the relative visibility of black issues and black officials, has likely linked attitudes about government to negative beliefs about blacks’ moral citizenship. If government is representing a group that in the eyes of racial conservatives rejects traditional American values, then the motivations of government are suspect. Second, our analyses combined with Hetherington’s work on racial policy in the 1970s-1980s, and Aberbach and Walker’s study of the immediate post-civil rights era, suggest that the racialization of government may have occurred in the 1960s and continues unabated to today.
Among today’s senators and representatives, the overwhelming majority of racial and ethnic minority members are Democrats (83%), while 17% are Republicans.
To summarize, these results show that voters perceive non-White MCs as more liberal than their White counterparts who take the same policy positions. Even in a relatively “high information” environment, where voters were given explicit information about legislators’ positions, voters categorized on the basis of race and attributed a more liberal ideology to non-White politicians. The ideological skew of the MC’s positions does not appear to significantly moderate the extent to which voters saw non-White MCs as more liberal than White MCs. Note that this does not mean that voters perceived conservative non-White MCs as liberals: No matter their race, MCs who took more conservative positions were perceived as more conservative. Rather, the results show that non-White MCs were seen as more liberal than White MCs who took the same positions. Conservative non-White MCs were seen as more conservative than liberal non-White MCs, in other words, but were still seen as more liberal than a White MC with an equally conservative record
I simulate the coefficients from Model 3(a) to estimate differences in the probability that respondents with different ideological outlooks approve of MCs of different races. These first differences show the impact of race on approval ratings for different sets of voters. Liberal voters (those who took a liberal position on every policy) respond more favorably to a Black or Hispanic MC than they do a to White MC (an increase in the probability of approving of .07 [.02, .13] and .04 [−.01, .09], respectively). Conservative voters, in turn, are less likely to approve of Black, −.11 [−.20, −.03], or Hispanic, −.07 [−.16, .02], MCs than White MCs, although these estimates for Hispanic MCs have confidence intervals that include zero. The stereotype of Black and Hispanic politicians as liberals leads conservatives to approve less, and liberals to approve more, than they would of otherwise equivalent White MCs.
Beginning with the question about work ethic, we see a marked and stable tendency for whites to rate blacks as lazier than they rate their own group. In 2008, 50% of white respondents rated blacks as lazier than whites, compared with 51% in 2012 (p < .67). At first glance, the intelligence question analyses seem more consistent with the argument that contact may reduce anti-black attitudes: in 2008, 45% of whites rated blacks as less intelligent than whites, compared with 39% in 2012 (p < .01). While these results may appear to bolster the argument in favor of positive effects of contact with the nation’s first black president, this decrease in describing blacks as less intelligent than whites actually results from a decrease in the average intelligence ratings of whites. When the analysis is restricted to the intelligence ratings of blacks alone, rather than looking at the difference measure, the magnitude of the increase is small at 0.12 of the 1–7 range, or about 2% of the scale. Thus, we do not see evidence that contact with Obama had a positive influence on white attitudes towards blacks as a group. As a complement to the stereotype questions, we also examine three alternative measures of prejudice against blacks (all recoded from 0 to 1).10 The mean level of white sympathy for blacks11 (Hutchings 2009) actually decreases from 0.44 in 2008 to 0.30 in 2012 (p < .001), the mean racial resentment score on the standard four-item battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996) changes little from 0.65 in 2008 to 0.64 in 2012 (where high values indicate more resentment), and the mean warmth toward blacks on a standard feeling thermometer decreases slightly from 0.66 in 2008 to 0.63 in 2012 (p < .001). Taken together, these analyses yield little evidence that white attitudes toward blacks improved during Obama’s first term as President, and there is even some evidence to suggest that prejudice may have increased. This pattern is consistent for
both Democratic and Republican respondents.
Next, we assess whether the impact of prejudice on policy opinion increases over time in the panel data. To do so, we examine associations between prejudice, again as measured by coldness toward blacks relative to whites, and opinion about whether the federal government should enforce legislation outlawing racial discrimination in the labor market. This question was asked in both September 2008 and May 2009 – spanning Obama’s inauguration as president. To determine whether the influence of prejudice on policy opinion increased over this time period – as we hypothesized and the cross-sectional data supported – we model opinion in May 2009 as a function of opinion in September 2008 and racial prejudice as measured in September 2008, as well as control variables (see Table 3). This standard practice of including a lagged dependent variable in the regression model (Keele and Kelly 2006) allows us to assess whether prejudice predicts opinion about the issue in May 2009 even taking into account how the respondent felt about the issue eight months prior. Here we see an association between racial attitudes and white policy opinion in May 2009 even after controlling for policy opinion in September 2008. Thus, we see an increase in the effect of racial attitudes on policy opinion over time. Considering this finding in combination with our cross-sectional data, we find scant evidence that racial prejudice declined during Obama’s first term in office even with whites’ regular exposure to the president. Indeed, on the topic of discrimination in the labor market and support for affirmative action, the association between prejudice and whites’ policy opinion actually became stronger over time. These results are consistent with the interpretation that Obama’s ascendancy to the presidency was perceived as a threat to whites’ superior group position: in the age of the first black president, the impact of prejudice on public opinion about racialized policies increased, even when Obama did not explicitly associate himself with such policies.
Our baseline estimates using racist internet searches as the outcome are reported in Table 2. The results show that pre-recession manufacturing and real estate shares are associated with substantial increases in racist internet searches after the start of the recession. A one standard deviation increase in the pre-recession manufacturing share is associated with a 5.5 percent higher rate of racist internet searches. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the real estate share is associated with a 6.1 percent increase in racist searches, and a one standard deviation increase in the recession vulnerability index is associated with a 5.8 percent increase in racist searches.
Table 3 shows results for Poisson regressions using the number of hate crimes against blacks as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2. A one standard deviation increase in the pre-recession manufacturing share is associated with a 55 percent (e0.44 − 1 = 0.553) increase in hate crimes against blacks. One standard deviation increases in the pre-recession real estate share and the aggregate recession vulnerability index are associated with 51 percent and 52 percent increases in hate crimes, respectively. These results suggest that the animus created by the economic downturn is not restricted to racist online speech, but translates into tangible behavior with potentially severe consequences for the affected individuals. There is no evidence that states that were especially dependent on manufacturing and real estate experienced increases in hate crimes prior to the Great Recession in 2007.
Fig. 2 shows that, before 2008, unemployment rates, GDP and racist searches were on parallel trends in states with high and low recession vulnerability. Starting in 2008, GDP begins to decrease, while racist searches and hate crimes begin to increase in vulnerable versus less vulnerable states. The unemployment rate does not begin to decrease until 2009, consistent with its status as a lagging indicator of economic performance. The unemployment effect of the recession vulnerability index begins to decrease starting in 2010, but the GDP effect persists over the entire period of observation. The estimated effect of the index on racist internet searches peaks in 2010 and decreases afterwards. By contrast, its estimated effect on hate crimes persists over the entire period of observation. Overall, the graphs in Fig. 8 provide evidence that the time-series relationship between sectoral employment shares and racial animus is similar to the relationship between employment shares and economic indicators (i.e., the unemployment rate and GDP), which suggests that our estimates are not driven by spurious correlations caused by pre-treatment trends in unobservables. Finally, we explore whether our results can be explained by latent racial tensions coming to the fore after the election of President Obama in 2008. If latent tensions were correlated with the manufacturing and real estate shares, and their effect on racist searches was amplified after 2008, the parallel trends assumption of our estimator would be violated. We begin by exploring whether pre-recession sectoral employment shares were related to survey measures of pre-recession racial attitudes or the vote share for President Obama in the 2008 election. Table 4 shows that the pre-recession manufacturing share was negatively related to attitudes towards blacks as measured by our five proxies of pre-recession racial tensions from the ANES. By contrast, the pre-recession real estate share was positively correlated with these same attitudes. Likewise, consistent with the hypothesis that racial animus reduced support for Obama in 2008, the vote share for Barack Obama was negatively correlated with the manufacturing share of employment but positively correlated with the real estate share. Importantly, this pattern of results suggests that latent racial animus coming to the fore is not a good explanation for our baseline results: although the pre-recession real estate share is positively related to racist searches after 2008 (Table 2), it is negatively related to pre-recession measures of attitudes towards blacks. In Tables 5 and 6, we report the results of additional robustness tests that control for our proxies for pre-recession racial tensions interacted with an indicator for the post-recession period. In the first column of either table, we show that controlling for the vote share for Barack Obama interacted with an indicator for the post-recession period has little effect on our estimates, which remain similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Likewise, controlling for survey measures of racial attitudes has little additional effect on the estimated effect of either sectoral share. Finally, including these additional controls has a negligible effect on our estimates using the aggregate recession vulnerability index. Overall, the estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6 increase our confidence that our estimates are not driven by a flare-up of latent racial tensions after the 2008 elections.
We have shown that manufacturing layoffs influenced the voting patterns of whites and non-whites differently in the 2016 election. In this section, we explore four possible mechanisms that may be driving this result. First, we focus on a question related to the status of the
US: Is the US economy improving?40. Second, we explore a question on the status of the country more generally: Is the country on the “right track”? Third, we include a question concerning individual upward mobility: How much opportunity is there to get ahead? Fourth, we explore the pocketbook economic channel: Are you better off financially than you were a year ago?
Table 5 reports the results of the 2SLS regressions. Model 1 demonstrates that white respondents who live in districts hit by greater job losses are significantly more likely to believe the economy is worsening. In model 2, the coefficient of the interaction between White and Layoffs is negative and significant, indicating that white respondents in districts affected by layoffs are more likely than non-white respondents to believe the country is on the wrong track. In model 3, white respondents in harder-hit districts report fewer opportunities to get ahead than non-white respondents living in the same districts. In model 4, we find no evidence that high layoffs operate strictly as a pocketbook economic issue for white respondents. Rather, the results suggest that white respondents in hard-hit districts have grimmer assessments of the US economic trajectory and individual opportunity than non-whites in the same districts regardless of personal economic circumstances. In sum, these results indicate that whites experience deindustrialization differently than do voters of color, as our theory anticipates. Localized manufacturing job losses appear to invoke concerns among white voters about American economic decline and the current course of the country. Job losses also appear to lead whites to question the prospects of upward mobility at the individual level, for the “average” American. These results suggest that localized manufacturing decline heightens economic anxiety among whites in particular. In conjunction with the voting results indicating a strong preference for Trump among white voters in localities with higher manufacturing job losses, one possible interpretation of the survey analysis is that some whites perceive deindustrialization as a status threat.
[...]
With the important caveat that we are examining a small number of elections, some notable inferences emerge when we compare the county-level results. First, while the pooled county-level analysis indicates that manufacturing layoffs induce anti-incumbent voting regardless of which party is in power, the 2008 results in isolation do not reveal a statistically significant decline in Republican support. Second, the anti-incumbent effects on manufacturing layoffs are stronger and more robust when Democrats are the incumbents. A similar story emerges in the individual-level models reported in Table 7. In model 1, we show the results of the pooled analysis.50 The estimated interaction between White and Manufacturing Layoffs is negative and significant, indicating lower support for Democratic incumbents among whites where manufacturing layoffs are high. Note that we include county-election year fixed effects in this model, which account for time-varying characteristics at the county level. For this reason, we are unable to estimate Manufacturing Layoffs, whose coefficient gets absorbed by county-election year fixed effects. Models 2 and 3 are similar to the results at the county level. There is no evidence that manufacturing layoffs affect the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate in 2008 (when the incumbent is a Republican) among white respondents, whereas the interaction between Manufacturing Layoffs and White is negative and significant in 2012 (when the incumbent is a Democrat). That is to say that anti-incumbent effects are not generic, but rather appear to depend on the party in power. In particular, we do not find robust evidence that manufacturing job losses contribute to increases in anti-incumbent voting among whites when the incumbent is a Republican. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, manufacturing job losses appear to harm Democratic incumbents more than Republican ones. Finally, we note that the estimated effect of the interaction term is substantively smaller in 2012 than it is in 2016. We find that Trump’s reactionary campaign particularly appealed to white voters in deindustrializing localities.
Participants answered a series of demographic questions, and then were asked to answer questions about one of two charts describing trends in the population share of different racial/ethnic groups in the United States, ostensibly as part of a study of quantitative reasoning and social opinions. Both graphs presented information adapted from Census Bureau population projections. Introductory text noted that the last presidential election had sparked discussion of changes in the demographic make-up of the country, and so “it is important to know the results of cutting-edge research.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions meant to highlight different aspects of these trends. Participants in the “Majority Salient” condition were shown population data from 2000 to 2020, when white Americans’ population share is expected to remain about 60 percent of the population (figure 3a). In contrast, participants in the “Decline Salient” condition were shown projections from 1960 to 2060, when whites’ population share is expected to fall to about 40 percent. This longer time scale was intended to communicate a sharp, stable decline in white population share. We also included a line for the share of “total non-white” Americans intended to underscore the growth in the minority population (figure 3b). The graphs were accompanied by captions describing the trends in words (e.g., “The majority of Americans will be nonwhite in about 25 years”), reinforcing the experimental manipulation. Participants were then quizzed regarding the information; one of these questions assessed whether the experimental manipulation was effective. Next, participants’ welfare attitudes were measured in two ways. First, participants were told to imagine they were on a Congressional committee charged with cutting $500 million from the federal budget. They were given a list of nine spending areas including “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (Welfare)” and asked to indicate how much they would cut from each area. Second, participants indicated their agreement with two statements adapted from the General Social Survey: “We are spending too much money on welfare” (reverse-coded) and “Public assistance is necessary to ensure fairness in our society.” These items were averaged to create a composite scale of welfare attitudes (Cronbach’s α =
0.77), centered at zero, ranging from −3 to 3. Next, racial resentment was measured using a standard scale including the above items from the ANES and four additional items (Henry and Sears 2002). These items were averaged to form a composite (Cronbach’s α = 0.87), centered
at zero, ranging from −3 to 3.
We first tested the effect of the population trend information on participants’ welfare support and racial resentment (table 3). White participants assigned to the Decline Salient condition reported significantly greater opposition to welfare than those assigned to the Majority Salient condition. While white participants who were told that whites continue to be the largest single ethnic group in the United States proposed cutting $28 million from federal welfare spending, those told that whites’ population share is substantially declining proposed cutting $51 million. In addition, whites in the Decline Salient condition reported significantly greater opposition to welfare and higher levels of racial resentment on survey measures. By contrast, minority participants proposed cutting roughly the same amount of money from welfare across conditions and showed opposite trends from whites on survey measures. These trends were not statistically significant, though due to the small number of minority participants, we have low statistical power to detect significance. For our purposes it is most important to note that the trends we observed among minorities were qualitatively different from those we found among whites.
We first model whites’ program support (model 1 in table 4). These participants reported significantly less support for TANF than for unemployment insurance net of condition. We found no significant main effects of exposure to the Gap Closing condition or the racial composition of program beneficiaries. There was, however, a significant, negative interaction between assignment to the Gap Closing condition and the race of beneficiaries (p = 0.04), such that whites showed uniquely low support for programs that benefited minorities if
they had been told that the white income advantage is closing. When evaluating programs they believed primarily benefited whites, white
participants who were told the racial income gap was shrinking did not differ much in their program support from white participants who were told the income gap was widening. However, when the program primarily benefited African Americans and Latinos, whites in the Gap Closing condition reported less support than in the Gap Expanding condition (figure 6a). This pattern suggests that the significant interaction found in model 1 is driven by decreased support for a welfare program benefiting minorities, not increased support for a program benefiting whites. In addition, we found no significant effect of the Gap Closing condition on white participants’ racial identification (p > 0.58), and racial identification did not moderate the interaction between the Gap Closing condition and race of program beneficiaries (p > 0.95).
In this study, we provide evidence supporting the final link in our logic: that racial threats lead to anti-welfare sentiment among whites because they perceive such programs to mostly benefit minorities. Where a welfare program was portrayed as primarily benefiting whites, threatened white participants reported almost identical support for welfare as unthreatened white participants. These findings provide discerning support for our claim that whites’ opposition to welfare following racial threat is due to increased racial resentment
Thirty-one percent of young Americans, but 37% of young Biden voters and 32% of young Trump voters say that politics has gotten in the way of a friendship before. Gender is not a strong predictor of whether or not politics has invaded personal space, but race and ethnicity are. Young whites (33%) are more likely than young Blacks (22%) to say that politics has gotten in the way--and nearly half of white Biden voters (45%) say politics has negatively impacted a friendship; 30% of white Trump voters say the same.
When young Americans were asked whether a difference of opinion on several political issues might impact a friendship, 44% of all young Americans said that they could not be friends with someone who disagreed with them on race relations. Sixty percent of Biden voters agreed with this sentiment, as did a majority of women (52%) and Blacks (57%). Americans between 18 and 24 (47%) were more likely than those slightly older (41% of those 25-29) to feel that race relations would cause a problem with friendships. Differences of opinion on whether or not to support Trump was an issue for slightly more than a third (34%), followed by immigration (30%), police reform (27%), abortion (26%), climate change (26%), and guns (19%).
For one thing, I hope my version clarifies that most of the questions that went into the “social/identity” dimension were actually about Black Americans, Muslims, and immigration. Only three of the twelve questions in the “Social Dimension” are really about “social issues” as I would usually use the phrase (issues like gay marriage, abortion, and transgender acceptance). Indeed the article itself defines a “populist” as “liberal on economic issues, conservative on race issues”. I had also wondered how much all of these results were driven by the questions about whether Medicare and Social Security were “important to you”. These were by far the most heavily-”progressive” questions out of the 24, so they will naturally push respondents into the “economically progressive” quadrants.
What happens if you zero out those questions? Suddenly Trump voters become a bit less “split by economic issues”:
We collected verbatim transcripts from the leading primetime shows on Fox News and MSNBC (in the 6:00–10:59 pm timeslots), between January to May 8, 2020. The sample included a total of 1088 transcripts from the two channels (n Fox = 558; n MSNBC = 530). These were provided via the LexisNexis database, and were initially gathered via an empty keyword search for these two channels over the timeframe specified above. The transcripts were then loaded into a text analysis software, where they were systematically ordered.
We them employed a quantitative content analytic approach, by which we constructed a dictionary of terms and phrases indicative of strong antipathy, such as “dislike,” “despise,” “can’t stand” or “hate.” As both channels are often perceived and depicted as highly partisan, we expected some degree of similarity along these basic measures of antipathy and negative sentiment. Our results painted a different picture: usage of these terms was 5 times higher on Fox News than on MSNBC. One term in particular stood out: “hate,” of which we found a total of 647 mentions on Fox, compared to MSNBC’s 118.
Further analysis revealed that “hate” was most frequently used in conjunction with “(Donald)
Trump” (n = 99) and in combination with the pronouns “I” (n = 128) and “they” (n = 101). This latter combination was also were the starkest difference between the two channels emerged: only 5 instances of this phrase were found in the MSNBC data, compared to Fox News’ 101 (=1:20).
Fox links most of these subjects (“they”) together. Terms such as media, the left, Democrats and political elites are often used interchangeably, portraying these actors as unified in hatred of Fox audiences, their views and their representatives
by Repubblica Fascista Sociale Italiana » Fri Apr 30, 2021 4:47 am
New haven america wrote:I don't think I've ever really heard a good argument against cities.
Usually all it boils down to it "Liberals!", "Drugs!", and "I want grass!"
Meanwhile, left-wing politics exists in rural areas (I should know, I live in one of those areas. 80% of the voters in the county went with Biden), drugs and addiction are actually a bigger issue in rural areas because they're less capable of getting help for their issues, and oh yeah, yards exist in cities, especially out West.
by San Lumen » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:19 am
Washington Resistance Army wrote:New haven america wrote:I don't think I've ever really heard a good argument against cities.
Usually all it boils down to it "Liberals!", "Drugs!", and "I want grass!"
Meanwhile, left-wing politics exists in rural areas (I should know, I live in one of those areas. 80% of the voters in the county went with Biden), drugs and addiction are actually a bigger issue in rural areas because they're less capable of getting help for their issues, and oh yeah, yards exist in cities, especially out West.
Cities are pretty strongly linked to higher rates of mental health problems (particularly depression), cost of living is drastically higher, there's usually more violent crime, they're dirtier both environmentally and physically etc etc. There are very real and very valid complaints about city living, even if a lot of it does get simplified down.
by Lady Victory » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:28 am
by The Alma Mater » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:29 am
Washington Resistance Army wrote:New haven america wrote:I don't think I've ever really heard a good argument against cities.
Usually all it boils down to it "Liberals!", "Drugs!", and "I want grass!"
Meanwhile, left-wing politics exists in rural areas (I should know, I live in one of those areas. 80% of the voters in the county went with Biden), drugs and addiction are actually a bigger issue in rural areas because they're less capable of getting help for their issues, and oh yeah, yards exist in cities, especially out West.
Cities are pretty strongly linked to higher rates of mental health problems (particularly depression), cost of living is drastically higher, there's usually more violent crime, they're dirtier both environmentally and physically etc etc. There are very real and very valid complaints about city living, even if a lot of it does get simplified down.
by Lady Victory » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:30 am
by The Alma Mater » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:31 am
by Lady Victory » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:34 am
by Borderlands of Rojava » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:43 am
Kowani wrote:SNIP
by Lady Victory » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:46 am
by Borderlands of Rojava » Fri Apr 30, 2021 5:49 am
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