Making the Secretary-General Meaningful

[Goobergunchia]

If this were implemented I would like to see Sec'y-General not be subject to Rule 3(a). It should absolutely be legal to Condemn a Sec'y-General for abusing their veto power, since that's a political action.

[Drew Durrnil]

If this were implemented I would like to see Sec'y-General not be subject to Rule 3(a). It should absolutely be legal to Condemn a Sec'y-General for abusing their veto power, since that's a political action.

Agreement on this.

[Sedgistan]

If this were implemented I would like to see Sec'y-General not be subject to Rule 3(a). It should absolutely be legal to Condemn a Sec'y-General for abusing their veto power, since that's a political action.

The S-G position isn't "site staff" so Rule 3a would not apply to it.

If someone wants to test that, they could Condemn Kuriko or Caelapes for doing nothing in their roles as S-G.

[Wallenburg]

I'm going to drop the GA side of things, so the brands and pitchforks can be put away. For clarity's sake, that means the veto would only be usable in the SC. I'd still like input from the GA crowd, as there are aspects of this that remain relevant to you, e.g. the TG spam issue, and the naming confusion.

I do believe this would have been positive for the General Assembly, but I can recognise when I'm in a small minority.

It concerns me that Sedge has not dropped the subject of a GA-relevant Secretary-General out of concern for the wellbeing of the community but out of a desire not to be yelled at by people who are afraid of what he proposes. It leaves open the dangerously real possibility that he or some admin not publicly associated with this project will turn around and backstab this community by applying a Secretary-General to the GA anyway. Such behavior, given the historic unimportance of the WA community's will in these decisions, would not be out of place nor entirely surprising (shocking might be a better term), just dishonest and immature in the sense that site staff would have gone behind the backs of those they presumably are trying to help.

However, if we operate under the assumption that this will not apply to the GA, then I can provide my input in a manner simply displeased rather than borderline panicked.

This proposed change should not be implemented at all. The SC in its current state is plenty ridiculous without warping its funhouse mirrors any further. I get that the GP community generally loves drama, and this will produce plenty of that, but there are those of us who still care about the SC and would rather try to reduce the toxicity and hysterics of that chamber than amplify them. It's bad enough that site staff brought back this event for 2020, let alone threaten to continue it indefinitely. Not to mention the fundamentally undemocratic nature of this proposal. This doesn't really involve people in the WA. It involves them in an event, and rewards a sufficiently popular GP figure with special WA powers. There may be a small group of people who actually enjoy the event itself (as shown in the 2016 and 2020 April fools' day events), but I really doubt that veto power would do anything but upset folks beyond the extent to which SC politicking already does.

Now, since I am under no illusion that you actually care about these things to an extent that I can convince you to stop trying to get this idea off the ground, I'll give you my thoughts on how to make this plan as painless as possible for the WA.

1. Introduce a separate campaign category. The system by which Secretary-General campaigns run must be entirely divorced from what currently exists for the WA. Constant elections will generate fatigue among WA members, and will lead to thousands of members blocking those telegrams. That is incredibly unhealthy for WA campaigns. The only solution then is to introduce a new category of TG campaign specifically for this event. The election barrage will still fatigue a great deal of people, but the WA will only feel that as a secondary effect of people not enjoying NS as much as they otherwise would have.
   
   
2. Increase the term length. Six months is far too short a term for the Secretary-General. If you live in the US, you are probably quite familiar with the concept of a permanent election cycle. That's what such a short term length will create here. GP will hardly have time to cool down from the last election before it gets prepared for the next. Furthermore, you run into the quite likely reality that in the span of 6 months, the Secretary-General never encounters anything with which they can apply their power in a manner they believe good (or at least advantageous to their interests). At the least, the term should be one year long. That allows for the SC to think about things other than Sec-Gen, and it allows the officeholder to use their power at opportune moments.
   
   
3. The name "Secretary-General" is problematic. First and most importantly, the only legitimate Secretary-General is Catherine Gratwick. Second, people will confuse the office with GenSec, and will therefore associate the former with the authority of the latter. Such confusion is not healthy for any community. "President" seems fitting, or perhaps something else which accurately captures the role of the office as something distinct from the membership of the SC.
   
   
4. Get rid of the veto. The veto power is a gimmick which sounds fun but will only cause frustration. I think you've seen enough of that expressed when it came to the GA. For the SC, the same remains true, except to a slightly lesser extent due to the total domination of GP over the SC community. As C&Cs can rather easily be repealed or reattempted at any time, the most obvious use for a veto is in the case of time-sensitive liberations. It should be no surprise that the first time this power were used against a liberation, the entire defender community would lose their fucking minds. I have heard some in GP express amusement at this prospect, but I simply have no stomach for the unmatched levels of toxicity to be expected in such circumstances. Multiple times you have dismissed concerns about the veto power as insubstantial, claiming that the veto power is "pointless". If you actually believed that, you wouldn't be trying to add it to the game. No, you know it's not pointless. This sort of addition is purely destructive and has no place in a part of the game which needs to be made less toxic, not more.
   
   
5. Introduce Sec-Gen powers that are constructive. If you want a power for the Secretary-General to wield, several people have already suggested one that, while it has its own dangers, actually sounds interesting: reordering the queue. I don't know whether it's possible for this to be done without a major change to how the queue works, but the power for Sec-Gen to flag a proposal to go to vote first sounds like one with some good potential.
   
   
6. Get rid of the Vice Secretary-General. The Sec-Gen is not likely to CTE, and if it does another one will be installed in fewer than 5 months (11 if you extend it to a minimally acceptable length). The SC has spent 12 years without a Secretary-General, I think it can survive a few months without one. Best to have the event and leave it at that, and if the Sec-Gen CTE's then the interregnum simply becomes another interesting bit of history.
   
   
7. Consider recall measures. I am interested in the ideas brought forward to "impeach" the Secretary-General. This would require either a new proposal category or something entirely different from what the WA currently has. This system would also have to deal with the asymmetric nature of recalling the Secretary-General: it can fail as many times as it likes, and only needs to succeed once. I don't think special elections would be appropriate, as that would further fatigue WA members. Perhaps a higher voting requirement for a successful recall would work (2/3 majority, for instance).

[Mancheseva City]

I have an alternative suggestion. Rather than giving the SG veto power, why not just assign them endorsements? Let's assume that the number that would equal a veto would be 10,000 endorsements. Now, instead of letting someone use them at once, we divide the 10,000 endos into 10 bundles of 1,000, or 20 bundles of 500, etc. I don't know the perfect number yet, but what I do know is that a veto would only be somehow fair/make sense if a proposal's vote count is really close, within at least 1000 endos.

Now, I don't know if it's possible to implement technically, but I think this is a good compromise if it is indeed possible

[Miravana]

I'm going to put in my two cents now that all the GA drama has died down so I can comment purely from an SC and GP standpoint. Renaming Sec-Gen to Security Council President (or SC President) is definitely worthwhile. The name was being mixed up with Secretariat and a term such as President is easily grasped by even the newest players. The term length however does seem too short. I would suggest either a year or 2 years per term as this will give time for the President to actually settle into their position before having to campaign for re-election. As far as powers I think the most important power they can possess is the reworking of the queue. This could be used in a multitude of ways and would create interesting new Gameplay mechanics. A veto sounds cool and all, but I would put it at second priority to the reorder. Considering the longer-term I think it would be best to give the President 1 veto per 6 months if implemented. I am pretty undecided on the topics of needing a VP, and if a veto is too destructive. All in all, I believe an SC President would present a lot of new avenues for gameplay, something the community desperately craves.

[Goobergunchia]

I also agree with the suggestion that the Secretary-General (or Security Council President), instead of having a veto, have the power to re-order the queue -- or as I'd call it, the agenda power. There are a few big problems with the veto:

• If used early in the term, it makes the S-G a lame duck. Obviously this would be part of the political considerations involved with issuing the veto but I see very little virtue in having a completely powerless office extant for a long period of time and I suspect many holders would feel similarly. It shouldn't be easier to pass a resolution in certain months of the year. The calculus changes if the S-G's veto locks out the resolution for the remainder of their term, but this causes its own issues -- blocking a Liberation for five months risks a game over situation (which is why we added Liberations to begin with), and the idea in general prevents the S-G from vetoing based on writing quality.
• It wastes the SC's time. Having a proposal sit through however long in queue, four days at vote, and then get vetoed seems like it would be profoundly frustrating for the author and proponents of the resolution, and there's nothing they can do about it until the next election. It would also be frustrating to have a proposal sitting in queue behind a resolution with a known veto threat knowing that there's just going to be an extra four-day wait for no reason. If we did implement the veto, I'd prefer it to be applied before the vote. This would also allow the veto to be applied to deny a targeted nation/region the publicity of a SC vote about them.
• It's hard enough to use effectively that I think it might almost never get used at all -- the veto may be more powerful unused than used. Which is fine in and of itself, but I think it would mean that increased activity around the S-G would be mostly limited to the election itself.

With a veto, the only political solution to a bad S-G decision is to wait for the next election, and that could be months away. I'd prefer a change that allows more rapid counteractions. By contrast, the agenda power would:

• Give the S-G the ability to indefinitely delay a proposal but only so long as there is at least one other proposal in the queue. This means that if others wanted the proposal the S-G was holding back to reach vote, they have options -- they can try to convince people not to submit proposals until the one they want reaches vote, or countercampaign endorsements on the proposals in front of it.
• Require the S-G to be continuously responsive to requests for agendization. If there's a Liberation that people feel is urgent, people can petition the S-G to bump it to the front. Alternatively, if the S-G opposes the Liberation that people think is urgent, they can try to bury it behind other proposals.
• Incentivize the S-G and their supporters to have a more active Security Council, as their power increases with the number of quorate proposals. (A good S-G could use the agenda power to promote variety in the queue by trying to filter in, say, RP C&Cs so it's not a continuous stream of GP resolutions.)

I really do think the continuous aspect of the S-G's power is important here, because Gameplay thrives on activity. Adding a new political element that is always present gives players more to do and respond to. I'd also be much more supportive of a longer term if the S-G had continuous powers rather than one use-it-or-lose-it moment.

[Sedgistan]

The primary issue I'm having with re-ordering the proposal queue is visibility. Who looks at it? Dedicated WA players, and some Delegates - that's it. An S-G fiddling around with the queue is meaningless to most WA members, and barely noticeable. A veto is big, obnoxious and obvious. It'd be there on the WA page that the S-G overrode the democratic wishes of WA member to block a proposal. That's something that regular players will see, and will care about.

There are also all sorts of details around how "reordering the queue" works that are being glossed over, and would have a significant impact on how it operated.

[Wallenburg]

The primary issue I'm having with re-ordering the proposal queue is visibility. Who looks at it? Dedicated WA players, and some Delegates - that's it. An S-G fiddling around with the queue is meaningless to most WA members, and barely noticeable. A veto is big, obnoxious and obvious. It'd be there on the WA page that the S-G overrode the democratic wishes of WA member to block a proposal. That's something that regular players will see, and will care about.

"Obnoxious" is not the sort of change we should be intentionally going for. What's more, the sort of low-activity WA members you are talking about aren't going to do anything about a veto, mostly because they know they can't. A veto doesn't engage them, it just frustrates them enough to go "see, this is why I don't get involved". Prioritizing a proposal for going to Vote, however, is both something that plenty of people seem interested in and something that doesn't inherently require pissing people off.

There are also all sorts of details around how "reordering the queue" works that are being glossed over, and would have a significant impact on how it operated.

Well, that's an inevitable consequence of the public being asked to provide input without having any knowledge of how the game works on the back end.

[Flanderlion]

My musts are having a regular (whether annually or twice a year) event/election for a position that can do something. Ideally it'd reorder the queue as it's a constructive power that can be used destructively. But I don't mind whether veto happens/is unlimited. Just throwing an idea out there re veto, not for or against:

What if veto was unlimited or monthly but just meant 60/66/70% required to pass the resolution?

[Wymondham]

My musts are having a regular (whether annually or twice a year) event/election for a position that can do something. Ideally it'd reorder the queue as it's a constructive power that can be used destructively. But I don't mind whether veto happens/is unlimited. Just throwing an idea out there re veto, not for or against:

What if veto was unlimited or monthly but just meant 60/66/70% required to pass the resolution?

I think this would be a good idea. A monthly veto that would require a supermajority to override.

[Crowheim]

Full support for what Goober said.

As for the “obnoxious, obvious” point that Serge made, re-ordering the queue could end up being just a less-flashy veto if implemented in a certain way. I’m not sure I understand the concern here.

[Comfed]

The primary issue I'm having with re-ordering the proposal queue is visibility. Who looks at it? Dedicated WA players, and some Delegates - that's it. An S-G fiddling around with the queue is meaningless to most WA members, and barely noticeable. A veto is big, obnoxious and obvious. It'd be there on the WA page that the S-G overrode the democratic wishes of WA member to block a proposal. That's something that regular players will see, and will care about.

There are also all sorts of details around how "reordering the queue" works that are being glossed over, and would have a significant impact on how it operated.

Eh... I'd really prefer reordering the queue. That's actually constructive as it can be used to actually put good proposals ahead of bad proposals, or safeguard proposals from quorum raids. A veto would produce one dramatic event every six months that people would quickly forget about and move on.

[Goobergunchia]

The primary issue I'm having with re-ordering the proposal queue is visibility. Who looks at it? Dedicated WA players, and some Delegates - that's it. An S-G fiddling around with the queue is meaningless to most WA members, and barely noticeable. A veto is big, obnoxious and obvious. It'd be there on the WA page that the S-G overrode the democratic wishes of WA member to block a proposal. That's something that regular players will see, and will care about.

I mean, if we wanted to be super visible -- and this would take more coding -- we could make the Security Council page header read something like this:

Security Council
Spreading interregional peace and goodwill, via force if necessary

The Security Council recognizes and responds to individual nations and regions, with the aim of ensuring global harmony.

The agenda for the Security Council is controlled by the Secretary-General, @@NATION@@.

"Agenda" would link to a new page that would list all quorate proposals (and link to the full text), something like this:

Security Council Agenda

AT VOTE: Condemn Minineenee

1. Commend Pope Hope
Question to be put in 2 days 5 hours.

2. Liberate Democratic Underground
Question to be put in 6 days 5 hours.

3. Condemn Francos Spain
Question to be put in 10 days 5 hours.

If we really wanted to be obvious we could even put the agenda on the main SC page, somewhere around "Proposals".

[Reploid Productions]

Another alternative I threw at Sedge in the lair to the veto idea is that the S-G gets a sort of soft veto/pass tool. Maybe monthly they can cast a super-vote for/against that is equal to basically a WA delegate of a supermassive region in terms of vote weight. I pitched it at roughly 50% of the total WA membership though the numbers would likely need fine-tuning; basically enough to make it take a supermajority of delegates/regular voters to override it, but giving more versatility than a pure veto since it could be used to try and discourage OR ram through a proposal. Plus that prevents a complete dead-end scenario since the S-G's influence in the vote could be overcome. And being more than a one-off nuke would give elections fodder since campaigns could levy that information: "So-and-so tried to push through $unpopular_proposal! So-and-so tried to block $popular_one" and such, since that would give voters more data points to consider during elections, and also make that a consideration for candidates interested in trying for another term.

Another potential soft power tool for the S-G might be a free WA-wide or delegate-wide telegram per resolution vote to "address the assembly" with their thoughts on the proposal being voted on.

Some other things to consider:

• We would definitely need to make a S-G campaign TG category so that folks could block S-G election stuff if they wanted without also taking out their ability to get regular proposal campaign messages.
• The first two S-G elections were April Fools jokes, with the usual accompanying laxness and levity regarding spam rules. If this were to become an actual part of the game, the level of nonsense seen in the two joke elections would NOT be permitted.
• We would probably need to include some kind of term limits to prevent it from stagnating or for one super-popular player becoming S-G for life. Like maybe 2 terms and then they can't run again until at least 2 more terms have elapsed. Enforcement could be tricky there since somebody would no doubt try to get around it by switching to a new WA nation though.
• Similarly, some manner of Impeach or Recall proposal type to remove a really unpopular S-G from office early would need to be added. (And the above suggested super-vote tool could not be used on those!)

[Nakena]

Making the SG more meaningful is something i support, because the elections are very much fun and I throughly enjoyed them last year.

[Sandaoguo]

While all this discussion is pretty interesting, I just want to make sure everybody has a realistic expectation of what the practical outcome of this would be. GA authors shouldn’t fear this idea because they won’t ever be targeted by it. This is a position that would rotate between Gameplayers in GCRs and other very large GP regions. Over the last several years, we’ve been purposefully building up endorsement programs and formidable voting activation networks. We’ve also been solidifying WA cooperative alliances, so that we can engage in multilateral strategies. We would 100% take this position over every time. Raiders would want it to block liberations. Defenders would want it to block raiders from having it. That’s all.

[Quebecshire]

TLDR: I like it.

But,

I have a couple of concerns and conflictions,

On the one hand, six months seems really frequent for something like this, on the other, with only one veto, I guess it seems reasonable.

My next thing would be resubmissions. At least in the case of the SC, if something is vetoed, it should be unable to be re-proposed until the next term, in my opinion.

If the Veto is OP an alternative to make SecGen meaningful could be to show voters how SecGen voted the same way it shows how your regional delegate has voted.

I feel like this should happen regardless, and there should be a differentiation between the SecGen voting no and the SecGen deciding to exercise their veto.

[Eshialand]

TLDR: I like it.

But,

I have a couple of concerns and conflictions,

On the one hand, six months seems really frequent for something like this, on the other, with only one veto, I guess it seems reasonable.

My next thing would be resubmissions. At least in the case of the SC, if something is vetoed, it should be unable to be re-proposed until the next term, in my opinion.

If the Veto is OP an alternative to make SecGen meaningful could be to show voters how SecGen voted the same way it shows how your regional delegate has voted.

I feel like this should happen regardless, and there should be a differentiation between the SecGen voting no and the SecGen deciding to exercise their veto.

In cases of urgent liberations (cough The Embassy cough), that would be devastating, and it isn't all that implausible if a raider gets elected Sec-Gen. What if it could be resubmitted, as long as it acknowledged that there was a previous veto and maybe was rewritten?

Also, in the RL USA, the Senate can override a presidential veto with a supermajority... maybe some kind of supermajority mechanism could be implemented as well/instead?

[Quebecshire]

In cases of urgent liberations (cough The Embassy cough), that would be devastating, and it isn't all that implausible if a raider gets elected Sec-Gen. What if it could be resubmitted, as long as it acknowledged that there was a previous veto and maybe was rewritten?

I suppose that seems reasonable. I'll concede that.

Also, in the RL USA, the Senate can override a presidential veto with a supermajority... maybe some kind of supermajority mechanism could be implemented as well/instead?

Hard disagree. The SC is (rightfully so) dominated by regional interests, therefore votes are not close like a one vote per Senator or representative type deal. Many votes are usually one-sided due to the influence of major delegates. If the SecGen is decided in a popular 1 WA member = 1 vote election then allowing an override of the veto would allow major delegates to completely nullify the one powerful factor of the position.

[Goobergunchia]

Another alternative I threw at Sedge in the lair to the veto idea is that the S-G gets a sort of soft veto/pass tool. Maybe monthly they can cast a super-vote for/against that is equal to basically a WA delegate of a supermassive region in terms of vote weight. I pitched it at roughly 50% of the total WA membership though the numbers would likely need fine-tuning; basically enough to make it take a supermajority of delegates/regular voters to override it, but giving more versatility than a pure veto since it could be used to try and discourage OR ram through a proposal. Plus that prevents a complete dead-end scenario since the S-G's influence in the vote could be overcome. And being more than a one-off nuke would give elections fodder since campaigns could levy that information: "So-and-so tried to push through $unpopular_proposal! So-and-so tried to block $popular_one" and such, since that would give voters more data points to consider during elections, and also make that a consideration for candidates interested in trying for another term.

Another angle on this could be the ability to deploy a soft veto/pass on proposals. Maybe halve/double the number of approvals needed for a given proposal to reach the floor.

[Imperium Anglorum]

Another potential soft power tool for the S-G might be a free WA-wide or delegate-wide telegram per resolution vote to "address the assembly" with their thoughts on the proposal being voted on.

I feel as though this might be a bit too spammy. It also gives a free campaigning for incumbents who want to up their profile in the run-up to an election.

We would definitely need to make a S-G campaign TG category so that folks could block S-G election stuff if they wanted without also taking out their ability to get regular proposal campaign messages.

Big support.

[The Free Joy State]

Another alternative I threw at Sedge in the lair to the veto idea is that the S-G gets a sort of soft veto/pass tool. Maybe monthly they can cast a super-vote for/against that is equal to basically a WA delegate of a supermassive region in terms of vote weight. I pitched it at roughly 50% of the total WA membership though the numbers would likely need fine-tuning; basically enough to make it take a supermajority of delegates/regular voters to override it, but giving more versatility than a pure veto since it could be used to try and discourage OR ram through a proposal.

I would rather the Secretary General/Security Council President have a soft veto that could be overriden by sufficient delegate and voter power than a hard veto.

But I think that vetoes, even if soft, should be a limited part of the SG/SCP's kitbag, and the appointee should still have to wrestle with the risk of using them up too soon and being a lame duck or trying to not use them at all and trading only on persuasion. I feel more use should made of the soft power mentioned in your post: politicking, persuading.

Some other things to consider:

• We would definitely need to make a S-G campaign TG category so that folks could block S-G election stuff if they wanted without also taking out their ability to get regular proposal campaign messages.

I think this will be a feature a lot of people will like.

We would probably need to include some kind of term limits to prevent it from stagnating or for one super-popular player becoming S-G for life. Like maybe 2 terms and then they can't run again until at least 2 more terms have elapsed. Enforcement could be tricky there since somebody would no doubt try to get around it by switching to a new WA nation though.

I agree that a term limit would be needed to prevent one player remaining in office until they retire, and support a two term limit for a six month term. But I would suggest a longer period between terms allowed, just to reduce the risk of two popular players "passing" the role between them in alternate years. As for enforcement, I'd guess some kind of system to prevent cheating would have to be in place (but Mods would know more about that than me).

Similarly, some manner of Impeach or Recall proposal type to remove a really unpopular S-G from office early would need to be added. (And the above suggested super-vote tool could not be used on those!)

I think the idea of impeachment could be a useful last resort tool. I think about 2/3 to 70% of voters' votes should be required (and that the appointee ought not be allowed to vote -- either with their super vote or a regular vote), to increase the chance of said motion only passing when the Secretary General/Security Council President's position has truly become untenable and to hopefully prevent impeachment or recall attempts becoming a recent feature of the game.

[Tinhampton]

...A veto is big, obnoxious and obvious. It'd be there on the WA page that the S-G overrode the democratic wishes of WA member to block a proposal. That's something that regular players will see, and will care about.

So something like Figure 1a, then?

(I was going to suggest that a veto would mean a proposal getting immediately removed from the voting floor, a la Gun Control Act by Far Rivia Hilolak, but then immediately returned to the proposal queue where a higher benchmark for approval such as maybe 10% would be needed to override the veto and return the proposal to vote - as in Figures 2 and 3. The idea behind this would perhaps be to demonstrate whether any given vetoed resolution was actually disliked enough by Delegates and others to deserve the veto... however, I understand Sedge's concerns about few people noticing the queue.)

Regardless of how the veto is implemented, there are some questions about its deployment in general I have: When in the voting stage can/should a veto be applied? Can proposals receive a veto when they are being defeated - and if a vetoed proposal is defeated by the voters anyway, does the SecGen have their veto "refunded?" Can the SecGen remove their veto from a resolution at vote?

---

And on that note, since some people think that the Vice S-G will be effectively useless, what if they get the SecGen post itself if their running mate is removed from office? I would argue that recalls or impeachments or whatever they're being called be put in the hands of delegates alone (definitely not a biased delegate here ), where a minimum quota of delegate approvals/signatures would have to be reached for removal to be automatic (I was thinking maybe 12% but sending out two campaign telegrams with differing content might make that milestone easily passable, so perhaps 14% or something like that) - meaning that they would not be put up to vote, thus leaving the SC's time for more normal resolution types.

(and conversely "Quorum Reached: Secretary-General to be Removed from Office")

[Merni]

I support giving the SG the ability to re-order the queue -- initially I thought it would allow them to indefinitely delay a Liberation, but actually it would only be possible if there was a continuous supply of proposals which have gained a quorum of approvals. All the same, it should also be limited somehow. Either with a limit on the number of times it can be used, or maybe a proposal would jump back to the top of queue if it had (say) twice as many approvals as the next.

As for impeachment/removal -- I don't agree with putting it in the hands of delegates alone like Tinhampton proposes. Making a removal just like a a regular SC proposal, needing delegate approvals then a vote, would be a fair way to do it. Although, should removal proposals be subject to re-ordering of the queue? That could cause some drama.