Find, Fix, Finish: A Special Operations RP (OOC, Interest)

[Organized States]

"If I told you we weren't going home until we win, what would you do differently?" - General Stanley McChrystal
"Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might." - The Ranger Creed
IC
Thread Soundtrack, as assembled by AD Pipehitters

Welcome to Qiyadar. The Year is 2020.

Until three months ago, the Republic of Qiyadar was ruled with an iron-fist by the governing council of the Qiyadari Socialist Party, a secular, but totalitarian regime propped up economically by a strong relationship with Russia and apathetic Asian corporations. Nearly split fifty-fifty between Shiite and Sunni Islamic communities, the Qiyadari Socialist Party struggled to keep this country, a colonial creation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in line through an extreme blend of nationalistic fervor and fear. However, despite the best efforts of the Party, the technological changes of the 21st century proved to be too much. The country descended into revolution late last year following the death of a journalist, whose brutal detention and torture was caught on video, leaked to Twitter, and quickly went viral. Before the Party could use a long rumored nuclear weapons program to put down the rapidly growing rebellion, US-led Coalition forces seized the capital Gerrha in less than five days in a highly successful and nearly bloodless invasion.

Met initially by cheering crowds in the capital city of Gerrha, the mood has considerably worsened in Gerrha in the past few months as the new UN and Coalition-backed provisional government has struggled to restore the most basic services to this city of nearly eight million people. Trash collection, electricity, and water services have all but stopped in the city’s poorest Sunni neighborhoods. False allegations of the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a Sunni family from their home by a reported group of Coalition troops and a Shiite gang has quickly spread amongst the Sunni population through social media, resulting in almost daily protests in the city’s predominantly Shiite neighborhoods and outside of the Coalition’s headquarters in Downtown Gerrha alongside of a rapidly escalating orgy of sectarian violence, topping off with last month’s deadly bombing of the world famous “Blue Mosque of Gerrha”, a site important to the Qiyadari Shiite community, by the Islamic State in Qiyadar.

Our mission, quite simply, is to FIND, FIX, and FINISH the enemy. In this RP, players will take charge of an elite team of Special Operations troops, corrupt local Qiyadari partner forces, or shady Intelligence operatives and analysts and work together to hunt down terrorists.

Factions Available to Players
Special Operations Task Force - Combined Joint Task Force Operation Nimble Guardian
Leader: Rear Admiral Eric J. James, USN
Headquarters: Camp Monsoor, Gerrha International Airport
Allies: CJTFONG, PRGA, UNAQ, Reformed Qiyadari Armed Forces, Indigenious Partner Forces
Enemies: Unnamed Sunni Islamists, Hezbollah, Quds Force, VEVAK, Al-Qaeda Qiyadari
Description: Rear Admiral Eric J. James’s SOTF is a web of intelligence agents, Special Operations troops, and support personnel from almost every part of USSOCOM and the USIC, in addition to troops, intelligence officers and assets from the UK, New Zealand, Poland, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Jordan. Tasked initially with conducting a series of high-profile raids and special reconnaissance missions to topple the Qiyadari Regime, the SOTF has quickly moved into the counter-insurgency and foreign internal defense mission, the bread and butter of these Afghanistan- and Iraq-hardened operators.

Provisional Governmental Authority (PRGA) for Qiyadar
Leader: Dr. Kadeem Hafeez (publically)/Brigadier General Al-Afri, Qiyadari Minister for the Interior (unofficially)/Ambassador Jim Steinman, US Department of State (unofficially)
Headquarters: The Radisson Hotel in Downtown Gerrha
Allies: CJTFONG, UNAQ, Reformed Qiyadari Armed Forces (ostensibly), VEVAK (alleged), Quds Force (alleged)
Enemies: Quds Force (it’s complicated), VEVAK (it’s complicated), Hezbollah, Sunni militants, Al-Qaeda, Reformed Qiyadari Armed Forces (also complicated)
Description: Led tenuously by Dr. Kadeem Hafeez, the former President of the University of Gerrha and the former regime’s most prominent critic, the PRGA is a lose and fragile collection of former opposition parties, Shiite community leaders, former Socialist Party apparatchiks, and bureaucrats forced into an uneasy alliance by Coalition leaders eager to not repeat the mistakes made in Iraq almost two decades ago. By keeping former Party members and officials involved in Government, however, the PRGA rendered itself almost entirely ineffective due to the largely foreseeable infighting between former dissidents and bureaucrats. As a result of this infighting, large amounts of power have coalesced around Brigadier General Al-Afri, a former Interior Ministry Officer and National Police Colonel (believed to have ties both to VEVAK and the CIA), who was appointed Interior Minister at the urging of Ambassador Steinman. It has thus far only been able to keep the lights and the water running in Gerrha’s coastal (and wealthy) Shiite neighborhoods and is accused by the Sunni population of being stooges for Iran, the CIA, or both.

The Reformed Qiyadar Armed Forces
Leader: Lieutenant General Salah al-Din Khalil, Chief of the General Staff, Qiyadari Army
Headquarters: Gerrha International Airport
Allies: Quds Force (alleged), VEVAK (alleged), CJTFONG (sorta), SOTF-CJTFONG (sorta), PRGA (sorta)
Enemies: Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Sunni Militants
Description:

The Reformed Qiyadari Armed Forces are the product of the Colonels’ Coup that ousted the Socialist Party from power in the final hours of the five day Coalition campaign against Qiyadar. Recognizing the futility of continued resistance to the Coalition, Lieutenant General Salah al-Din Khalil, then a Colonel and the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, declared himself Chief of the General Staff, promoted himself to Lieutenant General, and ordered thousands of battered and retreating Qiyadari troops to surrender to Coalition forces. These troops, who have largely been paroled by the PRGA and the Coalition after their capture, have been quickly reorganized by the Coalition into four brigades of infantry, a Special Forces battalion, and an armor brigade supported by three dozen helicopters, in the hopes of supplementing the PRGA’s stabilization efforts. Despite their reported allegiance to the PRGA, there are growing concerns that Dr. Hafeez’s government lacks any form of real control over the Armed Forces and worries that the ranks may be infiltrated with militants are quickly spreading amongst Coalition commanders.

OPFOR (Not Open at This Time)

Al-Qaeda “The Jamia Cell”
Leader: Francois Durand
Headquarters: Somewhere in Gerrha
Allies: None
Enemies: Everyone else.

A “Jihadi Dream Team” similar to the Khorasan Group formed in the wake of the group’s collapse in Syria and Iraq under constant pressure from Coalition forces. Unusual in its leadership and small in size, the Jamia Group is headed by the French-born Francois Durand, a former French Army EOD technician who converted to Islam and was radicalized in prison while serving a jail sentence for a deadly DUI incident. Recognizing Durand’s specific talents and background, Al-Qaeda’s leaders set him to work on developing a new series of IEDs and suicide vests that could defeat both security measures in European and American airports as well as attempts to disarm them. Significant amounts of signals and financial intelligence indicate the Jamia Cell is in the late stages of attempting to complete devices for an upcoming attack in the West.

Islamic State in Qiyadar
Leader: Abu Musab Al-Gerrha
Headquarters: Somewhere in Gerrha
Allies: None
Enemies: Everyone else.

The Islamic State in Qiyadar, IS-Q, has quickly emerged as the country’s newest Jihadist group and has quickly assumed leadership of multiple factions of Jihadists through both religious zeal and extreme violence. Led by Abu Musab Al-Gerrha, a former Qiyadari Army officer and organized crime figure, IS-Q has engaged in intense levels of violence in the city. Believed to be responsible for the bombing of the Mosque, IS-Q is looking to jumpstart sectarian violence in an effort to destabilize Qiyadar. IS-Q represents the primary OPFOR for SOTF-CJTFONG forces in the region.

Important NPC Factions

Combined Joint Task Force Operation Nimble Guardian (NPC)
Leader: General Scott McMahon, USA
Headquarters: Gerrha International Airport
Allies: SOTF-CJTFONG, PRGA, UNAQ, Reformed Qiyadari Armed Forces
Enemies: IS-Q, Hezbollah, Quds Force, VEVAK, Al-Qaeda Qiyadari
Description: Led by General Scott McMahon, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Nimble Guardian is a coalition of approximately 300,000 Allied troops, mostly American, but with significant contributions from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, NATO, Jordan, and the Gulf States. The Coalition, as it is commonly known to local and international media, appears to have accomplished its primary objective, securing Qiyadar’s nascent nuclear weapons program before it could be deployed against the country’s civilian population. However, despite the initial success, General McMahon’s Coalition has been forced into a security role in Gerrha, supplementing the Qiyadari Armed Forces in holding together the PRGA, whose loyalties are complex and often unclear.


The United Nations Agency for Qiyadar
Leader: High Commissioner for Qiyadari Refugee and Rebuilding Affairs Akio Suzuki
Headquarters: The Hilton Hotel in Downtown Gerrha
Allies: CJTFONG (ostensibly), PRGA, the various NGOs in the country
Neutral: VEVAK, Quds Force
Enemies: IS-Q
Description: UNAQ is the UN Agency responsible for the international community's interests in the rebuilding of Qiyadar. Headquartered in the luxurious Hilton Hotel in Downtown Gherra and protected by a battalion of Fijian peacekeeping troops, UNAQ has rapidly become the center of a massive, but growing network of international aid programs run by dozens of NGOs and UN Agencies. It has come under increasing threat, however, from IS-Q throughout Gherra and its hotel headquarters has been repeatedly targeted by car bombs.

Gerrha is a vast, metropolitan city of eight million people. An ancient coastal trading center, Gerrha has been inhabited since the area’s conquest by the Assyrian Empire in 709 BC. Albeit briefly occupied by the Secculids in 204 BC, the city’s history has mostly dominated the surrounding region, with the country having practically developed around Gerrha and its six districts.

District One: Al Faqf

A primarily Sunni neighborhood in Gerrha’s northeastern hills and UNESCO world heritage site, Al-Faqf has long been the cultural and civic center of Qiyadar’s Sunni population. Home to a series of massive mosques and huge gardens that have been continuously cared for since the days of the Ottoman Empire, Al Faqf’s residents are known throughout Qiyadar for their remarkable levels of oil wealth and political influence within the country. Streets in Al Faqf are remarkably clean, albeit extremely difficult to navigate and confusing, owing to the decades of generational building and the area’s extensively hilled geography. Coalition forces conducting operations within the AO should be advised of intelligence indicating that Al-Qaeda’s Qiyadari Affiliate, the Jamia Organization, appears to have developed an extensive network of local informants and collaborators in the area and are suspected to be conducting their operations within the neighborhood. Intelligence also suggests that IS-Q is gaining an increasing foothold in the area, due in large part to their shaky alliance with a number of former regime players who live in Al-Faqf.

District 2: Qahira/Downtown

Qahira would be referred to in most Western cities as “Downtown” and subsequently, is both the political and business center of the city. Home to the Gerrha International Airport, Coalition Headquarters, the Interior Ministry Building, Parliament, the US Embassy, and the sprawling Camp Anzio base complex, Qahira has quickly turned its former bureaucratic office spaces into supply depots and living, working, and recreation centers for the thousands of US and Coalition troops, intelligence agents, defense contractors, and diplomats responsible for administering the occupation and rebuilding of Qiyadar as an independent nation. While the number of residents within Qahira proper was previously quite small, it has steadily risen with the number of both foreign and Qiyadari nationals who have moved into the neighborhood to find work either as bureaucrats within the new government or as support personnel at Camp Anzio. Qahira’s security situation is by far the best of the Gerrha’s districts. Protected from most indirect fire by Camp Anzio’s, the Embassy’s, and the Airport’s air defense systems, mortar attacks into the area have been few and far between, and most insurgent attacks with gunmen or VBIEDs have thus far been halted on the district’s outer security perimeter by local or Coalition forces.

District 3: Al Thawra

Al Thawra is Gerrha’s largest neighborhood and is home to most of the city’s working poor. Built in the late 1950s as a massive public housing complex to accommodate the thousands of Sunni and Shiite migrants from the countryside, Al Thawra languished under the yoke of the regime. Hundreds of dissidents, both Communists and Muslim Brotherhood activitists, were abducted and tortured from Al Thawra during the height of the regime’s power and thousands of its residents were conscripted into the Regime’s Army as a result of largely classist conscription policies. An almost complete lack of economic or social programs within the district left its residents extremely poor and extremely poorly educated, with an estimated 50% literacy rate in the area. Al Thawra’s population is an almost even mix between poor Sunni and poor Shiite communities (approximately 60% Shiite and 40% Sunni), leading many within the Intelligence Community to believe that the area has the potential for extreme levels of sectarian violence between the two populations. IS-Q and a number of Shiite militant groups, believed to be backed by Iran, maintain a strong presence in the district and have engaged in regular street battles in an attempt to control the area. The District has a limited Coalition presence at Camp Tucson, occupied by the Arizona Army National Guard’s 158th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, and most Qiyadari Interior Ministry troops and National Police avoid the area.

District 4: Al Jihad

Appropriately named, Al Jihad is considered by many to be the center of IS-Q’s presence within the city. Formerly a largely Middle Class Sunni neighborhood and home to most of the former regime’s bureaucrats as well as much of the city’s merchant class, IS-Q has quickly established itself the dominant force within “Gerrha’s Brooklyn”, regularly engaging conventional Coalition and Qiyadari troops in open street battles in broad daylight. Hundreds of multi-family compounds and apartment buildings cover untold acres of Al Jihad and the inability of the Provisional Government to resolve the country’s electricity situation in this area has proven particularly acute in Al Jihad, adding further to the massive amounts of discontent in the neighborhood. Rumors and chatter of a “Basement Pentagon”, the reported Headquarters of IS-Q, have been persistent among captured insurgents and informants.

District 5: The Ports

Gerrha's location in between the Red Sea and the Fertile Crescent has long made the area extremely profitable to traders. For centuries, Arab and Greek traders exchanged billions of dollars worth of goods, services, and slaves in Gerrha's coastal districts. In more recent years, however, the commodities have changed by the strategic value of the ports have not. Oil, cotton, and heroin have flown freely through Gerrha's ports and warehouses for years, until recently. Financiers and traders have grown increasingly frustrated by the Provisional Government's inability to reopen ports consistently and with the widespread corruption of customs officers. Numerous criminal rackets operate inside of the Port District's sprawling warehouses and industrial facilities. Rumors of oil and antiquity smuggling by IS-Q have persistently appeared in detainee interrogations and intelligence reports.



District 6: Riverwalk

A former British Colonial outpost along the river that flows through Gerrha, the Riverwalk could only be described as a Western concession. Until the British pullout in 1962, Riverwalk was one of the most economically prosperous areas in the Middle East and Gerrha's religious and ethnic minority populations, largely Christians, Kurds, Yazidis, and Mandeans flocked to the neighborhood. Since the Socialist takeover of the country in 1978, however, the minority population has, for all intents and purposes, made Riverwalk its own autonomous zone. Heavily armed militias have long protected the minority population within the Riverwalk and remain intent on keeping out both Coalition and insurgent forces.

WIP

Special Operations Force

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[align=center][b][size=150]Special Operations Task Force, Operation Nimble Guardian[/size]
J-3 Operations Directorate[/b][/align]
[u]Organization Name (Task Force Green, Task Force Black, etc):[/u]
[u]Parent Unit Name (Special Air Service, 75th Ranger Regiment, etc):[/u]
[u]Coalition Nation Contributing (UK, US, AUS, NZ, Belgium, France, Norway, Poland, Canada, Germany, or Jordan):[/u]
[u]Unit Commander:[/u]
[u]Unit Commander Picture:[/u][spoiler=Image Classified][img][/img][/spoiler]
[u]Unit Strength:[/u]
[u]Unit Role (Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, etc):[/u]
[u]Unit History:[/u]
[u]RP Sample:[/u]
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Partner Force Application

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[b][align=center][size=150]Qiyadari Ministry of the Interior[/size]
Qiyadari National Police[/align][/b]
[u]Unit Name:[/u]
[u]Unit Commander:[/u]
[u]Unit Commander's Image:[/u] [spoiler=Attached][img][/img][/spoiler]
[u]Unit Specialty:[/u]
[u]Unit Size and Strength:[/u]
[u]Unit History:[/u]
[u]RP Sample:[/u]
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Intelligence Operative

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[align=center][b][size=150]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY[/size]
Directorate of Operations[/b][/align]
[u]Officer Name:[/u]
[u]Officer Nationality:[/u]
[u]Officer Parent Agency:[/u]
[u]Officer Image:[/u][spoiler=Classified][img][/img][/spoiler]
[u]Officer Education:[/u]
[u]Officer Biography:[/u]
[u]RP Sample:[/u]



[/box]


The Order of Battle, SOTF-ONG

A Squadron, Task Force Green - Organized States
Division for Indefinite Detention - Great Confederacy of Commonwealth States
ODA 3435, 3rd SFG (A) - Reverend Norv
Special Missions Force - Cylarn

Rules

1) Don't be a Dick. You're old enough to be on this site. Act like it.
2) This is a cooperative story, with limits. I am the OP and what I says go.
3) I reserve the right to appoint CO-OPs as necessary for the flow of this RP.
4) Realism will be at the heart of this RP.

[Organized States]

Special Operations Task Force, Operation Nimble Guardian
J-3 Operations Directorate

Organization Name: A Squadron, Task Force Green
Parent Unit Name: Combat Applications Group/TASK FORCE GREEN
Coalition Nation Contributing: United States
Unit Commander: Colonel Anthony S. Baker
Unit Commander Picture:

Unit Strength: Approximately 100 Operators
Unit Role (Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, etc): Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance
Unit History: A Squadron is the oldest of Task Force Green's Squadrons, having been stood up with the rest of the Combat Applications Group in November of 1977 and A Squadron operators have been involved in numerous counter-terrorism operations around the world ever since. Cutting their teeth during Operation Urgent Fury in Panama, A Squadron operators played a role in the killing of Pablo Escobar, the infamous Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and led the way during the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. More recently, A Squadron's operators were responsible for the most significant counter-terror raid since the death of Bin-Laden in 2011, successfully infiltrating deep into ISIS-held territory in Syria to kill Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, ISIS's spiritual leader dubbed by many to be the "next Bin Laden". These combat hardened and experienced operators are undoubtedly the premier counter-terror force in the world.
RP Sample:

[Great Confederacy of Commonwealth States]

Alright! I'm interested, just leaving this here to keep an eye on things while I work on an app.

[Cylarn]

Qiyadari Ministry of the Interior
Qiyadari National Police

Unit Name: Special Mobile Force; informally referred to as the "Haras Battalion."
Unit Commander: Colonel Hadi Nasrallah.
Unit Commander's Image:

Unit Specialty: The SMF is a specialty counter-terror unit of the National Police. Their most public function is as a robust tactical urban combat arm that fights to inflict casualties and instill fear in active Jihadi elements in Qiyadar. Close, fast combat in confined areas are where the SMF truly proves itself, willing to systematically clear every building on a city block if it means neutralizing an enemy position. Weapon organics per squad fit the typical paradigm of a US Army squad. Widely known but hardly publicized out of fear, the SMF also runs a variety of criminal enterprises in the capital, namely selling drugs, alcohol, and luxury goods.
Unit Size and Strength: The unit consists of six-hundred men - although some seventy-five women have been accepted into the unit - divided into companies of one-hundred men each, which are then decentralized into platoons and squads. Personnel are exclusively derived from the same Sunni-majority neighborhood in the capital city. Roughly three-quarters of the unit has served prior with the security forces of the old regime, and a quarter had previously served under Colonel Nasrallah during his time as the Al Faqf District Commander in the National Police.
Unit History: The origins can be traced to the pre-invasion People's National Police, particularly with the rapid-response "Flying Squads" that operated in the districts of the capital. Colonel Nasrallah, a long-time participant in the tactical elements of the National Police and District Commander of the Al Faqf Garrison, participated in corrupt activities to establish his own criminal network, protected by his status as a respected Party man. This network still survives, fueling drug and alcohol consumption in Gerrha while also performing other services at the discretion of its members. Despite the public posturing of law and order by the regime, the Al Faqf Garrison kept itself free of government ire by regularly arresting or killing suspected criminals as a way to suggest a nature as a superior crime-fighting force.

In the final days of the regime, as the Apparatchiks debated whether or not to vaporize their own people, Colonel Nasrallah grew disheartened by the prospect of mass-murder by atomic fire to save the regime. In secret, he assembled a militia and made contact with the CIA, to whom he provided intelligence of Qiyadari military and police strength, composition, and dispersion of forces, as well as information on an alternative infiltration route into the Gerrha Nuclear Power Station. On the opening day of the invasion, Nasrallah renounced his service to the regime and commenced a military campaign in Al Faqf with a thousand irregular fighters, mostly civilians and defecting police officers. The force was soon bolstered by American assets in the form of Green Berets, who quickly provided training and additional guidance for the group. Nasrallah sought out to influence additional unrest against the regime and quickly booted the demoralized units of the People's Army from Al Faqf. After the seizure of the "People's Voice of Qiyadar Radio Broadcast Station," Nasrallah famously carried out a broadcasted speech known as the "Airing of National Grievances," in which he read off the names of various regime figures and invited the public to support the Coalition forces in whatever way they could. Following this speech, it's been alleged that Nasrallah and his men began to sell off the luxury assets of regime figures they arrested and/or killed.

With the successful conclusion of the initial invasion, Nasrallah avoided punishment for his previous regime alignment and was recognized as a member of the Provisional Government, although not in control of any significant ministry. Meetings were regularly held to appoint a new government, which Nasrallah took part in. He openly pushed for Coalition authorities to promote him as the Minister of the Interior in the new government, which would give him control over all law enforcement forces in Qiyadar. However, a long-standing rivalry with Brigadier General Al Afri proved to be his folly, as his vulgar statements about Al Afri to a group of American officers would reach public ears. He was passed over for promotion, but instead offered command of a premier SWAT-style counter-terror unit within the National Police. Nasrallah formed the Special Mobile Unit from former officers of the People's National Police and members of his militia, which dissolved shortly after the Colonels' Coup.

The unit is equipped similarly to Western units, with all combat personnel issued plate carriers and MICH helmets with appropriate communications and first aid equipment. Firearms consist of a variety of Russian and Western pieces, usually selected based upon the mission conditions. Retaining their past heritage as a rapid-response force, Ford Explorer Police Interceptors have been fielded by the SMF, and to a lesser degree in numerical value, the SandCat has also made a debut in the SMF. Armored vehicles such as BMP-2s and American M113s are called in for high-risk situations. Their relationship with the Coalition has also granted them usage of an EOD robot and a fleet of non-combat-capable drones.

The first operations of the SMF concerned the capture of fugitive ex-Party officials, who were either fleeing from Gerrha or attempting to hide amongst the local population. Fifty former regime officers were officially detained and passed over to Coalition custody, but independent sources allege that ninety others were tortured and killed. The assets of the targeted officials were seized and sold off by the SMF. Despite the darkness of his actions, Nasrallah remains a valuable asset to CIA, and much of his illegal activities continue to be overshadowed by the role of the SMF in the counter-insurgency.

In regards to fighting Jihadi elements in the country, the SMF works directly alongside Coalition special operations units on a variety of operations. In engagements where troops of the Reformed Armed Forces found themselves either retreating or downright fleeing under heavy fire from multiple directions and elevations, SMF operators are noted to hold their own and use their heads under fire. Quite often, rather than staying with their vehicles during an ambush, squads will move to assault the enemy positions, particularly using building-to-building clearing tactics when confronted with fire coming from the rooftops and windows of the narrow streets of Gerrha. Their aggressiveness has led to casualties, as over one-hundred SMF operators have been killed in action since the unit's creation. Nasrallah himself has survived three separate premeditated attempts on his life.
RP Sample: HAVE SOME DAMN FAITH, ARTHUR MORGAN

This is still a WiP, in terms of the history, but I wanted to get it on record.

[Dayganistan]

This is pretty relevant to my interests. Still kind of deciding if I should do an SOF team or local forces.

[Reverend Norv]

This is pretty relevant to my interests. Still kind of deciding if I should do an SOF team or local forces.

I'd encourage you to go with local forces, personally. I think we are going to need more than one of those to tell the most interesting story.

[Reverend Norv]

Special Operations Task Force, Operation Nimble Guardian
J-3 Operations Directorate

Organization Name: ODA 3435, C Co, 4th Btn, 3rd SFG (A)
Parent Unit Name: 3rd Special Forces Group
Coalition Nation Contributing: USA
Unit Commander: Captain Jason Lewis
Unit Commander Picture:

Unit Strength: 12 soldiers: Captain Lewis, CWO Greene, Operations Sergeant Chen, Intelligence Sergeant Haddad, Weapons Sergeants Garcia and Pickering, Communications Sergeants Daniels and Murphy, Medical Sergeants Russo and Patel, Engineering Sergeants Diaz and Schwartz.
Unit Role: Unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance. The team has substantial experience with direct action missions, but prefers to operate alongside host nation forces.
Unit History:

ODA 3435 was stood up in 2012 as part of the expansion of each Special Forces Group from three to four battalions. Capt. Lewis, CWO Greene, and Sgts. Haddad, Pickering, and Patel were among the original personnel; with the exception of Sgt. Diaz, all other personnel have been with the team since 2016 at the latest. It is a close-knit group of old friends, bound together more by fire-tested trust and respect than by formal chains of command.

• Deployed Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, 2/07/2012 for Operation Enduring Freedom, with orders to coordinate ANA, ANP, and local tribal forces against Taliban networks. Lost three soldiers KIA, four WIA in friendly-fire attack by Taliban loyalists in ANP, 5/11/2012, and withdrawn to Ft. Bragg. Capt. Lewis received special clearance to attend National War College while in medical recovery, despite ranking below 0-5: a shortcut to high command.
  
  
• Deployed Entebbe, Uganda, 1/15/2013 for Operation Observant Compass. Trained, coordinated, and accompanied Ugandan troops in operations against Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), pursuant to 10 USC 127(e) authorization. Ultimately conducted unauthorized cross-border raid into DRC in order to rescue children abducted from village on Congo-Uganda border. Resulting diplomatic incident is broadly recognized to have been the end of Capt. Lewis' career prospects.
  
  
• Redeployed on expedited basis to Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, 4/12/2014 for Operation Inherent Resolve. Trained, supported, and coordinated Peshmerga forces in pushing back ISIL forces, primarily in Sinjar Mountains and around Mosul. Recognized by Kurdish and Coalition officers as one of the most effective ODAs working in northern Iraq.
  
  
• Deployed Kano, Nigeria, 3/10/2015 for Operation Juniper Shield. Trained and led Nigerian and Nigerien forces, pursuant to 10 USC 127(e) authorization, in operations against Boko Haram and AQIM. Led Nigerian raid that killed Abu Yakub al-Barnawi, a senior Boko Haram commander.
  
  
• Deployed Camp Shorabak, Helmand Privince, Afghanistan, 1/22/2016 for Operation Freedom's Sentinel. Training and coordination mission with ANP collapsed when Sgt. Russo discovered widespread sexual abuse of children among local police commanders. Deployment ended in eighteen-hour siege of team by ANP and tribal militia before ANA relief arrived.
  
  
• Deployed Kobani, Syria, 3/07/2017 for Operation Inherent Resolve. Supported and coordinated SDF troops in Battle of Raqqa. Relationships developed during 2014 deployment with Kurdish forces were essential to success. Noted for evacuation under fire of seven hundred civilians from the city, necessitating a seven-hour running battle with ISIL forces. Three team members were awarded Bronze Star with V Device, and Sgt. Schwartz received the Silver Star.
  
  
• Deployed Baledogle, Somalia, 2/12/2018 for Operation Mongoose Hunter. Trained and led Somali special operations forces, pursuant to 10 USC 127(e) authorization, in operations against al-Shabab forces in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Noted for very effective liaison work between Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian SOF. Suffered one KIA, who was subsequently replaced by Sgt. Diaz: the first woman to graduate the Special Forces Qualification Course.
  
  
• Deployed [CLASSIFIED], Libya, 1/16/2019 for Operation Obsidian Lotus. Trained, led, and coordinated Libyan (and Libyan rebel) special operations forces, pursuant to 10 USC 127(e) authorization, in operations against AQIM and ISIL forces. Coordinated closely with Task Force Green, CIA, DCS, and other classified US assets in-country.
  
  
• Deployed Gerrha, Qiyadar, 3/11/2020 for Operation Nimble Guardian. Made HALO drop outside Al Faqf on first day of invasion, and supported Col. Nasrallah and his People's Army in consolidating their district, seizing the People's Voice of Qiyadar radio station, and beginning the manhunt for senior regime figures. Assumed responsibility for training and supporting Qiyadari National Police forces (alongside five other ODAs), with special responsibility for police special operations units. Saw repeated high-intensity combat while supporting QMP on raids in Al Jihad. On one occasion, successfully launched independent hostage rescue mission, allegedly because hostages' families refused to pay Col. Nasrallah to conduct such an operation. Subsequently attached to Special Operations Task Force along with QMP Special Mobile Force.

RP Sample: Sure.

[Dayganistan]

Qiyadari Ministry of the Interior
Qiyadari National Police

Unit Name: Special Service Group
Unit Commander: Captain Samir Al-Qassam
Unit Commander's Image:

Unit Specialty: Counterinsurgency, urban warfare, deniable operations, undercover operations
Unit Size and Strength: 110 operatives.
Unit History: The Special Service Group was founded under the previous regime. It was intended as a counter-insurrection force capable of tracking down and eliminating dissidents before they became a problem, or dealing with them if they were to ever begin an armed uprising. They were (and continue to be) capable of undercover operations and are specialists in urban warfare. Due to their undercover heritage, the Special Service Group does not have an official duty uniform and operatives may wear civilian clothing or mismatched camouflage. Under the old regime, the Special Service Group trained alongside a variety of foreign special operations or counterinsurgency groups, most notably various Russian Spetsnaz formations and People's Liberation Army Special Forces. The Special Service Group recruits both Sunni and Shiite personnel. As well, they recruit female operatives in order to assist in undercover operations and, following the example of coalition special forces in Afghanistan, provide "cultural support" when performing counterinsurgency operations in more religiously conservative areas.

The Special Service Group was essentially gutted during the rebellion against the socialist regime. Operatives quit and attempted to flee the country fearing a tribunal for crimes against humanity. Others were hardliners who committed to defence of the regime to the bitter end, ending up captured or killed by coalition forces. Others still joined the rebel cause, whether out of genuine sympathy or simply a matter of self preservation. This last group are the operatives who formed the core of the new Special Service Group. All in all, the Special Service Group shrunk to around a company size force commanded by a Captain from two battalions commanded by a Brigadier General.

The Special Service Group has been both an asset for the new regime, and difficult to keep a handle on. They have been used as an effective urban counterinsurgency force in the months following the coalition invasion. The capability of the unit to operate undercover has not been heavily utilized however. The Special Service Group has proven difficult for the government to keep a handle on as they are ideologically connected to the old regime and could present a legitimate political threat at some point. Particularly if they end up using their training to coerce certain groups to vote a certain way. It has also been alleged that the Special Service Group has been funneling weapons ostensibly purchased for their own use to Syria and Libya for forces loyal to Bashar Al Assad and Khalifa Haftar, respectively.
RP Sample: viewtopic.php?p=35455849#p35455849

[Great Confederacy of Commonwealth States]

Qiyadari Ministry of the Interior
Qiyadari National Police

Unit Name: Office of the Special Prosecutor - Division for Indefinite Investigative Detention (OSP/DIID, Dee double-i Dee)
Unit Commander: Baheej al-Salloum
Unit Commander's Image:

Unit Specialty: Enhanced interrogation, suspect extraction (when unopposed)
Unit Size and Strength: 15 administrative staff, 60 internal guards, 50 defence guards and extraction personnel, 10 interrogators, 20 other support staff
Unit History: While the OSP/DIID is an entirely new subdivision, set up after the UN invasion, its assets were not created from scratch. The DIID combines parts from the National Police, the now-disbanded Republican Militia, and the Special Detention Unit. While the top has been meticulously shaved off these former regime bodies, they pretty much still consist of former Regime loyalists, being fiercely distrustful of any former opposition. In order to balance this out the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which has nominal control over the DIID, has been staffed entirely with members of the democratic opposition. However, a combination of lacking experience and struggle between even former comrades-in-arms, as well as the effectiveness of the DIID, has meant that the OSP does not try to interfere with the goings-on of the DIID.

The Special Detention Unit (SDU), predecessor of the DIID in the interrogative sense, was set up in the early 80s. Trained by the KGB and based out of a brutalist soviet-built prison complex, the SDU was tasked with acquiring information on the country’s many dissident groups and their connections. Their brutalist prison was built at the edge of Al Thawra, to serve as a constant reminder to the people there of government power. After the SDU was adopted into the DIID, however, this became more and more of a liability, since Al Thawra has been lacking in government control.

After the UN takeover the new provisional government made a big deal out of disbanding the old Republican Militia and the SDU, which had both become hated symbols of the old regime. The entire population of the prison, which was nicknamed ‘The Ka’aba’, was released as a show of good will. However, this included a few high-level Islamists as well, which soon bolstered the capabilities of the provisional government’s enemies. Knowing that they would have to engage terrorists in the fight for its existence, the provisional government created the Office of the Special Prosecutor, with broad powers to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects. Old SDU and Republican Militia assets were combined into the DIID, which too was given broad powers to detain and interrogate suspects with almost no oversight. Their legal mandate, a combination of some of the world’s loosest anti-terrorist laws, does not limit them to terrorism. Financing terrorism, or laundering money in support of terrorism... even some defeatist and anti-war sentiment is labelled as a terrorist offense. It’s not only jihadists languishing at the Ka’aba.

Despite being made up of former regime loyalists, the DIID poses no immediate threat to the provisional government. The make-up of the DIID is almost entirely anti-theists, who blame Islam and internal islamic struggle for much of the ills of the region. They hate islamist groups above all other groups, and are willing to ally with any cause in order to destroy the militants. This has also given rise to incredible mistreatment of jihadist prisoners inside the prison, where even basic observance of islamic law is forbidden.

Nowadays, the DIID and the prison complex serve as an important source of information for various intelligence agencies, as well as units in the field.
RP Sample:

[Somerania]

Tagged

[Champagne Socialist Sharifistan]

I'm interested.
I will study the factions more closely and then post further

[Organized States]

Snip

Got it. Adding to the roster.

Snip

Good to go. Adding to the ORBAT now.

Snip

Solid. Also adding to the roster.

[Organized States]

Snip

Accepted.

[The Knockout Gun Gals]

Qiyadari Ministry of the Interior
Qiyadari National Police

Unit Name: The Socialist Militia Corps
Unit Commander: Hussein Abbas
Unit Commander's Image:

Unit Specialty: Protections, sabotages, insurgency
Unit Size and Strength: 12,500, with active 10,000 front line soldiers and 2,500 behind-the-line (logistics, propaganda, intelligence gathering)
Unit History:
RP Sample:

[Cylarn]

I have decided to lay out my unit's composition, given its size. The relationship with the central government determines that the unit is not exclusive tied to Gerrha City. Indeed, while a major portion of SMF operations are conducted in Gerrha, the SMF may have units deployed elsewhere in Qiyadar. Standard uniform for the SMF consists of navy blue fatigues cut in the ACU style, along with black plate carriers and either a black MICH, a black ballcap, or a black beret.

ORBAT, Special Mobile Force
Qiyadari National Police

Battalion Staff & Headquarters Company

• Colonel Hadi Nasrallah, Battalion Commander
• Lieutenant-Colonel Bashir al-Jama, Battalion Executive Officer
• Sergeant-Major Bassam Halim, Battalion Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • Captain Samir el-Abdi, S-1 (Personnel)
  • Captain Ali Saeed, S-2 (Intelligence)
  • Major Kadir Soleman, S-3 (Operations)
  • Captain Wasim Rasul, S-4 (Logistics/Supply)
  • Major Asif Shaer, S-5 (Planning)
  • Captain Dawud Shahan, S-6 (Communications)
  • Captain Hamdana Ghanem, Battalion Female Affairs Officer

SMF Alpha Company (Direct-Action)

• Captain Akmal Madani, Company Commander
• First Lieutenant Rabah Hamad, Company Executive Officer
• Sergeant Major Tamir Moussa, Company Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • First Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Second Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Third Platoon (Marksman/Surveillance Unit)
  • Fourth Platoon (Support Unit)

SMF Bravo Company (Direct-Action)

• Captain Haroon Bacho, Company Commander
• First Lieutenant Qasiba Qasi, Company Executive Officer
• Sergeant Major Asahn Akter, Company Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • First Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Second Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Third Platoon (Marksman/Surveillance Unit)
  • Fourth Platoon (Support Unit)

SMF Charlie Company (Direct-Action)

• Captain Azim Haque, Company Commander
• First Lieutenant Alem Amara, Company Executive Officer
• Sergeant Major Usman Khawaja, Company Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • First Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Second Platoon (Standard Mobility Unit)
  • Third Platoon (Marksman/Surveillance Unit)
  • Fourth Platoon (Support Unit)

SMF Delta Company (Special Assignments)

• Captain Abdul Majeed, Company Commander
• First Lieutenant Damir Bangura, Company Executive Officer
• Sergeant Major Aiza Gad, Company Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • First Platoon (Armored Unit)
  • Second Platoon (Special Airmobile/Airborne Unit)
  • Third Platoon (PRG Dignitary Security Unit)
  • Fourth Platoon (Support Unit/Also provides a squad for a DIID liason unit)

SMF Echo Company (Training/Selection)

• Captain Dekel Abu, Company Commander
• First Lieutenant Dawid Alee, Company Executive Officer
• Sergeant Major Aram Nasser, Company Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
  
  • First Platoon (Training)
  • Second Platoon (Training)
  • Third Platoon (Training)
  • Fourth Platoon (Support)

[Wolfenium]

I'll think of something.

[Organized States]

Working on IC right now. Also bump.

[Somerania]

Bump

[Ormata]

Are allied militia allowed (for local support and the like)?

[Cylarn]

-snip-

All they would need is some connection, no matter how weak it might be, to the government. It also wouldn't hurt to have some grievances with the insurgents.

[Organized States]

Are allied militia allowed (for local support and the like)?

Somewhat, they'll need to be affiliated with the Government or the Military (it can be extremely loose, as Cy said).

[Ormata]

After some thought in the matter, I'm sorry to say that at this time due to a combination of an exceptionally busy work schedule on all days and my own conscience finding some issue in playing both an unfamiliar culture and real world environment, I do not think I will be able to play this game. My apologies.

EDIT: I hate me because I keep coming back to look at this thread. If I ever get a bit of inspiration I'll do something a little more closer to home.

[Krumbia]

This looks like a fascinating setting. I know there's a lot of options on offer, but I was drawn to RPing Ambassador Jim Steinman in the PRGA... would that be possible or should I stick to a conventional app?

[Organized States]

This looks like a fascinating setting. I know there's a lot of options on offer, but I was drawn to RPing Ambassador Jim Steinman in the PRGA... would that be possible or should I stick to a conventional app?

I'm not fundamentally opposed to this, but I would like to hear what your plans for the position would be. Just trying to make sure that it's within the overall vision I have for the RP (a primarily intelligence and SOF focus).

[Organized States]

Geronimo, for God and Country.