[CHALLENGE]Banning Discrimination in Religious Organisations

[Bears Armed]

GenSec has agreed to hear a challenge against this proposal.

viewtopic.php?f=9&t=462788

Banning Discrimination in Religious Organisations

Category: Civil rights
Strength: Mild
Proposed by: Maowi

The World Assembly,

Aware that discrimination within religious organisations against certain groups causes significant spiritual and psychological harm to individuals within those groups,

Outraged that this discrimination is, in many member nations, still permitted as being a compelling practical purpose, and

Determined to put an end to this disguised yet no less deplorable discrimination,

Hereby:

Defines, for the purposes of this resolution, a ‘religious organisation’ as any member nation or organisation of natural persons offering religious services, or basing its actions on religious beliefs or teachings;

Mandates that no religious organisation may deny a person a right, power, permission or service based on their innate belonging to a reductive category; but

Makes an exception to the above, in that religious organisations may deny a person a right, power, permission or service based on their religious beliefs, or lack thereof, except for the right to convert to their religion.

The author Maowi openly states in the drafting thread that this proposal is intended to close a ‘loophole’ left in GAR#35, by removing member nations’ power to declare the existence of a “compelling practical purpose” for continuing to allow discrimination in these matters. Given that when GAR#35 gives member nations the authority to define “compelling practical purpose” it says nothing at all about allowing future GA legislation to limit that authority, this seems to me to be a clear case of Contradiction and thus Illegal.

Some people have defended the proposal’s legality by stating that GenSec has already allowed other proposals to limit nations’ authority to define “compelling practical purpose”. I can neither remember nor find any formal, collective GenSec rulings to that effect: Can you? If no such rulings do exist then any such proposals being “allowed” would presumably have been a matter either of individual GenSec members giving opinions or simply of potential illegalities slipping past all of us without being noticed at the time, in which case — under the rules & guidelines that we’ve been following — I think they don’t count as valid precedents. Otherwise, after all, the passage of the “historial” resolution ‘Max Barry Day’ would effectively have cancelled the rules against both RL References and Meta-Gaming, but the Mods continued to enforce both of those rules right through until GenSec was established and we have cited them often enough since then as well…
One of this proposals' defenders specifically mentioned GAR#457 ‘Defending The Rights Of Sexual And Gender Minorities’ as an example of a passed resolution that they thought already limited nations’ authority to define “compelling practical purposes”. I point out that this resolution specifically applied, according to its own text, “ subject to previously passed extant World Assembly resolutions”… which means that it has to recognise member nation’s authority over defining “compelling practical purposes” in full. (A case could also be made that if GAR #457 doesn't Contradict GAR #35 then it does nothing but Duplicate it, and that -- although it's too late to do anything about it now -- GenSec should therefore have declared that proposal illegal before it was passed.)


__________________________________________________________________

ADDITION (4th May 2019)

Having thought further about this proposal's legality, i also see an arguable contradiction of GAR #27: 'Freedom of Assembly'. Explanation: memberlist.php?mode=viewprofile&u=175 .

[Maowi]

All inhabitants of member states have the right not to be and indeed must not be discriminated against on grounds including sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, skin color, language, economic or cultural background, physical or mental disability or condition, religion or belief system, sexual orientation or sexual identity, or any other arbitrarily assigned and reductive categorisation which may be used for the purposes of discrimination, except for compelling practical purposes, such as hiring only female staff to work with battered women who have sought refuge from their abusers.

As you say, GAR 35 does not say anything about allowing future GA legislation to limit member nations' authority to define 'compelling practical purposes'. Nor does it reserve them this right. Nowhere in the resolution text is it explicitly or, I would argue, implicitly stated that what constitutes a 'compelling practical purpose' must be left up to member nations to decide. Thus, a proposal that seeks to shape the boundaries of compelling practicality contradicts no section of GAR 35.

I was similarly unable to find an official GenSec ruling on the same issue. However, to give an informal precedent, which I accept you may not be able to consider:

1. 1. REQUIRES all member nations which allow civil marriages between individuals of a certain sexuality or gender to allow civil marriages between individuals of all sexualities and genders, subject to previously passed extant World Assembly resolutions.
      
      
   2. ORDERS all member nations to provide the same civil marriage services for individuals of all sexualities and genders.
      
      
   3. COMPELS all member nations to grant the same marriage rights to civilly married individuals of all sexualities and genders.

The use of 'subject to previously passed extant World Assembly resolutions' clearly applies only to part 1.a., in which case parts b. and c. do remove member nations' authority to define 'compelling practical purposes' in certain circumstances. So regardless of whether 'member nations' authority over defining “compelling practical purposes” in full' must or must not be recognised regarding part 1.a., it does not have to be recognised under parts b. and c., which, had there been an official ruling on this in favour of legality, would certainly set a clear precedent concerning the legality of this proposal.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

...Some people have defended the proposal’s legality by stating that GenSec has already allowed other proposals to limit nations’ authority to define “compelling practical purpose”. I can neither remember nor find any formal, collective GenSec rulings to that effect: Can you? ...

Not specifically for GAR #35, but it is well within game precedent, explicitly backed by GenSec opinion (formal ruling posted here), that a later resolution can refine or add to the interpretation of a broad phrase used in an earlier resolution, whether the earlier one claims to permit it or not.

[Aclion]

I don't think overriding the “compelling practical purpose” exception outright can reasonably be called refinement or adding interpretation.

[Bears Armed]

...Some people have defended the proposal’s legality by stating that GenSec has already allowed other proposals to limit nations’ authority to define “compelling practical purpose”. I can neither remember nor find any formal, collective GenSec rulings to that effect: Can you? ...

Not specifically for GAR #35, but it is well within game precedent, explicitly backed by GenSec opinion (formal ruling posted here), that a later resolution can refine or add to the interpretation of a broad phrase used in an earlier resolution, whether the earlier one claims to permit it or not.

I can see the basic similarity, but to me the difference in wording between GAR#10 & GAR#35 implicitly gives member nations more authority over the decision-making process for deciding on “compelling practical purposes” than it does for defining “the wrong hands”. I realize that there’s a subjective element here, and that others might disagree with this judgement call, but that’s still how I read it.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Additional question of Legality

Re GAR #27 'Freedom of Assembly':

Freedom of Assembly
A resolution to increase democratic freedoms.

Category: Furtherment of Democracy
Strength: Strong
Proposed by: Cookesland

Description: Nations of the World Assembly,

BELIEVING that it is an inherent right of every individual to freely associate and assemble,

APPALLED that in some nations this right is not enjoyed by all their peoples,

APPLAUDING the use of peaceful protest as a means to bring about political discussion and/or change,

DENOUNCING violence, fear, and/or terrorism as ways of bringing about these changes as a result of restriction of these freedoms,

Hereby establishes the following:

1.) All individuals shall have the right to peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view.

2.) No Government, Federal Authority, Corporation, or any other political or social group may take any action to infringe upon these rights; unless the individuals organizing are trespassing on private property and/or if circumstances beyond the control of the Government threaten the safety of those organizing.

3.) These things having been ordained, states that Freedom of Assembly cannot be extended towards any call for: violence, rioting, and/or actions that would cause harm to innocent people.

Does the right to associate, recognized here, include the right to form organisations? I would argue that it does.
Do the limits which this resolution's second clause then places on governments' authority to infringe on those rights include an effective ban on governments interfering with how those organisations are organised, which logically would include religious organisations policies about eligibility for the priesthood? I would argue that they do.

[Araraukar]

*snip*

In that case any religion trying to forbid people from partaking it for any reason whatsoever would already be in violation of that particular resolution. And the challenge target would contradict it only by leaving the religious organizations the right to discriminate based on people belonging to that religion.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

Additional question of Legality

Re GAR #27 'Freedom of Assembly':

Freedom of Assembly
A resolution to increase democratic freedoms.

Category: Furtherment of Democracy
Strength: Strong
Proposed by: Cookesland

Description: Nations of the World Assembly,

BELIEVING that it is an inherent right of every individual to freely associate and assemble,

APPALLED that in some nations this right is not enjoyed by all their peoples,

APPLAUDING the use of peaceful protest as a means to bring about political discussion and/or change,

DENOUNCING violence, fear, and/or terrorism as ways of bringing about these changes as a result of restriction of these freedoms,

Hereby establishes the following:

1.) All individuals shall have the right to peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view.

2.) No Government, Federal Authority, Corporation, or any other political or social group may take any action to infringe upon these rights; unless the individuals organizing are trespassing on private property and/or if circumstances beyond the control of the Government threaten the safety of those organizing.

3.) These things having been ordained, states that Freedom of Assembly cannot be extended towards any call for: violence, rioting, and/or actions that would cause harm to innocent people.

Does the right to associate, recognized here, include the right to form organisations? I would argue that it does.
Do the limits which this resolution's second clause then places on governments' authority to infringe on those rights include an effective ban on governments interfering with how those organisations are organised, which logically would include religious organisations policies about eligibility for the priesthood? I would argue that they do.

That line of argument requires a clear statement of principles as to why a private religious organization employing persons as priests may discriminate against otherwise qualified candidates based on gender, but a private manufacturing organization (for example) employing persons as business executives may not.

I don't think overriding the “compelling practical purpose” exception outright can reasonably be called refinement or adding interpretation.

If it were overriding it outright, that would be contradiction or amendment. Instead, what's happening is that the proposal attempts to render the kind of scenario pondered here no longer compelling by itself. Nations must have reasons applicable by any person aware of WA law, not just religious believers.

[Bears Armed]

Does the right to associate, recognized here, include the right to form organisations? I would argue that it does.
Do the limits which this resolution's second clause then places on governments' authority to infringe on those rights include an effective ban on governments interfering with how those organisations are organised, which logically would include religious organisations policies about eligibility for the priesthood? I would argue that they do.

That line of argument requires a clear statement of principles as to why a private religious organization employing persons as priests may discriminate against otherwise qualified candidates based on gender, but a private manufacturing organization (for example) employing persons as business executives may not.

Religions, like political parties but generally unlike private manufacturing organizations, are ideologically-based organisations. It is reasonable to allow ideologically-based organisations to require compliance with their underlying ideological doctrine's tenets for membership, and especially for holding office, and in the case of some religious organisations those tenets include "divinely-inspired" restrictions on who can be ordained (or consecrated, or initiated, or whatever term that faith uses) into the clergy. Allowing religions to bar people who do not meet the doctrinally-set requirements from this ordained is therefore reasonable. (Or, at least, is no less reasonable than allowing private manufacturing organisations to exclude people with records of making poor decisions about business matters from management posts...)

*snip*

In that case any religion trying to forbid people from partaking it for any reason whatsoever would already be in violation of that particular resolution. And the challenge target would contradict it only by leaving the religious organizations the right to discriminate based on people belonging to that religion.

"right to associate" =/= "compulsion to associate".
I would interpret the 'right to associate' as including the right to not associate with people whom you consider inappropriate for this purpose (or simply don't get on well with...), just as I presume many people here would take the term 'freedom of religion' to include the freedom to not practice any religion at all.
And the word "other" in GAR #27, clause 2's, mention of "No Government, Federal Authority, Corporation, or any other political or social group" could be read as meaning "any other political group [that is not a Government, Federal Authority, or Corporation, and thus barred from intervention, anyway] other than the actual group concerned itself. (Okay, yes, that might not be what the author meant, but it's arguably a "reasonable" interpretation even so: Reasonable enough that I'd allow an argument like that as defence against an 'Honest Mistake' challenge on a Repeal, anyway.)

[Maowi]

Not specifically for GAR #35, but it is well within game precedent, explicitly backed by GenSec opinion (formal ruling posted here), that a later resolution can refine or add to the interpretation of a broad phrase used in an earlier resolution, whether the earlier one claims to permit it or not.

I can see the basic similarity, but to me the difference in wording between GAR#10 & GAR#35 implicitly gives member nations more authority over the decision-making process for deciding on “compelling practical purposes” than it does for defining “the wrong hands”. I realize that there’s a subjective element here, and that others might disagree with this judgement call, but that’s still how I read it.

Another example to reinforce the precedent: [2018] GAS 4, in which a majority decided that 'GenSec is unwilling to make factual policy findings as to what objectively constitutes an extreme hazard', ruling that 'Agricultural Invasive Species' did not contradict NEF. Why, then, should GenSec be prepared to make a similar 'factual policy finding' as to what objectively constitutes a compelling practical purpose? In any case, the absence in GAR #35 of an explicit assignment of the ability to interpret the relevant clause leaves that power in the hands of both the World Assembly and member nations themselves. The General Assembly exercising this power is hardly an infringement of member nations' implicitly granted power - if it did not affect member nations, such exercise would be meaningless.

Re GAR #27 'Freedom of Assembly':

Freedom of Assembly
A resolution to increase democratic freedoms.


Category: Furtherment of Democracy
Strength: Strong
Proposed by: Cookesland

Description: Nations of the World Assembly,

BELIEVING that it is an inherent right of every individual to freely associate and assemble,

APPALLED that in some nations this right is not enjoyed by all their peoples,

APPLAUDING the use of peaceful protest as a means to bring about political discussion and/or change,

DENOUNCING violence, fear, and/or terrorism as ways of bringing about these changes as a result of restriction of these freedoms,

Hereby establishes the following:

1.) All individuals shall have the right to peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view.

2.) No Government, Federal Authority, Corporation, or any other political or social group may take any action to infringe upon these rights; unless the individuals organizing are trespassing on private property and/or if circumstances beyond the control of the Government threaten the safety of those organizing.

3.) These things having been ordained, states that Freedom of Assembly cannot be extended towards any call for: violence, rioting, and/or actions that would cause harm to innocent people.

Does the right to associate, recognized here, include the right to form organisations? I would argue that it does.
Do the limits which this resolution's second clause then places on governments' authority to infringe on those rights include an effective ban on governments interfering with how those organisations are organised, which logically would include religious organisations policies about eligibility for the priesthood? I would argue that they do.

GAR #27 does indeed limit the government's ability to prevent a group of individuals from assembling; but it would be absurd to declare that it must therefore ban member nations from imposing restrictions on the internal doings of organisations within their jurisdiction. If that were the case, any human rights resolution - such as GAR #35 - would have been declared illegal for contradicting GAR #27. CoCR bans discrimination with the exception of situations in which there is a compelling practical purpose for it. That would be 'interference with how those organisations are organised'; for it would impose restrictions on how candidates are selected for certain positions - which is precisely the argument you are making for the illegality of this proposal. The rights referred to by the second clause, upon which the government may not infringe, are the rights to 'peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view'. No mention is made of the structure or the system of the organisation, or, more crucially, the treatment of those belonging to the organisation.

[Bears Armed]

GAR #27 does indeed limit the government's ability to prevent a group of individuals from assembling; but it would be absurd to declare that it must therefore ban member nations from imposing restrictions on the internal doings of organisations within their jurisdiction. If that were the case, any human rights resolution - such as GAR #35 - would have been declared illegal for contradicting GAR #27. CoCR bans discrimination with the exception of situations in which there is a compelling practical purpose for it. That would be 'interference with how those organisations are organised'; for it would impose restrictions on how candidates are selected for certain positions - which is precisely the argument you are making for the illegality of this proposal. The rights referred to by the second clause, upon which the government may not infringe, are the rights to 'peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view'. No mention is made of the structure or the system of the organisation, or, more crucially, the treatment of those belonging to the organisation.

So, by your argument, it would be legal under GAR#27 for the political party controlling a nation's government to appoint the leaders of all rival parties, or to limit any single political party other than itself to an impractically low number of members?

[Maowi]

GAR #27 does indeed limit the government's ability to prevent a group of individuals from assembling; but it would be absurd to declare that it must therefore ban member nations from imposing restrictions on the internal doings of organisations within their jurisdiction. If that were the case, any human rights resolution - such as GAR #35 - would have been declared illegal for contradicting GAR #27. CoCR bans discrimination with the exception of situations in which there is a compelling practical purpose for it. That would be 'interference with how those organisations are organised'; for it would impose restrictions on how candidates are selected for certain positions - which is precisely the argument you are making for the illegality of this proposal. The rights referred to by the second clause, upon which the government may not infringe, are the rights to 'peacefully assemble, associate, and protest to promote, pursue, and express any goal, cause, or view'. No mention is made of the structure or the system of the organisation, or, more crucially, the treatment of those belonging to the organisation.

So, by your argument, it would be legal under GAR#27 for the political party controlling a nation's government to appoint the leaders of all rival parties, or to limit any single political party other than itself to an impractically low number of members?

My argument is not that GAR #27 allows member nations' governments to force organisations to place specific people in specific positions, but that it allows governments to impose anti-discrimination policies on them: I am making a distinction between the treatment of those belonging to an organisation and the formation of the organisation and the views it expresses. My example referring to GAR #35 is intended to make the point that, were GAR #27 interpreted as you say, governments would not be allowed to enforce CoCR's provisions against discrimination on them. This proposal also intends to place anti-discrimination regulations on organisations - so, if GAR #35 was legal, why shouldn't this be?

[Bears Armed]

So, by your argument, it would be legal under GAR#27 for the political party controlling a nation's government to appoint the leaders of all rival parties, or to limit any single political party other than itself to an impractically low number of members?

My argument is not that GAR #27 allows member nations' governments to force organisations to place specific people in specific positions, but that it allows governments to impose anti-discrimination policies on them

Your interpretation of GAR#27's actual wording, however -- that it allows governments to control the structures and systems of organisations -- would allow member nations' governments to place specific people in specific positions... or, acting in a marginally less blatant fashion, to require that all positions could only be filled by government-approved candidates -- as well as to enforce anti-discrimination rules as you want.
Also, if the combination of GAR#27 & GAR#35 is to be read in the way that you suggest, what does your proposal actually do that that combination doesn't?

My example referring to GAR #35 is intended to make the point that, were GAR #27 interpreted as you say, governments would not be allowed to enforce CoCR's provisions against discrimination on them. This proposal also intends to place anti-discrimination regulations on organisations - so, if GAR #35 was legal, why shouldn't this be?

I can't remember now whether possible contradiction of GAR#27 was actually considered when GAR#35 was being drafted & passed, and unfortunately the archives of relevant threads only go back to GAR#49 so checking for what was said back then won't be easy. Possibly this factor was simply overlooked, because so many people were swept along by a wave of enthusiasm for what became #35? Neither the Mods nor GenSec has guaranteed a 100% success rate at spotting illegalities in time...
Anyway, nothing in GAR#35 bars member nations' governments from deciding that compliance with GAR#27 (as well as promoting people's freedom by permitting non-governmental organisations to set their own standards for membership & office-holding instead of having those dictated by the government) is a "compelling practical purpose" for continuing to allow discrimination in that situation...

[Separatist Peoples]

...Some people have defended the proposal’s legality by stating that GenSec has already allowed other proposals to limit nations’ authority to define “compelling practical purpose”. I can neither remember nor find any formal, collective GenSec rulings to that effect: Can you? ...

Not specifically for GAR #35, but it is well within game precedent, explicitly backed by GenSec opinion (formal ruling posted here), that a later resolution can refine or add to the interpretation of a broad phrase used in an earlier resolution, whether the earlier one claims to permit it or not.

This is my reading. Precedent exists, we have a presumption of legality when proposals are ambiguous. Ergo, legal.

[Maowi]

My argument is not that GAR #27 allows member nations' governments to force organisations to place specific people in specific positions, but that it allows governments to impose anti-discrimination policies on them

Your interpretation of GAR#27's actual wording, however -- that it allows governments to control the structures and systems of organisations -- would allow member nations' governments to place specific people in specific positions... or, acting in a marginally less blatant fashion, to require that all positions could only be filled by government-approved candidates -- as well as to enforce anti-discrimination rules as you want.

I do think that the above is a reasonable interpretation of GAR #27 - not one that I would follow - but that is, I believe, a flaw in GAR #27 and whether it is reasonable or not has no bearing on the legality of this proposal. If we accept that GAR #27 allows governments to enforce anti-discrimination rules on organisations, this proposal - in this respect, at least - is legal.

Also, if the combination of GAR#27 & GAR#35 is to be read in the way that you suggest, what does your proposal actually do that that combination doesn't?

The purpose of this proposal is to prevent theocracies and religious organisations abusing the term 'compelling practical purposes' by placing limits on what objectively constitutes a compelling practical purpose. The initial challenge was against the legality of this and I believe it has been addressed, although you may of course think differently.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

That line of argument requires a clear statement of principles as to why a private religious organization employing persons as priests may discriminate against otherwise qualified candidates based on gender, but a private manufacturing organization (for example) employing persons as business executives may not.

Religions, like political parties but generally unlike private manufacturing organizations, are ideologically-based organisations. It is reasonable to allow ideologically-based organisations to require compliance with their underlying ideological doctrine's tenets for membership, and especially for holding office, and in the case of some religious organisations those tenets include "divinely-inspired" restrictions on who can be ordained (or consecrated, or initiated, or whatever term that faith uses) into the clergy. Allowing religions to bar people who do not meet the doctrinally-set requirements from this ordained is therefore reasonable. (Or, at least, is no less reasonable than allowing private manufacturing organisations to exclude people with records of making poor decisions about business matters from management posts...)

You're citing two completely unrelated standards. For the religion side, you're arguing that the organization should be able to say "Our religious ideology forbids black people from becoming priests, because of something our holy book says," based on the freedom to assemble. Why should businesses not be free to use that standard - to say "Our market-segmentation ideology forbids black people from becoming executives because of something our business plan says," - based on the freedom to assemble? Instead of asking that question, you pretend that the business equivalent is rather not hiring an incompetent executive based on their actual past performance as measured by profit and assets. This is not remotely equivalent. You have not explained why an organization whose business model is to sell weekly in-person metaphysics and motivational lectures (for pocket change, small bills, and occasional larger donations in currency and in kind) should be able to discriminate on basic innate attributes, while an organization whose business model is more regularly-priced goods or services should not. If it is legitimate for a church to refuse to employ persons as priests based on GAR #35 protected characteristics, without regard for the depth of their faith, their ability to command the attention of an audience, or their power to make difficult theological concepts accessible to the average churchgoer, why is it unacceptable for a business concern to do the same thing without regard to the subject's understanding of the organization, knowledge of the market, ability to recognize purchasing and sale trends, hiring acumen/character judgment, etc.?

[Aclion]

Religions, like political parties but generally unlike private manufacturing organizations, are ideologically-based organisations. It is reasonable to allow ideologically-based organisations to require compliance with their underlying ideological doctrine's tenets for membership, and especially for holding office, and in the case of some religious organisations those tenets include "divinely-inspired" restrictions on who can be ordained (or consecrated, or initiated, or whatever term that faith uses) into the clergy. Allowing religions to bar people who do not meet the doctrinally-set requirements from this ordained is therefore reasonable. (Or, at least, is no less reasonable than allowing private manufacturing organisations to exclude people with records of making poor decisions about business matters from management posts...)

You're citing two completely unrelated standards. For the religion side, you're arguing that the organization should be able to say "Our religious ideology forbids black people from becoming priests, because of something our holy book says," based on the freedom to assemble. Why should businesses not be free to use that standard - to say "Our market-segmentation ideology forbids black people from becoming executives because of something our business plan says," - based on the freedom to assemble? Instead of asking that question, you pretend that the business equivalent is rather not hiring an incompetent executive based on their actual past performance as measured by profit and assets. This is not remotely equivalent. You have not explained why an organization whose business model is to sell weekly in-person metaphysics and motivational lectures (for pocket change, small bills, and occasional larger donations in currency and in kind) should be able to discriminate on basic innate attributes, while an organization whose business model is more regularly-priced goods or services should not. If it is legitimate for a church to refuse to employ persons as priests based on GAR #35 protected characteristics, without regard for the depth of their faith, their ability to command the attention of an audience, or their power to make difficult theological concepts accessible to the average churchgoer, why is it unacceptable for a business concern to do the same thing without regard to the subject's understanding of the organization, knowledge of the market, ability to recognize purchasing and sale trends, hiring acumen/character judgment, etc.?

For one, nations have the power to regulate business models, while they don't have that power with religious ideology.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

You're citing two completely unrelated standards. For the religion side, you're arguing that the organization should be able to say "Our religious ideology forbids black people from becoming priests, because of something our holy book says," based on the freedom to assemble. Why should businesses not be free to use that standard - to say "Our market-segmentation ideology forbids black people from becoming executives because of something our business plan says," - based on the freedom to assemble? Instead of asking that question, you pretend that the business equivalent is rather not hiring an incompetent executive based on their actual past performance as measured by profit and assets. This is not remotely equivalent. You have not explained why an organization whose business model is to sell weekly in-person metaphysics and motivational lectures (for pocket change, small bills, and occasional larger donations in currency and in kind) should be able to discriminate on basic innate attributes, while an organization whose business model is more regularly-priced goods or services should not. If it is legitimate for a church to refuse to employ persons as priests based on GAR #35 protected characteristics, without regard for the depth of their faith, their ability to command the attention of an audience, or their power to make difficult theological concepts accessible to the average churchgoer, why is it unacceptable for a business concern to do the same thing without regard to the subject's understanding of the organization, knowledge of the market, ability to recognize purchasing and sale trends, hiring acumen/character judgment, etc.?

For one, nations have the power to regulate business models, while they don't have that power with religious ideology.

It's not regulation of ideology. It's regulation of employment practices.

Asserts, furthermore, the right of all individuals in World Assembly member-states to engage in any religious practice, or to refuse to engage in said practices, without fear of state punishment, reprisal, or persecution, except where restrictions on said practice are the least restrictive means by which to advance a compelling, practical public interest in the maintenance of safety, health, or good order,

[Bears Armed]

Religions, like political parties but generally unlike private manufacturing organizations, are ideologically-based organisations. It is reasonable to allow ideologically-based organisations to require compliance with their underlying ideological doctrine's tenets for membership, and especially for holding office, and in the case of some religious organisations those tenets include "divinely-inspired" restrictions on who can be ordained (or consecrated, or initiated, or whatever term that faith uses) into the clergy. Allowing religions to bar people who do not meet the doctrinally-set requirements from this ordained is therefore reasonable. (Or, at least, is no less reasonable than allowing private manufacturing organisations to exclude people with records of making poor decisions about business matters from management posts...)

You're citing two completely unrelated standards. For the religion side, you're arguing that the organization should be able to say "Our religious ideology forbids black people from becoming priests, because of something our holy book says," based on the freedom to assemble. Why should businesses not be free to use that standard - to say "Our market-segmentation ideology forbids black people from becoming executives because of something our business plan says," - based on the freedom to assemble? Instead of asking that question, you pretend that the business equivalent is rather not hiring an incompetent executive based on their actual past performance as measured by profit and assets. This is not remotely equivalent. You have not explained why an organization whose business model is to sell weekly in-person metaphysics and motivational lectures (for pocket change, small bills, and occasional larger donations in currency and in kind) should be able to discriminate on basic innate attributes, while an organization whose business model is more regularly-priced goods or services should not. If it is legitimate for a church to refuse to employ persons as priests based on GAR #35 protected characteristics, without regard for the depth of their faith, their ability to command the attention of an audience, or their power to make difficult theological concepts accessible to the average churchgoer, why is it unacceptable for a business concern to do the same thing without regard to the subject's understanding of the organization, knowledge of the market, ability to recognize purchasing and sale trends, hiring acumen/character judgment, etc.?

For the religions it is actual beliefs, which they may believe to be god-given (with contravening them consequently a dangerous sin) and thus beyond mortal authority to change: For businesses, it's just preferences which the people involved made and which those people are therefore able to change a LOT more easily...

[Separatist Peoples]

You're citing two completely unrelated standards. For the religion side, you're arguing that the organization should be able to say "Our religious ideology forbids black people from becoming priests, because of something our holy book says," based on the freedom to assemble. Why should businesses not be free to use that standard - to say "Our market-segmentation ideology forbids black people from becoming executives because of something our business plan says," - based on the freedom to assemble? Instead of asking that question, you pretend that the business equivalent is rather not hiring an incompetent executive based on their actual past performance as measured by profit and assets. This is not remotely equivalent. You have not explained why an organization whose business model is to sell weekly in-person metaphysics and motivational lectures (for pocket change, small bills, and occasional larger donations in currency and in kind) should be able to discriminate on basic innate attributes, while an organization whose business model is more regularly-priced goods or services should not. If it is legitimate for a church to refuse to employ persons as priests based on GAR #35 protected characteristics, without regard for the depth of their faith, their ability to command the attention of an audience, or their power to make difficult theological concepts accessible to the average churchgoer, why is it unacceptable for a business concern to do the same thing without regard to the subject's understanding of the organization, knowledge of the market, ability to recognize purchasing and sale trends, hiring acumen/character judgment, etc.?

For the religions it is actual beliefs, which they may believe to be god-given (with contravening them consequently a dangerous sin) and thus beyond mortal authority to change: For businesses, it's just preferences which the people involved made and which those people are therefore able to change a LOT more easily...

That isn't really relevant. Freedom of association protects the right to associate as private citizens, not the right to hire.

Since we have established that later resolutions can clarify ambiguous terms, and since compelling practical purposes is pretty ambiguous, precedent says it is legal, regardless of whether it is prudent policy, to make such a clarification.

Your argument is straying from whether this is permissible within the ruleset and into whether this is a good idea, which is not a determination GenSec makes.