RULE BROKEN: Committees Rule
EXPLANATION: "Committees cannot be the sole purpose of the proposal. It is an addition to the proposal and designed to carry out specific duties related to the proposal." No person can deny that 80% of the proposal's active text consists of committees and their functions. Any argument that this does not violate the committees rule depends on the few short mandates following the bureaucracy it establishes. In order to determine the legality of this proposal before the committees rule, we can look to two tests that GenSec has applied in other challenges.
The first, and older, test to determine legality before the committee rule is to remove the committee or committees from a resolution and see what remains. In this proposal each of the active clauses depends on one of the committees, committee hearings, or committee fines. When we apply this test, nothing remains of the active clauses. The first three articles disappear entirely. Of the fourth article, the first clause becomes meaningless, as it blocks member states from preventing cooperation with a nonexistent entity. The second clause becomes meaningless, as it establishes rights at hearings that will not be held. The third and fourth clauses become meaningless, as they legislate on sanctions that will never be applied. By this first test, the proposal violates the committees rule.
The second test, more affectionately known as the doomsday asteroids test, changes the mandates of the committee to something entirely unrelated, and checks for a category violation. So, if the ES, IAO, and the GAO were tasked with, say, providing interplanetary defense against doomsday asteroids, the test asks if the resolution still qualifies as a Human Rights proposal. If we so repurpose the committees, we then look to the other active clauses. Article four now prevents member states from preventing cooperation with committees that defend against doomsday asteroids. It entitles member states to representation at meetings on how to defend against doomsday asteroids. And it requires member states to levy sanctions against member states that do not allow these committees to defend against doomsday asteroids, to the extent that such sanctions do not threaten the survival of that member state's population. Certainly, this doomsday asteroid proposal does not belong in the Human Rights category, as it does nothing to guarantee human rights. By this second test, the proposal violates the committees rule.
By the precedent established in the majority opinion on "Ban on Secret Treaties", and by the tests it presents as valid methods for determining legality against the committees rule, this proposal is illegal.
RULE BROKEN: Strength Rule
EXPLANATION: A resolution that affects "a very broad area of policy in a dramatic way" falls into the Strong subcategory. This proposal legislates on the narrow area of compliance, and based on the category choice of Human Rights, focuses on an even narrower area of compliance with human rights mandates.
Compliance is already mandatory by the nature of the World Assembly, and the Compliance Commission already investigates instances of noncompliance and compiles information about noncompliance. With these factors to consider, the proposal "Administrative Compliance Act" simply does not have a dramatic enough effect. The Enforcement Sub-Commission duplicates the Compliance Commission within itself, and the rest of the resolution provides for hearings and fines for noncompliance. These effects are more incremental than dramatic.
Considering that this proposal neither acts on a broad area of policy, nor does so in a dramatic way, the resolution belongs in the Significant subcategory.
