BAISHADAO JOURNAL
SONGHUA GOVERNMENT BLOCKS MEDIA FROM HULIN DAM SITE
Protesters reportedly block roads leading to construction site
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20 November 2017 20:00 | Xikou, Songguo
Hulin Dam, under construction in Xiashan Governorate.
Photo courtesy of the Public Works Directorate.
Hulin Dam, first proposed nearly 20 years ago, shortly after Zhao Bolin's ascension to Chairman of the State Council, was a promising project. Investors flocking to a country newly opened by post-1984 reforms were eager to back ambitious infrastructure projects of all kinds, and a massive hydroelectric dam was right up their alley. The government, too, initially seemed as eager about Hulin Dam as it was about other proposed major hydroelectric dams at the time, such as the massive Four Canyons project near Yuling. The Bu River, in the eastern region of Songguo's far-flung and impoverished Xiashan Governorate, has enormous hydroelectric potential around the Bailu Falls, where it plummets nearly 100 meters over the course of 10 miles.
However, as Four Canyons and other projects around the country, such as the massive drive to build a high-speed rail network, gradually grew in scope, Hulin Dam languished and was not approved until 1998, with construction on the huge structure only beginning two years later in 2000. Since then, the project has lagged behind schedule and seen several embarrassing embezzlement and corruption scandals that have damaged its image significantly. Hulin Dam was supposed to bring jobs, development, and cheap electricity to Xiashan Governorate's impoverished countryside, but as workers were brought in from other parts of the country and villagers forcibly relocated by the Internal Security Service (which also kept supply roads to the dam clear of locals), many began to resent the project.
Protests have broken out repeatedly, most notably six years ago when the dam body was completed and the reservoir began to fill, when a group of villagers violently resisted the ISS's relocation efforts and camped amidst the floodwaters for three months until they finally were forced to retreat. Despite strenuous efforts by the Songhua government to censor the story, it was captured by the spotlight of the international media, provoking outrage against Tianjing's heavy-handed approach. Dam workers have also suffered a number of fatal or serious injuries in accidents, leading many to object to the government's lack of concern for safety and cutting corners in an effort to bring the much-maligned project back on schedule (while others have speculated the "accidents" may be a continuation of local protests by other means). Hulin Dam has become a poster child for critics pointing to overreaches by government bureaucrats living in what they say are ivory towers in the wealthy, developed, urbanized west, especially Tianjing and the Capital Region, and for the state's seeming lack of concern about issues in the more rural south and east.
Critics, both local and international, have also complained of the dam's enormous environmental impact. Hundreds of miles of forests and rice fields have been drowned as water levels have risen, and silt levels downstream have already dropped measurably, raising concerns about increased erosion along the coast. The Public Works Directorate and the Energy Ministry have also ignored accusations that construction had polluted the river and impacted the local population of Coral Sea pink dolphins, which frequent the Bu River estuary and its lower reaches.
Now it appears another wave of protests has erupted, with protesters reportedly blocking a number of supply roads leading to the dam and even apparently attempting to put obstacles in the path of barges and ships moving up the Bu. The Songhua government has been quick to react, dismissing the stories as "fake news" propagated by foreign operatives. However, the Interior Security Ministry has escorted nearly all journalists out of the western prefectures of Xiashan Governorate and dispatched ISS security troops to the region, likely with the intent of quickly subduing protesters. Public Works Director Jin Linzi (whose incumbency is in fact predated by the beginning of the Hulin reservoir filling) offered typical comments- assuring the public that the situation was under control and that steps were being taken to ensure the dam would soon be back on its revised 2004 schedule (calling for full operational status by the end of 2019).
However, most analysts are somewhat incredulous at Director Jin and the Songhua government's claims, saying the dam likely will not be fully operational until 2021 or 2022 given current progress. Experts have also been disappointed by the dam's failure to provide much in the way of transformation for western Xiashan Governorate- promised jobs and other development and investment have not materialized, while it now seems likely most the dam's plentiful electricity will be fueling explosive urban growth on the Chang Delta or exported to Namkwon rather than into rural electrification in Xiashan Governorate. Regardless of the costs, though, with the reservoir full and billions of Euclos and decades of work sunk into the project, Hulin Dam is too big for Tianjing to give up on.
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