Note that citizens will still be protected under GAR#334 as a minimum and hope that this gives a chance for the esteemed assembly to re-draft future resolutions on protecting wartime journalism, in light of the two previous resolutions on this matter (GAR#501 and GAR#554) and their repeals (GAR#504 and GAR#591).
Furthermore, urges the Assembly to carefully consider issues such as a balance between "operational security" (OPSEC) compared to freedom of press, for which the Assembly appears to have reached no consensus and strongly the Assembly to consider a replacement that reflects the changing realities of warfare, particularly the increased use of "open source intelligence" and the blurring of lines between ordinary citizens using social media (and sharing information that may end up having military use) vs proper reporters.
The OSINT comments are (quite obviously) in response to the current situation in Europe with the use of Telegram, Twitter, Starlink, open source drones and other technologies not seen in combat prior to February 2022.
Draft 2
The World Assembly,
Aghast at the passing of the resolution GAR#624 "Protections In Wartime Reporting", which includes several literally fatal loopholes endangering the lives of journalists, "civic journalism" and social media users already facing grave dangers at war, including:
- Section (3)(b) of the said resolution, which introduced the loophole of stopping all journalists to enter the war-torn areas, creating a loophole over protections afforded under GAR#601 ("Freedom of Travel") and hampering freedom of the press;
- Significant ambiguities resulting from (i) defining "wartime reporting", but not who is a "wartime reporter", (ii) an unclear definition of "espionage" and "clandestine" activities, resulting in numerous issues (specifically, depending on [i]which side[/] they fall among belligerents in a war), including:
- Potentially allowing significant users of social media to lose protection otherwise available under GAR#334 ("Protected Status in Wartime") and become belligerents in a war (inadvertently or otherwise) merely due to their use of social media to reveal information that may be considered "clandestine" ;
- The absence of any accountability towards "open-source intelligence" ("OSINT"), which has become far more important in warfare in very recent times as a result of developments in technologies across the NS multi-verse, such as the use of low-cost satellites, positioning systems, smart phones, the use of common social media and communication platforms even by troops on the ground, putting ordinary social media users at risk even if they inadvertently took pictures or shared information that turned out to have intelligence value;
- Ambiguities in section (4) resulting in the possible interpretation of social media users (and others engaged in citizen journalism, even merely as good neighbours informing each other of incoming missiles or the progress of war in general) as OSINT participants (and in turn as combatants), and causing them to lose their protection under GAR#334 ("Protected Status in Wartime") and GAR#345 ("Proscription on Living Shields")
- The absence of any protection for paramilitary activities (previously under GAR#554) which may be considered by separate pending resolutions on law enforcement officers;
- The replacement of a stronger resolution (GAR#554, "Safety and Integrity In Conflict Journalism") by a weaker resolution, and the abject failure to close loopholes cited in GAR#591 ("Repeal "Safety and Integrity In Conflict Journalism")
Hereby repeals GAR#[624] "Protections in Wartime Reporting" and looks forward to rigorous debate in the esteemed Assembly on any possible replacements.
Co-authors: [pending, will be edited in due course]
Draft 1
Personal note: I retract with apologies to my previous statements about insta-repeals being undemocratic and other related comments. I am writing in a personal capacity and this proposal does not represent the views of WALL or TNP in any way.