[PASSED] Religious Freedom Protection

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

This is not even close to ready. There are many problems with this rushed replacement. I'm only going to point out one obvious problem in the hopes you'll pause, reflect on what you're doing, and take the time to draft something of this magnitude properly.

"Religion" means a set of beliefs on the metaphysical governing means of behaviour or morality.

This definition is wholly inadequate. I'll have to just assume this definition might help someone understand the term better, but I'm really not convinced of that. "Beliefs on the metaphysical governing means of behavior?" What?

Anyway, this definition does not include very obvious components of religious faith, including beliefs about the creation of the world, and beliefs about what happens to us when we die. Indeed, those beliefs are far more fundamental to religion, and they predate religious forays into morality.

Your conception of religion as a mere tool for dictating behavior and morality demonstrates to me that you may not be competent to legislate in this area.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

This is not even close to ready. There are many problems with this rushed replacement. I'm only going to point out one obvious problem in the hopes you'll pause, reflect on what you're doing, and take the time to draft something of this magnitude properly.

"Religion" means a set of beliefs on the metaphysical governing means of behaviour or morality.

This definition is wholly inadequate. I'll have to just assume this definition might help someone understand the term better, but I'm really not convinced of that. "Beliefs on the metaphysical governing means of behavior?" What?

Anyway, this definition does not include very obvious components of religious faith, including beliefs about the creation of the world, and beliefs about what happens to us when we die. Indeed, those beliefs are far more fundamental to religion, and they predate religious forays into morality.

Your conception of religion as a mere tool for dictating behavior and morality demonstrates to me that you may not be competent to legislate in this area.

Ooc: For the record, the definition has been altered based on a conversation with others in the WA Discord. However, as to your particular post, I suppose that Buddhism and Jainism aren't religions because they aren't creationist.

[Princess Rainbow Sparkles]

This is not even close to ready. There are many problems with this rushed replacement. I'm only going to point out one obvious problem in the hopes you'll pause, reflect on what you're doing, and take the time to draft something of this magnitude properly.


This definition is wholly inadequate. I'll have to just assume this definition might help someone understand the term better, but I'm really not convinced of that. "Beliefs on the metaphysical governing means of behavior?" What?

Anyway, this definition does not include very obvious components of religious faith, including beliefs about the creation of the world, and beliefs about what happens to us when we die. Indeed, those beliefs are far more fundamental to religion, and they predate religious forays into morality.

Your conception of religion as a mere tool for dictating behavior and morality demonstrates to me that you may not be competent to legislate in this area.

Ooc: For the record, the definition has been altered based on a conversation with others in the WA Discord. However, as to your particular post, I suppose that Buddhism and Jainism aren't religions because they aren't creationist.

Both those religions have beliefs about the creation of the world you dingdong, even if those beliefs are that there was no moment of creation (as held by other religions) because the world is part of some mystical timeless cycle.

You yourself just pointed out how those beliefs about creation (or, in these cases, beliefs that there was never a moment of creation) are critical aspects of those religions. Aspects which your "governing means of behavior or morality" definition completely miss.

You are only further demonstrating that you lack sufficient understanding of this topic to make good law on it, particularly in the foolish hurry you seem to be in.

Edit: If the anonymous others who apparently conversed you into adopting this definition wish to speak up in its defense on the official forum now would be a particularly good time. Otherwise appeal to some vague conversation with your drinking buddies is hardly firm authority on which to rest on your laurels.

Edit: Struck out gratuitous meanness. Sorry, I really am just a bit ornery today.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

Ooc: For the record, the definition has been altered based on a conversation with others in the WA Discord. However, as to your particular post, I suppose that Buddhism and Jainism aren't religions because they aren't creationist.

Both those religions have beliefs about the creation of the world you dingdong, even if those beliefs are that there was no moment of creation (as held by other religions) because the world is part of some mystical timeless cycle.

You yourself just pointed out how those beliefs about creation (or, in these cases, beliefs that there was never a moment of creation) are critical aspects of those religions. Aspects which your "governing means of behavior or morality" definition completely miss.

You are only further demonstrating that you lack sufficient understanding of this topic to make good law on it, particularly in the foolish hurry you seem to be in.

Ooc: Nowhere does the definition say that each individual belief has to "govern means of behaviour or morality" (as shown by "which governs" being in singular, as opposed to the plural of "beliefs"). The set of beliefs collectively do govern behaviour or morality, as all religions do.

[Wallenburg]

In section 2, what does it mean to "prosecute or penalise any individual for their religion"? Do you mean by religion "religious identity" or "religious beliefs" or "religious practices"?

EDIT: It's defined right there. Brainfart on my part.

[The Orwell Society]

Support.

[Aelyria]

OOC: My criticism has largely been ignored, but I intend to do a full breakdown later today. For now, a key issue.

Your clause 5b prohibits church tax. But it also prohibits tax-exempt status for organizations supporting various forms of (non)belief. That's a pretty big oversight, one that would cause chaos in any member state where such laws exist.

[Aelyria]

OOC: Okay, let's do this.

1. So be it that in this resolution _
   
   
   1. "Religion" means a set of beliefs regarding the spiritual or supernatural, which governs means of behaviour or morality.
      
      
   2. "Religious practice" means a practice performed due to and as per one's bona fide religion, where said action is necessary for the observance of said religion.
      
      
   3. "Member state" includes any political or administrative subdivision thereof.
   
   
2. The holding or lack of any religion must be legal in all member states. Accordingly, no member state may prosecute or penalise any individual for their religion or lack thereof.
   
   
3. All individuals within the jurisdiction of the World Assembly have a right to engage in bona fide religious practices without state punishment or interference. Member states may restrict this right in order to advance a compelling, practical interest, where the scope of said restriction is substantially related to that interest. The promotion, suppression, or discouragement of a religion shall never be considered a "compelling, practical interest" for the purposes of this resolution.
   
   
4. The act of targeting violence, murder, or any otherwise-unlawful act towards a person on the grounds of their religion or lack thereof, or their membership or non-membership in a religious institution, is hereby prohibited. Further, no secular service -- such as education or insurance -- may be denied to any individual due to their religion or lack thereof, nor may any entity deny an individual employment in a secular role due to that individual's religion or lack thereof.
   
   
5. Each member state must refrain from discriminating against any individual for their religion or lack thereof. Accordingly, no member state may
   
   
   1. deny equality under the law to those holding or lacking a religion;
      
      
   2. discriminate in tax based on religion or lack thereof; or
      
      
   3. deny any secular right or privilege from individuals based on their religion or lack thereof.
6. Should a provision of this resolution contradict some past World Assembly resolution still in force, that previous resolution takes precedence.

1. (a) As others have said, your definition of "religion" is weak at best, and a likely reason for repeal. As it stands, it excludes things which demonstrably are religions, such as (several branches of) Buddhism and Hinduism, which reject belief in anything "supernatural." Likewise, it lumps in several things which demonstrably are not religions, and ignores the significance of organized belief vs. individual belief; by the definition given here, a "religion" can be just a single person declaring a particular perspective on these topics. Finally, not all religions specifically "govern behavior or morality"; consider Satanism, which acts almost totally against the idea of behavioral norms in the first place.
(b) This leaves open an enormous loophole regarding what is "necessary for the observance of said religion." E.g., there are Reform Jews who do not follow all of the Kashrut; hence, one can argue it is not "necessary" to follow the Kashrut to practice Judaism, even though essentially all practitioners of Judaism (whether reform or otherwise) consider it completely necessary. The "bona fide" part of the definition also leaves a lot to be desired--what counts as "bona fide religion"? Who decides this? How do they decide it?
(c) More a nitpick than a true issue, but this is very poorly-worded. Better to instead say something like, "All provisions herein apply equally to each Member State and every political or administrative subdivision thereof."

2. Again, not the wording I'd use, but I won't make too much of a fuss on that.

3. What defines a "compelling, practical interest"? This is a huge part of the problem with this proposal: you are permitting literally ANYTHING the state thinks is "compelling" and/or "practical," so long as it isn't directly and explicitly religious promotion/suppression/discouragement. E.g., "in order to promote the public welfare, to prevent current and unknown future diseases from spreading through the populace, all gatherings of more than three persons are hereby banned, unless receiving permit from the State." This could easily be undertaken with the goal of restricting religious freedom--e.g., only certain religious groups get their permits approved in a timely manner, while others have theirs slow-walked or continuously rejected due to technicalities. Further, because the only requirement is that the restriction is "substantially related to that interest," all sorts of onerous restraints can be applied, just so long as it bears some kind of relationship to the interest.

4. More or less fine, though prohibiting murder seems a little...unnecessary, unless you mean to make extra penalties for murder motivated by (non)religion. In which case, the fact that you did not actually do so is odd to say the least.

5. As already stated, clause 5b prevents providing tax-exempt status to organizations supporting adherents, be they believers or explicit non-believers, which is a massive problem. Further, clause 5c doesn't address, for instance, the problems of bigamy/polygamy (generally, though not always, polygyny) and other in principle secular rights which nevertheless are often connected to religious beliefs (e.g. the LDS Church defended their alleged religious freedom to practice polygamy, specifically polygyny, for several decades, and the Fundamentalist LDS Church currently still claims that this is a necessary tenet of their religion that must be respected.)

6. Boilerplate, nothing to comment upon.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

OOC: Okay, let's do this.

Long post

1. (a) As others have said, your definition of "religion" is weak at best, and a likely reason for repeal. As it stands, it excludes things which demonstrably are religions, such as (several branches of) Buddhism and Hinduism, which reject belief in anything "supernatural." Likewise, it lumps in several things which demonstrably are not religions, and ignores the significance of organized belief vs. individual belief; by the definition given here, a "religion" can be just a single person declaring a particular perspective on these topics. Finally, not all religions specifically "govern behavior or morality"; consider Satanism, which acts almost totally against the idea of behavioral norms in the first place.

Ooc: It does not require that there be belief in the supernatural, merely that there be beliefs regarding the supernatural or spiritual. A singular person declaring a particular perspective on these topic is also -- intentionally -- included as a "religion". Satanism does actually "govern means of behaviour or morality".

(b) This leaves open an enormous loophole regarding what is "necessary for the observance of said religion." E.g., there are Reform Jews who do not follow all of the Kashrut; hence, one can argue it is not "necessary" to follow the Kashrut to practice Judaism, even though essentially all practitioners of Judaism (whether reform or otherwise) consider it completely necessary. The "bona fide" part of the definition also leaves a lot to be desired--what counts as "bona fide religion"? Who decides this? How do they decide it?

A religion is "bona fide" if one genuinely holds it. This has been clarified -- thanks. Does "properly observe" as opposed to just "observe" resolve the former concern?

(c) More a nitpick than a true issue, but this is very poorly-worded. Better to instead say something like, "All provisions herein apply equally to each Member State and every political or administrative subdivision thereof."

2. Again, not the wording I'd use, but I won't make too much of a fuss on that.

Why?

3. What defines a "compelling, practical interest"? This is a huge part of the problem with this proposal: you are permitting literally ANYTHING the state thinks is "compelling" and/or "practical," so long as it isn't directly and explicitly religious promotion/suppression/discouragement. E.g., "in order to promote the public welfare, to prevent current and unknown future diseases from spreading through the populace, all gatherings of more than three persons are hereby banned, unless receiving permit from the State." This could easily be undertaken with the goal of restricting religious freedom--e.g., only certain religious groups get their permits approved in a timely manner, while others have theirs slow-walked or continuously rejected due to technicalities. Further, because the only requirement is that the restriction is "substantially related to that interest," all sorts of onerous restraints can be applied, just so long as it bears some kind of relationship to the interest.

I've semi-adapted from research on US jurisprudence a new and clearer version of the intermediate scrutiny test. Does the new test address this concern?

4. More or less fine, though prohibiting murder seems a little...unnecessary, unless you mean to make extra penalties for murder motivated by (non)religion. In which case, the fact that you did not actually do so is odd to say the least.

Done.

5. As already stated, clause 5b prevents providing tax-exempt status to organizations supporting adherents, be they believers or explicit non-believers, which is a massive problem.

Good.

Further, clause 5c doesn't address, for instance, the problems of bigamy/polygamy (generally, though not always, polygyny) and other in principle secular rights which nevertheless are often connected to religious beliefs (e.g. the LDS Church defended their alleged religious freedom to practice polygamy, specifically polygyny, for several decades, and the Fundamentalist LDS Church currently still claims that this is a necessary tenet of their religion that must be respected.)

Fair enough -- I've removed it as it's only an example and likely clear enough from the text of Section 5 anyway.

[Simone Republic]

Again, as long as there is some space for IA to modify his resolution to outright ban cannibalism, I am not expressing a view on this resolution.

[Old Hope]

5. As already stated, clause 5b prevents providing tax-exempt status to organizations supporting adherents, be they believers or explicit non-believers, which is a massive problem.

That's not really correct.
It can be easily circumvented by providing tax-exempt status to all nonprofit organizations. This means you discriminate by profit or lack of profit, which is not the same as religion or lack of religion.

[Aelyria]

5. As already stated, clause 5b prevents providing tax-exempt status to organizations supporting adherents, be they believers or explicit non-believers, which is a massive problem.

Good.

OOC: So...just so I am 100% clear on this (I intend to write a more full response)...

You want to make 501(c)(3) type tax-exempt organizations illegal. You want to make organizations like the Humanist Society, American Atheists, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, and the Council for Secular Humanism pay taxes, something which almost certainly would cause significant damage to their efforts (seeing as their current structure is based on *not* paying said taxes.)

Just as long as we're clear that you want to make taxing both religious and nonreligious/areligious/antireligious charitable organizations a thing. Because I want to be absolutely certain that that's your intent.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

Good.

OOC: So...just so I am 100% clear on this (I intend to write a more full response)...

You want to make 501(c)(3) type tax-exempt organizations illegal. You want to make organizations like the American Humanist Association, American Atheists, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, and the Council for Secular Humanism pay taxes, something which almost certainly would cause significant damage to their efforts (seeing as their current structure is based on *not* paying said taxes.)

Just as long as we're clear that you want to make taxing both religious and nonreligious/areligious/antireligious charitable organizations a thing. Because I want to be absolutely certain that that's your intent.

Ooc: I have no problem with exempting all non-profit or charitable organisations from taxes. I have a problem with exempting organisations from taxes specifically because they are religious, but still taxing comparable secular organisations.

Edit: In any case, given that (as of the latest revision) 5b applies only to discrimination in tax against "individuals", this issue becomes moot. I would still fully support a separate resolution that bans tax exemptions based on whether an organisation is religious.

[Aelyria]

5. As already stated, clause 5b prevents providing tax-exempt status to organizations supporting adherents, be they believers or explicit non-believers, which is a massive problem.

That's not really correct.
It can be easily circumvented by providing tax-exempt status to all nonprofit organizations. This means you discriminate by profit or lack of profit, which is not the same as religion or lack of religion.

It absolutely would end the tax-exemption status of organizations like the Humanist Society. That is unacceptable.

[Aelyria]

OOC: So...just so I am 100% clear on this (I intend to write a more full response)...

You want to make 501(c)(3) type tax-exempt organizations illegal. You want to make organizations like the American Humanist Association, American Atheists, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, and the Council for Secular Humanism pay taxes, something which almost certainly would cause significant damage to their efforts (seeing as their current structure is based on *not* paying said taxes.)

Just as long as we're clear that you want to make taxing both religious and nonreligious/areligious/antireligious charitable organizations a thing. Because I want to be absolutely certain that that's your intent.

Ooc: I have no problem with exempting all non-profit or charitable organisations from taxes. I have a problem with exempting organisations from taxes specifically because they are religious, but still taxing comparable secular organisations.

Edit: In any case, given that (as of the latest revision) 5b applies only to discrimination in tax against "individuals", this issue becomes moot. I would still fully support a separate resolution that bans tax exemptions based on whether an organisation is religious.

OOC: According to the common understanding of the exemption, atheists, agnostics, secular humanists, and a variety of other organizations are "religious" for the purposes of qualifying for these exemptions.

Like...do you seriously not know this? The "religious" exemption is extremely broad. It encompasses essentially anything regarding belief or lack thereof. English lacks a good word for this due to the implication that "religion" means active belief in some specific thing, but as a term of law, "religious organization" covers EVERYTHING, including outright anti-religion.

[Aelyria]

Responding only to those sections which require it and haven't been addressed above.

Ooc: It does not require that there be belief in the supernatural, merely that there be beliefs regarding the supernatural or spiritual. A singular person declaring a particular perspective on these topic is also -- intentionally -- included as a "religion". Satanism does actually "govern means of behaviour or morality".

If it requires beliefs "regarding" the supernatural or spiritual...and that "regard" can literally be "doesn't actually believe anything specific," what exactly is the definition doing? That's my point here. You've either defined "religion" so broadly that it means genuinely absolutely everything, all human beliefs (since the absence of a belief qualifies), or so narrowly that things which specifically should be in there would be excluded (such as Secular Humanist celebrants or particular branches of Buddhism, Hinduism, and other Eastern religions which reject the existence of anything supernatural or spiritual.)

Contrast, for example, against the definition from Dictionary.com: "a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs." You can see the similarities--mention of a moral code, reference to supernatural things ("superhuman agency or agencies"), but it's quite different.

A religion is "bona fide" if one genuinely holds it. This has been clarified -- thanks. Does "properly observe" as opposed to just "observe" resolve the former concern?

Again, the problem comes down to what "properly observe" means. How does one "properly" observe Secular Humanism? (Again, I know that secular humanism is areligious in the philosophical and colloquial sense, but in a legal sense, organized secular humanism qualifies as a "religion.") How does one "properly" observe Judaism, given there are substantial differences between Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and several other, smaller groups (with some, such as Messianic Judaism, challenged as to whether they qualify as "Judiasm" at all!) Or, if we go further afield, how does one "properly" observe Wicca, a religion developed less than a century ago and which has an intentionally many-fold approach (with most, though not all, Wiccans espousing, "Eight words the Wiccan Rede fulfill: An it harm none, do what ye will.")?

Who claims the authority to answer such questions, and how do we ensure that that authority does not become abused in its own way? Gatekeeping religious protections via requirements of "proper" practice is a risky thing, and forces courts to make hard-line decisions on complex legal matters, which most judges distinctly dislike doing.

Why?

Well, already explained my reasoning on clause 1c. As for 2, it's just clunky and reads poorly. Better to do something like, "No member state may penalize or prosecute any person within their jurisdiction on the basis of any religious belief or absence thereof." Since practice in particular is not the focus of your proposal, further statements are not necessary at this time.

I've semi-adapted from research on US jurisprudence a new and clearer version of the intermediate scrutiny test. Does the new test address this concern?

So...this is gonna be one of the biggest issues. Firstly because, in doing what you've done, you've completely reversed your position, and reinstated the alleged problem with the original legislation. "Narrowly-tailored" is the goal of the least-restrictive means test. In order to determine whether something is "narrowly-tailored" or not, you test whether it is the least-restrictive means which still achieves (as noted in my numerous citations, "achieves" is correct, not simply "advances") the state's desired and appropriate end.

Secondly, while narrow tailoring is acceptable (since, as I said, you achieve narrow tailoring by applying the least-restrictive means test), narrow tailoring is only useful once you have determined that the government's interest is, in fact, compelling and appropriate. The original legislation lays out limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate interest specifically because without such limits, the government can claim that anything whatever is compelling and legitimate. After all, if the government didn't think the interest was worth doing, they wouldn't bother writing a law about it! So we are still left with the question I asked: Who decides what qualifies as a "compelling" interest? What legitimizes these interests? How do we protect against a pretense, as I gave in my example, where an incredibly draconian limitation is applied for a theoretically valid purpose (protecting public health), but where in practice the limits never actually apply to (non-)religious groups the government supports, but disapproved (non-)religious groups get harsh enforcement or slow-walked processes?

[Heavens Reach]

Responding only to those sections which require it and haven't been addressed above.

Ooc: It does not require that there be belief in the supernatural, merely that there be beliefs regarding the supernatural or spiritual. A singular person declaring a particular perspective on these topic is also -- intentionally -- included as a "religion". Satanism does actually "govern means of behaviour or morality".

If it requires beliefs "regarding" the supernatural or spiritual...and that "regard" can literally be "doesn't actually believe anything specific," what exactly is the definition doing? That's my point here. You've either defined "religion" so broadly that it means genuinely absolutely everything, all human beliefs (since the absence of a belief qualifies), or so narrowly that things which specifically should be in there would be excluded (such as Secular Humanist celebrants or particular branches of Buddhism, Hinduism, and other Eastern religions which reject the existence of anything supernatural or spiritual.)

Contrast, for example, against the definition from Dictionary.com: "a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs." You can see the similarities--mention of a moral code, reference to supernatural things ("superhuman agency or agencies"), but it's quite different.

This has been discussed in the discord, and I think the general consensus is that ethical frameworks can be, effectively, religion, so I don't have a problem with the definition reflecting this. The example I used was conscientious objection. In a state where there is a draft, and someone objects to it on the grounds of conscience, I can see no reason why a sincere belief that engaging in war is wrong should be any less observed than a religious belief that it is wrong. So I support the definition of religion encompassing things which are not per se spiritual in nature.

A religion is "bona fide" if one genuinely holds it. This has been clarified -- thanks. Does "properly observe" as opposed to just "observe" resolve the former concern?

Again, the problem comes down to what "properly observe" means. How does one "properly" observe Secular Humanism? (Again, I know that secular humanism is areligious in the philosophical and colloquial sense, but in a legal sense, organized secular humanism qualifies as a "religion.") How does one "properly" observe Judaism, given there are substantial differences between Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and several other, smaller groups (with some, such as Messianic Judaism, challenged as to whether they qualify as "Judiasm" at all!) Or, if we go further afield, how does one "properly" observe Wicca, a religion developed less than a century ago and which has an intentionally many-fold approach (with most, though not all, Wiccans espousing, "Eight words the Wiccan Rede fulfill: An it harm none, do what ye will.")?

Who claims the authority to answer such questions, and how do we ensure that that authority does not become abused in its own way? Gatekeeping religious protections via requirements of "proper" practice is a risky thing, and forces courts to make hard-line decisions on complex legal matters, which most judges distinctly dislike doing.

I agree that adding "properly" before "observes" would only serve to narrow what is considered legitimate religious belief. That said, I am content to see practice addressed in a companion proposal tailored to that topic on its own.

I've semi-adapted from research on US jurisprudence a new and clearer version of the intermediate scrutiny test. Does the new test address this concern?

So...this is gonna be one of the biggest issues. Firstly because, in doing what you've done, you've completely reversed your position, and reinstated the alleged problem with the original legislation. "Narrowly-tailored" is the goal of the least-restrictive means test. In order to determine whether something is "narrowly-tailored" or not, you test whether it is the least-restrictive means which still achieves (as noted in my numerous citations, "achieves" is correct, not simply "advances") the state's desired and appropriate end.

Secondly, while narrow tailoring is acceptable (since, as I said, you achieve narrow tailoring by applying the least-restrictive means test), narrow tailoring is only useful once you have determined that the government's interest is, in fact, compelling and appropriate. The original legislation lays out limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate interest specifically because without such limits, the government can claim that anything whatever is compelling and legitimate. After all, if the government didn't think the interest was worth doing, they wouldn't bother writing a law about it! So we are still left with the question I asked: Who decides what qualifies as a "compelling" interest? What legitimizes these interests? How do we protect against a pretense, as I gave in my example, where an incredibly draconian limitation is applied for a theoretically valid purpose (protecting public health), but where in practice the limits never actually apply to (non-)religious groups the government supports, but disapproved (non-)religious groups get harsh enforcement or slow-walked processes?

Intermediate scrutiny does not require "the least restrictive means." That's strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, when challenged, a governing body must show "that the law or policy being challenged furthers an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest." While narrowly-tailored is an additional layer of protection against wayward government action, it is not as restrictive as the least restrictive means.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

Responding only to those sections which require it and haven't been addressed above.

Ooc: It does not require that there be belief in the supernatural, merely that there be beliefs regarding the supernatural or spiritual. A singular person declaring a particular perspective on these topic is also -- intentionally -- included as a "religion". Satanism does actually "govern means of behaviour or morality".

If it requires beliefs "regarding" the supernatural or spiritual...and that "regard" can literally be "doesn't actually believe anything specific," what exactly is the definition doing? That's my point here. You've either defined "religion" so broadly that it means genuinely absolutely everything, all human beliefs (since the absence of a belief qualifies), or so narrowly that things which specifically should be in there would be excluded (such as Secular Humanist celebrants or particular branches of Buddhism, Hinduism, and other Eastern religions which reject the existence of anything supernatural or spiritual.)

Does the belief address the supernatural or spiritual? If not, it is not "regarding the supernatural or spiritual".

A religion is "bona fide" if one genuinely holds it. This has been clarified -- thanks. Does "properly observe" as opposed to just "observe" resolve the former concern?

Again, the problem comes down to what "properly observe" means. How does one "properly" observe Secular Humanism? (Again, I know that secular humanism is areligious in the philosophical and colloquial sense, but in a legal sense, organized secular humanism qualifies as a "religion.") How does one "properly" observe Judaism, given there are substantial differences between Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and several other, smaller groups (with some, such as Messianic Judaism, challenged as to whether they qualify as "Judiasm" at all!) Or, if we go further afield, how does one "properly" observe Wicca, a religion developed less than a century ago and which has an intentionally many-fold approach (with most, though not all, Wiccans espousing, "Eight words the Wiccan Rede fulfill: An it harm none, do what ye will.")?

Who claims the authority to answer such questions, and how do we ensure that that authority does not become abused in its own way? Gatekeeping religious protections via requirements of "proper" practice is a risky thing, and forces courts to make hard-line decisions on complex legal matters, which most judges distinctly dislike doing.

I've elected to remove "properly" from this mandate.

Why?

Well, already explained my reasoning on clause 1c. As for 2, it's just clunky and reads poorly. Better to do something like, "No member state may penalize or prosecute any person within their jurisdiction on the basis of any religious belief or absence thereof." Since practice in particular is not the focus of your proposal, further statements are not necessary at this time.

Mostly adopted this change, thanks.

I've semi-adapted from research on US jurisprudence a new and clearer version of the intermediate scrutiny test. Does the new test address this concern?

So...this is gonna be one of the biggest issues. Firstly because, in doing what you've done, you've completely reversed your position, and reinstated the alleged problem with the original legislation. "Narrowly-tailored" is the goal of the least-restrictive means test. In order to determine whether something is "narrowly-tailored" or not, you test whether it is the least-restrictive means which still achieves (as noted in my numerous citations, "achieves" is correct, not simply "advances") the state's desired and appropriate end.

1. Read the FAQ. 2. "narrowly tailored" is with respect to the scope, not how restrictive the means are. The text has been amended to reflect the latter for the sake of clarity.

Secondly, while narrow tailoring is acceptable (since, as I said, you achieve narrow tailoring by applying the least-restrictive means test), narrow tailoring is only useful once you have determined that the government's interest is, in fact, compelling and appropriate. The original legislation lays out limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate interest specifically because without such limits, the government can claim that anything whatever is compelling and legitimate. After all, if the government didn't think the interest was worth doing, they wouldn't bother writing a law about it! So we are still left with the question I asked: Who decides what qualifies as a "compelling" interest? What legitimizes these interests? How do we protect against a pretense, as I gave in my example, where an incredibly draconian limitation is applied for a theoretically valid purpose (protecting public health), but where in practice the limits never actually apply to (non-)religious groups the government supports, but disapproved (non-)religious groups get harsh enforcement or slow-walked processes?

How does the previous resolution address this, since these "limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate" merely state that the interest must be in "health, safety, or good order"?

[Aelyria]

Does the belief address the supernatural or spiritual? If not, it is not "regarding the supernatural or spiritual".

Then your definition excludes non-spiritual, non-supernatural religious groups, like Zen Buddhists, who do not believe in either, but clearly still practice a religion. There's a reason I keep referring to them (and certain branches of Hinduism.) There are genuine religious beliefs which don't believe in anything "spiritual" or "supernatural." Generally, such beliefs still have a concept of the sacred, but "sacred" does not have to be spiritual or supernatural. For example, many Native American cultures recognize the sacred nature of the land itself, but hold no illusions that the land is actually "alive" or sentient in any meaningful capacity--they just frame natural resources as inherently worthy of reverence, and as part of that belief, desire to remain close to those resources. No need for the supernatural or spiritual: the physical fact that these environments exist is enough to justify reverence.

1. Read the FAQ. 2. "narrowly tailored" is with respect to the scope, not how restrictive the means are. The text has been amended to reflect the latter for the sake of clarity.

I'm not sure you have understood what I'm saying. "Narrower but less effective means would never be used" IS how the "least restrictive means" standard works. That is exactly how it has always worked. I gave numerous citations for this up thread. Here's the quote.

Edit: And for another citation, this one from the Wikipedia article regarding the Sherbert test, which is the test used in the US for religious-freedom cases (and thus, demonstrably, what GA#430 is based upon):

"However, not all burdens placed on religious exercise are constitutionally prohibited under the test. If the first prong is passed, the government may still constitutionally impose the burden on the individual's free exercise if the government can show

• it possesses some compelling state interest that justifies the infringement (the compelling interest prong) and
• no alternative form of regulation can avoid the infringement and still achieve the state's end (the narrow tailoring prong).

Edit II: And should Wikipedia fail to suffice, here are numerous other sources which use the word "achieve(s)," not simply "advance(s)," in describing this approach, even from atheist critics.

Actual documents from the US Supreme Court itself have also understood this standard in this way. It cites from a prior decision, Shelton v. Tucker, which states: "In a series of decisions, this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."

Fundamentally, the "least restrictive means" test is, and has always been, about ensuring that (a) so long as the government truly does have a compelling interest, and (b) uses the least-restrictive means which still achieves that compelling interest, then it is permissible to restrict the freedom of religion. A law which is narrowly-tailored, by definition, is using the least-restrictive means which still achieves the government's interest. US jurisprudence, actual legal documents (not always from the courts themselves), and academic legal/ethical discussion all agree on this point.

How does the previous resolution address this, since these "limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate" merely state that the interest must be in "health, safety, or good order"?

Because those are strong limits, as you yourself have argued. The state cannot infringe upon religious liberty to advance, for example: a state-operated business, a civic construction project unrelated to health or safety, or a military operation outside of wartime. Lacking these limits, all of the aforementioned things, and potentially more nefarious ones that simply haven't come to mind, are possible limitations so long as the government believes they are, in some way, beneficial to the government's own interests.

That's the critical problem here. The people who are deciding what to do are also the people who decide what is acceptable to do. If the law does not place limits on what is permissible, you can be confident that fallible humans will not either.

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

Does the belief address the supernatural or spiritual? If not, it is not "regarding the supernatural or spiritual".

Then your definition excludes non-spiritual, non-supernatural religious groups, like Zen Buddhists, who do not believe in either, but clearly still practice a religion. There's a reason I keep referring to them (and certain branches of Hinduism.) There are genuine religious beliefs which don't believe in anything "spiritual" or "supernatural." Generally, such beliefs still have a concept of the sacred, but "sacred" does not have to be spiritual or supernatural. For example, many Native American cultures recognize the sacred nature of the land itself, but hold no illusions that the land is actually "alive" or sentient in any meaningful capacity--they just frame natural resources as inherently worthy of reverence, and as part of that belief, desire to remain close to those resources. No need for the supernatural or spiritual: the physical fact that these environments exist is enough to justify reverence.

"As such, [Zen Buddhism] de-emphasizes knowledge alone of sutras and doctrine,[5][6] and favors direct understanding through spiritual practice and interaction with an accomplished teacher[7] or Master."

1. Read the FAQ. 2. "narrowly tailored" is with respect to the scope, not how restrictive the means are. The text has been amended to reflect the latter for the sake of clarity.

I'm not sure you have understood what I'm saying. "Narrower but less effective means would never be used" IS how the "least restrictive means" standard works. That is exactly how it has always worked. I gave numerous citations for this up thread. Here's the quote.

Edit: And for another citation, this one from the Wikipedia article regarding the Sherbert test, which is the test used in the US for religious-freedom cases (and thus, demonstrably, what GA#430 is based upon):


Edit II: And should Wikipedia fail to suffice, here are numerous other sources which use the word "achieve(s)," not simply "advance(s)," in describing this approach, even from atheist critics.

Actual documents from the US Supreme Court itself have also understood this standard in this way. It cites from a prior decision, Shelton v. Tucker, which states: "In a series of decisions, this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."

Fundamentally, the "least restrictive means" test is, and has always been, about ensuring that (a) so long as the government truly does have a compelling interest, and (b) uses the least-restrictive means which still achieves that compelling interest, then it is permissible to restrict the freedom of religion. A law which is narrowly-tailored, by definition, is using the least-restrictive means which still achieves the government's interest. US jurisprudence, actual legal documents (not always from the courts themselves), and academic legal/ethical discussion all agree on this point.

430 says "least restrictive means by which to advance a compelling, practical public interest in..." (emphasis added), not "by which to achieve...". The USA's version of strict scrutiny is irrelevant.

How does the previous resolution address this, since these "limits on what qualifies as compelling and legitimate" merely state that the interest must be in "health, safety, or good order"?

Because those are strong limits, as you yourself have argued. The state cannot infringe upon religious liberty to advance, for example: a state-operated business, a civic construction project unrelated to health or safety, or a military operation outside of wartime. Lacking these limits, all of the aforementioned things, and potentially more nefarious ones that simply haven't come to mind, are possible limitations so long as the government believes they are, in some way, beneficial to the government's own interests.

That's the critical problem here. The people who are deciding what to do are also the people who decide what is acceptable to do. If the law does not place limits on what is permissible, you can be confident that fallible humans will not either.

The very example you gave, "to prevent current and unknown future diseases from spreading through the populace", IS colourably a "health" interest, and hence not prohibited by 430.

[Excidium Planetis]

430 says "least restrictive means by which to advance a compelling, practical public interest in..." (emphasis added), not "by which to achieve...". The USA's version of strict scrutiny is irrelevant.

The US version says

is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

I don't believe there is a meaningful distinction between "furthering" and "advancing".

[Juansonia]

/bump

[Magecastle Embassy Building A5]

/bump

Ooc: Yes. I decided I'll be waiting about a week longer to submit given the amount of things currently in queue, and it would not be getting to vote until at least 11 days from now, even if I submitted immediately.

[Simone Republic]

/bump

Ooc: Yes. I decided I'll be waiting about a week longer to submit given the amount of things currently in queue, and it would not be getting to vote until at least 11 days from now, even if I submitted immediately.

I am trying to get maximum time for the cannibalism ban to pass, either through IA modifying his resolution or introducing my own (I understand Tin has a version as well). Obviously IA comes first.

[Juansonia]

"In case GA#436 gets repealed, I would recommend a clause protecting expression of religious belief and disbelief. During your repeal, the possibility of GA#436 meeting the same fate was mentioned as an argument against the repeal which this replaces, so protecting against such would be a good defense." - Maria-Fernanda Novo, WA Ambassador for the Armed Republic of Juansonia