Princess Rainbow Sparkles wrote:I already asked you what compromise you wanted and you responded by touting a distinction between criminal and civil law that I'm pretty sure is wrong (or, at least, very incomplete). What good faith engagement from me are you looking for?
Ooc: given I'm drawing on my Ooc private civil practice experience, I'm pretty confident that it's not wrong.
Ic: "The initial criticism included the solution, ambassador. Not forcing states to impose work restrictions on all prisoners is the solution. Voluntary labor programs eliminate inefficient labor practices and not conditioning leisure on labor reduces the incidence of violence in prisons."
Can we agree that restitution to victims is a legitimate facet of the criminal law? Or that promoting rehabilitation and a successful re-entry to society is a legitimate facet of the criminal law?
"I can agree to the latter, and the entirety of my argument has been based on the concern that this policy has on rehabilitation as much as it attempts to blur the role of civil and criminal court systems."
If so, then you're just being unimaginative about the concept and how to fairly achieve its aims. Put aside your predispositions about what criminal law should and should not do.
"Arguments criticizing my creativity when addressing the failures of the proposed policy to fit within the clearly delineated concepts of civil law vs criminal law sound to me like somebody who is defensive about their own bad information and are trying to convince me to overlook the myriad of technical concerns. That is why, the meters and bounds of criminal and civil law matter to me."
What exactly is wrong with conditioning the use and enjoyment of prison leisure offering on the agreement to work and thereby both engage in rehabilitation and earn money toward paying restitution.
"Because denying incarcerated populations recreational opportunities increases violence among convicts and against guards. Because conditioning those opportunities on labor is a coercive effect that will breed as much resentment as actual labor. Because coerced labor is of poor quality, which relegate prison labor to those tasks where labor quality is irrelevant, which are generally done better by machines to begin with. Because rehabilitation can only be achieved if a party wants to be rehabilitated, and resentment from being forced to so engage will sabotage rehabilitation and create recidivism. Because civil remedies, being born of civil causes of action tailored to specific intrapersonal interactions, are a better avenue for restitution than criminal law, which is primarily subject to the state's interests and expectations. Because restitution, broadly, can rely on remedies in contract or tort, and are dependant on societal norms and party expectations and not statute or direct state concerns. Because mandating restitution prevents prosecutors from using agreements to repay debts in a plea deal, increasing the need for trials and preventing parties from coming to an agreement as is the case in civil law. The best alternative is to let work opportunities to be voluntary for prisoners. The opportunity for repayment is, therefore, available but without need for blurring the lines between criminal and civil law and without coercing labor."
Surely, as I have agreed, we should not say you must work. But if you won't work (for instance, to repay the family whose money you stole), why is it so unreasonable to say "that's fine, but then you cannot enjoy the prison television and game room"?
"Ibid. But, again, I'm just as happy to address this politically and not through discussion, so yo can take or leave my concerns, ambassador."