[Draft] Affordable Compliance Act

[Morover]

Furtherment of Democracy - Significant

The World Assembly,

Aware of the economic infeasibilities of being in the World Assembly for many nations due to the monetary requirements which occur in many World Assembly resolutions;

Knowing that those nations who do choose to join the World Assembly, in spite of a below-par economy, may face consequences due to noncompliance;

Believing that economic instability should not be an incentive to not join the World Assembly for any nation, nor should any nation be punished for noncompliance resulting from economic constraints;

Hereby,

1. Expands the duties of the Compliance Commission (henceforth known as the WACC) to include the following:
   
   1. Receive and process requests for financial aid from both current member-nations and prospective member-nations;
   2. In the processing of these requests, the WACC will choose to either approve or deny them based off of
      
      1. The general economic constraints of the nation submitting the request;
      2. The feasibility of compliance within the nation submitting the request both with and without receiving financial aid;
      3. The efficiency of the budget within the nation submitting the request;
      4. Prior donations from the nation submitting the request to the World Assembly General Accounting Office (henceforth known as the GAO);
      5. Prior financial aid received from the World Assembly;
      6. The annual budget of the World Assembly, as designed by the GAO;
      7. Other requesting nations and their economic constraints, working in order to prioritize maximum compliance among all nations requesting financial aid;
      8. In the event of a request being made by a prospective member-nation, the likelihood of the nation submitting the request joining the World Assembly;
   3. In the event of an approval of a request for financial aid, the request shall be forwarded to the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (as outlined in clause two), and a recommendation made for the amount of funds needed in order to ensure compliance;
   4. In the event of a denial of a request for financial aid, contacting the requesting nation to inform them of the denial of the request, along with a detailed report outlining the reasons for denial;
   5. Blacklisting nations which continually attempt to frivolously abuse the financial aid supplied by the World Assembly from receiving financial aid in order to supplement compliance;
2. Founds the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (henceforth known as the WAACB), a subcommittee of the World Assembly General Fund, and charges the WAACB with the following:
   
   1. Receiving requests forwarded to them from the WACC;
   2. Determining a sufficient, yet reasonable amount of financial aid to supply the requesting nation, taking the recommendation of the WACC into account;
   3. Working with requesting nations in order to wane the nation off of the financial aid of the World Assembly;
   4. In the event of recurring payments being made to a nation in the form of financial aid in order to supplement compliance, determining when the member-nation is economically viable enough to have the recurring payments stopped;
   5. Record and submit all records of financial aid to the World Assembly General Fund
3. Mandates that member-nations not capable of compliance due to financial infeasibilities to submit a request of financial aid to the Compliance Commission, outlining the resolutions they are incapable of complying with, alongside the complete annual budget of the member-nation;
   
4. Allows non-member-states which are looking into joining the World Assembly to also submit requests for financial aid, provided they outline the same information as is required by a member-nation submitting a request;
   
   1. Mandates that all financial aid to be granted to these prospective member-nations to only be granted upon the admission of the nation into the World Assembly
5. Requires that nations which receive financial aid from the World Assembly in order to aid in compliance, but spend the money received frivolously, while remaining in noncompliance, shall be reported to the Independent Adjudicative Office in order to be adequately fined;
   
6. Clarifies that member-nations who willingly enter noncompliance, without any financial infeasibilities, will have all requests for financial aid discarded, regardless of external factors for the request of the financial aid;
   
7. Further clarifies that, even in the case of a request being denied by the WACC, economic constraints are not a viable excuse for noncompliance (subject to the opinion of the Independent Adjudicative Office), and the member-nation in violation will undergo an assessment for their noncompliance;

"As always, feedback is appreciated."

[Morover]

Drafts:

Furtherment of Democracy - Significant

The World Assembly,

Aware of the economic infeasibilities of being in the World Assembly for many nations due to the monetary requirements which occur in many World Assembly resolutions;

Knowing that those nations who do choose to join the World Assembly, in spite of a below-par economy, may face consequences due to noncompliance;

Believing that economic instability should not be an incentive to not join the World Assembly for any nation, nor should any nation be punished for noncompliance resulting from economic constraints;

Hereby,

1. Expands the duties of the Compliance Commission (henceforth known as the WACC) to include the following:
   
   1. Receive and process requests for financial aid from both current member-nations and prospective member-nations;
   2. In the processing of these requests, the WACC will choose to either approve or deny them based off of
      
      1. The general economic constraints of the nation submitting the request;
      2. The feasibility of compliance within the nation submitting the request both with and without receiving financial aid;
      3. The efficiency of the budget within the nation submitting the request;
      4. Prior donations from the nation submitting the request to the World Assembly General Accounting Office (henceforth known as the GAO);
      5. Prior financial aid received from the World Assembly;
      6. The annual budget of the World Assembly, as designed by the GAO;
      7. Other requesting nations and their economic constraints, working in order to prioritize maximum compliance among all nations requesting financial aid;
      8. In the event of a request being made by a prospective member-nation, the likelihood of the nation submitting the request joining the World Assembly;
   3. In the event of an approval of a request for financial aid, the request shall be forwarded to the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (as outlined in clause two), and a recommendation made for the amount of funds needed in order to ensure compliance;
   4. In the event of a denial of a request for financial aid, contacting the requesting nation to inform them of the denial of the request, along with a detailed report outlining the reasons for denial;
   5. Blacklisting nations which continually attempt to frivolously abuse the financial aid supplied by the World Assembly from receiving financial aid in order to supplement compliance;
2. Founds the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (henceforth known as the WAACB), a subcommittee of the World Assembly General Fund, and charges the WAACB with the following:
   
   1. Receiving requests forwarded to them from the WACC;
   2. Determining a sufficient, yet reasonable amount of financial aid to supply the requesting nation, taking the recommendation of the WACC into account;
   3. Working with requesting nations in order to wane the nation off of the financial aid of the World Assembly;
   4. In the event of recurring payments being made to a nation in the form of financial aid in order to supplement compliance, determining when the member-nation is economically viable enough to have the recurring payments stopped;
   5. Record and submit all records of financial aid to the World Assembly General Fund
3. Demands that member-nations not capable of compliance due to financial infeasibilities to submit a request of financial aid to the Compliance Commission, outlining the resolutions they are incapable of complying with, alongside the complete annual budget of the member-nation;
   
4. Allows non-member-states which are looking into joining the World Assembly to also submit requests for financial aid, provided they outline the same information as is required by a member-nation submitting a request;
   
   1. Mandates that all financial aid to be granted to these prospective member-nations to only be granted upon the admission of the nation into the World Assembly
5. Demands that nations which receive financial aid from the World Assembly in order to aid in compliance, but spend the money received frivolously, while remaining in noncompliance, shall be reported to the Independent Adjudicative Office in order to be adequately fined;
   
6. Clarifies that member-nations who willingly enter noncompliance, without any financial infeasibilities, will have all requests for financial aid discarded, regardless of external factors for the request of the financial aid;
   
7. Further clarifies that, even in the case of a request being denied by the WACC, economic constraints are not a viable excuse for noncompliance (subject to the opinion of the Independent Adjudicative Office), and the member-nation in violation will undergo an assessment for their noncompliance;

The World Assembly,

Aware of the economic infeasibilities of being in the World Assembly for many nations due to the monetary requirements which occur in many World Assembly resolutions;

Knowing that those nations who do choose to join the World Assembly, in spite of a below-par economy, may face consequences due to noncompliance;

Believing that economic instability should not be an incentive to not join the World Assembly for any nation, nor should any nation be punished for noncompliance resulting from economic constraints;

Hereby,

1. Expands the duties of the Compliance Commission (henceforth known as the WACC) to include the following:
   
   1. Receive and process requests for financial aid from both current member-nations and prospective member-nations;
   2. In the processing of these requests, the WACC will choose to either approve or deny them based off of
      
      1. The general economic constraints of the nation submitting the request;
      2. The feasibility of compliance within the nation submitting the request both with and without receiving financial aid;
      3. The efficiency of the budget within the nation submitting the request;
      4. Prior donations from the nation submitting the request to the World Assembly General Accounting Office (henceforth known as the GAO);
      5. Prior financial aid received from the World Assembly;
      6. The annual budget of the World Assembly, as designed by the GAO;
      7. Other requesting nations and their economic constraints, working in order to prioritize maximum compliance among all nations requesting financial aid;
      8. In the event of a request being made by a prospective member-nation, the likelihood of the nation submitting the request joining the World Assembly;
   3. In the event of an approval of a request for financial aid, the request shall be forwarded to the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (as outlined in clause two), and a recommendation made for the amount of funds needed in order to ensure compliance;
   4. In the event of a denial of a request for financial aid, contacting the requesting nation to inform them of the denial of the request, along with a detailed report outlining the reasons for denial;
   5. Blacklisting nations which continually attempt to frivolously abuse the financial aid supplied by the World Assembly from receiving financial aid in order to supplement compliance;
2. Founds the World Assembly Affordable Compliance Bureau (henceforth known as the WAACB), a subcommittee of the World Assembly General Fund, and charges the WAACB with the following:
   
   1. Receiving requests forwarded to them from the WACC;
   2. Determining a sufficient, yet reasonable amount of financial aid to supply the requesting nation, taking the recommendation of the WACC into account;
   3. Working with requesting nations in order to wane the nation off of the financial aid of the World Assembly;
   4. In the event of recurring payments being made to a nation in the form of financial aid in order to supplement compliance, determining when the member-nation is economically viable enough to have the recurring payments stopped;
   5. Record and submit all records of financial aid to the World Assembly General Fund
3. Mandates that member-nations not capable of compliance due to financial infeasibilities to submit a request of financial aid to the Compliance Commission, outlining the resolutions they are incapable of complying with, alongside the complete annual budget of the member-nation;
   
4. Allows non-member-states which are looking into joining the World Assembly to also submit requests for financial aid, provided they outline the same information as is required by a member-nation submitting a request;
   
   1. Mandates that all financial aid to be granted to these prospective member-nations to only be granted upon the admission of the nation into the World Assembly
5. Requires that nations which receive financial aid from the World Assembly in order to aid in compliance, but spend the money received frivolously, while remaining in noncompliance, shall be reported to the Independent Adjudicative Office in order to be adequately fined;
   
6. Clarifies that member-nations who willingly enter noncompliance, without any financial infeasibilities, will have all requests for financial aid discarded, regardless of external factors for the request of the financial aid;
   
7. Further clarifies that, even in the case of a request being denied by the WACC, economic constraints are not a viable excuse for noncompliance (subject to the opinion of the Independent Adjudicative Office), and the member-nation in violation will undergo an assessment for their noncompliance;

[Verdant Haven]

OOC:

I would see two potential major stumbling blocks with the present iteration of the proposal, which I suspect may cut close enough to the core that a major overhaul would be required. I am relatively new to drafting in the GA however, so by all means seek more experienced advice than mine.

1) The sections on member states which are in non-compliance cannot possibly be valid, as compliance is not optional. It is taken as rote that all nations in the WA are fully compliant with all WA legislation, and this state of affairs is enforced by faultless and incorruptible gnomes.
2) Though this isn't the usual way of seeing this problem come about, we must bear in mind that the WA cannot pass legislation affecting non-WA nations. As such, I believe that even if a bill is attempting to assist non-WA nations via their own voluntary interaction, it may in fact be illegal due to lack of jurisdiction for any WA committee to perform that interaction.

Apart from those two issues, I would be concerned that this would simply not be something mechanically possible for the game. Though it attempts to dance around the inability of the WA to affect taxation within player nations, the functional upshot of any financial interaction with player nations is one that simulates a taxation change. Due to the simplified economic modelling used, I believe it not only would be functionally identical to executing a taxation change, but it might not even be within the game's programming to allow this to occur – especially with relation to non-members or "prospective" members who are intended as possible recipients of aid. Add the subjective scale of the changes based upon RP elements and qualities, and this would require an actual committee - not an AI one.

This proposal feels like an outstanding bit of RP legislation, but appears to have no actual active clauses affecting WA nations. Due to the fact that compliance is 100% in members, and the WA can't interact with non-members, all this appears to do to me is establish a committee with no possible function.

[Morover]

OOC:

I would see two potential major stumbling blocks with the present iteration of the proposal, which I suspect may cut close enough to the core that a major overhaul would be required. I am relatively new to drafting in the GA however, so by all means seek more experienced advice than mine.

1) The sections on member states which are in non-compliance cannot possibly be valid, as compliance is not optional. It is taken as rote that all nations in the WA are fully compliant with all WA legislation, and this state of affairs is enforced by faultless and incorruptible gnomes.
2) Though this isn't the usual way of seeing this problem come about, we must bear in mind that the WA cannot pass legislation affecting non-WA nations. As such, I believe that even if a bill is attempting to assist non-WA nations via their own voluntary interaction, it may in fact be illegal due to lack of jurisdiction for any WA committee to perform that interaction.

Apart from those two issues, I would be concerned that this would simply not be something mechanically possible for the game. Though it attempts to dance around the inability of the WA to affect taxation within player nations, the functional upshot of any financial interaction with player nations is one that simulates a taxation change. Due to the simplified economic modelling used, I believe it not only would be functionally identical to executing a taxation change, but it might not even be within the game's programming to allow this to occur – especially with relation to non-members or "prospective" members who are intended as possible recipients of aid. Add the subjective scale of the changes based upon RP elements and qualities, and this would require an actual committee - not an AI one.

This proposal feels like an outstanding bit of RP legislation, but appears to have no actual active clauses affecting WA nations. Due to the fact that compliance is 100% in members, and the WA can't interact with non-members, all this appears to do to me is establish a committee with no possible function.

OOC:
1. While it does have a bit of contention, I believe that resolutions such as GAR#390 and GAR#440 establishes a significant enough precedent that, RP-wise, compliance is not automatic. This has been disputed by quite a few people, though.
2. Considering 4(a), I think this doesn't actually affect non-member-states in any such way.

In your concerns about the simulation of a taxation change, I think it's a relative non-issue, given the precedent of resolutions such as GAR#226, GAR#208, and GAR#17, among others.

Clause 3 (and somewhat 5) does actually create a mandate on member-nations, so I don't think it runs afoul of the "no committee-only" rule.

EDIT: I feel I should clarify that this is not to say that you are wrong in any of your points, but I think precedent overcomes it. Further thoughts are appreciated.

[Araraukar]

Furtherment of Democracy - Significant

OOC: How does "apply for money if you don't have enough" and then restrictions on how you're allowed to use said money, further democracy? Especially when the money's meant for doing exactly as WA says, in the first place?

[Morover]

Furtherment of Democracy - Significant

OOC: How does "apply for money if you don't have enough" and then restrictions on how you're allowed to use said money, further democracy? Especially when the money's meant for doing exactly as WA says, in the first place?

OOC: You're right. As far as I know, there's no explicit category for this, though I may be able to shoehorn it into political stability.

[Morover]

OOC: Bumping this. I still haven't changed the category, I know, as I'm waiting for a second opinion on where it would belong.

[Araraukar]

OOC: There's debate whether "demands" counts as a mandate or not. I'd use something unambigious like "mandates" or "requires".

[Morover]

OOC: There's debate whether "demands" counts as a mandate or not. I'd use something unambigious like "mandates" or "requires".

OOC: This has been changed.

I'm curious as to general thoughts on the content of the proposal. Verdant Haven gave their two cents on their concerns, and while their merit is certainly there, I'm just wondering about the general lack in responses to this.

[Kenmoria]

(OOC: This might go against the operative clause rule, as there are no actual mandates on member states. The ‘mandates’ clause is just filing paperwork, which has precedent as not being enough to avoid the committee-only rule, and the ‘requires’ clause isn’t actually a mandate on member states.)

[Araraukar]

OOC: I'm curious as to general thoughts on the content of the proposal. Verdant Haven gave their two cents on their concerns, and while their merit is certainly there, I'm just wondering about the general lack in responses to this.

OOC: In addition to what Kenmoria said, you yourself agreed that it doesn't really fit any category. You need to make changes to make it fit a category (and also take into account Kenmoria's feedback). It's hard to give feedback on something that doesn't fit anywhere and even the author knows it. It's the same as why GenSec and mods don't rule on hypotheticals.

On top of that, I don't really think anything like this is necessary, given the vast power that the Wine And Crouton Conference wields. Since it has the ability to force nations to comply, where compliance is at all possible, presumably it has the ability to use the General Fund to fund the compliance where necessary. Or else it'll just twiddle its thumbs on cases where nations simply can't afford a given mandate. On top of which, many resolutions actually have WA-funding possibilities written into them, so writing something like this and making it apply to all passed resolutions would likely seek to amend those ones, unless worded very carefully.

And lastly, what do you have against RPing as a piss-poor nation that has to struggle with providing even the most basics to their people and thus having to choose whether to apply resolution X or resolution Y, and accept strongly-worded letters from Wine And Crouton Conference on not doing both? That's apparently more popular than even I thought it would be. You'd be taking out all the fun.

[Imperium Anglorum]

1) The sections on member states which are in non-compliance cannot possibly be valid, as compliance is not optional. It is taken as rote that all nations in the WA are fully compliant with all WA legislation, and this state of affairs is enforced by faultless and incorruptible gnomes.

Explicitly rejected. Compliance Commission, [2016] GAS 5; Compliance Commission, (2016) 1 IAM 45 (aff'd).

2) Though this isn't the usual way of seeing this problem come about, we must bear in mind that the WA cannot pass legislation affecting non-WA nations. As such, I believe that even if a bill is attempting to assist non-WA nations via their own voluntary interaction, it may in fact be illegal due to lack of jurisdiction for any WA committee to perform that interaction.

Rejected. Meteorological Cooperation, (2010) 2 IAM __. The rules do not prohibit resolutions from affecting non-members, they prohibit resolutions from imposing policies on them. Policies such as, however, sanctions or tariffs by member nations which are imposed only in member nations, do not count. Ethics in International Trade, (2010) 1 IAM 8.

---

presumably [the WACC] has the ability to use the General Fund to fund the compliance where necessary. Or else it'll just twiddle its thumbs on cases where nations simply can't afford a given mandate.

Not if its ultra vires.

On top of which, many resolutions actually have WA-funding possibilities written into them, so writing something like this and making it apply to all passed resolutions would likely seek to amend those ones, unless worded very carefully.

No...

There is a reason that Amendment violations are separate from Contradiction violations. An amendment contradicts the existing terms, but breaks the game specifically because previous legislation can't be modified. If it wasn't for this underlying difference, Amendment violations could otherwise fall under Contradiction violations. So there must be something substantively different between the two, and we believe it is that Amendment violations actively attempt to somehow alter the text of the extant legislation. Protection of Nuclear Armaments, [2017] GAS 1.

I'll note also that this decision was reached in response to a challenge that you brought. You ought to know this.