[DEFEATED] Ban on Capital Punishment

[Sciongrad]

"If people have the right to live, then why is capital punishment a good idea? Life without parole also prevents such people from continuing to do harm. My question then--why is the death penalty neccesary?"

Your question seems logically quite reversed. At the point when the criminal justice system of a nation has deemed that a person has committed a crime (or multiple crimes) that deem the person such a safety concern that he or she will never, ever be allowed out prison again what is the point of continuing to keep that person alive? What value to anyone does this person provide that is worth such resources?

The audacity of this body to tell taxpayers that it must keep serial rapists and murderers alive for fifty years in a box, while many states and economic systems fail to keep innocent and good families fed is detestable. No grain should be wasted on a rapist. No meat wasted on a murderer. GA #9 appears to require that we give food and drink to prisoners, so that brings me to my impasse with this proposal.

The Pharaoh

This is a poor argument. If the argument is that it's unfair that criminals get to be fed and housed while law-abiding citizens languish in privation, it is basically arbitrary to draw the line at just murderers are rapists. If your ultimate concern is that criminals shouldn't get food and shelter until law-abiding citizens get them, then it doesn't make sense to fill prisons at all until the needs of the masses have been met. The logical conclusion of this argument is that keeping criminals in prisons — i.e., feeding and sheltering them — is not justified unless you can ensure the rest of your population has the resources it needs to survive. It doesn't make sense to say "it is not fair that people live in squalor while murderers get all the free prison gruel they want. Let's execute the murders," UNLESS executing the murderers will somehow help the people living in squalor. Somehow I doubt the only things standing between the abject poverty of the masses and prosperity are costs of plumbing and gruel for murders and rapists.

[Wallenburg]

"Indeed, usually such shortages arise from crop failures, misallocation of resources, or widespread poverty, problems which may be exacerbated by yet even more peripheral causes. My own father once faced a serious food shortage while guarding prisoners of war in the city of Kempington. Ultimately, the commanding officer of the city garrison decided that there weren't enough supplies to support the prisoners and the revolutionaries at the same time, and so he and several other soldiers were ordered to shoot all the prisoners. That unfortunate circumstance would have been avoidable if not for the destruction of farmland and food stores during the war. The prisoners were not worth the food and water the garrison had been feeding them, but it was not an ideal solution, despite it being necessary to avoid famine among the soldiers."

[The Pharaoh]

Your question seems logically quite reversed. At the point when the criminal justice system of a nation has deemed that a person has committed a crime (or multiple crimes) that deem the person such a safety concern that he or she will never, ever be allowed out prison again what is the point of continuing to keep that person alive? What value to anyone does this person provide that is worth such resources?

The audacity of this body to tell taxpayers that it must keep serial rapists and murderers alive for fifty years in a box, while many states and economic systems fail to keep innocent and good families fed is detestable. No grain should be wasted on a rapist. No meat wasted on a murderer. GA #9 appears to require that we give food and drink to prisoners, so that brings me to my impasse with this proposal.

The Pharaoh

This is a poor argument. If the argument is that it's unfair that criminals get to be fed and housed while law-abiding citizens languish in privation, it is basically arbitrary to draw the line at just murderers are rapists. If your ultimate concern is that criminals shouldn't get food and shelter until law-abiding citizens get them, then it doesn't make sense to fill prisons at all until the needs of the masses have been met. The logical conclusion of this argument is that keeping criminals in prisons — i.e., feeding and sheltering them — is not justified unless you can ensure the rest of your population has the resources it needs to survive. It doesn't make sense to say "it is not fair that people live in squalor while murderers get all the free prison gruel they want. Let's execute the murders," UNLESS executing the murderers will somehow help the people living in squalor. Somehow I doubt the only things standing between the abject poverty of the masses and prosperity are costs of plumbing and gruel for murders and rapists.

The ambassador has made a quite poor response.

To state it again, in a small fraction of the total instances of crimes, the crimes are so abhorrent or have recurred enough that the state makes the reasonable decision that the criminal is a threat to society that can never be part of it again. This is referred to by the ambassador to whom I was responding (and author, by happenstance) as a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

In those limited circumstances, when a court has decided that those beyond redemption can never belong to society again, the author asks basically what is the point of killing them if they are locked away and can never hurt anyone again? I posit that is a dumb question, because the real question is what is the point to their continued use of resources? If all appeals have been exhausted and the legal process is concluded, it is a complete waste to keep the abhorrents locked in a room for decades far away from anyone knew them awaiting death. It's a waste of food. It's a waste of someone's time to supervise their slow aging until death. It's a waste of space. Those are all resources that could be used better by any society than watching rapist or murdering scum slowly die in a room, but in particular some societies need every resource they've got and then far far more.

The Pharaoh

[The Pharaoh]

"Indeed, usually such shortages arise from crop failures, misallocation of resources, or widespread poverty, problems which may be exacerbated by yet even more peripheral causes. My own father once faced a serious food shortage while guarding prisoners of war in the city of Kempington. Ultimately, the commanding officer of the city garrison decided that there weren't enough supplies to support the prisoners and the revolutionaries at the same time, and so he and several other soldiers were ordered to shoot all the prisoners. That unfortunate circumstance would have been avoidable if not for the destruction of farmland and food stores during the war. The prisoners were not worth the food and water the garrison had been feeding them, but it was not an ideal solution, despite it being necessary to avoid famine among the soldiers."

There is (at least to my knowledge) no WA Resolution requiring the feeding of soldiers, but there is a law requiring the feeding of prisoners. Had WA Law prevented you from executing prisoners your soldiers would surely have been mandated to starve.

The law seems clear to me.

The Pharaoh

[New Min]

"Also, it may be an idea not to use the preamble as a method to make a statement regarding the necessity of preambles, that is not what it is meant for, and such a preamle makes it impossible for New Min to take this proposal seriously in consideration."

[Xanthal]

I find it fascinating the presumption is being made that sentencing a human being to rot in captivity for the rest of his natural life is more humane than a painless execution. The "every life has value, therefore ending life is always wrong" argument is a powerful one, but not practical and- Xanthal argues- not morally correct. Does not a person in intolerable pain with no hope of relief deserve the right to die? Should not the braindead patient stuck full of tubes in the hospital bed be allowed to pass on? Do not the pregnant have the right to control their own bodies, even at the expense of a new life growing inside them? Why, then, should the WA force life upon those for whom living means being stripped of liberty, dignity, and- dare I venture- hope?

The entire logic of United Massachusetts' proposal- down to the choice of words- takes for granted that an order of death can only be vindictive, even cruel. I submit that death can be a mercy as easily as it can be a punishment, whether in the sphere of criminal justice or elsewhere. That such an option- prudently applied- may confer wider benefits to society in addition should only serve to reinforce the positive utility of ending a life in certain circumstances. To ban executions rather than addressing the systems of so-called justice which stand upon base desires for retribution and discredited theories of deterrence is not a humanitarian position, it is simple dogma and the Federation rejects it as such.

[Uan aa Boa]

In those limited circumstances, when a court has decided that those beyond redemption can never belong to society again, the author asks basically what is the point of killing them if they are locked away and can never hurt anyone again? I posit that is a dumb question, because the real question is what is the point to their continued use of resources? If all appeals have been exhausted and the legal process is concluded, it is a complete waste to keep the abhorrents locked in a room for decades far away from anyone knew them awaiting death. It's a waste of food. It's a waste of someone's time to supervise their slow aging until death. It's a waste of space. Those are all resources that could be used better by any society than watching rapist or murdering scum slowly die in a room, but in particular some societies need every resource they've got and then far far more.

So you want to suggest that if a person can't justify the resources they consume then they should be killed? That sounds unfortunate for many severely ill and profoundly disabled people. Do you place no inherent value on life? I suggest that if you do it would be best not to embark on the slippery slope of deciding whose continued existence is worthwhile and whose isn't.

"Also, it may be an idea not to use the preamble as a method to make a statement regarding the necessity of preambles, that is not what it is meant for, and such a preamle makes it impossible for New Min to take this proposal seriously in consideration."

I'm assuming that this the preamble is a drafting thread joke and will be significantly changed before submission. I would also have to oppose this as it stands, confident that someone else would promptly submit a proper proposal if it failed.

[Sierra Lyricalia]

<snip>

"We welcome Xanthal's return to the halls of the World Assembly, and find ourselves in complete agreement with the Federation's position on this proposal."

[Sciongrad]

In those limited circumstances, when a court has decided that those beyond redemption can never belong to society again, the author asks basically what is the point of killing them if they are locked away and can never hurt anyone again? I posit that is a dumb question, because the real question is what is the point to their continued use of resources? If all appeals have been exhausted and the legal process is concluded, it is a complete waste to keep the abhorrents locked in a room for decades far away from anyone knew them awaiting death. It's a waste of food. It's a waste of someone's time to supervise their slow aging until death. It's a waste of space. Those are all resources that could be used better by any society than watching rapist or murdering scum slowly die in a room, but in particular some societies need every resource they've got and then far far more.

My point is that it is arbitrary to decide that murderers are the ones that need to be exterminated for resources, particularly if a. doing so has a negligible impact on those living in poverty and b. there are others that do not commit capital crimes that will also spend the majority of their lives in prison, despite not having received the maximum sentence. It is entirely possible that people that mutilate children or beat their spouses — abhorrent crimes, but crimes for which few nations would prescribe the death penalty or life in prison — may go to prison for a very long time, longer in some instances than some sentenced to life (someone sentenced to 30 in prison, for instance, may outlive someone sentenced to life), and drain resources from the public coffer. Yet even though these crimes are abhorrent and the drain on public resources is sometimes greater, you do not believe these prisoners should be executed. Why? By your own admission, the central question is resource allocation for those that would otherwise spend the rest of their lives in prison for gruesome crimes. Despite your attempt to differentiate the rationale for executing murders and rapists from other crimes, you can't square that circle if the bottom line is that locking people up for the rest of their lives is a waste of money. If someone goes to jail for a white collar crime — let's say 10 separate counts, each punishable by up to 15 years in prison — should this person be executed because their punishment will entail someone "supervis[ing] their slow aging until death"? No. If you think some crimes are awful and murderers deserve to die, that is a logically coherent argument (still flawed, though). But you cannot justify executing murderers and rapists on the basis of saving resources for the poor unless you apply that argument to all instances where the state needs to care for a prisoner until they die.

[The Pharaoh]

In those limited circumstances, when a court has decided that those beyond redemption can never belong to society again, the author asks basically what is the point of killing them if they are locked away and can never hurt anyone again? I posit that is a dumb question, because the real question is what is the point to their continued use of resources? If all appeals have been exhausted and the legal process is concluded, it is a complete waste to keep the abhorrents locked in a room for decades far away from anyone knew them awaiting death. It's a waste of food. It's a waste of someone's time to supervise their slow aging until death. It's a waste of space. Those are all resources that could be used better by any society than watching rapist or murdering scum slowly die in a room, but in particular some societies need every resource they've got and then far far more.

My point is that it is arbitrary to decide that murderers are the ones that need to be exterminated for resources, particularly if a. doing so has a negligible impact on those living in poverty and b. there are others that do not commit capital crimes that will also spend the majority of their lives in prison, despite not having received the maximum sentence. It is entirely possible that people that mutilate children or beat their spouses — abhorrent crimes, but crimes for which few nations would prescribe the death penalty or life in prison — may go to prison for a very long time, longer in some instances than some sentenced to life (someone sentenced to 30 in prison, for instance, may outlive someone sentenced to life), and drain resources from the public coffer. Yet even though these crimes are abhorrent and the drain on public resources is sometimes greater, you do not believe these prisoners should be executed. Why? By your own admission, the central question is resource allocation for those that would otherwise spend the rest of their lives in prison for gruesome crimes. Despite your attempt to differentiate the rationale for executing murders and rapists from other crimes, you can't square that circle if the bottom line is that locking people up for the rest of their lives is a waste of money. If someone goes to jail for a white collar crime — let's say 10 separate counts, each punishable by up to 15 years in prison — should this person be executed because their punishment will entail someone "supervis[ing] their slow aging until death"? No. If you think some crimes are awful and murderers deserve to die, that is a logically coherent argument (still flawed, though). But you cannot justify executing murderers and rapists on the basis of saving resources for the poor unless you apply that argument to all instances where the state needs to care for a prisoner until they die.

It is certainly not an arbitrary distinction between a 30 year prison term, and absolutely under no circumstances ever released. Those two things are actually quite different, and the court is saying two different things. In one, the court is saying after a certain amount of time we deem you can rejoin society and participate again. Even if that time is a long time off, it is far from saying the court system has called the person irredeemable. Life without parole however, is a death sentence in every since but biologically. The person is irredeemable and never ever going to be a member of society again. He's just going to suck time and resources away from the rest of us until he dies. That seems like a pretty obvious difference.

In the example of the white collar criminal: Most court systems, mine included, do not change the punishment based on the number of counts. So we don't generally say the punishment for doing some crime once is 10-15 years, but the punishment for doing it more than six times is death. We treat each count as a totally separate charge and punishment. On appeal a defendant might successfully argue that we didn't have the evidence to support 1 of the 10 alleged frauds, and that one might be overturned. Which is why you don't lump them all together and say in total as punishment for all of these crimes a person is sentenced to death, but had he or she only one of these charges been true and all the others false it would be 15 years. Most court systems don't function that way. So there is still the major, major non-arbitrary distinction between a crime whose commission just once leads to the possibility of never being released into society again, and crimes which individually would allow you to redeem yourself, but which you happen to have perpetrated in sufficient quantity to mean you probably won't see the light of day again.

[The Pharaoh]

So you want to suggest that if a person can't justify the resources they consume then they should be killed? That sounds unfortunate for many severely ill and profoundly disabled people. Do you place no inherent value on life? I suggest that if you do it would be best not to embark on the slippery slope of deciding whose continued existence is worthwhile and whose isn't.

I am saying that in the totem of people that possibly might be owed support from others, criminals are obviously at the bottom. Whether I believe anyone is owed support from anyone else in exchange for nothing is irrelevant. If anyone isn't, it is the person that has been proven a threat.

It is a very first world arrogant way to look at decades in prison as if it is easily doable. This body contains thousands of nations all in different levels of development. I have personally seen some absolutely shocking living conditions and certainly some societies that would not be capable of keeping their profoundly disabled alive. That is only something that has become relatively possible very late in the long development of mankind to this point.

This resolution strikes me as the World Assembly showing up in backwater third world countries and telling their governments, "Oh, no, there's no way we can let you execute this serial rapist and murderer. While we agree there's too much risk to ever let him walk the streets again it just wouldn't be ethical to kill him. You'd better keep him in a maximum security prison that he can't escape from. You can build one right next to those mud huts without running water."

[Auralia]

Auralia is opposed to this proposal, as well as any other that would prohibit member states from employing capital punishment. We maintain that World Assembly member states should retain the right to execute criminals for grave crimes.

We reiterate that the Auralian government previously held that capital punishment should be reserved for circumstances where an inmate cannot be safely imprisoned, but that this is no longer our position.

Arguments in favour of capital punishment

The primary argument in favour of capital punishment is that it is the most appropriate penalty for certain crimes. This argument is clearly articulated by Edward Feser as follows:

1. Wrongdoers deserve punishment.

2. The more grave the wrongdoing, the more severe is the punishment deserved.

3. Some crimes are so grave that no punishment less than death would be proportionate in its severity.

4. Therefore, wrongdoers guilty of such crimes deserve death.

5. Public authorities have the right, in principle, to inflict on wrongdoers the punishments they deserve.

6. Therefore, public authorities have the right, in principle, to inflict the death penalty on those guilty of the gravest offenses.

The individual premises of this argument are defended in depth as part of Feser's and Joseph Besette's book "By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed - A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment".

There are also a number of secondary arguments in favour of capital punishment:

1. Empirical evidence suggests capital punishment deters crime. Life is a greater good than liberty, which is why people fear death more than they do life imprisonment.

https://academic.oup.com/aler/article/5/2/344/131680
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/a ... 086/260598
http://www.sas.rochester.edu/psc/clarke ... itting.pdf
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12631
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... _id=354680
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20111831?s ... b_contents

To be fair, there is also evidence that suggests that capital punishment does not deter crime. Such is the nature of scientific analysis of heavily politicized topics. But this lack of clarity goes both ways; one cannot argue that it has been definitely shown that capital punishment does not deter crime.

2. Capital punishment is necessary to protect society from certain criminals. There are documented cases where (a) prisoners have seriously injured or killed other prisoners, (b) prisoners have continued to control criminal enterprises or even arrange assassinations from within prison, (c) prisoners have repeatedly escaped and continued to cause harm.

It is not clear whether such criminals cannot be safely imprisoned in a humane manner. The best way to ensure that they cannot cause harm in future is to take their lives.

3. Capital punishment has a rehabilitative effect, at least from a Christian perspective. St. Thomas Aquinas argued that those who are about to be executed "also have at the critical point of death the opportunity to be converted to God through repentance. And if they are so stubborn that even at the point of death their heart does not draw back from evil, it is possible to make a highly probable judgment that they would never come away from evil to the right use of their powers."

A more contemporary take from Michael Brendan Dougherty:

[The Church's historic position on the death penalty] presumes and has confidence in a living and just Judge that greets human souls after death, one capable of saving any soul He desires to see in heaven no matter what we do with the convict’s life on earth.

[...]

Even with the enormities that are allowed to continue in our judicial system, and the unusual spectacle of lethal injection, we still see that the death sentence seems to elicit from convicts exactly what the Church used to predict. You can read the final statements of death-row inmates on the website of the Texas government. In between a few prideful boasts, you’ll usually find a statement like the one offered last year by Rolando Ruiz, who was a convicted hitman who gunned down Theresa Rodrigues in exchange for $2,000:

Yes sir, I would first like to say to the Sanchez family how sorry I am. Words cannot begin to express how sorry I am and the hurt that I have caused you and your family. May this bring you peace and forgiveness. I am sorry. To my family, thank you for all your love and support. I am at peace. Jesus Christ is Lord. I love you all. Thank you Warden that is it.

I’m sure it sounds strange to the world, but for a Christian properly disposed, death-row final statements make for a rather tonic spiritual reading.

4. Capital punishment serves the common good. As a public act of justice, capital punishment emphasizes the value the state places on innocent human life and affirms the extent to which the state will go to protect it.

Responses to United Massachusetts's arguments

Restating, however, that the death penalty institutionalizes a model of justice based solely on revenge, a model inherently flawed in its assertion that violence and killing are best dealt with by more bloodshed,

We reiterate that the primary purpose of punishment is retribution; in Feser's words, "wrongdoers deserve punishment". It is contrary to the natural law for a criminal to benefit from his crimes, so he deserves to be deprived of some proportionate good in response. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, he "who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments" can only be restored to the "equality of justice" through "penal compensation"; that is, he "suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish."

Retributive justice is not cruel or barbaric; to the contrary, it is the only coherent concept of justice. If punishment is not ultimately justified by wrongdoing, then it can be inflicted on those who have done nothing wrong. Moreover, since the punishment is no longer related to a particular offense, it need not be proportionate to that offense. Under a non-retributive theory of justice, totalitarian states should be free to imprison innocent people indefinitely merely because they threaten "social harmony" or are in need of "rehabilitation", or because their arbitrary imprisonment would deter crime.

We recommend reading C.S. Lewis's essay "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment", which discusses this issue in significant depth. A key quote:

According to the Humanitarian theory, to punish a man because he deserves it, and as much as he deserves, is mere revenge, and, therefore, barbarous and immoral. It is maintained that the only legitimate motives for punishing are the desire to deter others by example or to mend the criminal. When this theory is combined, as frequently happens, with the belief that all crime is more or less pathological, the idea of mending tails off into that of healing or curing and punishment becomes therapeutic. Thus it appears at first sight that we have passed from the harsh and self-righteous notion of giving the wicked their deserts to the charitable and enlightened one of tending the psychologically sick. What could be more amiable? One little point which is taken for granted in this theory needs, however, to be made explicit. The things done to the criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in the old days when we called them punishments. If a tendency to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be forced to undergo the treatment. Otherwise, society cannot continue.

My contention is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears, really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of a human being.

The reason is this. The Humanitarian theory removes from Punishment the concept of Desert. But the concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the only one we can reasonably ask about a punishment. We may very properly ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But neither of these two last questions is a question about justice. There is no sense in talking about a ‘just deterrent’ or a ‘just cure’. We demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it will deter. We demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a ‘case’.

States that use capital punishment do not necessarily believe that "violence and killing are best dealt with by more bloodshed." They simply recognize that death is the most proportionate punishment for certain crimes. In some cases, mercy is called for, but we must not forget that a commutation is only merciful because the penalty being committed is actually deserved to begin with. In other cases, mercy is not called for.

the finality of the death penalty prevents the state from correcting any errors made in the legal and conviction processes, thereby inevitably condemning to death certain innocent individuals,

Concerned, further, that in their reckless pursuit of such an system, member nations have institutionalized the murder of innocent blood, unless they do consider themselves omnipotent,

In any system of criminal justice in this imperfect world, the state will inevitably inflict punishments in error upon the innocent. The pain and suffering inflicted by these punishments cannot meaningfully be reversed in many cases, even when the state realizes its error.

One doubts that a man who was wrongfully imprisoned for decades -- the prime years of his life lost forever, wasted behind cold steel and concrete walls -- will consider monetary compensation adequate recompense or deem the state's error "correct[ed]" after receiving said compensation.

The solution to this problem is not to abolish capital punishment because in some sense harder to "reverse", as if imprisonment is somehow sufficiently "reversible" as to justify imprisoning. The solution is to minimize the number of innocents who are wrongfully convicted.

For fun, one could rewrite the second clause as follows: "Concerned, further, that in their reckless pursuit of imprisonment, member nations have institutionalized the deprivation of liberty from innocents, unless they do consider themselves omnipotent..." I doubt many would consider this a compelling argument for the abolition of imprisonment, and it is not a convincing argument for the abolition of the death penalty either.

a great many individuals facing the death penalty are unable to afford their own attorneys, and are often forced to rely on overburdened public defense mechanisms,

Further angered that the complex legal mechanisms associated with capital punishment only serve to prolong the closure of crime victims by dragging them into a long legal process,

any long legal process associated with the death penalty is bound to extend the pain and frustrations of crime victims, rather than provide the closure they need and desire,

These are problems specific to the application of capital punishment in certain states, not capital punishment itself. They are not arguments that can be used to support the abolition of capital punishment across the World Assembly.

the predominantly retributive model of justice employed by the death penalty has failed to deter crime in any provable way,

This is simply not true, as I point out above. At best one can say that it is not clear whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect on crime.

permitting the death penalty represents a rejection of the notion that life has intrinsic worth merely by virtue of its existence,

No, it is not, for the same reason that penal imprisonment is not a rejection of the notion that liberty is intrinsically valuable. A person has neither an absolute right to life or liberty; both can be taken away as punishment for a crime.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[Imperium Anglorum]

I think I agree with the Pope, let's ban.

[Uan aa Boa]

You lost me at "wrongdoers deserve punishment," Mr Russell. If you wish to base a system of justice on the urge to harm people as an end in itself then we are talking entirely at cross purposes.

This resolution strikes me as the World Assembly showing up in backwater third world countries and telling their governments, "Oh, no, there's no way we can let you execute this serial rapist and murderer. While we agree there's too much risk to ever let him walk the streets again it just wouldn't be ethical to kill him. You'd better keep him in a maximum security prison that he can't escape from. You can build one right next to those mud huts without running water."

This is a more interesting argument but I simply don't buy it. Are the prisons where your petty criminals reside so porous as to be incapable of keeping their inmates off the streets? Or is it that your murderers are masters of escapology unrestrained by facilities that suffice for lesser offenders?

It's tempting to think that capital punishment might be a feature of less developed societies and that banning it outright would be less effective than supporting international development so that it withers over time, but the existence of highly developed nations such as Aurelia that still employ the death penalty indicates otherwise.

[Kenmoria]

“I’m not sure why you have put ‘within their jurisdiction’ in the first and second active clauses. This adds little to their meaning, seeing as member nations cannot execute somebody at all if they are banned from doing so, and opens up the loophole of them doing the execution elsewhere. For example, instead of killing them in a normal prison, doing so in international waters.”

[Auralia]

You lost me at "wrongdoers deserve punishment," Mr Russell. If you wish to base a system of justice on the urge to harm people as an end in itself then we are talking entirely at cross purposes.

We explain what retributive justice is and why it is the only coherent conception of justice in our reply to United Massachusetts:

We reiterate that the primary purpose of punishment is retribution; in Feser's words, "wrongdoers deserve punishment". It is contrary to the natural law for a criminal to benefit from his crimes, so he deserves to be deprived of some proportionate good in response. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, he "who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments" can only be restored to the "equality of justice" through "penal compensation"; that is, he "suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish."

Retributive justice is not cruel or barbaric; to the contrary, it is the only coherent concept of justice. If punishment is not ultimately justified by wrongdoing, then it can be inflicted on those who have done nothing wrong. Moreover, since the punishment is no longer related to a particular offense, it need not be proportionate to that offense. Under a non-retributive theory of justice, totalitarian states should be free to imprison innocent people indefinitely merely because they threaten "social harmony" or are in need of "rehabilitation", or because their arbitrary imprisonment would deter crime.

We recommend reading C.S. Lewis's essay "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment", which discusses this issue in significant depth. A key quote:

According to the Humanitarian theory, to punish a man because he deserves it, and as much as he deserves, is mere revenge, and, therefore, barbarous and immoral. It is maintained that the only legitimate motives for punishing are the desire to deter others by example or to mend the criminal. When this theory is combined, as frequently happens, with the belief that all crime is more or less pathological, the idea of mending tails off into that of healing or curing and punishment becomes therapeutic. Thus it appears at first sight that we have passed from the harsh and self-righteous notion of giving the wicked their deserts to the charitable and enlightened one of tending the psychologically sick. What could be more amiable? One little point which is taken for granted in this theory needs, however, to be made explicit. The things done to the criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in the old days when we called them punishments. If a tendency to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be forced to undergo the treatment. Otherwise, society cannot continue.

My contention is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears, really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of a human being.

The reason is this. The Humanitarian theory removes from Punishment the concept of Desert. But the concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the only one we can reasonably ask about a punishment. We may very properly ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But neither of these two last questions is a question about justice. There is no sense in talking about a ‘just deterrent’ or a ‘just cure’. We demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it will deter. We demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a ‘case’.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[Uan aa Boa]

Mr Russell, in common with much Catholic dabbling with philosophy your explanation here consists of reiterating your claim in a more verbose manner. It may be that Aquinas thought "penal compensation" important, but this is the same Aquinas who wrote: "In order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned." I have no wish to take moral lectures from a man who gets off on watching torture.

I agree that it's a bad idea to punish those who have done nothing wrong - this is not in dispute. There's an enormous logical leap from there to the conclusion that those who have done wrong must suffer as an end in itself. It's simply a non sequiter. Your C.S. Lewis quote is nothing but an extended failure to grasp the difference between a necessary and a sufficient condition.

[Auralia]

Mr Russell, in common with much Catholic dabbling with philosophy your explanation here consists of reiterating your claim in a more verbose manner.

Clearly not, or you would not have felt the need to write a second paragraph.

It may be that Aquinas thought "penal compensation" important, but this is the same Aquinas who wrote: "In order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned." I have no wish to take moral lectures from a man who gets off on watching torture.

Your distaste for Aquinas is not actually a response to my argument, and it is also rooted in a misunderstanding -- to recognize a just punishment as good, and to take pleasure in it as such, is not the same as taking a sadistic pleasure in the sufferings of others.

I agree that it's a bad idea to punish those who have done nothing wrong - this is not in dispute. There's an enormous logical leap from there to the conclusion that those who have done wrong must suffer as an end in itself. It's simply a non sequiter. Your C.S. Lewis quote is nothing but an extended failure to grasp the difference between a necessary and a sufficient condition.

Of course punishment is not absolutely required for every wrongdoing; otherwise it would never be appropriate to show mercy. It would be more accurate to say that there is a presumption in favour of punishment that can be overridden.

I'm glad you agree that actual wrongdoing is at least a necessary condition of punishment. The "humanitarian" theory of punishment described by Lewis denies that retribution plays any part in punishment, whether as a necessary or a sufficient condition. Contrary to your claim, Lewis understands perfectly well the distinction between a necessary and a sufficient condition. His whole point is that retribution is at least a necessary condition for punishment, even though it is not necessarily sufficient:

...the concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust. I do not here contend that the question ‘Is it deserved?’ is the only one we can reasonably ask about a punishment. We may very properly ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But neither of these two last questions is a question about justice.

I would also note that even though retribution may not be a sufficient condition for punishment, it is privileged in that it is the only condition for punishment that is always necessary. A particular punishment may not have the effect of rehabilitating the offender, protecting society, or deterring crime, and yet still be legitimate under the right circumstances; but a punishment that is not justified by or proportionate to the offender's crime is never legitimate. I think this makes clear that retribution is the primary purpose of punishment.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[Christian Democrats]

This proposal has several fundamental problems:

• It conflates revenge and retribution, which are distinct concepts (see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations).
  
• It is hyperbolic to say that capital punishment is "the murder of innocent blood."
  
• The "long legal process," which you criticize, exists precisely to prevent the execution of the wrong person.

With respect to style:

• There are too many silly clauses. Stop trying to be cute.
  
• The correct term is "commute," not "reprieve and cancel."
  
• Use the word "alternative" rather than "alternate." The former word is acceptable in all dialects of the English language, whereas the latter word is acceptable only in certain dialects.

I would like to see the death penalty abolished -- but not for batty, emotive reasons (e.g., "you're murdering innocents!"). Try to reframe this proposal so that it appeals to reason (e.g., life imprisonment is preferable to execution because it gives criminals an expanded opportunity to repent and reform themselves and possibly to leave prison and reenter civil society).

[United Massachusetts]

OK. I'll reframe the preamble. I only put it there out of spite.

[Xanthal]

False choices and quotations of famous dead people aside, there's an important distinction to be drawn between the crafting of the law and its enforcement. While the two are certainly related, what is illegal and how those accused of violating the law are dealt with are separate questions both philosophically and- insofar as many countries confer the responsibility of making those decisions on separate bodies- practically.

[Uan aa Boa]

I'm glad you agree that actual wrongdoing is at least a necessary condition of punishment. The "humanitarian" theory of punishment described by Lewis denies that retribution plays any part in punishment, whether as a necessary or a sufficient condition... I would also note that even though retribution may not be a sufficient condition for punishment, it is privileged in that it is the only condition for punishment that is always necessary. A particular punishment may not have the effect of rehabilitating the offender, protecting society, or deterring crime, and yet still be legitimate under the right circumstances; but a punishment that is not justified by or proportionate to the offender's crime is never legitimate. I think this makes clear that retribution is the primary purpose of punishment.

There's that non sequiter again, because requiring that sanctions can only be applied to the guilty has no bearing on the question of retribution.

I agree with Lewis that framing innocent people and fining or imprisoning them in order to serve as a deterrent (I believe it's referred to as telishment in the philosophical literature) is unacceptable because it's an excessive violation of the rights of the person involved. Yet if we construct a suitable hypothetical scenario in which a person who has done wrong can either be punished or not, but it's guaranteed that either way there will be no positive social consequence, then I will always contend that the punishment is unjustified. What you're terming humanitarian considerations provide the only justification for judicial punishments. At the same time, it's wrong to apply judicial punishments to those who have broken no laws.

A sensible government will enact evidence based social policies to reduce crime that in a sense "punish" all of us through taxation or a limitation on libertarian levels of personal freedom, but the pay off is a society with lower levels of crime and the violation of rights (if we even concede ground to the libertarian by describing it as such) is small and equitably applied. A sensible government will also be focused on far more holistic considerations that retribution.

[Xanthal]

On a more practical note, I suggest that the first clause be revised to be more inclusive than "penalty of death." The Federation takes its obligations as a member of the World Assembly seriously and strives to comply as much as reasonably possible with the spirit of passed resolutions and not merely the "letter of the law," but given United Massachusetts' clear intent to ban executions unconditionally I feel compelled to point out that with the current wording a member could claim to be in compliance by asserting that- like Xanthal- they do not use death as a "penalty." Given many members' love of semantic loopholes, this one is obvious and particularly easy to close.

[Auralia]

There's that non sequiter again, because requiring that sanctions can only be applied to the guilty has no bearing on the question of retribution.

If punishment can only be inflicted on the guilty and never on the innocent, then it follows that the guilty merit punishment in a way that the innocent do not. What basis other than retributive justice is there to reserve punishment for the guilty?

I agree with Lewis that framing innocent people and fining or imprisoning them in order to serve as a deterrent (I believe it's referred to as telishment in the philosophical literature) is unacceptable because it's an excessive violation of the rights of the person involved. Yet if we construct a suitable hypothetical scenario in which a person who has done wrong can either be punished or not, but it's guaranteed that either way there will be no positive social consequence, then I will always contend that the punishment is unjustified. What you're terming humanitarian considerations provide the only justification for judicial punishments. At the same time, it's wrong to apply judicial punishments to those who have broken no laws.

I think any public act of justice, which inherently serves to restore the proper order of things, is good in itself, and that is reason enough to make it at least morally justifiable in principle. (And because it is good in itself, it will almost always carry at least some positive social consequences, such as a heightened respect for justice among members of the public.)

However, I agree that it is wrong to punish in circumstances where it has been determined that the negative consequences of doing so will outweigh the positive consequences, as is the case for any act.

A sensible government will enact evidence based social policies to reduce crime that in a sense "punish" all of us through taxation or a limitation on libertarian levels of personal freedom, but the pay off is a society with lower levels of crime and the violation of rights (if we even concede ground to the libertarian by describing it as such) is small and equitably applied. A sensible government will also be focused on far more holistic considerations that retribution.

I would not accept that the mere exercise of legitimate authority, such as the power to tax or the power to legislate, can be validly characterized as punishment. Punishment requires guilt.

If punishment is reserved to the guilty, I do not see how governments can avoid focusing on retribution. They can and should certainly take into account other considerations as well, and should not engage in an act of punishment unless it ultimately serves the common good. But this does not change the fact that punishment is, at its core, an act of retribution, insofar as it is only justified by wrongdoing in the first place.

Martin Russell
Chief Ambassador, Auralian Mission to the World Assembly

[Xanthal]

If punishment is reserved to the guilty, I do not see how governments can avoid focusing on retribution.

Try understanding it not as punishment, but a remedy. The key characteristic of a positive, forward-looking judicial philosophy is that it asks not what suffering the person has earned, but what can be done to prevent further wrong in the future and- in the ideal cases- eventually benefit both the individual and those around him. A non-retributive model of justice can encompass many potential remedies depending on the dispositions and circumstances of the system and the criminal it's judging, but I can give you some very broad strokes of the Xanthalian system for example.

First, if the case involves theft of some kind and restoration is possible, that will be done to whatever extent practical; that system is complicated in its own right and I only partially understand it, so since the subject at hand is the criminal and not the victim anyway I won't get too far into the weeds here. Next, an attempt is made to determine why the crime took place and- based on that understanding- whether there's a significant chance of the criminal offending again. If there is not, the criminal may simply be released, with or without conditions depending on the situation. If another infraction is considered likely, the next step is determining whether that likelihood can be decreased to an acceptable level without indefinite close supervision; if so, a program will be undertaken with that goal in mind, generally focused on some combination of behavioral modification (internal factors) and changing the convicted's situation (external factors). If successful, again the criminal will be released. If it's decided- either initially or after attempts at rehabilitation- that such a program is unlikely to yield the desired results, then a new phase of "sentencing" is entered.

This phase focuses on seeking long-term solutions with the understanding that the convicted's eventual release back into Xanthalian society as a free citizen is probably impractical or impossible. The court will make a good faith effort to find at least one supervised solution in which the person can be maintained safely within the Federation at a cost not greater than their expected productivity in that scenario; depending on the case there may be many potential options, few, or none. If there are no security concerns with doing so, the court will also attempt to find at least one other country willing to accept the person either as a free citizen or under supervision. If the convicted wishes to propose a sentence of their own this will also be considered. The options found by the judges to be acceptable will be presented to him, along with the option of a quick and painless death. Historically, and in the future WA willing, if no other acceptable options exist a sentence of death will be ordered.

Like treatment for a disease is reserved for those who have the disease, judicial remedy is reserved for the guilty. Just as a good hospital will prevent the spread of infection from a diseased patient, a good court will keep a proven criminal from causing further harm; no retribution required. Or, as the inscription in front of our courthouses puts it, "jąj olĭnsi tu dąι." "Justice looks to the future."