Bananaistan wrote:GenSec has voted to hear this challenge. As always comments by the challenger, author and the community are most welcome.
Goody.
COMES NOW the appellee, Separatist Peoples, and requests the following: GenSec should find the Administrative Compliance Act (the "ACA") legal regarding it’s Strength, and by virtue of that, it’s Category, as the Appellant, Wallenberg, has failed to state a reasonable interpretation of the rules upon which GenSec can find the proposed ACA illegal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing strength, GenSec will first look to the Rule. The Strength rule reads The Strength Rule “determines the effect a proposal has on a nation's policy. A proposal with mild language or affecting a narrow area of policy is Mild, while one which [affects] a very broad area of policy in a dramatic way is Strong. Anything in between is Significant." GenSec will analyze each clause individually to consider the consummate whole. See Challenge of International Aviation Act, Dec. 1, 2016)(
viewtopic.php?p=30394708#p30394708).
DISCUSSION
A. The Category is appropriate, as it increases individual political rights while reducing national power accordingly.
Furtherment of Democracy is the appropriate category for the ACA, as it seeks to provide individual persons with the power to assert their rights at the cost of government control. Furtherment of Democracy and Political Stability are opposing categories that affect the Political Freedoms statistic. Despite the reference to democracy, any limitation of a political freedom is appropriate for Political Stability. Conversely, any increase is appropriate for Furtherment of Democracy. This can be better described in a metric of power. Where the national government gains power at the expense of a private person’s ability to assert a right or access the government decision-making system, Political Stability reigns. Where the national government loses power and the private individual gains the ability to influence government choice or enforce their rights at the expense of that government, Furtherment of Democracy becomes appropriate.
Here, the ACA serves to increase individual rights at the expense of government. Article IV specifically grants private individuals a right of action against their member state government when the member state government fails to act in accordance with international law. It also grants a remedy for the violation of that right. In any real-world nation governed by the rule of law, where there is a violation of a right guaranteed to an individual, there is a right to seek a remedy for that violation in court. This provides individuals the opportunity to enforce their rights
at the expense of the government’s power to restrict that right.
Most of the operative clauses within the ACA justify the category. In International Aviation Act, GenSec analyzed each individual clause’s effect before analyzing them in the aggregate. Of the ACA’s five articles, only two do not create committees or task committees with action. Of the remaining two, only one has an aggregate action upon member states: Article IV. Of Article IV’s five clauses, the first is most dispositive of the category. It creates an extremely broad right guaranteeing every individual the power to enforce their rights, as guaranteed by the WA, in a member state court. This is unquestionably Furtherment of Democracy and weighs strongly in favor of that category. The second is a powerful limit on member state ability to interfere with that right. This also weighs strongly in favor of the chosen category. The third clause grant members the right to have counsel present at committee actions. This is not a weight in favor of the chosen category, but neither does it weigh in favor of any other category. At best, it is neutral. The same can be said of the fourth and fifth clauses.
On the balance, the only clauses in the ACA that may justify a certain category point undeniably toward Furtherment of Democracy. None of the clauses, taken together or separately, suggest any other reasonable category choice. Thus, GenSec should find that the chosen category, Furtherment of Democracy, is correct.
B. The Strength is appropriate even considering that only two such clauses have a categorical effect, because Article IV, Clause 1 and 2 affect a broad part of World Assembly policy in a very strong way.
The ACA comports with a Strong strength. The Strength rule provides that a proposal with “mild language or affecting a narrow area of policy is Mild, while one which a very broad area of policy in a dramatic way is Strong. Anything in between is Significant.” When a proposal is mostly a committee, GenSec will use a two-part test to decide if the strength is appropriate: First, GenSec will inquire as to whether Category and Strength are appropriate for the proposal as a whole, with the committee-related clauses included. Second, if the committee and all clauses that involve action by member nations in connection with the committee are removed, GenSec will inquire as to whether any requirements for member states remain.
As previously noted, the ACA complies with the first prong. Articles 1-3 all create a judicial framework that the WA and member states use to assess compliance in a rigorous, balanced way, and provides a remedy in the form of fines. That entire framework is intended to provide individual persons with the means to access rights promised by resolutions but potentially denied by noncompliant nations. Thus, their entire focus is to provide legal rights at the expense of their national government’s power.
Additionally, Article IV provides either minor rights to member states regarding the category or broad rights to individual persons to enforce their international rights against their national government. This also is done at the expense of the national government’s power. Finally, Article V provides a limit to future World Assembly legislation, which has no determinative category implications. Thus, this conforms with the selected category.
Even taken in a light least favorable to the ACA’s legality, the ACA also satisfies the second prong, as it still relates a very broad area of policy in a dramatic way after every single clause referencing or relating to the category is removed. Doing so leaves only Article IV, clauses 1 and 2. Taken more broadly (and thus in a light least favorable to the proposal’s legality), it might also include clause 4 and Article V, clause 1.
As noted before, clause 1 of Article IV provides a great power upon individuals to assert rights against their governments. It does so without regard to any committee, and it does so without regard for the right guaranteed under World Assembly law. The relevant parts of clause 2 of Article IV does the same, by baring states from interfering with their rights under clause 1, though this prong eliminates the first half of clause 2’s requirements to cooperate with the IAO. Further, assuming that Article IV clause 4 and Article V, clause 1 are included, the second prong is still met. Neither the World Assembly nor member states can frustrate the endeavors of the ACA, protecting the previously noted policy implications.
This satisfies the broad policy area part of the Strength rule under the second prong, as it affects literally any right provided for by World Assembly law, which spans everything to free trade reform, rules of warfare, basic human rights, intellectual property protections, and guarantees of heath standards for research. There is no interpretation of “broad” that the scope of the ACA does not meet, even eliminating the committees. Further, the effect of that broad scope is unquestionably significant: establishing a method of forcing states to grant their citizens those rights already guaranteed by World Assembly law has significant impacts on member states, both legally, financially, and practically. They are forced to generate legal procedures that may not have previously existed, remedy their own legal failings, and enforce, in good faith, resolutions not previously obeyed. States are also barred from interfering with those rights, as is the World Assembly. Taken together, the impacts are significant compared to a previous system with no obvious enforcement mechanism.
With or without the committees, the ACA clearly satisfies the Strength rule and the two-pronged test that applies for committee-heavy proposals. It affects all policy touched upon by the World Assembly, with or without it’s committees. That policy is affected substantially, as are member states, by any possible interpretation of the effects. Pretending otherwise would be disingenuous, and suggestive of ulterior motive regarding the proposal’s effects.
WHEREFORE, the Appellee respectfully requests that GenSec finds, on all counts, that the ACA is appropriately Furtherment of Democracy with a Strong strength.
Posted: Mon Mar 19, 2018 3:34 am)