Excalibur Squadron OOC - European Tour '39 - CLOSED

[Morrdh]

I think there should be an academic term for that guy's argument. Strategic Appeasement.

Appeasement 2: European Vacation

So, found this magazine today - it deals with “What If” scenarios, one of which being “what if Hitler invaded the UK?”. Full of badly photoshopped pictures of German troops marching past Buckingham Palace. Got into the text just to see what it says.

“It was a matter of transport and Germany couldn’t cross the Channel.”

Things are looking up, I thought

“But what would have worried people was the possibility of Germany developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and atomic warheads”

In 1940? U wot?

There is a very attenuated argument, if you squint really hard, that if Germany had maybe held off on the whole Russia thing in 1941 and instead knuckled in on industrial and technological buildup, maybe stuff like the V2 could have emerged earlier. But the German nuclear program was always a shambles and I don't see how it ever transcends that.

One of the things this book does really well, surprisingly, is argue that the German transport capacity has been underrated in most sources, which has sort of convinced me a bit on that issue. According to the calculations, the Germans had "80-85%" of the necessary barge capacity to fit the Sealion plan as constituted for a landing in September, and would have had 100% by October, the last possible window for a landing in 1940. This begs the question of how good these barges actually were for making an opposed landing in the teeth of air/naval/land resistance, but the Germans made an insane amount of progress in collecting an amphibious fleet within a few months, relative to where they had been at the start of the year. He also says the Germans wouldn't just have had enough barges by 1941, but they would have had dedicated landing craft in large numbers as well by then.

I should point out that this guy's ultimate conclusion w/r/t the most likely outcome of Sealion (either "Sealion Classic" in 1940 or "Sealion Redux" in 1941) would be a bloody stalemate. Assuming full-on Kriegsmarine/Luftwaffe support, the Germans would take significant losses, but would likely be able to overwhelm Nore Command in the short term, take advantage of British Army doctrinal flaws and intelligence preconceptions that the landing would come on the eastern shore, and successfully land on the Folkestone-Rye-Bexhill-Brighton frontier. However, this would likely spike American help hugely and the Germans would face massive onslaughts on all fronts, resulting on the Germans being hung on the outskirts of London.

I dunno how convinced I am of that. He goes to some pretty heroic lengths to try and justify how a barge fleet could make it past 30 destroyers, seven cruisers, and a battleship, which doesn't really sell me, but then again, the Germans did something like that in Norway over a much larger distance, so it can't be wholly discounted

IIRC East Anglia was already considered the prime spot for a landing for a long time in British defence planning.

Theres also a conspiracy theory that certain farming sites built by a German company in the 1930s were secretly landing strips.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

IIRC East Anglia was already considered the prime spot for a landing for a long time in British defence planning.

There is some real logic to this that Fleming mentioned in his book, even if it wasn't necessarily very compelling. The RAF could recon the French ports that would be used for a landing on the south coast, and while the barges were spotted, for whatever reason, the British never saw enough of a barge concentration to actually convince them that this was where the landing was going to come from.

But if the landing was coming on the east coast, it would be coming from German or even Baltic ports that the RAF couldn't observe very much, if at all. So, to be "safe", CIGS assumed that the ports they couldn't see were full to bursting with German transports, when in actuality, they were stripped bare.

[Morrdh]

IIRC East Anglia was already considered the prime spot for a landing for a long time in British defence planning.

There is some real logic to this that Fleming mentioned in his book, even if it wasn't necessarily very compelling. The RAF could recon the French ports that would be used for a landing on the south coast, and while the barges were spotted, for whatever reason, the British never saw enough of a barge concentration to actually convince them that this was where the landing was going to come from.

But if the landing was coming on the east coast, it would be coming from German or even Baltic ports that the RAF couldn't observe very much, if at all. So, to be "safe", CIGS assumed that the ports they couldn't see were full to bursting with German transports, when in actuality, they were stripped bare.

The 1903 novel The Riddle of the Sands revolves round the idea of Germany preparing to invade Britain via its east coast, the film version states the intended landing area was the Wash (King Lynn and the Norfolk/Lincolnshire border area).

Oh and the supposed landing fields; http://www.edp24.co.uk/news/was-norfolk ... -1-3931286

[The Tiger Kingdom]

There is some real logic to this that Fleming mentioned in his book, even if it wasn't necessarily very compelling. The RAF could recon the French ports that would be used for a landing on the south coast, and while the barges were spotted, for whatever reason, the British never saw enough of a barge concentration to actually convince them that this was where the landing was going to come from.

But if the landing was coming on the east coast, it would be coming from German or even Baltic ports that the RAF couldn't observe very much, if at all. So, to be "safe", CIGS assumed that the ports they couldn't see were full to bursting with German transports, when in actuality, they were stripped bare.

The 1903 novel The Riddle of the Sands revolves round the idea of Germany preparing to invade Britain via its east coast, the film version states the intended landing area was the Wash (King Lynn and the Norfolk/Lincolnshire border area).

Oh and the supposed landing fields; http://www.edp24.co.uk/news/was-norfolk ... -1-3931286

I have Riddle of the Sands! Good god, it was hard to read. 10% of it is invasion-conspiracy-adventure and like 90% of it is just about yachting.

Also fun fact: Riddle of the Sands was written by Erskine Childers, who was a legitimate British war hero who was later convicted of treason for smuggling weapons from Germany to the IRA. Churchill personally advocated for his execution.

[Morrdh]

The 1903 novel The Riddle of the Sands revolves round the idea of Germany preparing to invade Britain via its east coast, the film version states the intended landing area was the Wash (King Lynn and the Norfolk/Lincolnshire border area).

Oh and the supposed landing fields; http://www.edp24.co.uk/news/was-norfolk ... -1-3931286

I have Riddle of the Sands! Good god, it was hard to read. 10% of it is invasion-conspiracy-adventure and like 90% of it is just about yachting.

Also fun fact: Riddle of the Sands was written by Erskine Childers, who was a legitimate British war hero who was later convicted of treason for smuggling weapons from Germany to the IRA. Churchill personally advocated for his execution.

I've only seen the film version, but thanks to my college I've learnt that texts of that period take some effort.

Related fun fact; Churchill had earlier gotten Childers employed by Naval Intelligence when WW1 broke out.

EDIT: 'Advocated' might not have been a strong enough word.

[Goram]

One of the things this book does really well, surprisingly, is argue that the German transport capacity has been underrated in most sources, which has sort of convinced me a bit on that issue. According to the calculations, the Germans had "80-85%" of the necessary barge capacity to fit the Sealion plan as constituted for a landing in September, and would have had 100% by October, the last possible window for a landing in 1940. This begs the question of how good these barges actually were for making an opposed landing in the teeth of air/naval/land resistance, but the Germans made an insane amount of progress in collecting an amphibious fleet within a few months, relative to where they had been at the start of the year.

If I remember this rightly, they did it by taking flat bottom barges from the Rhine. These are river craft, not exactly ideal for crossing 20 odd miles of open water - assuming a Calais to Folkstone crossing. The Channel isn't an easy body of water to cross at the best of times. The current move West to East and it's strong - giving some interesting tides to work with. If you go to Bournemouth, high tide occurs there six hours before Dover. Thus, if the Germans wanted to land at high tide (as one assumes they would) you either have to do it in a very localised spot or risk giving every other defence and, indeed, the Royal Navy, several hours notice that you're coming. Even if you do get across, getting out of those barges underfire wouldn't have been overly fun - considering they don't have ramps and you'd have to clamber over the side. The Canadians proved, at Dieppe, that you need proper assault craft - especially for tanks - or an opposed landing is going to get shat on. I think the same happened to the Japanese once or twice against Indian troops in late 1941 but I can't remember where. It's also worth noting that Bomber Command was doing it's utmost and, indeed, a surprisingly effective job at bombing the barge build ups.

I dunno how convinced I am of that. He goes to some pretty heroic lengths to try and justify how a barge fleet could make it past 30 destroyers, seven cruisers, and a battleship, which doesn't really sell me, but then again, the Germans did something like that in Norway over a much larger distance, so it can't be wholly discounted

Nore Command isn't all of it either. As much as there would not be anything larger than light cruisers (RN strategy being don't commit capital ships until the Germans do, fearing air attack), you'd still have to contend with the Home Fleet coming South and the Channel Fleet. If you were to take the names of every vessel on the south coast during the height of the invasion scare and write them on a map, the lists would go well into the Bay of Biscay/North Sea. After Norway, and arguably before it, the Kriegsmarine (with Luftwaffe support or not) couldn't go about gaining sea control for any meaningful length of time. They just didn't have the ships for it.

Whilst they did manage it in Norway, over a much larger area of sea, I'm not sure it counts for much. They didn't have to contend with the battlecruiser Renown and her screen of, I think, 12 destroyers. Even they weren't there at the time, having been drawn away to investigate something to do with the destroyer HMS Glowworm. Combine that with bad weather and unimpeded Luftwaffe air superiority, and Freddie Flintoff's pedalo could have taken sufficient control of the North Sea for long enough to transport men across. It's also worth noting that the landings were largely unopposed.

Conversely, almost none of that is true for the English Channel. It was dominated by the Royal Navy and the RAF, even if forced to withdraw beyond the Thames, would be able to contest the airspace at least for a time. If the Germans attempted a daylight crossing, maybe it's possible that they might be able to get men across at the narrowest point, if they commit everything they've got. But after the first day, the Royal Navy is most definitely coming. The Dover Strait would become so full of destroyers that you could argue the Germans would no longer need to ship men across when they could simply walk. The British might lose ships to air attack, but not nearly enough to prevent them from severing the supply lines to whatever forces the Germans managed to land.

I haven't read that much about it, but, I just can't see how there was any chance of Sealion being successful at all. The Royal Navy had command of the sea, it would have been a massacre. I don't doubt that, privately, there were a number of naval officers who would have welcomed Hitler to have a go - just to see how bad it would be.

[The Tiger Kingdom]

If I remember this rightly, they did it by taking flat bottom barges from the Rhine. These are river craft, not exactly ideal for crossing 20 odd miles of open water - assuming a Calais to Folkstone crossing.

The book says that there were about 2350 barges collected from both the Rhine route and from all the occupied Low Countries. And no, they were not ideal - I think the projected speed they gave was 2-3 knots (!!!) for the invasion armada.

The Channel isn't an easy body of water to cross at the best of times. The current move West to East and it's strong - giving some interesting tides to work with. If you go to Bournemouth, high tide occurs there six hours before Dover. Thus, if the Germans wanted to land at high tide (as one assumes they would) you either have to do it in a very localised spot or risk giving every other defence and, indeed, the Royal Navy, several hours notice that you're coming. Even if you do get across, getting out of those barges underfire wouldn't have been overly fun - considering they don't have ramps and you'd have to clamber over the side.

The Canadians proved, at Dieppe, that you need proper assault craft - especially for tanks - or an opposed landing is going to get shat on.

TAUCHPANZER!!!
Yeah, this gets glossed over real bad.

I think the same happened to the Japanese once or twice against Indian troops in late 1941 but I can't remember where. It's also worth noting that Bomber Command was doing it's utmost and, indeed, a surprisingly effective job at bombing the barge build ups.

That's true and accounted for. Forczyk actually says that even beyond hitting the barges, Bomber Command probably would have been at their most effective after the landing had actually taken place and the Germans were on the beaches.

Nore Command isn't all of it either. As much as there would not be anything larger than light cruisers (RN strategy being don't commit capital ships until the Germans do, fearing air attack),

Apparently, the Revenge actually was split off to Plymouth and was there with the Western Approaches ships during the summer of 1940, so it would have been there to mix it up at the time.

you'd still have to contend with the Home Fleet coming South and the Channel Fleet. If you were to take the names of every vessel on the south coast during the height of the invasion scare and write them on a map, the lists would go well into the Bay of Biscay/North Sea. After Norway, and arguably before it, the Kriegsmarine (with Luftwaffe support or not) couldn't go about gaining sea control for any meaningful length of time. They just didn't have the ships for it.

To give credit to Forczyk, his ultimate conclusion is that the GEermans essentially force a landing in the first few hours, commit themselves totally, and then get bogged down in a war of attrition as the British run out of manpower and the Germans run out of shipping, so he's not totally untethered to this viewpoint of the situation. I'm basically on your side.

Whilst they did manage it in Norway, over a much larger area of sea, I'm not sure it counts for much. They didn't have to contend with the battlecruiser Renown and her screen of, I think, 12 destroyers. Even they weren't there at the time, having been drawn away to investigate something to do with the destroyer HMS Glowworm. Combine that with bad weather and unimpeded Luftwaffe air superiority, and Freddie Flintoff's pedalo could have taken sufficient control of the North Sea for long enough to transport men across. It's also worth noting that the landings were largely unopposed.

Conversely, almost none of that is true for the English Channel. It was dominated by the Royal Navy and the RAF, even if forced to withdraw beyond the Thames, would be able to contest the airspace at least for a time. If the Germans attempted a daylight crossing, maybe it's possible that they might be able to get men across at the narrowest point, if they commit everything they've got. But after the first day, the Royal Navy is most definitely coming. The Dover Strait would become so full of destroyers that you could argue the Germans would no longer need to ship men across when they could simply walk. The British might lose ships to air attack, but not nearly enough to prevent them from severing the supply lines to whatever forces the Germans managed to land.

The counter to that in the book is that Norway proved - if you buy it - that the Luftwaffe had such a talismanic power in the eyes of the Royal Navy that aside from how many ships would actually get knocked out or sunk by the Stukas, just the prospect of ships operating in the vicinity of the Luftwaffe would keep the Royal Navy at bay. I don't know if that's a reasonable assumption. He also argues that Stalingrad/Korsun proved that even being cut off by sea wouldn't neutralize the Germans, especially in a place where they could conceivably live off the land for a time. Again, his argument, not mine. He brings up the idea that the Germans could have tried a JU52 "air bridge" again, without really addressing that...uh...that didn't work at Stalingrad. It did at Demyansk! But that was with almost no Soviet air support contesting the transports.

He then goes off the deep end a bit. He takes a prospective battle between Royal Navy forces and a German invasion fleet, and deducts the British intercepting force down to half. He then says that British destroyers were old, obsolete, poorly armed, and slow, while the landing barges - BARGES -were " were armed with an assortment of 2cm and 3.7cm Flak guns whose high rate of fire could easily have raked the bridge and open gun mounts of any British destroyers that came too close. The larger transports were armed with 7.5cm and 10.5cm field guns. Furthermore, the invasion convoys would be escorted by far more substantial Kriegsmarine assets than is commonly understood."

He then goes on to say that because the Germans would be prospectively committing every single ship they had at more or less one zone of the Channel, while the British would just have a few ineffective destroyers milling about, that the fleet would get through on the first day - again, by his math. Interestingly, Forczyk points out that British submarines might also have been committed as well, which would change the math in the favor of the Royal Navy.

And of course, he deduces the British Army's numbers down from 1.2 million to "about 120,000 troops in total from Land's End to Scotland" and doesn't really include the Home Guard at all, rightly or wrongly.

I haven't read that much about it, but, I just can't see how there was any chance of Sealion being successful at all. The Royal Navy had command of the sea, it would have been a massacre. I don't doubt that, privately, there were a number of naval officers who would have welcomed Hitler to have a go - just to see how bad it would be.

[/quote]
That's the Peter Fleming argument, which I still more or less subscribe to. A lot of the Forczyk stuff is really interesting and takes a lot of subjects seriously that seem to have been brushed off in recent years, but he seems to have a habit of assuming the absolute worst of the British forces (the Royal Navy couldn't stop the Germans before a landing, British forces were dangerously undersupplied and out of position, British tactical doctrine was hopelessly flawed) and not doing the same for the Germans. He'll admit that the Kriegsmarine flatly didn't want to do the operation at all, that the Luftwaffe was completely out alone by themselves doing whatever the hell Goring wanted with no actual connection to actual invasion strategy, Hitler was only partially interested, the German naval campaigns at the time weren't really well-coordinated towards choking off British commerce entirely rather than just inflicting random damage, but that doesn't seem to play into the ultimate assessment.

It strikes me like this guy really wanted to be the revisionist who overturned the conventional wisdom that Sealion was doomed, but he couldn't quite do it, so he glossed over some things and juggled the numbers a bit. So he moderates the conclusion and says that Sealion probably would have ended with the Germans in Southeast England, but getting no farther, and with the British at a loss to actually kick them out.

I'll try and revisit this and see what else interesting that I can mine out, but I think a lot of the ultimate strategic verdicts Forczyk makes can be tossed.

[The Two Jerseys]

He brings up the idea that the Germans could have tried a JU52 "air bridge" again, without really addressing that...uh...that didn't work at Stalingrad. It did at Demyansk! But that was with almost no Soviet air support contesting the transports.

That's assuming they actually had enough Ju 52s for an effective air bridge after the Dutch fucked them up.

He then goes off the deep end a bit. He takes a prospective battle between Royal Navy forces and a German invasion fleet, and deducts the British intercepting force down to half. He then says that British destroyers were old, obsolete, poorly armed, and slow,

I call bullshit, the RN had close to 80 destroyers from 1930 and newer in commission at the start of the war. Which is twice the number of destroyers that the Kriegsmarine had, period.

while the landing barges - BARGES -were " were armed with an assortment of 2cm and 3.7cm Flak guns whose high rate of fire could easily have raked the bridge and open gun mounts of any British destroyers that came too close.

Dafuq is this shit?

Even if the destroyers do stray too close to the barges, as soon as the first barge opens fire the commodore is just going to order them to stand off and pound a for-all-intents-and-purposes stationary target with 4.7 inch QF at their leisure.

The larger transports were armed with 7.5cm and 10.5cm field guns.

Torpedomen are going to earn their pay today...

Furthermore, the invasion convoys would be escorted by far more substantial Kriegsmarine assets than is commonly understood."

Is Decius going to magic them up some more destroyers or something?

[The Tiger Kingdom]

That's assuming they actually had enough Ju 52s for an effective air bridge after the Dutch fucked them up.

A 30% loss rate against The Kingdom Of Orange, Cheese, and Windmills is not a good precedent at all.

I call bullshit, the RN had close to 80 destroyers from 1930 and newer in commission at the start of the war. Which is twice the number of destroyers that the Kriegsmarine had, period.

The theory is is that a) British destroyers were bad, b) there were never enough, c) the Luftwaffe could have kicked the Royal Navy's ass or at least countered them thoroughly, and d) the German Army would have reliably been able to beat the British as soon as they came ashore until hitting the London urban conurbation and the GHQ line.
ARE WE HAVING FUN YET

Even if the destroyers do stray too close to the barges, as soon as the first barge opens fire the commodore is just going to order them to stand off and pound a for-all-intents-and-purposes stationary target with 4.7 inch QF at their leisure.

Ah, but you see, he's got you pegged because he actually specifies that 4.7" was too big and unwieldy to be of use in fights against low-lying barges! They should have had Oerlikon 20mms! Which they didn't have!
Like I said, he is going to heroic lengths, here.

Also, of course, to avoid the Luftwaffe, the British would operate at night sans radar instead, kindly allowing the Germans to sneak past them.

Torpedomen are going to earn their pay today...

Conveniently, Forczyk asserts that the Royal Navy was "very short of torpedoes" at this point.

Is Decius going to magic them up some more destroyers or something?

There's a blast from the past!
No, it's all S-Boats and "auxiliaries".

What we can conclude, I think is that - assuming that the Germans put LITERALLY EVERYTHING THEY HAD into the shortest possible hop, they a) would have sustained almost certainly horrific losses b) probably have gotten some troops actually on shore, and then c) would be almost certainly unable to sustain that landing.

[The Two Jerseys]

Even if the destroyers do stray too close to the barges, as soon as the first barge opens fire the commodore is just going to order them to stand off and pound a for-all-intents-and-purposes stationary target with 4.7 inch QF at their leisure.

Ah, but you see, he's got you pegged because he actually specifies that 4.7" was too big and unwieldy to be of use in fights against low-lying barges! They should have had Oerlikon 20mms! Which they didn't have!
Like I said, he is going to heroic lengths, here.

This guy seriously doesn't get it.

They're not trying to pull lead on a kamikaze, they're shooting at commandeered river barges that are about as fast and nimble as HMS Victory.

Hell, they don't even need to score hits, straddle those barges with near-misses for hours on end and those infantrymen will be exhausted by the time they hit the beach.

Torpedomen are going to earn their pay today...

Conveniently, Forczyk asserts that the Royal Navy was "very short of torpedoes" at this point.

And the Kriegsmarine being very short of surface combatants isn't an issue?

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Ah, but you see, he's got you pegged because he actually specifies that 4.7" was too big and unwieldy to be of use in fights against low-lying barges! They should have had Oerlikon 20mms! Which they didn't have!
Like I said, he is going to heroic lengths, here.

This guy seriously doesn't get it.

They're not trying to pull lead on a kamikaze, they're shooting at commandeered river barges that are about as fast and nimble as HMS Victory.

Hell, they don't even need to score hits, straddle those barges with near-misses for hours on end and those infantrymen will be exhausted by the time they hit the beach.

Conveniently, Forczyk asserts that the Royal Navy was "very short of torpedoes" at this point.

And the Kriegsmarine being very short of surface combatants isn't an issue?

There's inconsistencies all over the place. In one chapter, he's castigating Churchill for not deploying the exiled Polish units to southern England where they could have been of use (as opposed to being dumped up in Scotland), and then in another chapter, he accentuates how "Germany had allies in 1940, while Britain had refugees".
Like...what? Yeah, Britain had refugees, and they probably made the difference in 1940 in terms of RAF manpower.
Meanwhile, all Germany's allies did in 1940 was show up months late, get their asses kicked, and then went home.
Either Britain has useful allies, or they don't. Don't completely change your characterization of them based on what point you're trying to prove.("Churchill was foolish by not deploying the Poles properly" versus "The British Army had no hope in 1940 and the Poles wouldn't have mattered")

Back to the barges - he also admits that in the event of a British attack, regardless of losses, the German fleet would probably have been forced to scatter completely out of formation...which never gets linked to the horrific impact that would prospectively have had on the actual landing...

[Morrdh]

Me wonders whether he looked up the wargame they did at Sandhurst in 1974.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... n_(wargame)

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Me wonders whether he looked up the wargame they did at Sandhurst in 1974.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... n_(wargame)

He did. This is basically all of it.

"The war game assessed that, once isolated, the trapped German troops in England would have surrendered within just four days. Little regard was given to the ability of the Luftwaffe to mount aerial resupply missions or the fact that trapped German formations in places such as Stalingrad, Demyansk and Korsun demonstrated a marked ability to fight on for weeks or months on minimal supplies. Unlike the Russian Front, German troops in England would not be freezing to death or surrounded by an enemy with vastly superior numbers. In North Africa, even when Rommel’s Deutsche Afrikakorps (DAK) troops were short on fuel and ammunition, they were repeatedly able to repulse British infantry and armour attacks; the idea that German forces in England would simply surrender because a number of supply ships had been sunk is preposterous..."

"The main British trump card – the battleship HMS Revenge and the remaining cruisers and destroyers from Portsmouth Command would have to gain control of the sea against Bey’s destroyers, a large force of torpedo boats, S-Boats and small craft. Although the Sandhurst study of 1974 made this seem a straightforward task, it would be just as difficult and frustrating for the Royal Navy to accomplish as it was for the Luftwaffe to achieve
air superiority over England. In the face of incessant German air attacks, the weakness of British shipboard anti-aircraft defences suggests that the Royal Navy’s surface warships in September 1940 could only achieve sea control in the Channel for brief periods of time, but could not permanently sever the invasion force’s lines of communication. Simply put, the Royal Navy was capable of mounting ‘Thunder Runs’ through the Channel, shooting up assorted German shipping, but their warships could not remain there in daylight for very long. Consequently, the Germans were bound to shift most of their follow-on shipping to small convoys in daylight, with Luftwaffe air cover. "

[The Tiger Kingdom]

In other news, I've learned that the secret to keeping OOC chat active is to talk a monstrous amount of shit about history books that I don't like.

[The Two Jerseys]

Me wonders whether he looked up the wargame they did at Sandhurst in 1974.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... n_(wargame)

He did. This is basically all of it.

"The war game assessed that, once isolated, the trapped German troops in England would have surrendered within just four days. Little regard was given to the ability of the Luftwaffe to mount aerial resupply missions or the fact that trapped German formations in places such as Stalingrad, Demyansk and Korsun demonstrated a marked ability to fight on for weeks or months on minimal supplies. Unlike the Russian Front, German troops in England would not be freezing to death or surrounded by an enemy with vastly superior numbers. In North Africa, even when Rommel’s Deutsche Afrikakorps (DAK) troops were short on fuel and ammunition, they were repeatedly able to repulse British infantry and armour attacks; the idea that German forces in England would simply surrender because a number of supply ships had been sunk is preposterous..."

"The main British trump card – the battleship HMS Revenge and the remaining cruisers and destroyers from Portsmouth Command would have to gain control of the sea against Bey’s destroyers, a large force of torpedo boats, S-Boats and small craft. Although the Sandhurst study of 1974 made this seem a straightforward task, it would be just as difficult and frustrating for the Royal Navy to accomplish as it was for the Luftwaffe to achieve
air superiority over England. In the face of incessant German air attacks, the weakness of British shipboard anti-aircraft defences suggests that the Royal Navy’s surface warships in September 1940 could only achieve sea control in the Channel for brief periods of time, but could not permanently sever the invasion force’s lines of communication. Simply put, the Royal Navy was capable of mounting ‘Thunder Runs’ through the Channel, shooting up assorted German shipping, but their warships could not remain there in daylight for very long. Consequently, the Germans were bound to shift most of their follow-on shipping to small convoys in daylight, with Luftwaffe air cover. "

"As the Luftwaffe bombs the Royal Navy into oblivion, Fighter Command is locked in their bedroom looking at porn..."

[Alversia]

He did. This is basically all of it.

"The war game assessed that, once isolated, the trapped German troops in England would have surrendered within just four days. Little regard was given to the ability of the Luftwaffe to mount aerial resupply missions or the fact that trapped German formations in places such as Stalingrad, Demyansk and Korsun demonstrated a marked ability to fight on for weeks or months on minimal supplies. Unlike the Russian Front, German troops in England would not be freezing to death or surrounded by an enemy with vastly superior numbers. In North Africa, even when Rommel’s Deutsche Afrikakorps (DAK) troops were short on fuel and ammunition, they were repeatedly able to repulse British infantry and armour attacks; the idea that German forces in England would simply surrender because a number of supply ships had been sunk is preposterous..."

I quite like how he uses these two examples as if they were somehow victories for the Germans, rather than quite heavy defeats.

He also seems to think that fighting the British and fighting the Soviets were the same in the minds of the Germans. If I was trapped with minimal supplies, I know which one I'd be fighting to the death against and which one I'd be surrendering to.

"The main British trump card – the battleship HMS Revenge and the remaining cruisers and destroyers from Portsmouth Command would have to gain control of the sea against Bey’s destroyers, a large force of torpedo boats, S-Boats and small craft. Although the Sandhurst study of 1974 made this seem a straightforward task, it would be just as difficult and frustrating for the Royal Navy to accomplish as it was for the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority over England. In the face of incessant German air attacks, the weakness of British shipboard anti-aircraft defences suggests that the Royal Navy’s surface warships in September 1940 could only achieve sea control in the Channel for brief periods of time, but could not permanently sever the invasion force’s lines of communication. Simply put, the Royal Navy was capable of mounting ‘Thunder Runs’ through the Channel, shooting up assorted German shipping, but their warships could not remain there in daylight for very long. Consequently, the Germans were bound to shift most of their follow-on shipping to small convoys in daylight, with Luftwaffe air cover. "

This book seems quite amusing. Does it delve into the entirely hypothetical 'What if' that Stalin could have broken the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact when the Germans were all in France and England. The Germans could have ended up fighting wars on three, if not four, fronts at once, assuming Mussolini did as normal? (Thinking off the top of my head; North Africa, the Balkans, Britain itself and then against the Soviets).

[The Tiger Kingdom]

I quite like how he uses these two examples as if they were somehow victories for the Germans, rather than quite heavy defeats.

Ah, but this is different, you see.

He also seems to think that fighting the British and fighting the Soviets were the same in the minds of the Germans. If I was trapped with minimal supplies, I know which one I'd be fighting to the death against and which one I'd be surrendering to.

True, but that was also the case in Tunisia, which he does mention. But then again, those were also super-hardened veterans, as opposed to the Wehrmacht in 1940, which was still pretty callow and not very experienced.

This book seems quite amusing. Does it delve into the entirely hypothetical 'What if' that Stalin could have broken the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact when the Germans were all in France and England. The Germans could have ended up fighting wars on three, if not four, fronts at once, assuming Mussolini did as normal? (Thinking off the top of my head; North Africa, the Balkans, Britain itself and then against the Soviets).

No, it doesn't. The book lays out its assumption that assuming Sealion occurs in 1940, that Germany never deploys the Afrika Korps in March of 1941, never invades the Balkans, and the USSR remains a year or so away from trying to invade Germany.
I can understand those assumptions - Africa and the Balkans were small fry next to knocking Britain out of the war, and the Soviets had just gotten their asses handed to them by FINLAND.

[Morrdh]

Me wonders whether he looked up the wargame they did at Sandhurst in 1974.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... n_(wargame)

He did. This is basically all of it.

"The war game assessed that, once isolated, the trapped German troops in England would have surrendered within just four days. Little regard was given to the ability of the Luftwaffe to mount aerial resupply missions or the fact that trapped German formations in places such as Stalingrad, Demyansk and Korsun demonstrated a marked ability to fight on for weeks or months on minimal supplies. Unlike the Russian Front, German troops in England would not be freezing to death or surrounded by an enemy with vastly superior numbers. In North Africa, even when Rommel’s Deutsche Afrikakorps (DAK) troops were short on fuel and ammunition, they were repeatedly able to repulse British infantry and armour attacks; the idea that German forces in England would simply surrender because a number of supply ships had been sunk is preposterous..."

Think that being captured by the Soviets was a fate worse than death probably influenced the Germans to fight on at places like Stalingrad.

IIRC the Luftwaffe was pretty shit at doing resupply sorties, it was designed and built as a tactical air force to support the German Blitzkrieg. It also ended up being severely overextended. The other issue is that those supply ships need some place to unload and would be sitting ducks for the RAF.

Anyhows, another topic I've thought of.

Would the war in the Pacific had happen if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance hadn't ended?

I'm aware that Britain and Japan had drifted apart by the time it ended, though the Japs being snubbed by not being invited to the post-WW1 talks (despite fighting the Germans in the Far East) probably didn't happen. But could Britain have been able to reign Japan in and thus avoid a conflict?

[The Tiger Kingdom]

Anyhows, another topic I've thought of.

Would the war in the Pacific had happen if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance hadn't ended?

I'm aware that Britain and Japan had drifted apart by the time it ended, though the Japs being snubbed by not being invited to the post-WW1 talks (despite fighting the Germans in the Far East) probably didn't happen. But could Britain have been able to reign Japan in and thus avoid a conflict?

I really doubt the British-Japanese alliance would have made much of a difference. Japan's military was out of control for decades and war with China seemed pretty much inevitable. The Japanese government was in the middle of a horrific resource crunch which practically invited desperate action and was in the hands of militarists for a long, long time.

Maybe Japan doesn't attack Britain directly, but they'd still embark on an imperial path that would put them in conflict with British interests.

[Alversia]

Anyhows, another topic I've thought of.

Would the war in the Pacific had happen if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance hadn't ended?

I'm aware that Britain and Japan had drifted apart by the time it ended, though the Japs being snubbed by not being invited to the post-WW1 talks (despite fighting the Germans in the Far East) probably didn't happen. But could Britain have been able to reign Japan in and thus avoid a conflict?

I really doubt the British-Japanese alliance would have made much of a difference. Japan's military was out of control for decades and war with China seemed pretty much inevitable. The Japanese government was in the middle of a horrific resource crunch which practically invited desperate action and was in the hands of militarists for a long, long time.

Maybe Japan doesn't attack Britain directly, but they'd still embark on an imperial path that would put them in conflict with British interests.

Sums it up pretty neatly. The Anglo-Japanese alliance had run it's course by the end of WW1 and Malaysia had lots of things the Japanese needed for their own empire building. Not to mention the Japanese could hardly be allowed to attack the other colonial powers in the region (France, Netherlands, US) and have Britain just sit back. Sets a bad precedent for their colonies (and especially India).

[United Kingdom of Poland]

not to mention the war in Europe killing it completely (or rather the US making England chose between receiving lend lease or standing against them on the oil embargo)

[Morrdh]

not to mention the war in Europe killing it completely (or rather the US making England chose between receiving lend lease or standing against them on the oil embargo)

Even though the alliance ended 20 years before Lend Lease?

Interestingly enough, some scholars argue that the end of the alliance (chiefly how it ended) was a big factor for Japan's involvement in WW2.

[Grenartia]

I know this will likely end in a Yank vs Limey flamewar, but what about War Plan Red?

[The Tiger Kingdom]

I know this will likely end in a Yank vs Limey flamewar, but what about War Plan Red?

Nothing more than a conspiracy to keep American war planning staff officers employed during the Depression

[Grenartia]

I know this will likely end in a Yank vs Limey flamewar, but what about War Plan Red?

Nothing more than a conspiracy to keep American war planning staff officers employed during the Depression

Right, but what if it had happened? Like, I don't know, either the UK or US goes fash.