Gibberan wrote:Hey, can I edit the TV Tropes page to add the name of Carter's Hurricane?
I would've done it for you...but you had to go an lock it up...
Advertisement
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 11:28 am
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 11:33 am
by Morrdh » Thu Dec 26, 2013 11:38 am
Le-Quebec wrote:Given your account, it sounds as if Bomber Command was going through Stalingrad with its night time doctrine. My point here is that, at least in the eyes of an American, the RAF was only trying to reduce casualty figures amongst expensive and valuable pilots. I once had the opportunity to talk with a B-17 veteran at a regional air museum; he joked that the USAAF was willing to go daylight because glorious 'Murica had all the reserves for bomber pilots to spare, and that Harris and his people had the sense to let the Yanks eat all the bullets and flak whilst they were able to conserve the fragile number of British airmen in the process.
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 11:44 am
by Goram » Thu Dec 26, 2013 12:21 pm
Morrdh wrote:Le-Quebec wrote:Given your account, it sounds as if Bomber Command was going through Stalingrad with its night time doctrine. My point here is that, at least in the eyes of an American, the RAF was only trying to reduce casualty figures amongst expensive and valuable pilots. I once had the opportunity to talk with a B-17 veteran at a regional air museum; he joked that the USAAF was willing to go daylight because glorious 'Murica had all the reserves for bomber pilots to spare, and that Harris and his people had the sense to let the Yanks eat all the bullets and flak whilst they were able to conserve the fragile number of British airmen in the process.
Thing is us Brits still suffered higher losses.
). I know of at least two rear gunners (one of them holds the record, I think, at 122) that became centurions and perhaps one pilot (Cheshire, Gibson's 174 don't count as that number includes time on Night Fighters) who managed to become centurions. by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 3:55 pm
by Jamessonia » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:09 pm
Gibberan wrote:Hmmm, what to post?
by The Tiger Kingdom » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:23 pm
Le-Quebec wrote:Given your account, it sounds as if Bomber Command was going through Stalingrad with its night time doctrine. My point here is that, at least in the eyes of an American, the RAF was only trying to reduce casualty figures amongst expensive and valuable pilots. I once had the opportunity to talk with a B-17 veteran at a regional air museum; he joked that the USAAF was willing to go daylight because glorious 'Murica had all the reserves for bomber pilots to spare, and that Harris and his people had the sense to let the Yanks eat all the bullets and flak whilst they were able to conserve the fragile number of British airmen in the process.
The Pacific war is more of an enigma to study than the European theatre, at least personally to me. It should be noted that many of the well known aspects of the war there have been written by the victors; in this case, Westerners from the US and Commonwealth states. Whilst I'm not stating that they're biased in their interpretation of history, I'm trying to say that the Pacific also involved an easily overlooked clash of cultures alongside more appealing and understandable mechanical battles often confusing to those outside of Asia. For example, it's a common motif to hear that the Japanese were so obsessed with their warrior Bushido values that they neglected the study of supply and logistics. This is both true and misinterpreted - note that I didn't say "false" - depending on which spectrum of the military you're looking at.
It's well known that the IJN, unlike the USN and RN, was forced to use active warships and destroyers as supply transports because of the lack of vessels specialized in that role. Thus, the IJN neglected naval supply as apparently dishonorable because such a field didn't involve nobly meeting the enemy face to face. This is more of a misunderstanding by foreign observers than an actual falsehood; the mentality prevalent within the IJN ever since the Meiji Restoration was that the production of more vessels that could actually return fire and engage the enemy guaranteed national security more effectively than having to spend strained resources on supply ships that would easily be sent to the bottom in the event of a major conflict against the Home Islands.
In essence, their argument was this: say a zombie apocalypse is imminent, and that you and your neighbors must defend your property from an inevitable zombie horde sooner or later. However, your budget is tight, and you only possess the funds enough to purchase more weapons and ammunition for your garrison, or splitting the budget between weapons and foodstuffs. While choosing the latter seems logical in the sense that you would be able to last out a siege of the undead longer, you will sacrifice the effectiveness of your garrison in actually repelling or breaking out from the zombie horde. While the first option will give you less food and water in exchange for a number of rifles and magazines, the increased firepower of your garrison will enable it to not only overcome a zombie attack, but also aggressively forage and search for needed resources if required, potentially bringing back even more weapons and ammunition in the process. Thus, if wielded correctly, the first option can enable a win-win situation in terms of both physical safety and secure supply.
In summary, the IJN's attitude towards supply and logistics was that it was less about maintaining an empire, but more so about defending it from foreign threats to maintain it.
Another case with the Japanese Army; statistics and comparison of archives show that the Japanese were the most starved and malnourished Axis military compared with their European allies. The common motif is the same as with the IJN; Japanese strategists were less concerned about supplies and logistics because they were more obsessed over combat effectiveness.
It wasn't so much that the Japanese Army neglected supplying its troops altogether - it was more that the IJA believed in a different method of supply and logistics than its Western counterparts. Western armies, such as those of the US and Commonwealth, typically envision supply lines as linear routes and channels funneled by long columns of trucks/lorries, transport aircraft, and naval convoys. In this manner, field combat units along the battle front were only branches of a tree in which supplies flowed to them from a central root around the home front.
Le-Quebec wrote:The Japanese, knowing that the Home Islands possessed rather miniscule natural resources and young industrial assets compared to the United Kingdom (whom ironically served as the primary role model for the land of the Rising Sun), felt that such a system of centralized management was not only cumbersome, but also rather impractical given the aforementioned inappropriateness of the Home Islands to do so. Instead, the IJA opted for a strategy involving essentially a military autarky; instead of long and predetermined supply routes, Japanese army units at least on the operational level were expected to be self-sufficient in feeding themselves. Essentially, this meant that IJA troops had to forage and live off of the lands that they were deployed in, as to ease the wartime burden upon the resources and economy of the Home Islands. This is reflected on the tactical level in the sense of how Japanese troops weren't issued canned and preserved field rations, unlike their Western counterparts; instead, they were simply given a small portable stove set in which they were to cook their own obtained rice with.
Le-Quebec wrote:This mentality can also help explain (note that I said explain, not justify) one of the reasons for the large numbers of Japanese war crimes against the populations of their civilian subjects: unlike the Germans whom were reasonably well fed and thus on even terms with their conquered domains, the Japanese had to make do with not only the less fertile soil and arid climate of the Far East, but also the fact that they had to obtain their daily meals from local sources whom were less than willing to hand it over to them. Add the anger and frustration of being sniped at by said conquered peoples, and you've got the recipe for serious repercussions against disloyal populations under the Empire.
GOram wrote:Today is the 70th anniversary of the sinking of the Scharnhorst.
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:28 pm
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:32 pm
by Gibberan » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:39 pm
by The Tiger Kingdom » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:50 pm
by Len Hyet » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:54 pm
The Tiger Kingdom wrote:Wait, Kour, what wasn't polite?
by The Tiger Kingdom » Thu Dec 26, 2013 4:56 pm
Return to Portal to the Multiverse
Users browsing this forum: Dragos Bee, Kandex, Newne Carriebean7
