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NS Military Worldbuilding Thread No. 12

A place to put national factbooks, embassy exchanges, and other information regarding the nations of the world. [In character]

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Hurtful Thoughts
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Postby Hurtful Thoughts » Tue Aug 16, 2022 4:04 pm

Gallia- wrote:Two weeks is really short tbf.

When I say "paramedic" I mean EMT-P standard in USA.

Still a head and shoulders better than a single 4 hour physical-course with a 30 minute refresher/re-qual every 2 years [not counting 3 hours of online refresher coursework].

Although that level of training is more on par with very basic buddy-care.

That said, knowing how to re-set an ingrown toenail so it won't bleed through somebody's socks on the next march is still a nice skill to learn for the platoon motrin-man.

Military medics at their most basic levels should be able to conduct IO/IV/IA and ILS in general, as well as limited surgical methods like venous cutdowns, since they are going to be dealing with people missing arms and legs due to rocket strikes and stuff and they may not have immediately available veins for injection of saline. I can think of one incident off the top of my head where a 68W had to perform venous cutdown on a sergeant missing his arms due to a Zuni rocket IRL, and at least two others where proper training in bleeding control would have saved people's lives. These would be the people at the company casualty collection point, with a paramedic as supervising, and the people in the platoon as first point of contact for severe injuries such as traumatic amputation via long rods or severe burns caused by internal ammunition/fuel fires that can't be handled by a CAT, bandage, Asherman seal, or pre-measured analgesic syrettes that you'd find in a typical IFAK. For major trauma injuries they would be first point of contact for the wounded.

Buddy aid is used for simpler GSWs on the vest and unconscious casualties due to mine or grenade explosions, which in the grand scheme of things don't matter much since you can survive them provided you aren't hit by a piece of metal that severs a major artery or two. Dudes have survived getting hit in the neck by small arms and having jugulars cut with proper bleed control and pinpoint pressure as a form of self-care, but you can't expect an 18 year old private to do that I guess, since the guys I'm thinking of were special forces dudes in their late 20's and early 30's.

That said, basic medical training should just be standard curricula for motor riflemen in general (i.e. stop bleeding, recovery position, splinting, Asherman seals, etc.) and paramedics should be at battalion with the battalion surgeon, for ALS and initial triage, and then they are evacuated to a regimental aid point for further shipment to a national hospital (for major surgery such as severe burns, traumatic amputation, spinal injuries, etc) or a combat field hospital for relatively minor things like illness or minor injuries that could be healed within a couple weeks or days and returned to the frontlines.

I'll probably draw a medkit for Dumblan combat troops that is issued to everyone. It'll be packaged by a really austere/retro way, because Galla grows poorer by the minute to preserve its wholesomeness, but otherwise fairly modern.
Factbook and general referance thread.
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The People's Republic of Hurtful Thoughts is a gargantuan, environmentally stunning nation, ruled by Leader with an even hand, and renowned for its compulsory military service, multi-spousal wedding ceremonies, and smutty television.
Mokostana wrote:See, Hurty cared not if the mission succeeded or not, as long as it was spectacular trainwreck. Sometimes that was the host Nation firing a SCUD into a hospital to destroy a foreign infection and accidentally sparking a rebellion... or accidentally starting the Mokan Drug War

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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Tue Aug 16, 2022 6:05 pm

I'm sorry but 68Ws are actually well trained compared to whatever you just made up lmfao.

Even the CLS course is a week long, and the very basic "how to bandage" buddy aid course is three days during Red.

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Kerberos
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Postby Kerberos » Wed Aug 17, 2022 1:31 pm

So its been a long, interesting road, but I'm finally getting the USSK Army's doctrine. The theory is based on combined arms brigades capable of operating independently, but in practice grouped into small divisions with so called Special brigades that include air support, airmobile and dedicated tank units that can't operate alone. Artillery is grouped into company sized batteries that are attached to brigades as needed. In practice most Independent brigades are based around Armoured and light infantry battalions, with attached artillery batteries and dedicated engineering, logistics and medical assets.

I also set up an airmobile special brigade with way a more user friendly format, once again link to my factbook.
https://www.nationstates.net/nation=ker ... id=1750074

Edit: also cleaned up the 1st Independent Brigade.
https://www.nationstates.net/nation=ker ... id=1749585
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Dtn
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Postby Dtn » Wed Aug 17, 2022 3:31 pm

Gallia- wrote:I'm sorry but 68Ws are actually well trained compared to whatever you just made up lmfao.

Even the CLS course is a week long, and the very basic "how to bandage" buddy aid course is three days during Red.


Literally got more training at middle school farm safety camp lol

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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Wed Aug 17, 2022 4:22 pm

Dtn wrote:
Gallia- wrote:I'm sorry but 68Ws are actually well trained compared to whatever you just made up lmfao.

Even the CLS course is a week long, and the very basic "how to bandage" buddy aid course is three days during Red.


Literally got more training at middle school farm safety camp lol


I'm pretty sure a CPR course is more training than the IFAK application but yeah.

68Ws are just old EMT-I (they still are allowed to do endoscopes and charcoal) so they aren't total bozos though.

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Tippercommon
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Postby Tippercommon » Thu Aug 18, 2022 8:03 pm

A task organized battle group sent by a communist nation to reinforce a rebel cause overseas, generated from airborne and Troupes de marine type units.

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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Mon Aug 22, 2022 1:11 am

Hemvaernet IR-85 Luftvaernsrobotsystem m/32 team on a Gallan Motors Rymdig 248-88

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Lvrbs m/32 missile team, operating within the limits of the system, as it is designed.

The motorization of the Gallan Home Guard has always relied extensively on Galla's own domestic automobile industry, exclusively operating domestic equivalents ("clones") of foreign made designs when possible, but preferentially edging towards fully indigenous design. One of these is the rather unusual RM248 scooter, stripped of its commercial ABS plastic, and fitted with a new aluminum body. Although not as capable as the regular Army's AK800-derived motor bike, the RM248 is substantially cheaper, and more importantly very familiar with most civil drivers. It is one of the most common motorbikes for intra-city commuting, giving drivers of the Home Guard's infantry regiments a lot of "baked in" experience in using it both on- and off-road. While the ordinary RM248 is often used for commuter travel or light load carrying, the engine is relatively unstressed, and this makes it an excellent and reliable basis for a military transporter. The depicted '88 series features stainless steel tires, which were replaced by aluminum alloy tires in the '96 series. More modern versions of the bike, such as the '18 series, incorporate advanced "fog vision" modes on the electronic speedometer, giving an approximated view of the road with a W-band inclement weather radar for detection of obstacles in low visibility conditions. Early models, such as the '88 and '96, only had the speed, miles, fuel gauge, and temperature listed.

The 248 cc 1-cy SOHC outputs 20 HP at 7400 RPM, giving the RM248 a top speed of about 65-70 mph light loaded, more than sufficient to keep up with the rest of the missile platoon vehicles, and maintains a maximum speed of around 40-45 mph when fully loaded with crew and ammo. Ordinary movement speed in convoys is rarely greater than 30 miles per hour, however, meaning that the RM248 is rarely stressed significantly, despite the large mass loads placed on it by two fully kitted Guardsmen (~420 lbs) and missile system (~75 lbs). Unlike the civil model of the RM248, part of the military modifications included stronger shock springs, giving the RM248-88 a more extensive ability to carry the mass without damaging the frame, although it remains somewhat underpowered for the task in general. Taking this into account, the later IR-85M Regiment, first equipped in 1994, included a second bike for the missile teams, carrying the TADS display computer and VRC FM radio pack, while the missile system and gunner were transported on the first bike. Additionally, the heavy aluminum body would be replaced by lighter CF reinforced GRP, itself stronger than typical ABS plastic and lighter than aluminum, on the '96 model.

Military modifications of the '88 series include the replacement of ABS plastic with aluminum hard shell, the addition of grab handles on the back for the passenger, a rear trunk with a storage tray for a VRC-type field radio and upper area for storage of the IFF interrogator and gripstock. Finally, the TADDS (plan position indicating alert computer), which connects to the VRC and the tactical alerting radar (TAR) in the battery headquarters which allows the missile team to orient themselves to incoming targets picked up by the TAR (20-km range), is stored on the rear trunk, below the VRC. A whip antenna is often mounted on the left side. Spare battery-cooling units are stored immediately behind the rear position on the bike. As the RM248 is a two seat scooter, the gunner and NCO, the latter typically a Lance Corporal (lanskorpral) and the former typically a Guardsman in rank, both ride together, forming a full team. Two missile rounds are carried on the left and right sides of the scooter, immediately below the handrails. Code input computers, used for programming the EEPROM of the IFF interrogator are carried in the section headquarters.

The basic load for a missile team is one IFF interrogator-computer, one gripstock/IFF antenna, one VRC manpack radio (5 W), four battery-cooling units, and two missile all-up-rounds (AUR). Further spare and support equipment (including additional missiles) is stored in the section headquarters, including a single IFF code computer and cryptographic programming equipment.

Similar modes of transport are used for the Pansarskott m/98 (PS98) 5" (127-mm) anti-tank rocket launcher, intended for light infantry company use as an intermediate between the light 84-mm grenade and longer range 5" or 6" anti-tank missile. Both crewmen carry Ak58K carbines, smaller .223" Short (5.56x33mm) caliber rifles intended for vehicle crewmen (aviators, truck drivers, and the like), either on their back (for the team leader) or in a holster on the right side of the bike. Like most motorcycle crewmen in Galla, the guardsmen wear standard Army three-quarter helmets with a face shield, but they can be allowed to wear their own helmets provided they meet or exceed the Army standard, as the NCO depicted wears his personal modular-type helmet.

The Lvrbs m/32 missile was designed to replace the 1960's-era Lvrbs m/22 MPADS, a 2" diameter missile based on the Navy Type 2-53 2" aerial rocket motor, with a simple radio guidance package installed. The Lvrbs m/22 was considered somewhat of an improvement over the platoon machine gun, which was the primary anti-helicopter weapon until the m/22's introduction in 1962, and not considered a serious threat to fixed-wing aircraft, instead being designed to be carried and fired rapidly with a unique two-shot design. Guidance was achieved via radio command line of sight using a small thumbstick mounted on the gripstock, with the intention being the engagement of low altitude, propeller driven aircraft and attack helicopters on the approach. Unusual for its time, this game the m/22 a full all-aspect engagement capability and rapid-follow up, although the 2" motor's short range made tail engagements difficult. The m/22 had a maximum range of about a mile.

This system was abandoned rapidly with the adoption of the Lvrbs m/32, a 3" diameter rocket body but similar guidance package, in 1974, with a range approximately thrice the m/22. However, the m/22 was exported to Ynglia, where it inspired the development of a 3" diameter missile using the m/32 motor body and domestic radio guidance kit, the Bristol Bellows, which was received about as warmly. Nonetheless, Ynglisc missile designs diverged significantly from Gallan, until the 2010's with the adoption of the Morris Marten, a 3" diameter super-accelerating IR guided missile unusually similar in design to the m/32, albeit incorporating laser beamriding. Conversely, the Gallan Lvrbs m/56, adopted in 1997, resembles the Bristol Bantam, a 4" diameter missile adopted in 1977 by the Ynglisc Army.

The Lvrbs m/32 was improved in 1978, and again in 1985, with new guidance systems: initially a combined IR/UV seeker and then again with a digital EEPROM computer as opposed to discrete components. Modern Lvrbs m/32s have been upgraded to kill low altitude artillery spotting drones with new proximity fuses, imaging infrared guidance seekers, and improved rocket motors for faster/longer-ranged target engagement and can engage targets out to nearly 5 miles. It is likely that the Lvrbs m/32 will be replaced by the Lvrbs m/56, a 4" diameter rocket that has been procured in limited quantities for the Army since 1997, but has yet to fully displace the m/32 (primarily used by airfield defense units of the Royal Army Air Defense Command), or by the Lvrbs m/67, a 5" diameter rocket based on the RBS 148 Pansarknackare (yng. "Tank Breaker"/"Armour Cracker") and shares the same CLU design.

Home Guard m/32 missile teams are organized into regimental air defense platoons comprising a 4-man platoon headquarters, mounted in a pair of extended cab ¾-ton 4x4 trucks, typically a Gallan Motors Kyu-7 or an Alarian Motors 720 pickup truck, painted in Army green, and equipped with a communications shelter. Each platoon has four section headquarters, each with five teams, and each section headquarters has a single extended cab ¾-ton 4x4 truck, transport trailer, four men, TAR radar, VRC radio, a motorbike and wire spools for establishing communication with the platoon HQ or section teams by field telephone. Each missile team is 2-men, mounted on the RM248 scooter, and accompanies the section's truck into action, typically establishing themselves 3 to 5 miles out from the section HQ, itself 5 to 10 miles out from the platoon HQ. This gives the m/32 platoon sufficient frontage (~30-40 miles) to cover the rear area of a Home Guard regiment in combat in an ideal terrain, although in practice this is generally more constricted by radio LOS limits. Total manpower of the platoon is 54 men.

The Home Guard IR-85 Regiment organization was first adopted in 1982 and saw first fielding in 1991, as part of the "Flower" (B-series) TO&E, where the IR-85 Regiment is referred to as "Bellflower".

tl;dr I enjoy the ecstatic stimulation that occurs when a scheme is excellently executed.

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Emus Republic Of Australia
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Postby Emus Republic Of Australia » Mon Aug 22, 2022 4:18 pm

((OOC: wow a important thread where the OP isn’t collapsed, nice))
Tier 5-6 level 0 type 5. According to this: viewtopic.php?f=23&t=363018
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Austria-Bohemia-Hungary
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Postby Austria-Bohemia-Hungary » Wed Aug 24, 2022 4:15 pm

Can you still do a contested major river crossing (think Danube around Belgrade etc) in 2022 without getting rofl'd on by artillery?

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Allanea
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Postby Allanea » Wed Aug 24, 2022 4:36 pm

Isn't the whole meaning of 'contested' = people are shooting at you?
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Radictistan
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Postby Radictistan » Thu Aug 25, 2022 9:10 pm

Speaking of artillery, can anyone explain site and angle of site in actual English, not Army English? I have a strong feeling that the concept is simpler than the FMs make it out to be.

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Tippercommon
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Postby Tippercommon » Thu Aug 25, 2022 10:25 pm

Radictistan wrote:Speaking of artillery, can anyone explain site and angle of site in actual English, not Army English? I have a strong feeling that the concept is simpler than the FMs make it out to be.

When the target is at a different elevation than the shooter or observer, it creates a triangle and the smaller angle is the angle of site (SI). VI is the difference in elevation.
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Site is "angle of site" plus "complementary angle of site" which is a formula that takes into account different factors of the flight path to give a corrected value. These include range and firing angle (greater changes in the trajectory over longer ranges or higher firing angles, which increase flight time), charge (the propellant), the projectile (different mass, material and dimensions affect ballistics) and the quirks of the specific weapon.

Basically part of a bunch of math to make sure rounds don't overshoot or undershoot the target due to the target being on a hill or in a valley or something.
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Tippercommon
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Postby Tippercommon » Thu Aug 25, 2022 10:50 pm

Austria-Bohemia-Hungary wrote:Can you still do a contested major river crossing (think Danube around Belgrade etc) in 2022 without getting rofl'd on by artillery?

The U.S. Army's notional future approach is to maneuver so the enemy is forced to reveal their artillery and suppress that artillery with corps/theater army/joint force artillery, missiles, air power, EW, etc. before a crossing is made by a specialized force with lots of engineers. So maneuver so they can fire so they can maneuver.

As well, ideally Division Cavalry (the division's reconnaissance and security element) would cross first covertly and clear the area 5-8 kilometers in-depth on the other side, supported by Division Artillery. A properly executed river crossing in a contested environment is not the same type of contested as Saving Private Ryan (by the same token a modern amphibious assault wouldn't be either).

That notwithstanding, traditional methods of preventing a crossing site being targetted by artillery are destroying any observers on the far side, employing counter battery fire against any artillery making unobserved fire, screening the larger crossing area with strike aircraft, and periodically moving the bridging (with forces staged ready to use the new crossing site). Division short-range air defenses and corps ADA battalions would also have to be detailed to protect the bridging sites.

Other obvious factors brought to the forefront by current events would be denying the area with electronic warfare equipment and employing counter-drone ADA systems, which are in the pipeline. In the case of Russian gap crossers getting stomped a few months ago they apparently provided visual obscuration (smoke), so armored recon observers couldn't visually see the bridge, but their drones still could. The Russian ability to direct artillery fire with small drones has been known to the U.S. for many years though and it was developing ADA units to handle it before the Ukraine invasion.

River crossings are very risky and have to be heavily supported by levels much higher than the battalion actually doing the crossing. Just smoke won't do. In the case of Russia's failed crossing of the Siverskyi Donets river in May, the Russians failed to "set the conditions" by denying observation of the crossing site to the Ukrainians, adequately suppressing artillery or maintaining an effective air defense.
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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Fri Aug 26, 2022 2:00 am

Considering the last time the US Army conducted a major opposed river crossing of any notable size was in WW2, against an already defeated opponent, it probably isn't a great example to look at lol.

That said, I think the ADA Stryker is just going to die (literally, that is, it will probably be procured in wholly inadequate quantities), partly because it's not very well protected in close combat, partly because it won't be procured in adequate quantity (company level, at minimum, and a pair of them, or a platoon of 6 vehicles in the battalion), and partly because it's not particularly versatile enough for modern combat use. The US Army is just warming over weird Cold War ideas ultimately because it's literally too untrustworthy to be given a blank cheque by Congress and has proven itself incapable of procuring actually modern systems so far. The great irony is that the current command staff are probably the most sensible guys yet, but I suppose anyone can turn into Shinseki.


I feel like a clean sheet design of armored vehicles for the XXI would be something like this:

  • Direct Fire Support Vehicle (DFSV) - Frontal protection against 105-115mm long-rods, 125mm HEAT. Side protection against 40mm Bofors/CTA, 125mm HEAT. Top protection against 40mm bomblet grenade and 152mm EFP. APS protection against top attack missiles and all-aspect LRP/ATGW. 12-24 main gun rounds, segregated from crew, and commander's station with a 25-40mm airburst grenade launcher for destruction of observer UAS. Radar adequate for terminal tracking of frontal aspect weapons (artillery shells, mortar bombs, etc.) at a range of roughly 1 km. Used by APS and networked with other platoon vehicles. Directional or SATCOM SHF link to company command with datasharing between armors.
  • Cannon Fire Support Vehicle (CFSV) - All aspect protection against 40mm Bofors/CTA, 125mm HEAT. Other protections as Direct Fire Support Vehicle. Armament as 25-50mm chain gun, 2-4 152mm HEDP missile (fiber optic or self-guiding), and commander's weapon station as DFSV. Radar as DFSV with miniature hit-to-kill type interceptors for destruction of higher altitude, spotter UAS and defence of dismounted infantry against mortars and artillery munition. Commo as DFSV.
  • Indirect Fire Support Vehicle (IFSV) - Armament as 155mm howitzer, segregated, with automatic charge/shell handling. 30-50 rounds and full zone charges stored. All other aspects as DFSV.
  • Utility Carrier Support Vehicle (UCSV) - No armament, or armament only incorporates the RWS. Giant box. Empty. Can be fitted for a lot of stuff, like Tracked Boxer (Pinscher? Daschund?), but doesn't actually do anything by itself. It just serves as a general utility transport. Armor as FSVs. Commo equipment varies from strategic jamming to company command post etc. etc.

The organization of such a unit would be probably a combined arms company of two platoons of four CFSVs of infantry with four 7-9 man squads and a platoon headquarters vehicle, a scout-recce platoon of troops on motorbikes and in armored cars (akin to Komatsu LAV or VBL) with probably 4-6 motorbikes and two LAVs for each section (one carries a radar combined with optronics mast, the other a UAS) and three sections within, a five-ship of DFSVs, a few utility carriers for mortars (like two or four), ARV/maintenance team, vehicle-launched bridge for rapid mobility over anti-tank ditches, company command carrier (possibly a modified CFSV), and some MCLC carriers. The vehicles are diverse enough in capability that they would provide their own short range air defense (out to 3 km) with MHTKs and Quick-Kill-type APS from VLS pods would deal with all-aspect missile and LRP threats. Three "CACs" per regiment. Pontoon bridging would be held at a regiment along with a gun artillery battalion or two and a MRL battery. The gun battalions would be batteries of four to six IFSVs with an infantry platoon in CFSVs in every battery, for local defense against missiles and mobile or static defense against ambush or raiding mechanized troops. Everything else would either be high mobility trucks or legacy chassis like old MBTs or something, whichever is cheaper.

There's very little that this gaggle of four (or fewer, if you go Full British and make it all Boxeroxes) armored vehicles and a bunch of cheap trucks and motorbikes couldn't do that a FCS or something like a Stryker company similarly could do with their dozen or so specialized chassis. It's just taking the Boxer concept of "as few special vehicles as possible" and applying it to a more heavily armored chassis. I just doubt that you could make tanks and IFVs into proper Boxerized boxes on the cheap tbh, but that probably wouldn't stop someone from doing it.

You might be able to eliminate the DFSVs if your automatic cannon is good enough for wallbusting but I'm extremely skeptical of this, especially since that turret is sharing space with a vertical launch silo and radars. It seems far more sensible (IMO) to bust walls with big guns than expending a quarter of your stowed kills on cutting through rebar with a glorified machine gun.

You, reading this, won't get that meme, but that guy who talked about yelling a few days ago would.

The resemblance to FCS is entirely coincidental, as FCS was dumb, and this is essentially a souped up version of Simpkin's simping for Merkava. These are 35-50 ton vehicles, with actually good armor protection, minus the utility carrier which is just a box and not a combat vehicle. That said at least European arms concerns are actually looking into reducing the number of specialized chassis they have in their companies and platoons, rather than increasing them, and this is the actual way forward for integrating close protection against field artillery and engaging a 20th century ground force with fewer armored vehicles. Too bad such machines would literally cost more money than they're worth and no one will ever field them in quantity in our lifetimes.

Of course actual practice suggests that 1970's armored vehicles will perpetuate until at least the latter half of this century if Puma, whose only real improvement over legacy equipment from the 1960's like M2 Bradley is its powerpack, is anything to go by. Big oof. Mark Milley might be a hyper futurist but all his memes are like from 2005 stuff like VR training and whatnot, and nothing about high speed radio communications since all that stuff is just, again, warmed over hot takes in tangible form, like the notorious "JTRS-GMR". Meanwhile Rheinmetall and KMW are basically out here shilling absurd future vehicles like the ones I described above and I'm not talking about the KF51 because that's a warmed over Leopard 2.

Can't wait for the US Army to buy KMW's awesome future tank lineup in 2040 for 20 minutes and replace it with another warmed over M1 though because no one wants to open a factory in 2040s Ohio.

Austria-Bohemia-Hungary wrote:Can you still do a contested major river crossing (think Danube around Belgrade etc) in 2022 without getting rofl'd on by artillery?


To elaborate on "yes": Yes, but...

Practically speaking it's pretty tough if you're fighting guys with decent artillery and UAS and the chances are probably not very good unless you're willing to conduct multiple opposed river crossings simultaneously and lose a couple (okay probably more than "a couple") battalions in the process to MRLs. That's the nature of the beast though. This is not terribly possible for fairly the mass lean and relatively trimmed down Western armies, with their paucity of industrious or fecund manpower, and their immensely expensive machines, but is practical for larger field forces that don't model themselves on post-industrial malaise era armies I guess. India or the PLA come to mind, as does the former Red Army.

The best option has always been to simply capture a bridge, but failing that a river crossing is pretty easily summed up in a few words: You need to present more possible crossing points being attacked than the enemy has artillery to deal with, and sustain those crossing points for longer than the enemy is willing to put up with.

There is probably a Soviet nomogram series regarding factors of river crossing time given various variables of rivers but I'm not the person to ask about it specifically. Width and speed are most important, all others can be broadly ignored provided pontoon bridging is used, as depth and gradient only becomes a factor in wading/assault, and the estimated time-response of enemy artillery. The important factors for artillery would be how many guns the enemy has (this gives you approximately how many targets he can engage), the individual factors of these guns, and what sort of observing he is doing, whether it's by map firing, observation, or sound or radio-electronic ranging. In the modern era of gunfire correction, it is almost entirely observation, the most accurate form of ranging, followed by radio-electronic ranging.

Forcing a river of any size would require conducting assault bridging under the expectation of multiple failures, perhaps simultaneously, and the require to push deep enough to strike enemy artillery to keep it away from your crossing points, so you'd identify several points of crossing and push them all at once. During the Cold War the French Army concluded that modern nuclear artillery would have rendered the assault crossings This becomes a mass problem, which no one really has solved IRL (although of all armies in the world, the PLA or Indian Army would be most well equipped to actually do it, I guess), but I guess you handwave it for NS or something.

The mass problem scales with the size of the river crossing, but the Danube j would be forced by a field army or army group, or larger formation. During Plunder, it was two field armies, a British and American one. There would be multiple corps, hundreds of battalions, and probably a forced assault landing on the other side by brigade- or division-level parachute assaults. I'm using Western terms, not Soviet ones, so armies are multiple corps and corps are multiple divisions. The last time the US Army had to cross a river even comparable to the "Danube around Belgrade", it secured the opposite bank with an airborne corps and forced the crossing with literally a million men and 6,000 guns.

I cannot see it being done any less in the age of radio-video observation and satellite inertial location reporting. You'd just be feeding in battalions from further out, and more dispersed in linearity, but their actual quantity, and very likely the butcher's bill, would still need to be similar. Perhaps the dead would be higher, though. Nuclear weapons are an excellent means of disrupting battalion-sized assault crossings, which would be the ordinary method of dispersion. A single battalion's assault crossing would be tying down a field division's worth of conventional artillery, or a battery of nuclear firing guns, and there's unlikely to be much to do about this really besides simply throwing as many possible battalions as you can on a stretch of river and trying to cross with mechanized forces before the enemy can obliterate all your crossing points.

Assault helicopters can disrupt or conduct raids on artillery positions, at least provided there isn't a threat of MANPADS, or that the terrain is particularly clear and free of obstructions, which is not exactly the case near the Danube or anywhere in Europe, really. Otherwise, bad things happen. So you're looking at a lot of dead helicopters and a lot of dead airborne riflemen, probably they could secure intact bridges with their speed though. They would need to be quickly joined by mechanized troops or risk being pushed off by enemy defenders, but that's about it. And that assumes that there isn't some suburban sprawl they have to fly over where machine guns and MANPADS or anti-helicopter mines can simply be lying in wait in a garage or whatever (or worse, barrage balloons).

That would be the best method, still, because it would preclude the rather agonizingly slow labors of establishing pontoon bridges and hoping they aren't simply sunk by 1-2 KT airbursts. Parachutists would be necessary to go any further, both because they are inherently more survivable than helicopter-borne troops, and modern field guns can have ranges in excess of 60 kilometers, so you're looking at pushing well into a division's middle fighting area (or a brigade's rear) with airborne assaults to destroy field guns. Helicopters cannot go that far. They die. Period. Deeper still, about 70-300 kilometers, to destroy multiple rocket launchers which can obliterate a battalion crossing point roughly every hour or so if they aren't killed, would be the purview of tactical nukes, long range rocket launchers with minefields, loitering-type munitions (Thirsty Saber???), and frontal aviation if you can spare the latter.

In other words it will be bloody, slow, and painful, and require substantial, if not nearly all, important equipment of a national arsenal being marshaled for the task, but that's assuming (a big if!) that the enemy actually shows up and fights. For most major river crossings in the last major war, they rarely did. The Oder-Neisse comes to mind as one of the major water obstacles where an actual scrap happened and it was pretty nasty by all accounts. Modern river crossings would be even worse than WW2's casualty rates and chewing up of manpower and mechanization, of course, and those same manpower and machines are pretty much priceless these days. I don't really see such scraps happening in modern macroeconomic conditions, or if they do, the attacking side is chewed up badly without explicitly preparing for the job of losing tens of thousands of troops like it was a Tuesday.

This is all assuming you can't simply find a dam or a bridge or something and cross there instead, which is always preferred, and one of the main jobs of helicopter infantrymen is capturing bridges before they can be exploded as I said earlier. That said if you aren't being seriously opposed, as was the case of the Red Army versus any Axis force that wasn't German, or the United States Army in any combat operation in living memory, of course, you can do whatever you want. It will probably work without revealing any notable weaknesses and will probably lead you down a dark path of "maneuver warfare" and "1st/7th Deep Strike Recce Air Combat Mechanized Mobile Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action", the latter of which isn't too far from the truth for some unfortunate souls.

So yes, but, as long as your army is big and muscular it can force a modern major river like a Rhine or a Danube or an Oder-Neisse. It can't be weak and tiny. It has to sort of go into a fight expecting to lose a lot of dudes and come out on top in the exchange of mass, blow for blow. And then it still has to have enough meat on its bones to keep going and muscle through the breakout operation of the river crossing. If it's weak and tiny, and it's being opposed by an army of similar size with decent moral and training (or worse, larger), it will probably just crumple after losing a couple relatively priceless divisions instead.

Major, forced river crossings and amphibious assaults, somewhat unsurprisingly, have a lot in common in both the amount of mass needed and the quantity of losses that should be expected.

Just keep feeding battalions (motor rifles, tanks, artillery, and bridges) in and stepping on artillery brigades, battalions, and batteries as they pop up to counter your river crossing attempts. Eventually you will get through when the enemy runs out of howitzers. This is ultimately the only way it can be done. Modern just artillery means these battalions need to be deployed from further away, and transition from march formation from 50 km out instead of 5 or so, but still. The only thing that has meaningfully improved since WW2 for forced riverine crossing is the fact that artillery is longer ranged, all artillery is visually or radar observed instead of sound ranged or map observed (thus you know you are hitting at a target instead of an assumed target), and that artillery is probably producing (slightly) more dead than wounded than it did in the past.

All of this means it's more time consuming and requires more resources to force a crossing, both because the crossing forces can be shot at much sooner and their mustering points are further from the assault positions, so you need to march longer, establish laagers and hides, and push artillery back further, and establish strongpoints on the far bank, probably with paratroopers or gliderborne troops I guess if you're a meme. Once the enemy runs out of artillery (either they are literally run out of the area possibly by airborne troopers or tank troops chasing them, or they die), they will crumple rapidly and the crossing forces will face far less stiff resistance though. You just have to be absolutely sure that you don't run out of assault battalions during the crossing to achieve that, and expect to lose a lot of battalions before the loss rate drops off dramatically.

Nuclear weapons are an ideal solution to this problem in the real world since they let smaller forces punch above their physical weight (a single artillery piece can neutralize or destroy a battery with a single atomic shell, and this increases approximately linearly), but because it's NS I guess you go without them, so you literally cannot make it work without having physically more ammunition or guns than the enemy at the end of the day. Anything other than that just means you lose the mass exchange and the river crossing fails.

The tactical methods of the approach aren't as important (obviously) as the actual correlation of forces and means, which typically goes all the way back to respective long-run macroeconomic conditions though. Battalions will be lost during the crossing and their methods of loss aren't important so long as the main group of forces can sustain the loss rates. So have more battalions than the enemy can shoot at and shoot at his artillery as he's shooting at your battalions. Lots of people will die. Boom boom explosion. etc. Guy with the bigger army/more guns/more dudes wins.

It's pretty simple in words but there are a fair few moving parts that can all bungle it up I guess, but these are easily predicted if you have a common understanding. Things like "don't use helicopters over wooded or urban areas, they will be ambushed by infantrymen," and "if you must fly over wooded/suburban areas with low altitude aircraft be sure to clear the ingress and egress routes with firepower (heavy artillery or nuclear weapons) to disrupt ambush troops," and "mechanized forces should probably have things like radio jammers and ESM gear to detect UAS," and whatnot. All those basic, common sense things more or less that will marginally reduce the battalion loss rates.

Even if you don't, which you might not (who does, really), this is only going to marginally increase loss rates, and can be calculated by a competent General Staff (or Academy trained junior officer) with some prior knowledge to base the norms on. A certain ongoing war is proving troublesome for both sides if only because it's relatively unprecedented in its scale and magnitude, but it's a learning experience for both sides, and for everyone else it's a stark lesson in a very simple axiom: that more battalions is always better. They don't need to big, you just need more of them.

You'll still need a few dozen divisions at the end of the day to make any meaningful progress though, if you're opposed by 10-20,000 dudes or whatever. This again is a roughly linear scale, as this stuff hasn't changed significantly enough since WW2 to allow an order of magnitude fewer forces to take the same amount of land, barring the use of tactical nukes at the platoon level or something very Dumblan.

Of course this isn't the only way to cross a river, I guess you could train your soldiers incredibly well, give them excellent tactical understanding and split them into platoons and companies and infiltrate across a river in some sort of mass commando action. This has succeeded, as the Dutch Waterline showed, but it succeeds less on its own merits and more on factors beyond its control (the Dutch did not blow the bridge because they believed the French were coming to relieve them, and the entire axis of attack was a feint to begin with, so...) and it is a far less reliable method in terms of actually connecting national strategies and priorities with practical matters of battle action on the ground. More wars have been lost in a meaningful sense of "the antebellum was better for the belligerent's stated goals than the postbellum," by these sort of elite, tactically minded armies than by the most famous army that fed battalions into a grinder and devoured what might as well have been the most elite, tactically sound force of its time in the process.

But luckily Austro-Hungary straddles the line between Slavic and German so it can literally pick and choose whether it's mass mobilizing and emphasizing battalions or companies sticking to a greater goal to the detriment of individual excellence or a system that pines on individual excellence while letting losers wallow in their own misery and gore on the battlefield. Historically speaking the former has a rather better track record at winning major, epoch-defining, Armageddon-style wars than the latter, but the latter is arguably far better for fighting every other kind of war, really. Especially true if you're smol and can't afford to muster hundreds or thousands of battalions in the field after a major national mobilization.


tl;dr ...artillery isn't going to stomp you if you're big, or if you have tons of nukes, or both.

Part of the reason Dumbla maintains cavalry tank/infantry tank dichotomy is because the Cavalry are responsible for pushing riverine crossings and assaulting field gun positions on the opposite bank with their relatively more operationally mobile (more fuel/economical diesel engines) and lighter squadrons and troops (battalions and companies) that I've sorta modeled on Simpkin's combined arms companies.

The more conventional battalion centric Infantry Branch is responsible for sustaining the Cavalry's death rides with motor infantry and tank troops who can actually muscle through small strip villages and the like while taking the initial losses during a Strategic Offensive Operation so the Cavalry can be opened up at the first possible assault crossing in fairly fresh form, and the Line Infantry Divisions are the mobile machine gun regiments that form a strategic backstop when combined with nuclear artillery to give the Supreme High Command enough weeks/months if they actually fail in a Strategic Defensive Operation or three to reconstitute the ground forces and try again. And again. And maybe again. That last one is a bit touch and go since at that point Dumbla is probably throwing 50 year olds with AR-10s (or Krags) and Bren guns (or Madsens) and basic bitch M1s (or super duper Centurions) at T-14s or whatever. But being honest if Dumbla's "Staven" doesn't get it right after three tries they don't really deserve to keep going.

Of course, Dumbla doesn't have limitless resources, it just has enough resources to fight the one major ground war it thinks it's going to fight, but it turns out it's a lie and it fights the lesser suspected foe. C'est la vie.

It would probably expect to be able to raise about 80-100 divisions out of a population of about 140 million, with varying forms of equipment, nearly all of which is stored in its pp (prodigious peninsula). Since it expects to fight a country with about 3-3.5x that, it makes up for this small size by giving every division large quantities of tactical nukes. Of course it could handle a few Rhines or Danubes if they were standing in the way of whatever it wants, but it's all a matter of scale at the end of the day, not absolute size.

tl;dr tl;dr It's not about inches, biggest always tops.

Tippercommon wrote:River crossings are very risky and have to be heavily supported by levels much higher than the battalion actually doing the crossing. Just smoke won't do. In the case of Russia's failed crossing of the Siverskyi Donets river in May, the Russians failed to "set the conditions" by denying observation of the crossing site to the Ukrainians, adequately suppressing artillery or maintaining an effective air defense.


This is important but sort of misses the point, as I don't think Bilohorivka was the main effort for 41st CAA, like at all, which seems to be the main reason the Ukrainians defeated the crossing relatively simply.

The CAA was mostly focused on pushing towards Sieverdonetsk to capture the bridges there. It probably thought the Ukrainians were focused around Sieverdonetsk and may have sent a battalion into the teeth of the Ukrainian defensive positions, since Bilohorivka and Siversk are pretty tough nuts so far. Of course, battalions being the ammunition of the CAA/Corps, they were expended in a failed attempt to perform a turning maneuver as you'd expect (because proryvs are so 1943), because the Red Army had become terribly infatuated with these bizarre, somewhat weakly supported (in practice, no support), multiple axis attacks intended to draw off NATO battalions and gunnery from the main effort. If you poke enough at a cloth you'll find some holes.

In Ralph Peters's Red Army there's a part where a Afghansty crewed assault helicopter battalion is thrown at the Dutch (or the Belgians) by GEN Malinsky and they succeed in capturing a intact bridge across some river. While they await the arrival of ground troops who never come, at least from the Soviet side of the bank, they sorta mill around and setup trenches and foxholes, and are instead annihilated by a combined Dutch-Belgian mechanized force. The captain of one of the assault companies realizes that their entire purpose was to serve as a distraction for the main effort, to draw off defenders and draw off artillery batteries that would otherwise hinder the opposed crossing of the major water obstacle by a ground division.

Not saying that those guys were deliberately sent to Bilohorivka to die, that's not actually a job for a motor rifle or tank battalion because they can like...do stuff better than that? That's definitely a job for an assault helicopter battalion though (I'm sorry Puzikas but you must go on the Helix) but the lack of multiple attempts to breakthrough at that point, whereas the 41st CAA was hammering battalions down the throats of Skif and Korsar gunners meandering the suburbs of Sieverdonetsk, suggests that they were mostly a minor effort that was repulsed rather than either a major crossing point or a significant, well, anything. Someone at the CAA HQ probably said "this battalion isn't doing anything" and made a bet on a 60/40 chance they'd die or succeed to relieve some pressure on the main effort. They died, as was anticipated and calculated, but it was not what was hoped, because that's an important crossing point. It was hoped that they'd open up a assault axis across the river to encircle Lysychansk, but this failed, but importantly that also didn't actually affect the overall outcome of the offensive operation.

Corps are big enough that a single battalion out of something like the 20 or 30 or 40 that they normally have can get absolutely annihilated and not seriously disturb their thought processes. They're a bit like hedge funds in that regard, but it's 18 year old boys, instead of magnetized stripes denoting ones and zeroes.

Anyway yes deliberate river crossings require at least a corps sized formation and willingness to get battalions mulched for at least one crossing to succeed. They are also complex and have a lot of moving parts, but they can be broken down fairly simply because they are practical matters, not theoretical ones. They require practice and realistic practice at that, but they aren't like just one battalion trying to cross at a narrow gap though. That's one battalion, out of maybe half a dozen or a dozen or more, that are trying to cross a river section that might be 20, 40, 60 or more kilometers long.

It's partly why the Penetration Division seems to me to be more than a bit misguided is that it's trying to make a ersatz corps, when Ukraine has shown that even Cold War corps-sized formations aren't really adequate for modern combat, and this is more of a band aid on the bleeding wound that is the US Army's (and America in general) demographic and macroeconomic decline.

If America wanted to make a war-winning organization of battalions to cross rivers, it would be better off practicing army-level maneuvers with multiple corps. Both because that's going to happen to it eventually, and because it's not promised to have the Iraq War era air defense where the other side literally is just discovering the mystical dark art of "map plotting" and "trigonometry" and lacks Boer War level of understanding of combat, let alone figuring out to manage an air combat campaign against the Westernized reincarnation of Marshall Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front. It may very well end up in a situation where it has to fight a competitor with equivalent, or worse, better, local air power and artillery, and that's when it will just straight up lose without sufficient battalions. Maybe if they replaced the "armored cavalry troops" in the brigades with a fourth CAB (the division already has a recce unit just attach it to each battalion?) and gave each Corps a second Penetration Division, and maybe chose something less sexually charged when referring to "wet gap crossings" to "get into his [the enemy's] rear area" with "penetration divisions", they'd be onto something, but that's apparently beyond science (or recruiting goals).

As long as you never get involved in a serious war with your major military opponents you can do whatever you want I guess, but it doesn't really answer Ostmark's question about forced river crossings, and it's a bit misleading to cite the US Army's idea of what a river crossing looks like, since it has less experience in the matter of major theater operations over the past 3 decades than the Russians and Ukrainians have gained in the past 3 months, though.

At least III US Corps has a brigade of random battalions and companies with a weird missile truck I guess. Nothing to mention about its ability to perform river operations or what sort of planning staff will be available to coordinate battalion crossings, which is a necessary component of a deliberate river crossing (as America, somehow, managed to understand in Desert Storm but that knowledge got left somewhere around the time Shinseki took charge). But hey, weird missile truck. I guess when the weird missile truck blows up a singular S-400 battery and gets blown up by a nuclear Iskander or something the Air Force will just show up or something and win is their plan?

It's good that they haven't forgotten that you need bridges to cross a river but they seem to have forgotten that people are going to die I guess is my point. They also apparently forgot that you need more artillery than men to force a river, because it's functionally just an artillery duel until you actually, like, cross the river...

It's especially bizarre because it wasn't that long ago that brigades had organic field artillery batteries, and divisions were supposed to get organic FA batteries alongside those, and MLRS. Wild.
Last edited by Gallia- on Fri Aug 26, 2022 6:28 am, edited 29 times in total.

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Amidia-
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Postby Amidia- » Fri Aug 26, 2022 7:08 am

These are the Katposts that I'm here for.


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The Dolphin Isles
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Postby The Dolphin Isles » Fri Aug 26, 2022 7:02 pm

I am kind of curious why Kerberos and Gallia chose to have a recce section/platoon at the company level. I was under the assumption that these types of assets are better used at the battalion+ level. What benefits does this organization provide as it seems that any form of reconnaissance conducted by a company could be similarly achieved by a detached rifle squad or even platoon.

I could definitely see the benefits of having a small team with a ground radar and/or UAVs though. UAVs would definitely help the company's 60/80 mm mortars if they had the ammunition to conduct independent harassing fire missions.

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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Fri Aug 26, 2022 7:11 pm

Infantry aren't trained for recce and infantry and their mechanized vehicles are too precious to be wasted in what is likely going to be a bloody job. You might find you've screened so much for tanks you run out of infantry to escort them with. A perennial issue.

Anyway a guy on a motorcycle can do the same job as like five infantrymen and a APC without being seen or killed. Recce troops have sensors that are $ and not exactly something you want to put on a bog standard BTR. And you don't need a lot of guys to actually tell you there's a thing there. You just need one guy to see it and have a radio, actually.

Of course you don't have to do it like that and you can keep recce elements in a battalion and attach down, but it's good to give company captains and lieutenants an idea of what combined arms command is like, so they aren't left total dunces when they hit their first field grade post in a battalion or something. Better to put them in charge of a unit every couple of years, so your captains know how the recce platoon, mechanized platoon, and tank platoon work after two years of commanding each plus a couple years as a company XO. Periodic attachment during FTX isn't really the same as having to deal with a mishmash of motor rifles, razvedki, and tank troops day in and day out.
Last edited by Gallia- on Sat Aug 27, 2022 11:42 am, edited 5 times in total.

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Radictistan
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Postby Radictistan » Sat Aug 27, 2022 11:37 am

Tippercommon wrote:
Radictistan wrote:Speaking of artillery, can anyone explain site and angle of site in actual English, not Army English? I have a strong feeling that the concept is simpler than the FMs make it out to be.


Site is "angle of site" plus "complementary angle of site" which is a formula that takes into account different factors of the flight path to give a corrected value. These include range and firing angle (greater changes in the trajectory over longer ranges or higher firing angles, which increase flight time), charge (the propellant), the projectile (different mass, material and dimensions affect ballistics) and the quirks of the specific weapon.

Basically part of a bunch of math to make sure rounds don't overshoot or undershoot the target due to the target being on a hill or in a valley or something.

That is a much more readable diagram than anything else I've seen. So Site is what actually gets applied as a correction to the firing table?

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Free Jeililand
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Postby Free Jeililand » Sat Aug 27, 2022 11:39 am

Null
Last edited by Free Jeililand on Fri Sep 30, 2022 11:58 am, edited 1 time in total.
Free Jeililand is a strong, patriotic society of settlers exhiled from a failed state that didn't respect the citizen's right to refuse to participate in a chaotic, uncontrolled, and vile society.

That's why the federal police force control everything instead of the government. How orderly and well kept!

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Laka Strolistandiler
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Postby Laka Strolistandiler » Sat Aug 27, 2022 11:44 am

Austria-Bohemia-Hungary wrote:Can you still do a contested major river crossing (think Danube around Belgrade etc) in 2022 without getting rofl'd on by artillery?

I’d argue that this is possible as long as one suppresses hostile artillery and yet has the assets necessary to arty the hell out of defenders.

Russians got their asses handed to them at Chernobayevka because tactical stupidity
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Hurtful Thoughts
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Postby Hurtful Thoughts » Sat Aug 27, 2022 11:59 am

Austria-Bohemia-Hungary wrote:Can you still do a contested major river crossing (think Danube around Belgrade etc) in 2022 without getting rofl'd on by artillery?

Shooting out their ammo-dumps and depleting their ability to counter you with artillery is a plus. Chilling their C3 just delays and disjoints their ability to change how they choose to react, usually forcing them to commit to whatever their knee-jerk mistake was until someone MUCH higher up realizes something is very wrong down there by the old mill-pond.

Then using smoke to increase artillery expenditure in order to suppress, maybe even some psyops to feint a fake river-crossing (louspeakers and smoke, mostly) so they shell an empty field repeatedly and then bum-rushing the same spot after they think the 15th attack is another feint meant to waste their ammo. Counter-artillery should be alert when all this is happening, because less artillery to worry about is a good thing.

Also, when making the actual crossing to push hard, wide and deep as fast as possible. A lightly held perimiter further out with a smattering of landmines and dispersed AT-teams is better than a tight packet of lollygaggers in tanks sunning themselves on the far-shore.
Last edited by Hurtful Thoughts on Sat Aug 27, 2022 12:08 pm, edited 3 times in total.
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Gallia-
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Postby Gallia- » Sat Aug 27, 2022 1:42 pm

If you have to aim at ammo dumps instead of the actual gun batteries you've probably lost the artillery duel tbh. That's probably one of those more obscure historic axioms like "bridges aren't logistics" and "yelling good".

"Faking a river crossing" is kind of impossible also since there wouldn't be anything to shoot at, which is the main thing that gives away that your river is being crossed lmfao. Expending a battalion of troops to conduct a feint is probably what you mean but in that weird and squeamish, modern Westerner/Generation XYZ-way, you just think there's a way to somehow fake it without spilling blood lol. If you make people on the opposite bank observe tanks and bridges being brought up and actually just be hallucinating it all, you might have a point, but that's not really possible because forward observers view things through electro-optics, but their eyeballs. The psychic mind wizards you're employing would just make them think the tanks are coming out of the LCD screen I guess.

If you want to "fake a river crossing" you tell a battalion to cross in range of enemy guns and they die horribly, but they absorb a lot of fire and commit to exposing the enemy's major artillery pieces to be smashed by counterbattery, so that future crossing efforts are less damaged. You repeat this process until you're sure that they've been damaged sufficiently that you can force a crossing at multiple points and overwhelm their fires capacity. This battalion would be something like a reconnaissance or cavalry battalion instead of a motor rifle or tank battalion, so relatively lean in manpower and equipment but diverse enough to look imposing, and given only limited bridging equipment instead of pushed redundant articles, if you're American. If you're a Soviet you just gave the motor rifle battalion a recce company and told it to cross with pontoons. Obviously American is better but meaner in costs, but you have a lot more potential casualties to soak up while giving you juicy deets. So you expend something like a company of dead and wounded versus a battalion of dead and wounded to obliterate a regiment of artillery pieces...

...because that's how an actual feint works like goddamn lol.

Rinse and repeat or go with your main assault plan next time if you feel like you did enough of a beating of the enemy's artillery. Feints are attacks with real troops and real equipment and real deadass dead dudes whose goal is to get the enemy to shoot at him, but it's just reconnaissance in force on a operational scale. RIF is a pretty normal job for lean recce troops and they expect to die doing it so it's not exactly like they're going into it unawares of what's about to happen.

Opposite banks are usually only lightly defended, with the main destruction coming from mobile forces moving to smash your bridgehead if they're lame (Sedan), or heavy gunfire directed by observers in camouflaged observer positions if you know how to fight (literally anywhere else). If nothing actually comes out of that smoke or loudspeakers then it's just going to be ignored by observers because it's an obvious and amateurish ploy probably invented by a child lmfao. An actual feint would be something like a 20-30 km push by a reconnaissance regiment in support of a corps-level assault crossing with a few assault bridges and pontoons brought up, or even amphibious crossing by light armor, and a preferential reaction by the enemy of "oh shit we're being attacked" followed by a brief CB spurt to neutralize some of the artillery.

Soviet reconnaissance battalions and regiments of motorcycle and tank troops were often tasked in the Great Patriotic War with large quantities of artillery to conduct feint assaults using minor probing attacks on German lines to draw forces away during major offensive operations, but they weren't using "loudspeakers and smoke" by themselves lol, nor were they used in isolation, and often attacked across the entire frontage. If the defense was noticeably weaker compared to estimates and allocated forces, the RIF might turn into a main effort at points, and any crossing zones would be exploited to the maximum of course because the corps or division or what-have-you commander has made the feint part of his maneuver scheme. The only difference is that the allocation of real reserves is kept back and the RIF only advances a short distance beyond the crossing zone.

Either way, in any case you're trading some dead now for fewer dead later. There's no real way around that unless you are a psychic wizard who can magic up hallucinations in the enemy observers or something. Which you can't. Which is why you need real deadass dudes down there poking the river and getting yeeted into oblivion. And ideally why they would look almost indistinct from normal mechanized forces so forget stuff like robots or whatever because that'll just be noted as "minor reconnaissance/probing attack, defeated by jamming/motor rifles" or something. It has to look real without being real because that's the point lmao.

Like do you even read books my guy lol? Dyel?
Last edited by Gallia- on Sat Aug 27, 2022 2:54 pm, edited 12 times in total.

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Hurtful Thoughts
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Postby Hurtful Thoughts » Sat Aug 27, 2022 7:35 pm

Gallia- wrote:Like do you even read books my guy lol? Dyel?
Not any good ones in awhile, no.

Haven't read "Ghost Army" by Jack Kneece since highschool. But I do sorta remember a thing about the unit doing some deception-antics in preparation for the Rhine crossing, and the deceptions around the various amphibious landings made in history were reasonably well documented and studied, and a large river crossing is an amphibious operation, only much shorter, at least until you get a bridgehead up.

Granted, deception alone usually isn't enough to cause a break in fire discipline, so a feint or diversionary attack of some sort to make it real is called for, and usually you give that unit a chance of actually succeeding. Otherwise the OPFOR would see no harm in ignoring them if they obviously can't do the thing they were set out to pretend to do in force. The difference is just how massive a force they are pretending to be while doing it.

You're pretty much saying the same thing but with way more words.
Last edited by Hurtful Thoughts on Sat Aug 27, 2022 7:39 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Factbook and general referance thread.
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Due to population-cuts, military-size currently being revised

The People's Republic of Hurtful Thoughts is a gargantuan, environmentally stunning nation, ruled by Leader with an even hand, and renowned for its compulsory military service, multi-spousal wedding ceremonies, and smutty television.
Mokostana wrote:See, Hurty cared not if the mission succeeded or not, as long as it was spectacular trainwreck. Sometimes that was the host Nation firing a SCUD into a hospital to destroy a foreign infection and accidentally sparking a rebellion... or accidentally starting the Mokan Drug War

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