NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Vol. 11.0

[Austrasien]

Essay competition 1:

Discuss the utility of the IAI Harpy 1 and 2 drone-attack SEAD systems on countries which aren't third world.

Could Harpy 1 and 2, or an analagous system (if choosing an analagous system explain the differences) be used effectively to degrade battlefield tier (ie anti-helicopter) air defence systems employed and manned by NATO, Russia, China, to the extent that attack helicopters or other attack aviation like drones and low-flying aircraft could cause significant damage?

1. Though they haven't gotten much use there is good reason to believe anti-radiation drones are a sound concept. ARM seekers self-evidently work well and short-range AA has not proven very effective against small UAVs, with a high rate of leaks.
2. Helicopters are rarely shot down by radar-guided weapons. A helicopter popping up from behind trees or a ridgeline is a fairly serious threat to most AD radars. Especially if it has ARMs. Recognizing a hovering helicopter as a valid target is impossible for many radars and slow/unreliable for ones which can because the main characteristic radar uses to separate clutter and targets, motion of the aircraft, is absent.

AD weapons that don't rely on search radar remain a serious problem for low altitude penetration though because there is no reliable way to detect or interfere with them prior to them engaging. A laser beam rider missile like the RBS-70 isn't susceptible to any existing countermeasure at all.

[Gallia-]

imagine investing in radars after like 1965 lmao

just use acoustic identification and infrared or beam riders e-z

[New Vihenia]

2. Helicopters are rarely shot down by radar-guided weapons. A helicopter popping up from behind trees or a ridgeline is a fairly serious threat to most AD radars. Especially if it has ARMs. Recognizing a hovering helicopter as a valid target is impossible for many radars and slow/unreliable for ones which can because the main characteristic radar uses to separate clutter and targets, motion of the aircraft, is absent.

Their rotor give a clear modulation which can be recognized tho. I recalled that SPAAG like Tunguska and its later iterations are designed with it in mind.

[The New California Republic]

I see that Theodosiya, one of the fairly frequent posters here, has become an ex nation since yesterday. I wonder what the fuck happened.

---

Regarding the drone-based SEAD systems question on how well they'd suppress air defence systems, I remember that during Operation Allied Force that Yugoslav forces used machine guns firing out of the doors of Mi-8 helicopters to shoot down drones, until NATO tightened up their air cover.

But I think more broadly that there could be tactics to counter them, such as strict emcon both in terms of radar emissions and comm traffic, frequent movement of air defence assets and use of traditional camouflage netting and inflatable decoys, using passive acquisition and guidance methods such as IR and visual, using lower band VHF radars which are more difficult for AR-type weapons to target because of limitations on the size of the seeker head, using emitting decoys which are synchronised with the radars that they are protecting to draw the drones away from the real targets, etc.

[Questarian New Yorkshire]

he probably accidentally deleted himself

[The New California Republic]

he probably accidentally deleted himself

Disgraced: This name was soiled by a former nation (of significant size).

Oh well. Can't see where it happened tho, but nvm.

[Austrasien]

Their rotor give a clear modulation which can be recognized tho. I recalled that SPAAG like Tunguska and its later iterations are designed with it in mind.

It does but it is still seeking a much smaller return.



An ARM seeker is almost certain to lock a radar before a radar locks a hovering helicopter in the presence of ground clutter unless there is a gross disparity in the technology. And for a typical SHORADS like the Tunguska an engagement can't occur until the search radar has handed off to the fire control radar or the optical channel, while an ARM can fire immediately after locking the search radar.

So it is a favourable duel situation.

[Gallia-]

duels be like

[New Vihenia]

An ARM seeker is almost certain to lock a radar before a radar locks a hovering helicopter in the presence of ground clutter unless there is a gross disparity in the technology. And for a typical SHORADS like the Tunguska an engagement can't occur until the search radar has handed off to the fire control radar or the optical channel, while an ARM can fire immediately after locking the search radar.

So it is a favourable duel situation.

Well since the search radar is in the same place as the engagement, i dont think the handoff process would be any longer than few short seconds. and newer shorad is supposedly can do self defense shot against the ARM's.

[The New California Republic]

An ARM seeker is almost certain to lock a radar before a radar locks a hovering helicopter in the presence of ground clutter unless there is a gross disparity in the technology. And for a typical SHORADS like the Tunguska an engagement can't occur until the search radar has handed off to the fire control radar or the optical channel, while an ARM can fire immediately after locking the search radar.

So it is a favourable duel situation.

Well since the search radar is in the same place as the engagement, i dont think the handoff process would be any longer than few short seconds. and newer shorad is supposedly can do self defense shot against the ARM's.

Exactly. This isn't like the old legacy systems where the process of the handover from the acquisition to the tracking and guidance function could take about half a minute or more, as was found during US Army tests of captured ZSU-23-4s; where the best result they achieved was 32 seconds, with the average actually being about a minute.

In current systems with far better automation the total process from initial acquisition to engagement can be measured in a few seconds.

[Gallia-]

An ARM seeker is almost certain to lock a radar before a radar locks a hovering helicopter in the presence of ground clutter unless there is a gross disparity in the technology. And for a typical SHORADS like the Tunguska an engagement can't occur until the search radar has handed off to the fire control radar or the optical channel, while an ARM can fire immediately after locking the search radar.

So it is a favourable duel situation.

Well since the search radar is in the same place as the engagement, i dont think the handoff process would be any longer than few short seconds. and newer shorad is supposedly can do self defense shot against the ARM's.

Even if this is true, it hasn't been demonstrated in actual combat experience where systems with active search radars have been destroyed by laser guided weapons fired from non-stealthy aircraft, much less passive guiding ARMs.

Well since the search radar is in the same place as the engagement, i dont think the handoff process would be any longer than few short seconds. and newer shorad is supposedly can do self defense shot against the ARM's.

Exactly. This isn't like the old legacy systems where the process of the handover from the acquisition to the tracking and guidance function could take about half a minute or more, as was found during US Army tests of captured ZSU-23-4s; where the best result they achieved was 32 seconds, with the average actually being about a minute.

In current systems with far better automation the total process from initial acquisition to engagement can be measured in a few seconds.

And you'd never be able to tell if the attacker knows roughly where the SAM is before he comes into line of sight.

[New Vihenia]

And you'd never be able to tell if the attacker knows roughly where the SAM is before he comes into line of sight.

If the attacker actually knows it before attacking it implies off board targeting or flying high where the ESM can receive any spurious radiation from the Radar.

For say Attack helicopter to fire ARM.. it needs to first get line of sight so the ESM can receive radar emissions and then it can fire. Which i think it's why Sidearm is considered a defensive weapon.

[The New California Republic]

Exactly. This isn't like the old legacy systems where the process of the handover from the acquisition to the tracking and guidance function could take about half a minute or more, as was found during US Army tests of captured ZSU-23-4s; where the best result they achieved was 32 seconds, with the average actually being about a minute.

In current systems with far better automation the total process from initial acquisition to engagement can be measured in a few seconds.

And you'd never be able to tell if the attacker knows roughly where the SAM is before he comes into line of sight.

Decoys, both physical and emitters, can be used to obfuscate the pilot's and intel's perception of the battlefield and thus greatly increase the likelihood that he/she doesn't.

[New Vihenia]

Decoys, both physical and emitters, can be used to obfuscate the pilot's and intel's perception of the battlefield and thus greatly increase the likelihood that he/she doesn't.

This actually for a "semi-mobile" SAM's e.g S-125 or S-300. Deployment of such decoy may not be practical for High mobility Battlefield SHORADS like Pantsyr or Tunguska.

[Gallia-]

And you'd never be able to tell if the attacker knows roughly where the SAM is before he comes into line of sight.

If the attacker actually knows it before attacking it implies off board targeting or flying high where the ESM can receive any spurious radiation from the Radar.

No, it implies that it is aware roughly of the location of the SAM, that's all. Most likely it would be informed through pre-flight briefing thanks to ESM or in flight with imagery from small tactical drones controlled by the aviation brigade, about the size of Shadow UAS or something similar. This is how the US Army does it (and by extension, the Turks). Alternatively it could simply be spotting the SAM on a FLIR in the gunner's seat, because the SAM is generally non-reactive and not actively searching for threats, or at least the casualty ratios would suggest this. Very few aircraft have been lost to Pantsirs, and substantially more Pantsirs have been bombed than drones shot down by them, so having a expensive radar on the expensive missile carrier hasn't helped.

Americans went into Karbala and were able to detect the locations of more or less stationary ZSU-23-4s and evade them. What they couldn't detect were the DShKs and light infantrymen with AKMs who actually killed them. Likewise, Turks have been going into Syria and detecting locations of Pantsirs and killing them with near impunity. Mostly because they've been using unmanned systems, but even the loss rates of manned aviation would not be much more severe than Karbala. So far the Turks have only lost a few aircraft to sporadic machine gun and MANPADS, but that's it. 7 gunships dead vs 7 drones is not significant in either case, although the gunships would possibly warrant a stopping to air operations (the Turks did stop their air war when the Russians threatened to blast their F-16s out of the sky) assuming the gunships were employed en masse, due to flight damage. If employed in small groups, you would be able to continue air operations because you'd have undamaged aircraft still able to fight.

In either case it is a net win for aviation, although the margin is much larger with drones than gunships, but things like Pantsirs and their crews aren't cheap either. Trading 7 gunships for 200 tanks and trucks is a good deal. 7 drones just makes a good deal a great one.

For say Attack helicopter to fire ARM.. it needs to first get line of sight so the ESM can receive radar emissions and then it can fire. Which i think it's why Sidearm is considered a defensive weapon.

I'm not talking about attack helicopters specifically, I'm talking about the general "low altitude tank destroyer" niche filled by both gunships and Predator-type drones.

This is just not the case in Syria and it's not like a fixed wing turboprop aircraft is somehow less stealthy than a helicopter gunship (or turbojet, in Anka's case). What is happening is either the Predator is cresting a ridge and sees a SAM on its FLIR and kills it with a small laser guided bomb, or a missile, or the SAM has been spotted by some strategic intelligence system earlier and is being deliberately hunted by small aircraft with rockets. In the first case it's likely that both systems acquire (or should) each other at the same time, but the SAM never seems to react for some reason (or at least they didn't in Spring Shield, where something like 3-4 Pantsirs were lost), while in the second case it's likely that it is being ambushed, but it should be at least aware that a laser guided or radar guided missile has been fired at it, if it has any capacity for self-defense against missiles, and be able to intercept it.

In neither case have SAMs shown anywhere near the capability they need to actually win the war against aircraft: they keep losing even when they supposedly have the advantage and it's probably very distressing for people who make SAMs like Pantsir. MANPADS makers are gonna make a huge killing though because it just demonstrates that passive guided, passive acquired systems are still incredibly lethal
A combination of some cheap air search radar on a trailer and cued (perhaps by something similar to the FAAR computer notepad, with manually input offsets etc.) air defense teams is still the preeminent method of air defense against low altitude threats and gunships/drones. Same as it was in 1975.

It's a small sample size but it hasn't shown any significant change in trends between ZSU-23-4's relative ineffectiveness against attack helicopters. Even if they are incapable of engaging the attacking jet (you might see footage of F-16 bombing Pantsirs), they should at least be able to engage the munition itself, but they never seem to do this. It could be that these are being suppressed by censors but it's more likely that Pantsir lacks the ability to engage PGMs or something.

Decoys, both physical and emitters, can be used to obfuscate the pilot's and intel's perception of the battlefield and thus greatly increase the likelihood that he/she doesn't.

This has never been demonstrated. If it is plausible as a means of defeating the threat of low altitude aircraft hunting short range air defense systems, then it is too difficult to implement in practice or too expensive.

The primary casualty producers for A-129 and Turkish drones in Syria has been Grouses and massed heavy machine gun fire, TBH. The primary casualty producers for Pantsirs and Tunguskas has been attack helicopters and low altitude drones: the very things they ostensibly defend against.

You can chalk it up to a general lack of movement on Syrian part and inadequate concealment through the use of terrain, netting, and frequent relocation, I guess. But there's no reason to believe that these same vices can't befall a more "respectable" ground force like the Russian, French, or American armies. The primary means that low altitude air defense systems defend themselves from being ambushed by helicopters (and drones, since they are effectively the same thing) is by frequent relocation to confuse gunship pilots who might have received information that is 30-40 minutes out of date based on ESM or visual reconnaissance, and you've shifted location once, or twice, in that time. So when they crest the ridge looking for your Pantsir, they're looking in the wrong place and they have to start scanning the entire ground terrain with a NFOV FLIR. That's when you can have sufficient time to lock up and kill them with supersonic missiles.

Whether that would work remains to be demonstrated, but it is ostensibly practical based on NTC experiences, with the caveat being that isn't real life. Syria is.

Without a way to counter the advantages Turkey enjoys in strategic ISR, which is how it is able to employ its UAVs to such high relative effectiveness tactically, Syria is basically doomed to get bombed to death. It doesn't really matter how much movement the Pantsirs do since they're under the scrutiny of the all-seeing electric eye.

[Grand Indochina]

Thank you for answering my previous question, Spirit of Hope and The Manticoran Empire.

---

Here is my question, can these two Chinese fighters, Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-16, compete with their Western counterparts like F-16, Dassault Rafale, Sukhoi Su-27, Mikoyan MiG-29M and Sukhoi Su-30MKI ?

[New Vihenia]

In neither case have SAMs shown anywhere near the capability they need to actually win the war against aircraft: they keep losing even when they supposedly have the advantage and it's probably very distressing for people who make SAMs like Pantsir. MANPADS makers are gonna make a huge killing though because it just demonstrates that passive guided, passive acquired systems are still incredibly lethal
A combination of some cheap air search radar on a trailer and cued (perhaps by something similar to the FAAR computer notepad, with manually input offsets etc.) air defense teams is still the preeminent method of air defense against low altitude threats and gunships/drones. Same as it was in 1975.

So when the radar is supressed... the air defense team survive but they wont have the big picture especially if they lack ISR in the first place. They may be very difficult to suppress but.. Why something Like Pantsyr can't do it.. with say, tight EMCON. Only radiates as needed.

In this case i guess even MANPADS team wont fare any better, despite being good at hiding themselves.

It's a small sample size but it hasn't shown any significant change in trends between ZSU-23-4's relative ineffectiveness against attack helicopters. Even if they are incapable of engaging the attacking jet (you might see footage of F-16 bombing Pantsirs), they should at least be able to engage the munition itself, but they never seem to do this. It could be that these are being suppressed by censors but it's more likely that Pantsir lacks the ability to engage PGMs or something.

It was attacked when it's running out of ammo and waiting for resuplly for the F-16 case.

Without a way to counter the advantages Turkey enjoys in strategic ISR, which is how it is able to employ its UAVs to such high relative effectiveness tactically, Syria is basically doomed to get bombed to death. It doesn't really matter how much movement the Pantsirs do since they're under the scrutiny of the all-seeing electric eye.

Which the whole problem to begin with for Syrian Case. Like they fought with one hand tied on back. No airforce, no attempts to engage the ISR system and rely only on terminal defense while old Soviet doctrine does have aircraft in its place.

[The New California Republic]

Decoys, both physical and emitters, can be used to obfuscate the pilot's and intel's perception of the battlefield and thus greatly increase the likelihood that he/she doesn't.

This actually for a "semi-mobile" SAM's e.g S-125 or S-300. Deployment of such decoy may not be practical for High mobility Battlefield SHORADS like Pantsyr or Tunguska.

Decoys exist for the SA-8, so using them for other similar high mobility systems wouldn't be a problem.

Decoys, both physical and emitters, can be used to obfuscate the pilot's and intel's perception of the battlefield and thus greatly increase the likelihood that he/she doesn't.

This has never been demonstrated. If it is plausible as a means of defeating the threat of low altitude aircraft hunting short range air defense systems, then it is too difficult to implement in practice or too expensive.

Using decoys has been demonstrated in Operation Allied Force, and the equipment and expertise is out there to put it into practice for relatively little cost.

[Gallia-]

In neither case have SAMs shown anywhere near the capability they need to actually win the war against aircraft: they keep losing even when they supposedly have the advantage and it's probably very distressing for people who make SAMs like Pantsir. MANPADS makers are gonna make a huge killing though because it just demonstrates that passive guided, passive acquired systems are still incredibly lethal
A combination of some cheap air search radar on a trailer and cued (perhaps by something similar to the FAAR computer notepad, with manually input offsets etc.) air defense teams is still the preeminent method of air defense against low altitude threats and gunships/drones. Same as it was in 1975.

So when the radar is supressed... the air defense team survive but they wont have the big picture especially if they lack ISR in the first place. They may be very difficult to suppress but.. Why something Like Pantsyr can't do it.. with say, tight EMCON. Only radiates as needed.

In this case i guess even MANPADS team wont fare any better, despite being good at hiding themselves.

MANPADS teams fare a lot better, actually. They've shot down almost as many drones as the Turks have lost to the USAF in Yemen, and they've lost fewer MANPADS than the Turks have lost drones to counter fire, evidently.

The issue is that Pantsir can be seen from space and a MANPADS team can't. A vehicle has a pretty gigantic signature in all spectra and will generally be detected regardless of whatever action it takes specifically, whether by radar, acoustic, or simply someone taking a picture on their cell phone and putting it on Twitter. It's much harder to determine who, out of millions of villagers, is carrying a specific type of pipe that is a MANPADS. It's much easier to pick out which out of these 100 tanks is the air defense system.

Less flippantly, the Pantsir has a bigger signature in all regards, so it will be detected first, whereas a MANPADS can only be detected visually, or more likely, after it has fired. This is good for the MANPADS because the crew of the gunship will be more focused on evading the missile than engaging the MANPADS team. Conversely, a Pantsir, assuming it's able to detect its attacker at all, will be similarly ambushed and suffer the same problems of crew panicking from being under attack.

Much like tanks, air defense is determined by who is able to fire the first shot, not the second.

Who gets the first shot off is generally determined by who is better able to draw pictures on a map, and the Turks have access to the NRO's satellites probably, so they aren't hurting for strategic ISR.

It's a small sample size but it hasn't shown any significant change in trends between ZSU-23-4's relative ineffectiveness against attack helicopters. Even if they are incapable of engaging the attacking jet (you might see footage of F-16 bombing Pantsirs), they should at least be able to engage the munition itself, but they never seem to do this. It could be that these are being suppressed by censors but it's more likely that Pantsir lacks the ability to engage PGMs or something.

It was attacked when it's running out of ammo and waiting for resuplly for the F-16 case.

Yes, and it points to the problems of the SAA.

Without a way to counter the advantages Turkey enjoys in strategic ISR, which is how it is able to employ its UAVs to such high relative effectiveness tactically, Syria is basically doomed to get bombed to death. It doesn't really matter how much movement the Pantsirs do since they're under the scrutiny of the all-seeing electric eye.

Which the whole problem to begin with for Syrian Case. Like they fought with one hand tied on back. No airforce, no attempts to engage the ISR system and rely only on terminal defense while old Soviet doctrine does have aircraft in its place.

True, but air forces tend to liquidate themselves on contact historically. The Western powers were able to completely liquidate the Japanese and Nazi air forces, after all, and I think the only reason the Ostfront had any sort of aviation capacity for the Luftwaffe left was because both air forces focused less on destroying each other and more on killing the enemy ground forces or supply depots.

It isn't impossible to successfully beat back aviation offensives, it's just something that gets decided very early on and very quickly, because once the aviation offensive gets rolling it literally won't stop. At that point your best bet is to revert to something that is hard to attack by air, like the Vietnamese did, rather than try to claw back some sort of parity like the Syrians are doing. If this applies to strategic aviation, it also seems to apply to tactical aviation, even on the small scale.

[Vaspelia]

Ospery's books are good or they are a meme?. The first book i have read was about the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay and i quite enjoyed it, the books as whole inspire me to make realistic ORBATs and made me got interested on strategic organization and division-building. Be honest plz.

[The Manticoran Empire]

Ospery's books are good or they are a meme?. The first book i have read was about the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay and i quite enjoyed it, the books as whole inspire me to make realistic ORBATs and made me got interested on strategic organization and division-building. Be honest plz.

Not familiar with them. I mainly got interested in organization and shit through Sun Tzi and Clausewitz.

[Serria]

How effective are satellite networks in detecting ships nowadays? Or in a more broad sense, how probable is it that a surface ship can remain undetected by enemy recon?

[Triplebaconation]

Ospery's books are good or they are a meme?. The first book i have read was about the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay and i quite enjoyed it, the books as whole inspire me to make realistic ORBATs and made me got interested on strategic organization and division-building. Be honest plz.

They're ok. A good source of niche information difficult to find elsewhere. The art has gone downhill since the 80s.

[Ideal Britain]

Would using Marines in the DRC ever make sense?

[Spirit of Hope]

How effective are satellite networks in detecting ships nowadays? Or in a more broad sense, how probable is it that a surface ship can remain undetected by enemy recon?

Complicated question, it is going to depend a lot on what the ship is doing, and where the ship is doing it.

If your warship is trying to avoid detection, by reducing or eliminating its emissions, moving along known shipping lanes, and not firing missiles, it will be hard to detect or determine is a warship from satellites.

If your warship has all of its radars on, is sitting in place in the ocean, and is shooting weapons it will be very easy to detect and determine is a warship from space.

The obvious problem is the things you do to avoid detecting make you more vulnerable if you are detected.

Would using Marines in the DRC ever make sense?

What type of Marines? US Marines were some of the first conventional forces in to Afghanistan, a land locked country.