NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Vol. 11.0

[Gallia-]

it should just build more burkes instead of uselses fremm tbh

[Austria-Bohemia-Hungary]

it should just build more burkes instead of uselses fremm tbh

Rip off sejong the gr8 and call it a dlg. *thinking*

[Velkanika]

Why do you only use proper grammar and punctuation when you're angry?

Naturally this leads, almost inevitably, to a world where instead of asking serious questions like "what is the purpose of a surface ship of any variety in a world where submarines can routinely communicate with each other underwater and satellites can routinely monitor the littorals from orbit in real time" instead you get people seriously pondering the return of battleships with railguns and screaming about the threat of boghammars, Osas, and other ancient threats that were solved decades (or centuries) ago. Also they try to explain Eastern Thought Process with Sun Tzu and other bizarre, somewhat racist stereotypes instead of genuine knowledge. Perhaps because they lack historical perspective, perhaps because they focused on some specific niche like "supercomputer modeling" and branched out into history as a side gig, or maybe they're genuine charlatans, but it's so hard to tell that teasing out the difference is almost not worth the effort.

You know, it's polite to just tell someone to go fuck themselves and save everyone some time.

The last good "military science" book was probably Soviet Air Land Battle Tactics and that's only because COL Baxter genuinely knows what he's talking about and explains it in a way that makes sense to someone versed in American military thought. It seems we don't have those kind of people anymore, though. Very sad.

You should probably stop living in the 80s and do some more reading before you try to tell me I haven't read enough. The Cold War ended 30 years ago, and China is the new serious adversary in case you haven't noticed.

I think I've finally figured out what you are exactly. You're a spigot of generic internet analysis of defense topics, which despite your admittedly significant knowledge base on select military topics your personality leaves you blind to the big picture stuff outside of your areas of focus. You have literally nothing important you can teach me that I do not already know, or could find out from someone more enjoyable and credible to talk to.

[Immoren]

So what this thread is telling me is that because Finland is no longer bound by WWII peace treaties because SU fell, she should invest in carrier battlegroup.

[The New California Republic]

You know, it's polite to just tell someone to go fuck themselves and save everyone some time.

No because that'd be flaming. But admittedly the responses can be rather unnecessarily caustic...

[Austria-Bohemia-Hungary]

So what this thread is telling me is that because Finland is no longer bound by WWII peace treaties because SU fell, she should invest in carrier battlegroup.

She should totally buy like a squadron of Type 212's to permanently lock the Baltic Fleet into their anchorages though. <.>

[New Visayan Islands]

it should just build more burkes instead of uselses fremm tbh

Rip off sejong the gr8 and call it a dlg. *thinking*

Or go all the way and call her a cruiser.

EDIT: A word.

[Mitheldalond]

EDIT: I should mention that this post was written mostly from memory, and therefore may contain errors.

What do you mean by gliders ? Does that means fins ? or wings ?

glide extended-range projectile like Fritz X.But it was fired from battleship guns

Depends on whether you're talking about using these in the 1940s, or if you're talking about making new shells for the Iowas in like the 1990s.

If this is actually in WWII, then the question is basically irrelevant. Battleships guns in WWII (or basically any other period) already had much longer ranges than would ever have been useful in combat. Most battleship engagements in the WWII period took place at an average of around 20,000 yards. The two longest range gunfire hits ever scored in ship-to-ship combat were both slightly over 26,000 yards, by Scharnhorst and Warspite. Granted, neither of these ships was especially well suited to super long range engagements, and neither was equipped with the latest and greatest of fire control systems. Fast forward to the late war when there are Iowas running around that do have the latest and greatest fire control systems, and fire control isn't as much the limiting factor anymore. I believe it was Iowa and New Jersey that opened fire on the Japanese destroyer Nowaki from about 35,000 yards away. I think it was New Jersey that scored a straddle on like her third salvo or something, which from a fire control perspective means that the guns are on target. It's just the dispersion of the guns that's causing them to miss. IIRC, the Nowaki reported that none of the shells landed closer than a couple hundred yards away. Their modernization in the 1980s made the 16"/50 Mark 7s on the Iowas into the most accurate battleship guns ever. Test shoots produced a dispersion pattern 220yd across, with a shell-to-shell dispersion of 123yd. Dispersion during WWII would have been noticeably worse.

Basically, the limitation isn't the range of the guns, it's the fire control systems and the accuracy of the guns.

Once you start adding in guidance systems, however, longer ranges start to become more usable. The issue with guidance systems, especially during WWII, is durability. Firing a 16"/50 Mark 7 involves setting off ~600 lbs of explosives underneath the shell, accelerating it from zero to 2500 ft/sec in about 65 ft. That's quite a bit of oomph (the muzzle blast alone could theoretically level buildings). IIRC, one of the reasons the Iowas weren't given surface-to-air missiles during any of their refits was because either the missiles' guidance systems or the radar on the ship couldn't withstand the shock of firing the main guns.

That said, extended range and guided projectiles were developed for the Iowas' guns (see the ammunition section on the navweaps article). These were sub-caliber saboted shells though, not glide bombs.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

In many ways, ffgx is just a degraded version of Burke. But it's not much cheaper.Oh, Burke 3 will use AESA, and the cost of ffgx may become less than half of its cost.lol
I'm more concerned with the tower like masts of U.S. Navy destroyers and frigates.Why not use a totally enclosed mast?

[Shanghai industrial complex]

I realized that gliding bombs are unsuited for battleship.To make it work depends on highly precise positioning.But the water reconnaissance planes of World War II were unable to undertake this task beacause the ballistic calculation of high-speed projectile is too complex.So a heavy shell can't work like Fritz X.It will encounter many technical problems, most of which can not be solved in that era.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

According to Russian sources, the green areas on the t-57 are AESA antennas(Type N036 AESA).The antenna at the nose has 1552 T / R modules, and the antenna on both sides of the nose has 358 T / R modules, which can provide the scanning capability of 270 degree airspace in front of the aircraft.An L-band AESA radar antenna is installed on the leading edge of the wing（Type N036L-1-01）Radar for wings and tails combines the L402 electronic countermeasure Suite.But I don't know the number of T / R modules in the wing and tail part of the radar.
Q:1.I don't think there will be too many t / R modules in other locations except for the nose part.Can it really find stealth fighters from all directions?Does AESA perform well in detecting stealth fighters?The message I got was that AESA could concentrate all of its power in one direction to detect stealth aircraft
2.Will radar antenna affect stealth capability?Whether installing so many radar antennas will greatly affect its stealth ability?
3.Are aircraft platforms more important or missiles and radars more important?I think if the large radar can find stealth fighters at a long distance, then the fighter team equipped with AWACS and advanced missiles can effectively counter stealth fighters

In addition, I found some academic journals of PLA.The article reveals a technical route for their next generation fighters,It may be a tailless hypersonic vehicle.From the wing's point of view, we can see that this kind of design will be very fast

https://xueshu.baidu.com/usercenter/paper/show?paperid=1x2n0p300k3y0cy01w1u0as0hv369692&site=xueshu_se

[New Vihenia]

According to Russian sources, the green areas on the t-57 are AESA antennas(Type N036 AESA).The antenna at the nose has 1552 T / R modules, and the antenna on both sides of the nose has 358 T / R modules, which can provide the scanning capability of 270 degree airspace in front of the aircraft.An L-band AESA radar antenna is installed on the leading edge of the wing（Type N036L-1-01）Radar for wings and tails combines the L402 electronic countermeasure Suite.But I don't know the number of T / R modules in the wing and tail part of the radar.
Q:1.I don't think there will be too many t / R modules in other locations except for the nose part.Can it really find stealth fighters from all directions?Does AESA perform well in detecting stealth fighters?The message I got was that AESA could concentrate all of its power in one direction to detect stealth aircraft
2.Will radar antenna affect stealth capability?Whether installing so many radar antennas will greatly affect its stealth ability?
3.Are aircraft platforms more important or missiles and radars more important?I think if the large radar can find stealth fighters at a long distance, then the fighter team equipped with AWACS and advanced missiles can effectively counter stealth fighters
[/spoiler]

1.Well for the L-band antenna in wing leading edge... the size would be dependent on the available length and frequency. So far however 12 elements per leading edge appears to be practical thus if they are working in Unison that would made about 24 elements. The range however is hotly debated. Common consensus however regards wing leading edge AESA on Su-57 was a mere IFF.

Which is true if it assumed to be working in the same manner as the nose AESA. Problem is that it may not so as far as i see.

The following is a simple "tradeoff" sheet i make mainly to compare or estimate radar performance based Only on 4th root laws


The sheet however includes RCS "scaling" so you can compare radar or "build" a radar based on your reference but works in different wavelength. Top is known parameters for Su-57 nose radar, lower one is "scaled" radar but with less elements and different wavelength.

The important parameter here is the Pulsewidth and the Dwell time. As seen working on L-band, 24 elements. 100 usec of pulsewitdh and 1 Second of beam dwell time.. so the beam would "stay" on particular sector for 1 second... Thus if you have 5 sectors, then your search time would be 5 seconds. One can have considerable range against 0.001 sqm RCS in X-band (about 0.005 sqm in L-band)

If the radar works independently (12 elements)



The range is about 82 Km.

However one may doubt the usefullness of it. Long dwell time does help range BUT.. it may actually lowers the probability of target being detected as target may "escape" before the beam is there. Plus 1 second is considerable time for ESM receiver. Long pulsewidth is helpful.. but It may lowers your minimum range... 100 us pulsewitdh is about 1500m of "dead range" where your radar cannot detect target due to eclipsing.

2.Yes as Radar antenna is a very great reflector. There is Bragg lobes and direct reflection lobes.. thus why stealth fighter or reduced RCS fighter have its radar canted upwards. Otherwise the radome have to be designed to be "frequency selective" so only working frequency of the antenna can enter the radome.

-----------------------
Anyway.. i would release the sheet soon including the description on how to use it.

[Triplebaconation]

I realized that gliding bombs are unsuited for battleship.To make it work depends on highly precise positioning.But the water reconnaissance planes of World War II were unable to undertake this task beacause the ballistic calculation of high-speed projectile is too complex.So a heavy shell can't work like Fritz X.It will encounter many technical problems, most of which can not be solved in that era.

Realistically the spotting plane would just guide it by looking at a flare or something in the shell's ass-end.

"Smart" artillery was far more important in WW2 than stuff like Fritz X, but as Kiev said you're better off putting a bomb in a little remote-controlled plane. This is peak 1918 technology.

Re badposting I suspect people pitching railgun battleships are a greater threat to US national security than a bunch of fishing trawlers.

ah quick question... so the size of a runaway may determine what kind of aircrafts an airbase can host. I'm curious however if there is a relationship between airbase's occupied area and the amount of fighter aircrafts it can host.

E.g Airbase as big as Nellis can host 1000 fighters, but smaller airbase can only hold like 100.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p ... 16.app.pdf

[New Vihenia]

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p ... 16.app.pdf

Thanks. and yeah.. i should be looking at those RAND reports on airbase vulnerability.

[Champagne Socialist Sharifistan]

Does a Nuremberg-style tribunal for the crimes of your enemies reduce potential for hard-liners to further stir up hatred?

[Velkanika]

Re badposting I suspect people pitching railgun battleships are a greater threat to US national security than a bunch of fishing trawlers.

Agreed, missiles and carrier aviation are better at doing everything a railgun battleship could potentially do. F-35Cs are great at delivering JDAMs at long ranges, and NGAD is coming around just in time to compete with China's stealth fighter force. I don't think railguns are going to be the holy grail for supporting amphibious assaults - they're more likely to end up as an anti-air weapon given how missiles are starting to move into the hypersonic range.

I was trying to make the point that disruptive tech can lead you interesting places when I made that post, in case I wasn't clear enough.

[Triplebaconation]

If I was China I'd encourage the US to buy even more dumb acronyms.

[Velkanika]

Commies love acronyms more than the Department of Defense does, and China is no exception to that.

[New Vihenia]

If I was China I'd encourage the US to buy even more dumb acronyms.

Does this include SLOC (Strategic Long Range Cannon) ? aka modern Paris gun.

[The Corparation]

Commies love acronyms more than the Department of Defense does, and China is no exception to that.

We must not allow an acronym gap.

[Spirit of Hope]

Commies love acronyms more than the Department of Defense does, and China is no exception to that.

We must not allow an acronym gap.

To late, there is already an acronym gap, we must double our acronym funding to remain competitive.

[Gallia-]

You should probably stop living in the 80s and do some more reading before you try to tell me I haven't read enough. The Cold War ended 30 years ago, and China is the new serious adversary in case you haven't noticed.

Don't worry, no one else has noticed either.

You have literally nothing important you can teach me that I do not already know, or could find out from someone more enjoyable and credible to talk to.

I can't teach you how to actually understand boring topics like naval warfare or People's War Under Modern Conditions or whatever the PLA is calling its doctrine of the week, but I can assure you it has nothing to do with vaguely racist, Orientalist notions like "Sun Tzu" and other bizarre "devious Asiatic" stereotypes; nor are these topics so esoteric or difficult to understand that they require 10 years of study to actually discover. They've already been discovered, they're just waiting for someone to actually bother looking at it.

The bulk of "military history" is less about actually understanding military history and more about doing one of two things: 1) writing obscure/niche history books about specific things and trawling through archives for fun and profit; 2) pretending to have the latest, greatest understanding of military warfare that is actually just a rehash of a literal centuries old idea but with some corporate buzzwords and management course acronyms tossed in to hide the fact that you don't know what you're actually talking about, but by drowning your Powerpoint presentation in them you can present an aura of understanding as everyone else in the room scratches their head trying to figure out what you really mean.

The first category is harmless at worst and articulate, concise breakdowns of a highly specific, relevant, contemporary subject at best. The latter is always dangerous charlatanism.

COL Baxter's book gives a very brief overview of Marxist-Leninist war thought in a simple, easy to understand manner that doesn't hide behind jargon to obscure the fact that the writer has nothing to contribute to the conversation. Nor does it require reading such dense literature as actual Marx, Lenin, or Mao to understand. He doesn't have a lot of original thinking to contribute, true, but Baxter does provide a concise and well written dissection of the basic fundamentals of Soviet military thinking at a time when the West was obsessed with what the Russians were doing and had little to go on besides its own imagination. He somehow managed to produce a more literate and succinct description of things like the "fundamental laws of war" and "scientific Marxism" while still having time to address the basic misunderstandings that plagued period contemporary "military academics" than the academics themselves.

This is mostly because he understood what the Russians were writing in its most obvious form: he could read Russian, he did so in his day job, and he understood enough about basic principles of fighting and the historic grounding of a Russian instructor to translate the idea that "doctrine", as understood by the Russians, was nothing more than a collection of commander's approved reading lists and some basic, applied mathematics using high school algebra and simple trig, at most.

Perhaps Americans being relatively more innumerate than Eurasians contributed to this failure to understand that "doctrine" is nothing more than providing the basic tools and decision making elements needed to react to an ambiguous situation with incomplete information? It would certainly help explain the obsession with boat swarms, which have statistically never been a threat to large ships (neither have cruise missile swarms, or bomber swarms, or kamikaze swarms, or any other sort of "swarm"), but it is something that literally no one else has bothered themselves with because they understand that boat swarms, when they exist, cannot challenge aviation (or even large ships) except in the rare blue moon where it actually happens. Perhaps because American "military historians" are simply statistically less likely to be numerate than Eurasians, since they don't understand statistics, they tend to focus on anomalies rather than boring outcomes, and this colors their perceptions to the point that they attempt to "explain" these anomalies through just-so stories? Maybe that's reading too much into it.

Anyway at some point this was quite literally lost in translation in the 1980's and "doctrine" in the US Army (and by extension, the entirety of the Anglo-American cultural sphere) became synonymous with "biblical dogma" I guess. Which is funny, because in the Russian sense of the word the US Army always had quite OK "doctrine", in that it provided fairly reasonably advice in concise formats in field manuals, it just never took the next step to applying these field manuals to a centrally organized curricula like the Russians did through the General Staff's Training Directorate. TRADOC started out as a way to try to fix this, but it quite quickly got subverted by the parochial branches of the US Army and it ended up not much better than when it started sometime in the 1990's, with the exception of the things that obviously worked like NTC and CALL publications, there's still nothing to really unify these distinct elements into a whole training curricula like the Soviets had. Then again, the Soviets had an excellent academic education system for their officers but very little practical education, in the form of realistic field exercises and umpires, so it's not like they were free from problems either.

This sort of cultural misunderstanding was always the case in "military consulting" though, perhaps because the rudiments of such organizations were generally too distant from Anglo-Americans to be understood by them, as the general arguments for most military consulting when it started in earnest in the 1950's in America came from Germans, Jews, and other groups that prefer to use a dozen fancy five dollar words where four twenty cent words would suffice to make the same point.

Currently the United States' greatest enemy isn't China, it's its own misunderstanding and misconceptions masquerading as somehow "cracking the Chinese code" or whatever, which will lead to it pretending the PRC is somehow more influenced by stereotypes of Fu Manchu, or the second coming of the Tanaka Plan or the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, rather than anything actually real. Once again America's biggest enemy is...itself.

In many ways, ffgx is just a degraded version of Burke. But it's not much cheaper.Oh, Burke 3 will use AESA, and the cost of ffgx may become less than half of its cost.lol

It's just a subsidy to the shipyards that aren't building enough Burkes.

I'm more concerned with the tower like masts of U.S. Navy destroyers and frigates.Why not use a totally enclosed mast?

I'm not sure the mast would do much since it has to be radar transparent. The USN's preferred solution at the end of the day was flush antennae in a low RCS housing, but this was really expensive, and didn't really work very well in practice since a lot of the antennae ended up vaporware.

Commies love acronyms more than the Department of Defense does, and China is no exception to that.

Lol.

If I was China I'd encourage the US to buy even more dumb acronyms.

Does this include SLOC (Strategic Long Range Cannon) ? aka modern Paris gun.

https://acquisitiontalk.com/2019/06/ffg ... were-four/

The USN probably has the most dumb acronyms but the US Army isn't far behind.

Commies love acronyms more than the Department of Defense does, and China is no exception to that.

We must not allow an acronym gap.

The USSR preferred medical terminology to acronyms.

carrier aviation

Can't sink an island.

Can't sink CONUS.

Replace all carriers with B-21s, littoral reconnaissance satellites, and Minutemen. Replace all battlegroups with submarines, UAVs, and MPAs.

This meme brought to you by the year 2077.

it should just build more burkes instead of uselses fremm tbh

Rip off sejong the gr8 and call it a dlg. *thinking*

ok me

:x

You know, it's polite to just tell someone to go fuck themselves and save everyone some time.

No because that'd be flaming. But admittedly the responses can be rather unnecessarily caustic...

It's a fairly serious problem that can probably only be solved by the general and widespread discrediting of the entire institution of "military consulting" though.

It seems immune to colossal failures though so I'm not sure it can ever be truly discredited, just challenged whenever it appears. So long as you keep people on their toes they will generally prefer to verify what they say rather than turn into generic fraudsters because they can hide behind an impenetrable piece of paper and a wall of incomprehensible acronyms and jargon to deflect serious criticism.

If you just had W.P. Baxters, John English's, and Richard Simpkins the business as a whole wouldn't be awful, Simpkin's eccentricities aside he made excellent points. Baxter and English weren't super original but they were able to squash foreign thought into bite sized chunks digestible for anyone with a cursory understanding of the subject i.e. lieutenants and captains. But these guys are also practical men, and successful ones (being colonels, generals, and the like), who learned a trade before they got into history and contemporary arts writing, so they don't count. OTOH military historians and consultants nowadays are just LARPers who are fit for little more than being snake oil salesmen, and maybe teaching public education, but little else. So essentially a management firm for what amounts to one of the most important jobs of all, which is always dangerous.

If they were actually competent individuals they would have learned a trade or joined the actual military but I guess for a variety of reasons they can't do either of these things.

It's enough to make you wish physicists or astronomers got away from metaphysics of quantum gravity and string theory and started asking questions about why boats sink or why jet planes blow each other up at this point.

[Triplebaconation]

If I was China I'd encourage the US to buy even more dumb acronyms.

Does this include SLOC (Strategic Long Range Cannon) ? aka modern Paris gun.

Yes, the US Army suddenly realizing its main priority should be leveraging disruptive technologies to conduct long-range precision fires and ensure multidomain operations capability in the vitally important A2/AD zone of...the Spratly Islands is a win-win for China.

[Gallia-]

The USN needs UUVs to ensure it can conduct multi-domain air-sea battle operations in the anti-access area denial zone of "that one underwater rock that is like 10 feet below the sea that Japan and Korea fight over".

[Triplebaconation]

There are two basic scenarios for stuff like SLRC.

1) The program fails, and the US wastes billions it could have spent on maintaining leadership in world organizations, repairing infrastructure, or teaching kids STEM on a dumb GI Joe cannon. China uses its industrial espionage capability to cheaply develop a less ambitious alternative.

2) The program succeeds, and the US bases a few batteries of SLRCs in Guam or somewhere. China uses its industrial espionage capability to cheaply develop its own GI Joe cannons, but these are protected by a nuclear umbrella in the Chinese heartland, making them vulnerable only in the most dire and politically unacceptable scenarios.