NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Vol. 11.0

[Velkanika]

compared to land, the sea is a lot less complex, obviously

Operations at sea are inextricably tied to operations ashore. In the missile age, and specifically when multi-domain warfare really took off, all those extra elements like electronic warfare, long-range aviation, cyber warfare, and long-range shore batteries of ASCMs that have blurred the lines between naval and land operations.

[Gallia-]

im pretty sure darius's island hopping campaign across the aegean was more significant an event in military history than the "anti-shipping cruise missile age" but whatever

[Velkanika]

im pretty sure darius's island hopping campaign across the aegean was more significant an event in military history than the "anti-shipping cruise missile age" but whatever

No argument there, the Mediterranean and Baltic basins are a perfect example of that. Both have long histories of naval operations being principally in support of amphibious envelopments or raids, with more than a few full-on invasions too.

[Gallia-]

the reason the montreaux convention wasnt challenged is because if you tried to sail a nimitz carrier into the brackish baltic or black seas it would just sink instantly

1012 kg/m^3 vs 1025 kg/m^3 water densities unfortunately the naval architects of the anti multi ship electronic domain cruise missile warfare aircraft age never anticipated this

[Shanghai industrial complex]

More advanced technology, larger fleet size and better ocean supply system?What a strong navy needs most is more money and resources

[Shanghai industrial complex]

the reason the montreaux convention wasnt challenged is because if you tried to sail a nimitz carrier into the brackish baltic or black seas it would just sink instantly

1012 kg/m^3 vs 1025 kg/m^3 water densities unfortunately the naval architects of the anti multi ship electronic domain cruise missile warfare aircraft age never anticipated this

I think it's because the entire black sea is within the range of shore based anti-ship missiles. It won't sink, the waterline will change.

[Gallia-]

the PVA was cool in korea

ltc-dr john english's book (a perspective on infantry) has a whole section devoted to extolling the virtues of 1950's IDF paratrooper night attacks and PLA short attacks which are all good

PLA not so spicy after it but that's life i guess

The PLA in the 1950s was a veteran who had been fighting for decades.Long term use of technically inferior equipment against the enemy, yes, they have to use these tactics.It is difficult for the PLA to be as spicy as their predecessors.Experience is very important,the last time they fought was in 1989.Emm...but they became crazy about the US military's superior firepower doctrine after Korean War.

i meant vietnam

the pla's current (and past) problem is that it wants to put appearances before effectiveness because it's effectively a political party alongside the communist party proper

blue brigade might change that but they could just as easily be shut down for ruining some general's career or whatever in like 5 years because it made him look like a fool

or they could just ignore its recommendations and it becomes a way for generals to show how "tough" they are by beating it in scripted events rather than seriously exploring military problems

the PLA obsession with air mechanization and othermega american dubious stuff seems to be a 1990s invention tho?

suddenly they had money, factories, and industry so why not use it to make shiny body kits for t-72

spiritual atomic bomb defeated by financial atomic bomb

the reason the montreaux convention wasnt challenged is because if you tried to sail a nimitz carrier into the brackish baltic or black seas it would just sink instantly

1012 kg/m^3 vs 1025 kg/m^3 water densities unfortunately the naval architects of the anti multi ship electronic domain cruise missile warfare aircraft age never anticipated this

I think it's because the entire black sea is within the range of shore based anti-ship missiles. It won't sink, the waterline will change.

just imagine a supercarrier sinking like a stone really fast as soon as it crosses the internationally defined boundary of the black and mediterranean seas

doesnt even leave a conning tower top poking out of the waterline of the istanbul harbor or whatever it's just gone

this is why naval combat is so hard to understand the terrain is invisible because it's based on salinity

anyway yes it was a joke

[Velkanika]

the PLA obsession with air mechanization and othermega american dubious stuff seems to be a 1990s invention tho?

They had a massive panic attack after Operation Desert Storm, because while the Soviets sold Iraq their export models the Chinese sold them what the PLA had. Then they went right into the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and had to admit internally that they were almost certainly technically overmatched, and have spent the time since working to correct that as fast as possible. They had a geopolitical panic attack they've been treating with debt Prozac.

[Manokan Republic]

The art of war can be found online for free actually, although my favorite version, is by Raplh D. Sawyer in 1996, who includes a lot about Chinese history and his translation is more poetic. The main thing is it includes a lot of easily memorable phrases to help you maintain a clearly oriented vision of how you should engage in combat. It's not really novel information or anything you couldn't figure out yourself, but it's good to keep in the back of your mind when formulating plans.


Some example quotes:

"Anger can revert to happiness, sadness can revert to joy, but the past cannot be rewritten, and the dead cannot be brought back to life."- Even more profound than this is the context, which is that it's written in the Art of War, a book specialized in how to best kill people.

"The art of war is the art of deception."- This is really important, as it stresses the fact that war is ultimately a social conflict between people, and the point of any plan is to attack the enemy by surprise via exploiting the fog of war. Any strategy or attack your enemy can prepare for is potentially one they can defeat, if you are at least somewhat fairly matched, and so strategies and tactics, and ultimately the element of surprise is a key element to focus on. Presumably if the enemy knows where you are going to be at any given time, they can just bomb it, mine it, or send overwhelming forces there (I.E. 10,000 of their men vs. 100 of yours) in advance to guarantee victory in that particular battle. Defeat in detail is a common tactic used by Napolean and Rommel in WWII, where despite being outnumbered you can outnumber the enemy in a particular fight, and defeat them one by one. Too often people get caught up too much in the mechanics of war and equipment which, while I love myself, is not really what war is about. It's a struggle between two peoples, two ideologies and political outlooks, two groups with a different self perception of who they are, which is ultimately a social construct (nations don't exist except by the subconscious acceptance of those who reside within them), and this should ultimately be the focus of strategies and tactics. The point of how to win a war isn't just by using the biggest or bestest gun, but to understand what it's used for, and what's it's roles and capabilities are. A far smaller gun may make sense because it can be carried on foot, such as by infantry, and so it makes it more convenient to deploy and attack the enemy with, as compared to just a bigger more powerful gun which may be too big to reasonably deploy. The way in which it can be employed, such as attacking around corners, or over barriers etc. are all important features and not just raw fire power, be it indirect fire with a mortar or a plane flying over, flanking the enemy and so on. Defeating the enemy strategically, because you use a rifle grenade to attack them after they hide behind a barrier such as a large rock or hill (which gives you indirect fire), is a lot better than wasting tons of ammunition trying to shoot through their cover. Taking cover in natural terrain in the first place like hiding behind a car or inside a building, or behind a large tree etc. is an important feature, and not just having a more powerful gun per se. All strategies are in effect, a way to trick your opponent, to attack them in a way they don't expect, as if they expect it the strategy is no longer useful. A flanking attack is useless if the flank comes from the direction the enemy is facing; it is only useful when the enemy is not faced in that direction, and so it responds to what the enemy is doing. To quote Sun Tzu again, what is unorthodox becomes orthodox with enough times, and vice versa, and is effectively inexhaustible. What the enemy expects only comes from what they experience, and so you can surprise them by doing what seems orthodox, if they get used to whatever it is you're not normally doing.

"The height of war is to attack the enemy's plans. The next is to attack their movements."- This like the above stresses the importance of strategy and tactics. It's ultimately about strategies and tactics and not just weapons. It's also importance to not exhaust your manpower and resources trying to destroy the enemy directly all the time, say bombing a base to oblivion, when instead you could lure them out and attack them and use far less resources, and take far less time. In the Alamo for example, the defenders had a 1 to 5 kill ratio against their attackers who, while they successfully won, lost so many resources and so much time that it ultimately lead to the victory of the Texas forces who, by most objective measures, were an inferior military, or at least inferior trained and equipped. They ultimately ended the war by capturing Santa Anna, and getting them to force a surrender, as opposed to militarily defeating his whole army which would have exhausted the Texas forces. In this case, the height of warfare is to attack the enemy's planners, and not just their plans. All of your strategies should be based around countering what the enemy is doing, as in comparison to just having a strategy itself. To add another quote by Audie Murphey could be "All plans change upon first contact with the enemy." Your strategies counter what the enemy is doing and thinking, not just are strategies that exist in a vacuum by themselves.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

The PLA in the 1950s was a veteran who had been fighting for decades.Long term use of technically inferior equipment against the enemy, yes, they have to use these tactics.It is difficult for the PLA to be as spicy as their predecessors.Experience is very important,the last time they fought was in 1989.Emm...but they became crazy about the US military's superior firepower doctrine after Korean War.

i meant vietnam

the pla's current (and past) problem is that it wants to put appearances before effectiveness because it's effectively a political party alongside the communist party proper

blue brigade might change that but they could just as easily be shut down for ruining some general's career or whatever in like 5 years because it made him look like a fool

or they could just ignore its recommendations and it becomes a way for generals to show how "tough" they are by beating it in scripted events rather than seriously exploring military problems

the PLA obsession with air mechanization and othermega american dubious stuff seems to be a 1990s invention tho?

suddenly they had money, factories, and industry so why not use it to make shiny body kits for t-72

spiritual atomic bomb defeated by financial atomic bomb

From February 17 to March 5, PLA captured all cities except Hanoi in Vietnam. At this time, Vietnam had no regular army to resist.But at the beginning, the PLA's armored forces did suffer a lot.（Vietnam claims that PLA has more casualties than it has although they didn't win a battle.The loser is not qualified and able to clean the battlefield and count the casualties）The Vietnamese are good fighters and their army is like a replica of the PLA. To be precise, Many officers of the Vietnam people's army are trained by CCP. And their weapons were superior to the PLA at that time.Their army is far superior to India.However, they did not bring too much trouble to the PLA.They were taught a terrible lesson from PLA, which in the next decade saw the battlefield as a training ground for recruits.
Between 1996 and Mao Zedong's time, there was a fault in PLA's equipment renewal.After the Korean War, PLA quickly established artillery, air force and missile systems. From universities, research institutes, design, manufacturing to military use theory.CCP first began to pay attention to the aircraft carrier program in the 1930s.It's easy to understand, because most of the top echelons of CCP are graduates from first-class universities in the Soviet Union, the United States, Germany and France.They had a certain understanding of these things, and after the Korean War, they began to be able to carry out some plans.Technically speaking, PLA technology is unlikely to make a big leap forward in 20 years.Factories and industries already have, and there are many experimental products.

I think your impression of the rigid PLA system is actually something unique between the 1980s and 1990s.At that time, PLA's military expenditure was greatly reduced, military training was insufficient, corruption and formalism were serious problems.Before 1980's, the people's Liberation Army implemented a democratic consultation system. Before fighting, all soldiers should have knowledge of the campaign and strategy and be able to discuss it equally in meetings with officers.After all orders from the supreme command, the general was given the right to modify the target on the battlefield.In the past decade, the PLA has carried out many reforms.The blues usually give the Reds a good lesson in most time.In the past few years, the Red Army has won only once.The blue army will use nuclear bombs, aircraft carriers, missiles and other weapons(using technical means of simulation), and will conduct information warfare and psychological warfare. They are used to simulate the Soviet army in nuclear war, the PLA of modern American and infantry tactics, the most powerful army in PLA mind.

These are the things I have never seen mentioned in my English materials.Maybe I read too few books.Usually, I think that English materials will describe PLA in their own way and belittle it to a certain extent for ideological reasons. Chinese materials will be upgraded to a certain extent.Foreign military enthusiasts have a lot of time delay in PLA Information, which makes me a little sad.

[Gallia-]

yeah like i said the blue brigade is a good step forward for the PLA but it's still too politicized as an organization

the main issue it seems that those reforms could be swept away with a purge/forced retirement of a lot of the good officers, or something similar, depending on which way the leadership swings

this happened in gorbachev's ussr and saddam's iraq because the good officers were seen as a potential political threat to the politburo executives

it's much rarer an occurrence in Western armies, which for sure have their own issues (~ C O I N ~, A I R M E C H S T R I K E), but being purged by the civil government en masse is usually not one of those

generally the Western armies just get lame ideas about the future from bad airport novels or something

the only time i can think of a Western nation actually doing a mass purge of its own military staff in recent decades is when the BRD ate the DDR and NVA was dissolved by Kohl's govt

but most of the time the biggest purges that westerners do tend to be one or two flag officers getting the boot for actual corruption, or even when they fall afoul of political correctness it's no more than a couple dozen guys being slapped on the wrist at most and typically middling rank guys

western armies tend to be trusted to not interfere with the local politics because they arent super politicized entities, really

that sort of energy gets outsourced to the social media and actual political parties in western countries; whereas in communist countries (or perhaps just despotic ones, as the Iranians are not exactly immune to it) like Ba'athist Iraq/USSR/PRC it seems that the energy goes towards politicizing the CPC or intelligence services against the army instead

[Shanghai industrial complex]

The art of war can be found online for

free actually, although my favorite version, is by Raplh D. Sawyer in 1996, who includes a lot about Chinese history and his translation is more poetic. The main thing is it includes a lot of easily memorable phrases to help you maintain a clearly oriented vision of how you should engage in combat. It's not really novel information or anything you couldn't figure out yourself, but it's good to keep in the back of your mind when formulating plans.


Some example quotes:

"Anger can revert to happiness, sadness can revert to joy, but the past cannot be rewritten, and the dead cannot be brought back to life."- Even more profound than this is the context, which is that it's written in the Art of War, a book specialized in how to best kill people.

"The art of war is the art of deception."- This is really important, as it stresses the fact that war is ultimately a social conflict between people, and the point of any plan is to attack the enemy by surprise via exploiting the fog of war. Any strategy or attack your enemy can prepare for is potentially one they can defeat, if you are at least somewhat fairly matched, and so strategies and tactics, and ultimately the element of surprise is a key element to focus on. Presumably if the enemy knows where you are going to be at any given time, they can just bomb it, mine it, or send overwhelming forces there (I.E. 10,000 of their men vs. 100 of yours) in advance to guarantee victory in that particular battle. Defeat in detail is a common tactic used by Napolean and Rommel in WWII, where despite being outnumbered you can outnumber the enemy in a particular fight, and defeat them one by one. Too often people get caught up too much in the mechanics of war and equipment which, while I love myself, is not really what war is about. It's a struggle between two peoples, two ideologies and political outlooks, two groups with a different self perception of who they are, which is ultimately a social construct (nations don't exist except by the subconscious acceptance of those who reside within them), and this should ultimately be the focus of strategies and tactics. The point of how to win a war isn't just by using the biggest or bestest gun, but to understand what it's used for, and what's it's roles and capabilities are. A far smaller gun may make sense because it can be carried on foot, such as by infantry, and so it makes it more convenient to deploy and attack the enemy with, as compared to just a bigger more powerful gun which may be too big to reasonably deploy. The way in which it can be employed, such as attacking around corners, or over barriers etc. are all important features and not just raw fire power, be it indirect fire with a mortar or a plane flying over, flanking the enemy and so on. Defeating the enemy strategically, because you use a rifle grenade to attack them after they hide behind a barrier such as a large rock or hill (which gives you indirect fire), is a lot better than wasting tons of ammunition trying to shoot through their cover. Taking cover in natural terrain in the first place like hiding behind a car or inside a building, or behind a large tree etc. is an important feature, and not just having a more powerful gun per se. All strategies are in effect, a way to trick your opponent, to attack them in a way they don't expect, as if they expect it the strategy is no longer useful. A flanking attack is useless if the flank comes from the direction the enemy is facing; it is only useful when the enemy is not faced in that direction, and so it responds to what the enemy is doing. To quote Sun Tzu again, what is unorthodox becomes orthodox with enough times, and vice versa, and is effectively inexhaustible. What the enemy expects only comes from what they experience, and so you can surprise them by doing what seems orthodox, if they get used to whatever it is you're not normally doing.

"The height of war is to attack the enemy's plans. The next is to attack their movements."- This like the above stresses the importance of strategy and tactics. It's ultimately about strategies and tactics and not just weapons. It's also importance to not exhaust your manpower and resources trying to destroy the enemy directly all the time, say bombing a base to oblivion, when instead you could lure them out and attack them and use far less resources, and take far less time. In the Alamo for example, the defenders had a 1 to 5 kill ratio against their attackers who, while they successfully won, lost so many resources and so much time that it ultimately lead to the victory of the Texas forces who, by most objective measures, were an inferior military, or at least inferior trained and equipped. They ultimately ended the war by capturing Santa Anna, and getting them to force a surrender, as opposed to militarily defeating his whole army which would have exhausted the Texas forces. In this case, the height of warfare is to attack the enemy's planners, and not just their plans. All of your strategies should be based around countering what the enemy is doing, as in comparison to just having a strategy itself. To add another quote by Audie Murphey could be "All plans change upon first contact with the enemy." Your strategies counter what the enemy is doing and thinking, not just are strategies that exist in a vacuum by themselves.

My favorite is the third chapter."上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。" in English The best military means is to defeat the enemy with one's own strategy, the next is to disintegrate the enemy through diplomatic means, the third is to defeat the enemy by force, and the last is to attack the enemy's city.Occupying land is the worst war strategy. The best strategy is to subdue the other side without using force.

[Immoren]

Four levels of fortifications-
Field fortifications (Level 4)
Field fortifications are fortification built, as well as firing zones cleared, by troops themselves based on the mission and task with their own equipment and machines. Mainly using material found onsite. Unit can also be supported with supply of pre-cut timber, roofing plates and other similar bulk material. Field fortifications offer moderate protection and they are suitable for short duration fighting. Terrain is used as part of fortification as far as manpower allows. Field fortifications are simple and easy to build. Fortifications and either open or have only light roofing. If possible, fighting parts of fortifications are equipped with protective holes. Fortifications are usually unhardened. In addition of combat fortifications, field fortifications include foxholes and/or dugouts for accommodations. Obstacles are not built. Decoy fortifications are built which double as makeshift fortifications. Protective levels of field fortifications are gradually built starting from small arms fire, fragments of hand grenades and up to area effect weapons like surface detonating shells.

Light component fortifications (Level 3)
Light component fortifications are fortifications done based on mission and purpose of unit with material and engineering support from higher level of command. Light-weight human transportable pre-fab fortifications like woodcut(?) foxholes and dugouts are used and fighting and living fortifications. Light component fortifications allow defensive battles for extended periods. Terrain is used as part of fortifications. roofing for combat fortifications are done with local materials. Accommodations are pre-fab dugouts as priority. Some fortifications are built with local materials. Decoy fortifications are build to cover width and depth. Some of decoy fortifications must double as combat fortifications. Obstacles are built on endangered approaches. Light component fortification offers same protection as field fortification and protection and surface detonating shells.

Heavy component fortification.(Level 2)
Heavy component fortifications are mainly built by engineering units or civilian contractors. Fortifications are primarily made with heavy, machine transportable pre-fab fortifications like concrete slab foxholes and dugouts. Fortifications can be supplemented with light component fortifications and field fortifications. structure of fortifications is otherwise same as at lower levels. Heavy component fortification offers same protection as field and light component fortifications as well as protection as against 155mm shell with delayed fuse and 100kg aerial bomb.

Base(?) fortification (Level 1)
Base fortifications are fortification based on careful structural planning by professional task groups like civilian building contractors and engineering construction units. Base fortifications are always cast onsite from concrete and using purpose built heavy concrete elements and rock blasting. In peace time base fortifications usually include camoflage and decoys. Positions are supplemented with suitable combat and sleeping fortifications, decoys and counter movement systems. Base fortifications use structural engineering methods to create fortifications that are strong enough. Base fortifications need to protect at least against 250kg aerial bomb.

Where is Gorchak doe?

Is he 1 or 2?

Sorry, this went over my head. lol

[Shanghai industrial complex]

yeah like i said the blue brigade is a good step forward for the PLA but it's still too politicized as an organization

the main issue it seems that those reforms could be swept away with a purge/forced retirement of a lot of the good officers, or something similar, depending on which way the leadership swings

this happened in gorbachev's ussr and saddam's iraq because the good officers were seen as a potential political threat to the politburo executives

it's much rarer an occurrence in Western armies, which for sure have their own issues (~ C O I N ~, A I R M E C H S T R I K E), but being purged by the civil government en masse is usually not one of those

generally the Western armies just get lame ideas about the future from bad airport novels or something

the only time i can think of a Western nation actually doing a mass purge of its own military staff in recent decades is when the BRD ate the DDR and NVA was dissolved by Kohl's govt

but most of the time the biggest purges that westerners do tend to be one or two flag officers getting the boot for actual corruption, or even when they fall afoul of political correctness it's no more than a couple dozen guys being slapped on the wrist at most and typically middling rank guys

western armies tend to be trusted to not interfere with the local politics because they arent super politicized entities, really

that sort of energy gets outsourced to the social media and actual political parties in western countries; whereas in communist countries (or perhaps just despotic ones, as the Iranians are not exactly immune to it) like Ba'athist Iraq/USSR/PRC it seems that the energy goes towards politicizing the CPC or intelligence services against the army instead

Politicized s have some disadvantages, but the PLA and the Soviet Red Army are different from Iraq.The systems of the Soviet Union and China were developed after decades of fighting. Politicization is conducive to maintaining the army's loyalty and resilience in adversity.It can prevent the army from breaking up or mutiny in the event of major failure.Otherwise, I don't think they will be able to keep fighting in many wars.It's like France and the Soviet Union in World War II.These are, of course, World War II experiences.However, due to the principle of "political power comes out of the barrel of a gun",this is not going to change.However, this has the advantage that the PLA's discipline is very good, and there is no news about such things as hurting the public.
I think one of the main factors of Communist countries is to build a country through revolution, while the revolutionary history of Western society is too long.The Western military is more specialized,better professional skills and personal quality.PLA is expanding the recruitment threshold and recruiting more college students to fill these gaps.I think with the development of technology, the impact of technical equipment and use skills is becoming more and more important.Fortunately, the PLA system is not rigid,they are happy to learn from the West.

Where is Gorchak doe?

What's that?google show me this https://twitter.com/ninja998998/status/1183285323171794944

[Gallia-]

By politicization I meant that the army competes with the intelligence services and the central party for political power.

In the West this zero-sum competition is kept internal to the civilian governments through the use of political parties. Armies are primarily apolitical because they know they will get about the same amount of support from any generally mainstream party (or the army is otherwise irrelevant to political discussion entirely). One of the stronger arguments against democratic centralism is that it doesn't actually reduce political factionalism, it just shifts its scope from being majorly within a government organ, like a legislature, to being all encompassing of the government. Instead of the Green party and the Blue party, you have the Red Army and the Central Administration, and the Secret Service helps whichever side seems more likely to give it power to pass laws that assist it to keep its own bureaucrats in power, which is what happened to the Soviet Union.

If the Politburo decides that the PLA has too much competence and prestige it will knock them down by a purge, hurting their ability to actually fight wars. This happened in the USSR and Iraq, the first <numerous times> and the second after the Iran-Iraq War. The PLA has avoided it for now, maybe, but it's always an issue in these sort of systems where the executive holds a lot of power. Another example would be pre-WW2 Japan, too, but that was mostly between the army and the navy, with the civil government being mostly a forgotten sideshow after the Taisho era.

e: Yes that is Gorchak. It is a pillbox that has an anti-tank missile (Konkurs or Kornet), a 30mm grenade launcher, a 7.62mm machine gun, and a 12.7mm machine gun. The weapons retract and are reloaded by the gunner-operator, who sits underneath the little periscope there.

When I get around to it I will draw an Americanized Gorchak with a TOW/M60/CIS 50MG/Mk 19 because Galla is Swedish Soviet America.

[The New California Republic]

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Sweden likely would have acted as a deterrent to invasion tbh.

And the Swedes would likely have opted for dispersal as a counter to that, by having them operating from roads, as they sometimes like to do.

Only because tactical nuclear weapons could have been used on cities. Which, by definition, makes them strategic weapons.

The dispersed basing system wasn't really designed to survive under a mass nuclear attack. It was supposed to resist conventional bombing attacks for a limited time. The Soviets had more than enough bombs to obliterate the distributed operating bases of every fighter wing by the 1970's though, much less just the main peacetime bases.

Tactical nuclear weapons alone would have acted as a deterrent to attack.

And I meant dispersal away from bases onto roads.

[Immoren]

Oh that. Google was giving me something else so I thought it was joke. lol
It was just general outline I was going through, but I guess they'd be at 2 or 1. lol

[Gallia-]

Only because tactical nuclear weapons could have been used on cities. Which, by definition, makes them strategic weapons.

The dispersed basing system wasn't really designed to survive under a mass nuclear attack. It was supposed to resist conventional bombing attacks for a limited time. The Soviets had more than enough bombs to obliterate the distributed operating bases of every fighter wing by the 1970's though, much less just the main peacetime bases.

Tactical nuclear weapons alone would have acted as a deterrent to attack.

And I meant dispersal away from bases onto roads.

The only way nukes are a deterrent is if you can actually deliver one to your enemy. The Soviets don't care about landing craft. They lost more barges to capsizing than enemy fire in the Kurils. I think they could handle their marines getting nuked a bit, assuming Sweden ever had the chance to do so: The USSR would just bomb Sweden to death and it wouldn't be able to do anything if it relied entirely on anti-shipping missiles and artillery shells for nuclear weapons.

It would take like a dozen Okas and they would surrender instantly because their nuclear storage bases would be destroyed. And then the Soviets would invade. Lol.

When Sweden found out it could buy nukes or plane, but not nukes and plane, it chose the plane, and Saab 36 became Saab 37. The nukes themselves would have been like South Africa's nukes if they had built them IRL: probably useless and wasting space in a warehouse waiting for a delivery system. And no deterrent to anyone. Because a Swedish nuclear program without the ability to nuke Tallinn or Riga is dumb.

Had Sweden actually pursued a nuclear program it would have probably focused entirely on strategic weapons because those are the most important. It didn't have the budget realistically for any sort of tactical weapon, or delivery means for that, and it's highly arguable if it had the budget for even the bare minimum of a nuclear deterrence capability. Considering the Swedes have no nukes nor planes able to deliver them something was lacking. If Sweden had built nukes though, it would have heavily centralized its military, not dispersed it.

The dispersion was just a means of making an otherwise conventional army survivable for more than about 5 minutes in the face of a superpower's nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear weapons obviate the need for dispersion beyond constant airborne patrols of Saab 36s over Skane or something.

Which is why it would probably be better for Sweden: it would have had a much smaller investment requirement in its military (capital costs upfront are high, maintenance costs are lower) over time than its actual cold war army because it would just be the air force with some nukes and a couple interceptors to escort the bombers on their patrols. No need for tank divisions or whatever if you're just going to nuke Riga and Tallinn at the first sign of Soviet invasion, or Leningrad, or whatever.

Oh that. Google was giving me something else so I thought it was joke. lol
It was just general outline I was going through, but I guess they'd be at 2 or 1. lol

oic

i was asking because he needs a concrete casemate to be constructed by engineering troops

but these sort of troops would probably exist in the Soviet Army in a casemate battalion or something

[Shanghai industrial complex]

It has happened many times in China's history that the military has too much political power so be attacked.The CCP's current policy is...if I became the leader of the army first,then no one can be politically opposed to me.So no one could shake Mao and Deng's political position at that time.It's the same now, just focus on their resume.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, I remember that there is always some free space under the buildings in the city.Recently, some air raid shelters have been converted into restaurants.It's great to eat in it.

[Triplebaconation]

3000 pages of NIP crap and Clausewitz aren't "good starting sources" lol

They are if you want to be able to have an in-depth conversation with any of the people who do this stuff as their day job. Also, don't knock it until you've read it, and I know you haven't read much from the Naval Institute if you're calling it collectively trash.

When someone says they know nothing about a topic and want a starting point, they're usually looking for a simple synopsis instead of a degree's reading list.

I used the word "crap" instead of "trash" because of the different connotations of the two words. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Cooperation, for example, is completely superfluous to his purpose. He probably doesn't want to read all that crap.

Mao's Little Red Book really needs to have a whole bunch of associated information alongside it in order to understand what exactly the CCP was trying to say with it

This is hardly surprising since The Little Red Book is just a collection of short quotes taken from his actual works.

Realistically, you need to read both if you want to crawl inside Xi's head, but if you want to just understand where they're coming from doctrinally Sun Tzu is what ultimately informs most of their military philosophy.

This is a silly. Even if you accept that Art of War is some comprehensive guide to modern Chinese strategy, the Western reader's interpretation will be radically different than that of the Chinese political and military establishment. Without looking at contemporary Chinese thought Sun Tzu is about as useful as a fortune cookie.

The idea perpetuated by books like Chinese Ways in Warfare that there's something uniquely sneaky and indirect about Chinese strategy isn't borne out by historical evidence or recent events. Strategy doesn't differ much from East to West, and Chinese concepts like unrestricted war and the three warfares may be couched in terms of Sun Tzu but they're just a modern state using all means at its disposal to fulfill its goals just like anywhere else.

[Gallia-]

The secret Chinese economic war plan revealed.

Oh, wait, no, it's just what economically inferior states do to economically superior ones: they legislate themselves comparative advantage over their opponents and steal their share of the pie. And to think some random loser got a Nobel for saying that only 100 years after it already happened to the British lmao.

Anyway I just think it's funny that the PLA for all its high speed isn't doing something chad like DARPA's SUO. Instead it did the thing everyone else from the Levant the the Gulf Coast to the Urals to Ruhr did and decided to subsidize the tractor plants and make high speed baby tanks instead. B O R I N G.

The one guys you'd think who'd have read that stuff because there's probably more Chinese colonels than DOD employees period, with opinions to share, just ignored it. Like come on it's great. You buy some missiles, some 4x4s, and put them together, and kill tanks. SOCOM, Russia, and ISIS can't be the only guys genuinely interested in that strain of thought. ):

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Yeah,Mao's Little Red Book is a few words were excerpted.Its service groups are uneducated farmers and workers.If you want to learn Maoism,you should read Selected works of Mao Zedong，in five volumes.

The secret Chinese economic war plan revealed.

Oh, wait, no, it's just what economically inferior states do to economically superior ones: they legislate themselves comparative advantage over their opponents and steal their share of the pie. And to think some random loser got a Nobel for saying that only 100 years after it already happened to the British lmao.

Anyway I just think it's funny that the PLA for all its high speed isn't doing something chad like DARPA's SUO. Instead it did the thing everyone else from the Levant the the Gulf Coast to the Urals to Ruhr did and decided to subsidize the tractor plants and make high speed baby tanks instead. B O R I N G.

The one guys you'd think who'd have read that stuff because there's probably more Chinese colonels than DOD employees period, with opinions to share, just ignored it. Like come on it's great. You buy some missiles, some 4x4s, and put them together, and kill tanks. SOCOM, Russia, and ISIS can't be the only guys genuinely interested in that strain of thought. ):

You know, it was done in the early stages of development in the United States, Germany and Japan.They blame it because they know exactly what's going to happen, because they do the same.Why does your link point to American history?
What's the high speed baby tanks you mean?Type 15?I dont know what you want to say.The army's weapons research is based on its preset scenarios and enemies.The weapons used by an army can tell who and how they are going to fight.You often see see 4x4 missiles to antitank in the Western army,because NATO usually takes advantage of the air.But European countries also have such things.And it's light enough to be used by paratroopers.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

I heard that armored vehicles from the U.S. Marine Corps are voting for names.But I only saw the pictures on Twitter and couldn't find the web page.

[Gallia-]

I mean the various little tanks that the tank factories have made over the years that are comparable to things like ASCOD/Boxer/CV90/M8 AGS and whatnot. Type 15 is an example, yes, but it also applies to things like CV90-120 and other stuff other countries made. Either for export or domestic use. It's just kind of silly that everyone does it, although it does mean that the USA had some inkling of a thing that might happen in the future i.e. everyone gets little FCS things by 2030.

I linked to the American System because it's what America did in the 18th and 19th centuries to usurp the UK as preeminent economic power, and is roughly similar to what the PRC has been doing: It's a historical case where a government managed to legislate comparative advantage into existence from nothing.

e: The Stryker Stinger/Hellfire thing is just something Boeing made for trade show stuff. The Marine Corps hasn't bought it, AFAIK, but they are buying Iveco SuperAVs.

[Velkanika]

They are if you want to be able to have an in-depth conversation with any of the people who do this stuff as their day job. Also, don't knock it until you've read it, and I know you haven't read much from the Naval Institute if you're calling it collectively trash.

When someone says they know nothing about a topic and want a starting point, they're usually looking for a simple synopsis instead of a degree's reading list.

That is the starting point, about a third of the degree's reading list currently fills two bookshelves in my bedroom, and that's just the stuff I bought hard copies of. There's also six banker boxes full of research notes from things I didn't buy in one form or another. And that's to just get to the "well informed" point honestly, it's going to take me at least another year or two before I can start work on my personal bibliography.

I used the word "crap" instead of "trash" because of the different connotations of the two words. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Cooperation, for example, is completely superfluous to his purpose. He probably doesn't want to read all that crap.

Guy, are you serious right now? Those books are about either how to put missiles, bombs, and shells on targets or overall naval doctrine and operational art. Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations for example spends the second half digging into the details of what missile warfare has looked like historically, plus exploring common tactical problems that have either occurred IRL or in exercises.

This is hardly surprising since The Little Red Book is just a collection of short quotes taken from his actual works.

About half of which are questionable if he ever actually said them in the context presented. I got my hands on a copy from the 60s that had been revised up through '91 that had all the owner revisions made at the direction of the Communist Party as various people were removed from the official history, so their photographs were alternatively inked over black with a pen or pages were torn out depending.

This is a silly. Even if you accept that Art of War is some comprehensive guide to modern Chinese strategy, the Western reader's interpretation will be radically different than that of the Chinese political and military establishment. Without looking at contemporary Chinese thought Sun Tzu is about as useful as a fortune cookie.

I have a reading list for that specific question, but I'm pretty sure you wouldn't like the publishers.

The idea perpetuated by books like Chinese Ways in Warfare that there's something uniquely sneaky and indirect about Chinese strategy isn't borne out by historical evidence or recent events. Strategy doesn't differ much from East to West, and Chinese concepts like unrestricted war and the three warfares may be couched in terms of Sun Tzu but they're just a modern state using all means at its disposal to fulfill its goals just like anywhere else.

Really, it just comes down to two strategies at the moment that the PRC favors: Hit peripheral targets, and use measures short of war. Also, don't go to war unless doing so is extremely low risk.

Yeah,Mao's Little Red Book is a few words were excerpted.Its service groups are uneducated farmers and workers.If you want to learn Maoism,you should read Selected works of Mao Zedong，in five volumes.

Yeah, I didn't make it through those, Mao bores me to death and there's only so much Communist bullshit I can handle in one sitting.