NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Vol. 11.0

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Nuclear weapons are the most efficient means of defensively countering a conventional army. The South Koreans aren't a nuclear state because they expect to perform some level offensive, ground gaining combat. Namely, they want to conquer the North, by force if needed, and are well equipped and trained to do this. The Swedish Army isn't a nuclear army because, well, frankly the Swedes were sorta stupid and preferred to buy a new fighter-bomber instead of a nuclear weapon, but I guess that's fair since they probably couldn't have developed the missile delivery systems (or bombers) needed to drop nukes in the first place if they went full bore down that route.

Nordic balanceNorthern Europe is not a strategic location, nor does it have the scarce resources that all countries in the world want.The whole of northern Europe has no nuclear weapons.If they do, NATO and the Warsaw pact will probably give them some gifts.If you are not a global power, then nuclear weapons will be a curse.North Korea and Iran are in the most dangerous regions in the world, and without nuclear weapons, they have no right to speak.Sweden is different. They are safe. It's cold and there are few people there.

[Gallia-]

If Belgium and Netherlands can have nuclear weapons, so can Sweden. It almost did, except it bought Viggen instead, and presumably had it bought nuclear weapons it wouldn't have had any means to deliver them since it was down to a choice between "new fighter-bomber" and "nuclear weapons". Atomic weapons are the only thing that can seriously ensure national sovereignty. Well that, and the fact that Russia couldn't invade its way out of a wet paper bag at the moment. A country that is at reasonable risk of invasion by a hostile neighboring state and can't really challenge it conventionally (or just plain has no designs on any sort offensive wars) would do good to replace its entire army with a nuclear missile force. It's the ultimate defensive strategy.

North Korea is so dangerous that it's become an isolationist hermit state that wants nothing to do but build wood fired trains and not get invaded by its neighbors lol.

It, and Taiwan, are the most obvious candidates for switching from conventional ground armies to all atomic militaries. They have literally no desire to engage in offensive wars and only want to keep their neighbors from invading them. Atomic weapons are the ultimate defensive weapon. Sure you can't invade Iraq with them, but you can keep yourself from being invaded like Iraq with them.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Sweden was not a member of NATO during the cold war.The Soviet Union was not the enemy of Sweden.If you have nuclear weapons, you need a lot more.Reliable means such as strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, and adequate nuclear arsenals to deter opponents.Long range early warning facilities to prevent there is no time for nuclear counterattack, mobile missile forces and nuclear submarines to ensure reliable probability of counterattack.If you don't, you will become a dangerous country in the world like North Korea.If you do, you will become a reliable regional power like France and Britain.If your nuclear weapons can destroy the earth over and over again, you will be the defender of the earth's peace.
North Korea's nuclear bomb is just a decoration to bully South Korea.China, Russia and the US agreed to sanction it together is to warn the world,"If you don't guarantee that your bomb can destroy the whole world, it's better not to touch it".

[Gallia-]

Sweden was not a member of NATO during the cold war.

It may as well have been.

The Soviet Union was not the enemy of Sweden.

No.

you need a lot more.

No.

Reliable means such as strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, and adequate nuclear arsenals to deter opponents.

No.

Long range early warning facilities to prevent there is no time for nuclear counterattack,

Again, no.

If you don't, you will become a dangerous country in the world like North Korea.

North Korea is only dangerous because George Bush thinks they want to destroy American freedom I guess. It's been terrified of being invaded by the South since the early 1980's though, which is why it started the nuclear weapons program in the first place.

There are only two seriously dangerous countries in East Asia, in terms of general warmongering and potential to start big regional wars: the PRC (obviously) and the ROK. The PRC might start a war by accident or something, or deliberately if it feels like it's slipping too far away from the United States in its slow motion trainwreck of an economic system, as a sort of spite move (or really a last hurrah).

The ROK might start a war because it decides it needs to reunify the peninsula because Kim had a stroke or fell down the stairs or something.

For right now the ROK doesn't actually want to invade the South, but that changes between leaders, and demography might force their hand. The North has a large working age population, relative to the South, so economic factors of needing more people might push them to invade, especially if the North decides it doesn't want a general labor/brain drain to the South, if they think they can get away with it. They probably could, too, at least today while they still have men in their army.

If you do, you will become a reliable regional power like France and Britain.

Fun fact: The UK and France do not have the ability to actually monitor long range missile launches, because they don't need to! The UK's nuclear launch authorization rests entirely on the hands of the SSBN captains, there is no need to run through a chain of command from Prime Minister to sub captain, because the Prime Minister would be atomized in less than five minutes. Same goes for France, although they like to pretend otherwise. Neither did the Soviet Union, which is why it was obsessed with 100k PSI superhard silos: its entire SRF policy was based around launching after, or under, an attack. Of course you can't know if you're under attack unless you see an atomic bomb go off on your land, so that was sorta where the Soviets would have started from.

Without a space based system like MiDAS or DSP or SBIRS, and the geographical distance to actually, physically move people and machines out of the way of a nuclear bomb, you're sorta stuck between "devolve to local commanders" or "launch after the first strike". Which means investing heavily in submarines and other mobile launch systems, and putting the captains and colonels in charge of those things in charge of deciding to launch, based on their own experience and intuitions. You might get a lunatic O-6 that decides to launch all their atomic bombs at Moscow because he really hates Russians or something, but in the 80+ years of nuclear bombs being a thing this has never happened, nor does it seem likely to happen in the future.

So the difference between unreliable and reliable is a matter of perception, not some magical policy choice. If the UK can devolve all nuclear weapons release authority to "some O-6" and still be considered "reliable" by your estimate, then I don't see why the DPRK would be any more threatening to anyone, considering its entire strategic position has been one of a defensive posture against a hostile southern neighbor that might invade it. What is Kim gonna do? Nuke Beijing because they forgot to helicopter him a aquarium of lobster this week? Unlikely.

The more likely issue that will arise is that the DPRK might implode and lose all its nuclear weapons to weirdos like <insert international gang of terrorists here>. But of course that applies equally to the USSR and the PRC as well! At least one of those had it happen already, and the other one seems to be headed in the same direction, so I guess we should invade and destroy the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the PRC before they explode and lose them all. Oh, wait, no one did that.

The only solution there is to not have nuclear weapons at all, really.

If your nuclear weapons can destroy the earth over and over again, you will be the defender of the earth's peace.

No. Nuclear weapons only ensure national sovereignty, nothing else. If you're the only person with nuclear weapons, you actually have free reign to do whatever you want to anyone.

North Korea's nuclear bomb is just a decoration to bully South Korea.

No. It's a burgeoning arsenal of maybe a couple dozen bombs and some missiles at most to nuke Seoul, Pusan, Okinawa, Tokyo, and Guam, if they need to. You don't spend large amounts of money on a nuclear program for "decoration" or scary political points. By investing that amount of money you generally predispose yourself to a willingness to use them. If they wanted to be spooky they could just make rockets with empty aeroshells and say they're nukes. It might have the same effect, but given the ROK is probably going to call their bluff eventually without nukes, it's better to have them than not have them.

If the South invades North Korea its most obvious solution to survive is to nuke Seoul.

China, Russia and the US agreed to sanction it together is to warn the world,"If you don't guarantee that your bomb can destroy the whole world, it's better not to touch it".

Yeah it was kinda stupid to sanction them or whatever because DPRK isn't going to stop because they're starving or don't have blue jeans or whatever.

1) The USA makes sure they won't starve because it's cool and nice and gives grain to starving countries.
2) They already starved and they can't starve more than actually starving.

To keep the DPRK from getting nuclear weapons you have to remove the actual motivation for them getting nuclear weapons in the first place: the fact that they're prime material for a revanchist campaign by the South. I don't see anyone forcibly disarming the North or the South, and neither the USA or PRC would allow it to happen to their respective side to begin with, so the DPRK is getting nukes like it or not.

[Austria-Bohemia-Hungary]

Russia in its various iterations has been fighting Sweden since the 15th century and the USSR was aggressively imperialistic. What rock have you been sleeping under?

[Gallia-]

TBF it did briefly halt its imperialist expansion after the Polish War.

Only to promptly start it back up after WW2.

Thanks Joe.

[The New California Republic]

At most I think Sweden's nuclear capability would have been limited to tactical rather than strategic, as it would have been straightforward to have the capability for tactical weapons delivery, either by artillery or air.

[Gallia-]

At most I think Sweden's nuclear capability would have been limited to tactical rather than strategic, as it would have been straightforward to have the capability for tactical weapons delivery, either by artillery or air.

Tactical weapons were important, but the primary delivery system was a regional strategic bomber. It would have resembled the French nuclear program, if only Sweden hadn't been creaky and aging by the '60's, though. The entire point was to deter invasion by the Soviets. There would have been gravity bombs for Lansen, nuclear anti-shipping missiles, and then some sort of strategic weapons for killing Leningrad or whatever.

A purely tactical weapons capability wouldn't have made much sense for Sweden since it wouldn't really deter the Soviets much to invade them if they just had artillery shells and some dumb bombs. You could kill the Swedish Air Force on the ground with nuclear rockets and that would be that. It would be much harder to justify that sort of attack if Sweden could still reliably strike a major Soviet city like Leningrad with a handful of nuclear bombers or something though.

That said the combat range of the Saab 36 was only sufficient for a short hop across the Baltic to nuke Talinn or Riga or something.

Maybe they would have been able to make a IRBM to hit Leningrad though. That would really put the Soviets in a bind if they'd wanted to invade.

But they bought Viggen instead so sad.

[The New California Republic]

A purely tactical weapons capability wouldn't have made much sense for Sweden since it wouldn't really deter the Soviets much to invade them if they just had artillery shells and some dumb bombs. You could kill the Swedish Air Force on the ground with nuclear rockets and that would be that.

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Sweden likely would have acted as a deterrent to invasion tbh.

And the Swedes would likely have opted for dispersal as a counter to that, by having them operating from roads, as they sometimes like to do.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

you need a lot more.

No.

Your connection says more nukes are needed.Minimal deterrence,enough quantity is needed. Although China, the practitioner of this strategy, maintains a policy of absolute secrecy about the number of nuclear weapons,an underground nuclear weapons depot revealed by the 2008 earthquake shows that its number of nuclear bombs is not the 250 generally predicted by research institutions.It's some of the minimum MAD implied by the PLA's general.

Reliable means such as strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, and adequate nuclear arsenals to deter opponents.

No.

Well, the Arabs are too weak. It seems to be very reliable

Long range early warning facilities to prevent there is no time for nuclear counterattack,

Again, no.

What do you want to say? early warning facilities

If you don't, you will become a dangerous country in the world like North Korea.

North Korea is only dangerous because George Bush thinks they want to destroy American freedom I guess. It's been terrified of being invaded by the South since the early 1980's though, which is why it started the nuclear weapons program in the first place.

There are only two seriously dangerous countries in East Asia, in terms of general warmongering and potential to start big regional wars: the PRC (obviously) and the ROK. The PRC might start a war by accident or something, or deliberately if it feels like it's slipping too far away from the United States in its slow motion trainwreck of an economic system, as a sort of spite move (or really a last hurrah).

The ROK might start a war because it decides it needs to reunify the peninsula because Kim had a stroke or fell down the stairs or something.

For right now the ROK doesn't actually want to invade the South, but that changes between leaders, and demography might force their hand. The North has a large working age population, relative to the South, so economic factors of needing more people might push them to invade, especially if the North decides it doesn't want a general labor/brain drain to the South, if they think they can get away with it. They probably could, too, at least today while they still have men in their army.

North Korea is only dangerous because the government wants you to think it's dangerous.No one is really worried about North Korea except South Koreans.North Korea has no space surveillance network, and they have no idea where their missiles will fall.And, I think, is it not that Americans often wage wars?Americans have really threatened China with nuclear war.

If you do, you will become a reliable regional power like France and Britain.

Fun fact: The UK and France do not have the ability to actually monitor long range missile launches, because they don't need to! The UK's nuclear launch authorization rests entirely on the hands of the SSBN captains, there is no need to run through a chain of command from Prime Minister to sub captain, because the Prime Minister would be atomized in less than five minutes. Same goes for France, although they like to pretend otherwise. Neither did the Soviet Union, which is why it was obsessed with 100k PSI superhard silos: its entire SRF policy was based around launching after, or under, an attack. Of course you can't know if you're under attack unless you see an atomic bomb go off on your land, so that was sorta where the Soviets would have started from.

Without a space based system like MiDAS or DSP or SBIRS, and the geographical distance to actually, physically move people and machines out of the way of a nuclear bomb, you're sorta stuck between "devolve to local commanders" or "launch after the first strike". Which means investing heavily in submarines and other mobile launch systems, and putting the captains and colonels in charge of those things in charge of deciding to launch, based on their own experience and intuitions. You might get a lunatic O-6 that decides to launch all their atomic bombs at Moscow because he really hates Russians or something, but in the 80+ years of nuclear bombs being a thing this has never happened, nor does it seem likely to happen in the future.

So the difference between unreliable and reliable is a matter of perception, not some magical policy choice. If the UK can devolve all nuclear weapons release authority to "some O-6" and still be considered "reliable" by your estimate, then I don't see why the DPRK would be any more threatening to anyone, considering its entire strategic position has been one of a defensive posture against a hostile southern neighbor that might invade it. What is Kim gonna do? Nuke Beijing because they forgot to helicopter him a aquarium of lobster this week? Unlikely.

The more likely issue that will arise is that the DPRK might implode and lose all its nuclear weapons to weirdos like <insert international gang of terrorists here>. But of course that applies equally to the USSR and the PRC as well! At least one of those had it happen already, and the other one seems to be headed in the same direction, so I guess we should invade and destroy the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the PRC before they explode and lose them all. Oh, wait, no one did that.

The only solution there is to not have nuclear weapons at all, really.

Looks like they don't have money.But it doesn't matter. If you shoot a nuclear bomb across the English channel, it can be detected by ordinary radar.Their nukes are used to threaten each other.LOL Britain abandoned its independent nuclear weapons strategy and use the BMEWS of USA.France still has an independent nuclear policy, and they don't need a global ballistic missile surveillance system because the enemy is not far .But China, the United States and Russia all have it.

If your nuclear weapons can destroy the earth over and over again, you will be the defender of the earth's peace.

No. Nuclear weapons only ensure national sovereignty, nothing else. If you're the only person with nuclear weapons, you actually have free reign to do whatever you want to anyone.

That's what I'm saying. You can claim to be the guardian of world peaceIt's an irony.The owner of the world's largest nuclear arsenal

North Korea's nuclear bomb is just a decoration to bully South Korea.

No. It's a burgeoning arsenal of maybe a couple dozen bombs and some missiles at most to nuke Seoul, Pusan, Okinawa, Tokyo, and Guam, if they need to. You don't spend large amounts of money on a nuclear program for "decoration" or scary political points. By investing that amount of money you generally predispose yourself to a willingness to use them. If they wanted to be spooky they could just make rockets with empty aeroshells and say they're nukes. It might have the same effect, but given the ROK is probably going to call their bluff eventually without nukes, it's better to have them than not have them.

If the South invades North Korea its most obvious solution to survive is to nuke Seoul.

They can drop bombs in Seoul, but their backward missiles can't hit other places correctly.Advanced air defense missile systems will shoot them down.But army guns are enough to destroy Seoul, if you know how close Seoul is to the border.

China, Russia and the US agreed to sanction it together is to warn the world,"If you don't guarantee that your bomb can destroy the whole world, it's better not to touch it".

Yeah it was kinda stupid to sanction them or whatever because DPRK isn't going to stop because they're starving or don't have blue jeans or whatever.

1) The USA makes sure they won't starve because it's cool and nice and gives grain to starving countries.
2) They already starved and they can't starve more than actually starving.

To keep the DPRK from getting nuclear weapons you have to remove the actual motivation for them getting nuclear weapons in the first place: the fact that they're prime material for a revanchist campaign by the South. I don't see anyone forcibly disarming the North or the South, and neither the USA or PRC would allow it to happen to their respective side to begin with, so the DPRK is getting nukes like it or not.

[/quote]
The United States will not guarantee North Korea's food.North Korea lacks food because it cannot get enough gasoline and fertilizer.Their luxurious agricultural machinery can only rust on the farm.Who knows what nuclear weapons are good for them.They don't actually have to worry about war at all，because neither Korea can control this.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Russia in its various iterations has been fighting Sweden since the 15th century and the USSR was aggressively imperialistic. What rock have you been sleeping under?

On the 15th, the Swedish empire was stronger.But in the Czar era, they had long lost the power to fight Russia.Sweden has been a neutral country since 1905.No, they don't have Soviet phobia

[Gallia-]

A purely tactical weapons capability wouldn't have made much sense for Sweden since it wouldn't really deter the Soviets much to invade them if they just had artillery shells and some dumb bombs. You could kill the Swedish Air Force on the ground with nuclear rockets and that would be that.

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Sweden likely would have acted as a deterrent to invasion tbh.

And the Swedes would likely have opted for dispersal as a counter to that, by having them operating from roads, as they sometimes like to do.

Only because tactical nuclear weapons could have been used on cities. Which, by definition, makes them strategic weapons.

The dispersed basing system wasn't really designed to survive under a mass nuclear attack. It was supposed to resist conventional bombing attacks for a limited time. The Soviets had more than enough bombs to obliterate the distributed operating bases of every fighter wing by the 1970's though, much less just the main peacetime bases.

Sweden wasn't prepared for a bolt from the blue sort of attack anyway, as it was mostly geared towards the possibility of invasion during an already occurring European war. In hindsight this wasn't a great decision since it probably factored into the whole debacle that was the post-WW2 Swedish arms industry and the acquisition of conventional weapons over strategic ones, since Sweden's current problem is it has no ability to defend itself from invasion and no means by which to rejuvenate its now dilapidated defense industry. Nuclear weapons would at least solve the first issue: even if they couldn't fix the second one they would still be able to bomb Putin with a F-35 or something.

No.

Your connection says more nukes are needed.Minimal deterrence,enough quantity is needed. Although China, the practitioner of this strategy, maintains a policy of absolute secrecy about the number of nuclear weapons,an underground nuclear weapons depot revealed by the 2008 earthquake shows that its number of nuclear bombs is not the 250 generally predicted by research institutions.It's some of the minimum MAD implied by the PLA's general.

Yes the 2nd Artillery Corps is great at demanding additional subsidies for budget allocation. Doesn't really change that having a mere dozen or so large nukes is more than enough to liquidate the majority of the industrial base of the ROK and keep it from invading you.

Well, the Arabs are too weak. It seems to be very reliable

The ROK is also weak. Weak to two or three nukes a piece blowing up their grand total of four or five major industrial cities.

What do you want to say? early warning facilities

That's not really a gotcha when...

The first of them was launched on 17 November 2015[2] and as of May 2020 there are four in service.[7]

Lol.

First, Oko was the only Soviet equivalent to space based warning and was never operational to the extent that DSP was, or really operational at all, to be honest. It was more like a proof of concept for a potential system, like MiDAS, and the Soviets never relied on it for warning information terribly much. It had extremely bad reliability, and the engineers were aware of this, but it was honestly better than nothing. It's why Stanislav Petrov's story is sort of overblown. The only definite means of launch command authority would come from the CPSU, or the Soviet Army, and the latter only when it could no longer hear from the CPSU and it detected nuclear detonations (gamma rays, seismic sensors, and severed telephone lines) in the vicinity of Moscow or something.

The major weakness of Soviet nuclear planning was recognized by the Red Army as being, basically, zero space infrastructure, and a general inability to see "the other side of the hill". Or in this case, the other side of the planet. They lacked capability to track mass nuclear raids with more than maybe a 5-8 minute warning, and less if the Americans were firing a shallow trajectory SLBM launch. This is why the Soviets were so interested in semi-automatic launch means like Perimeter, which never became fully operational, but considering the system was going to be based on seismic, gamma ray, and real-time communications links. It's safe to say the Soviets simply couldn't practice launch on warning. Rather they had to practice launch after attack, although they had specific terminology for it, and launch under attack, i.e. "nukes detonating near the silos", but that was not a reliable method of launching.

Second, the Russians are trying, and failing, to address the lack of launch on warning capability that the Soviets wanted to address. They have yet to seriously invest in the space infrastructure needed, and can't really track to the extent they want or need to, so they still rely somewhat on launch after attack as their main means of retaliation. It's why they are so paranoid about American Aegis Ashore and stuff: they know they can't reliably detect missile launches and are afraid the Americans might destroy their silos and invade them, or something.

The United States meanwhile has a system that can detect howitzer batteries, or individual multiple rocket launchers, and translate this information into actionable tactical intelligence for theater air strike planners.

The difference is enormous in capability and it's basically nothing to do with the satellites themselves. The Russians have...OK satellites, technically, but entirely lack the experience, the knowledge (of what the satellites might be able to do), and the institutional capacities (mainly in cross communication between the SRF and other branches of the military) to really do much with it. Besides that they also lack the coverage they need, really, besides the most basic LOW capacity. It's still vulnerable to cruise missile raids and shallow trajectory SLBMs, the same as it was 40 years ago. EKS is more like a developed Oko than anything, which puts it firmly in the same capability as the American DSP of the 1980's, but the Russians lack the rest of BMEWS so if the Americans attack them with any numerous means of atomic strike that doesn't involve firing every rocket silo in Minot AFB they probably won't see it coming.

And unlike the Russians, the Americans have that capacity, in general, to launch multiple atomic raids with numerous weapons that require a vast array of sensors to detect that the Russians simply do not possess in quantity enough to ensure their coverage. The same basic Soviet era "launch under attack" applies, and while the Russians are in the process of addressing it very slowly, it still chills them to the bone to think that the America might be sneaking in trucks full of Tomahawks or something, because the Americans have actually advanced since the end of the Cold War (F-35's nuclear basing capability probably spooks them a lot) while Russia has been stuck in a rut.

Theoretically, they're a lot better off than they used to be, but that's irrelevant in practical terms. Recognizing you have a problem is not the same as being able to address the problem, which the Russians, like the Soviets, still can't do.

North Korea is only dangerous because the government wants you to think it's dangerous.No one is really worried about North Korea except South Koreans.

Meanwhile, in the post immediately preceding this one:

If you don't, you will become a dangerous country in the world like North Korea.

Which is it? Is North Korea dangerous? Or is it not?

You're right, though. But it's good, because North Korea is unlikely to attack South Korea in the first place. Kim wants to continue getting lobster helicoptered to his train. If he invades the South he will no longer get lobster helicoptered to his train. Maybe when he dies of gout or whatever his sister will be more hardcore, I don't know, because she's also the social media spokesperson so she might just be hamming it up.

North Korea's biggest threat is South Korea invading it. It puffs itself up to make itself bigger and hisses a lot, like a bird or one of those frilly lizards, but it's really terrified of the thing it's looking at and wants it to go away. It isn't going to be sneaking up on South Korea in its sleep to try to kill it because it'll be too busy whittling tractors and jet powered crop dusters out of granite to do that.

North Korea has no space surveillance network, and they have no idea where their missiles will fall.

It's not important or relevant. North Korea has zero interest in ICBMs. They just want to kill Guam, really, because it might have B-2s or something that could hurt the Great Leader.

Looks like they don't have money.

No, they don't have time. The warning period for a missile launched from Russia, or Iran, would be measured in literally dozens of seconds.

Just look at a map of Europe lol.

But it doesn't matter. If you shoot a nuclear bomb across the English channel, it can be detected by ordinary radar.

No one cares. You have a good 2-3 minutes to get woken up, told a nuke is coming, and kiss your ass goodbye. Literally.

Britain abandoned its independent nuclear weapons strategy and use the BMEWS of USA.

It doesn't solve the issue of geography or the time of flight problem.

This si why the Soviets negotiated the removal of American IRBMs from Turkey.

France still has an independent nuclear policy,

Obviously, but they aren't going to do anything except entrust all launch authority to low ranking field commanders. Somehow this would make them "unreliable" by your metric where reliability is measured by the ability to see launches before they impact, I guess. You will have a better argument if you point out that the DPRK is a paper tiger internally and might implode in on itself and release some nukes into the wild, but that argument applies to the PRC as well, as it is also currently imploding, and is just as dangerous to nuclear proliferation as the DPRK.

The USSR already imploded, but as far as we know no nukes were released, so the entire argument against DPRK having nukes "because it might fall apart and nukes end up being in a dirty bomb in Tokyo or San Francisco" is a bit...empty. The biggest nuclear arsenal in the universe exploding and this not happening in Berlin or London or New York City is pretty damning to the whole scenario. Why would a dozen nukes under lock and key in a shed next to a Hwasong-69 TEL do anything after the DPRK implodes except wait to be picked up by the US Marines?

and they don't need a global ballistic missile surveillance system because the enemy is not far .But China, the United States and Russia all have it.

Russia doesn't, but wants it badly and will probably never have it. China doesn't, but might have one in the future. America does.

Not sure why its relevant. You don't need anything you mentioned to be reliable custodians of nuclear weapons. You just need to be a reliable custodian of nuclear weapons. The DPRK fits that bill as much as anyone else who's ever been allowed nukes lmfao.

That's what I'm saying. You can claim to be the guardian of world peaceIt's an irony.The owner of the world's largest nuclear arsenal

The Russians have the biggest arsenal.

They can drop bombs in Seoul,

All they need to do.

but their backward missiles can't hit other places correctly.

Irrelevant. Might as well complain about the PRC not being able to deal with anti-African American racism in its police ranks. About as much relevance to DPRK not being able to hit Berlin or whatever.

It's simply not a problem that they would need to address.

Advanced air defense missile systems will shoot them down.

Maybe, but they can always shoot more nukes.

But army guns are enough to destroy Seoul, if you know how close Seoul is to the border.

Nope.

If that were true, the DPRK wouldn't have been pursuing nukes for the past literally 40 years. They know they can't literally flatten Seoul. As does everyone else who matters. It's a scare tactic to spook the South Koreans to not push the issue of war on their president. Has it worked? Well it hasn't harmed them, because the ROK isn't terribly interested in forcibly reuniting with the North, but it probably won't stop the next strongman dictator of South Korea from running over the DPRK and stealing all their women and working age males to build flat screen TVs and cellphones. Only nukes will do that.

The United States will not guarantee North Korea's food.

It did the last time it had a bad harvest.

North Korea lacks food because it cannot get enough gasoline and fertilizer.

Yes their agriculture is over-mechanized, this is a common communist problem.

Their luxurious agricultural machinery can only rust on the farm.

True. Not sure why you're saying this is relevant though. If fewer tanks need gasoline (you only need to fuel like 10 trucks to make the nuke plan work) then that means more gasoline for agriculture!

Who knows what nuclear weapons are good for them.

Preventing invasion by aggressive, expansionist, southern neighbors who want to conquer you is as good a use as any.

They don't actually have to worry about war at all，because neither Korea can control this.

Well you're right that neither Korea can control the conditions for war because South Korea is barreling towards demographic collapse and the only thing that might stave it off for a generation or two is conquering, annexing, and integrating the North's relatively more fecund populace into itself.

I don't think you're correct about the DPRK being potentially bad at managing its nuclear arsenal, considering the illustrious list of people who have nuclear weapons includes two states which fell into civil wars and lost control of their arsenals, numerous satellite states which might do the same, and one large UNSC member who might have a similar fate to another large UNSC member in terms of political-economic upheaval, or that the alternative of not having nukes is somehow better an outcome for the DPRK.

I think we may be talking past each other on a few accounts, since I am merely saying what I think is good from the perspective of the DPRK. I'm speaking descriptively, not prescriptively, as I don't really have an opinion either way on whether or not DPRK has nuclear bombs. It simply doesn't, and won't, affect me very much in my life if at all, but I recognize why the DPRK wants them, that the DPRK is honestly not much worse than the PRC or USSR at potentially managing its bombs, and that they will be beneficial in the long run for its civil economy since it will free up resources currently used to field, fuel, and feed a mass mechanized army that is useless and incapable of doing its job.

The main arguments against it: that the DPRK might go crazy and start randomly nuking various places in Asia, and that the nukes might get lost and turned into crude dirty bombs and show up in San Francisco or Tokyo, seem rather thin at best. If the DPRK were truly interested in starting a war it could just start shelling Seoul literally today. It won't. It's afraid of a war and doesn't want one, because it knows it would lose, but I suppose it has to keep up appearances. Seems unlikely. And since the USSR blew up, taking the world's biggest stockpile of nukes with it, and leaving them in such great bastions of security and functional governance as "Ukraine" and "Turkmenistan", and these nukes have yet to appear in places despite being "uncontrolled" for literally years amidst a major international terrorist spike mainly caused by a particularly angry Saudi Arabian construction worker with a large bank account, I think that the argument that a few dozen "loose" nukes in the DPRK is substantially more imperative than the literally thousands of weapons held in the backwater and non-functional state of Ukraine between 1992 and 1994 (which somehow didn't get nabbed by these nefarious atomic terrorists) rings a bit hollow.

I suppose there might be other arguments I'm missing since I'm not particularly interested in the matter, but a cursory look at the issue makes it appear that the most publicized potential problems are pretty vapid.

Whether the DPRK has nukes or not is not particularly important, mostly because it's getting them, and it will probably be quite a good custodian of them, because it seems unlikely it would be willing to sling them around outside of the peninsula, if it came down to it, as the DPRK isn't interested in being nuked back by the various atomic countries of the world.

The only measure of a "reliable" custodian, given that you apparently don't consider Russia perhaps literally the most unreliable custodian of nuclear weapons ever to exist in the history of the things, seems to be fleeting and nebulous by your previous statements, though, but it seems to be based around "having a comprehensive and materially reliable method of delivering nuclear weapons despite possibly having a lot of them destroyed by the enemy in surprise nuclear attacks from across the world, either by firing them before the incoming weapons arrive or by making them so hard to kill that they don't get neutralized by surprise attacks in the first place". Yes, that's one definition of "reliable", and perhaps important from the standpoint of military perspective.

Show me on the map where the ROKAF or Japan has the ability to nuke DPRK and I might take it seriously as an argument, or maybe an argument that doesn't involve weird hypotheticals.

At the moment all I'm seeing is:

1) DPRK is in existential danger from the South due to COFM going into a nosedive in favor of the South.
1a) This has been true since at least 1980, when the atomic program started, probably a lot earlier.
2) DPRK cannot afford to keep pace with the South in war materiel without the assistance of the USSR, and the USSR went kaput decades ago.
2a) The PRC is not interested in arming the DPRK, although it will feed it and fuel it.
3) Regardless of how the South actually feels at the moment, it might decide to attack at the drop of a hat.
4) Since DPRK cannot afford the new tanks and planes needed (and since the famine, healthy people themselves are a scarce resource) to defeat the ROKA/ROKAF, it needs more efficient methods of deterrence.
5) Nuclear weapons are cheap (relative to a conventional army), effective at widespread destruction, and a plausible means of destroy the industrial-economic means of the South if it comes to it being necessary.

Could the DPRK be more diplomatic and tactful in its statement for atomic bombs? Sure, but that wouldn't get it anything, because the USA is adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation for some reason. It's also not like the Islam (or Persian/Arab?)-Israel situation where there is a genuine and earnest attempt to wipe each other out, either. The DPRK gave up conquering the South decades ago. The South probably knows it can smash the DPRK like a sledgehammer smashing an eggshell, but it has no desire to...for now. The DPRK is hedging that it might desire to conquer it in the future and is planning accordingly.

Since military planning is as much perception and assumption as actual truth (no one knew the USSR was going to collapse in 1991 as quickly as it did, but the USA had an inkling that there was going to some sort of uprising or something, like in Baku, rather than a total general collapse presumably) whether or not Sweden is safe now doesn't really disprove or even matter to the fact that an atomic arsenal is a great deterrent to invasion by other armies. Nothing else has proven effective. The only thing atomic countries have to fear is collapsing from the inside, which the USSR shows is entirely possible, but they aren't going to be invaded even then by covetous neighbors because if you're going to keep control of literally only one thing in the general societal collapse it's going to be the communication lines between the president/king/general-secretary and the nuclear missile silos.

Nuclear bombs are not synonymous with empire, despite what you implied in your first post on this page, although they certainly help, they are not required. Nor does one follow the other. Serbia has an empire, yet not a single atomic bomb, nor does it really need nor want them. Belgium, the weakest of all European countries, has almost as many atomic bombs as Israel, yet lacks entirely for an empire. It's not only possible that Sweden would have been able to have a nuclear arsenal and not have an empire, it's the most likely outcome of all, because nuclear weapons only ensure Sweden's sovereignty in the face of aggression by expansionist neighbors. The fact that Sweden's enemies are buffoons does more to protect it than any of Sweden's own actions, though that is an inherently defensive move and lacks initiative.

If Russia suddenly ponies up a Baltic fleet able to land a armored brigade in Skania and shoot down all 4 or 6 or 12 of the Gripens that work, it would be able to do nothing to stop them or keep them from doing that, if they wanted to. Nuclear weapons would stop them, and as it stands having an atomic bomb and needing to buy an F-35 to replace an F-16 would probably have been a better buy for Sweden than Viggen and a handful of a busted ass Gripens.

Russia in its various iterations has been fighting Sweden since the 15th century and the USSR was aggressively imperialistic. What rock have you been sleeping under?

On the 15th, the Swedish empire was stronger.But in the Czar era, they had long lost the power to fight Russia.Sweden has been a neutral country since 1905.No, they don't have Soviet phobia

Sweden was a member of the Western bloc all but in name and supported the CIA and SR-71 operations numerous times over the Baltic. It was pretty clearly anti-Soviet. It wouldn't have been like WW2 where they kowtowed to the Germans or whatever. That was Finland's schtick, in both cases, and the Swedes would have fought if push came to shove. The real question is why are the Soviets invading Sweden when they only want to close the Skagerrak? Maybe they need to invade both sides of the strait or something?

Finding a reason for the USSR to actually get involved is more difficult than anything else, although you can find bizarre technothrillers from the '80's about the Russians invading Skane. Or one from the 2000's about the Russians invading Gotland with a RO/RO ferry filled with T-90s that get ass blasted by a battery of STRIX mortars and a platoon of Leo 2A4s? That was a weird book.

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Not only Belgium had nuclear bombs, but also Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the Netherlands, but also Japan and South Korea. But these belong to the United States. So you can't count them in nuclear weapon state.These weapons are designed to protect the United States. Protecting Europe is just an added effect.If there were no nuclear weapons, even if the Soviet Union attacked Europe, these residents would not be turned into dust in the flames.
reliable----After being attacked by the enemy, our nuclear weapon base can carry out effective nuclear counterattack against the enemy.
If you have an early warning system, you can fire missiles at the same time as the other party launches a nuclear bomb.If you have some nuclear submarine and some hidden fortifications, after the first round of nuclear attack, your remaining nuclear warheads can still destroy your opponent.These are very reliable.But if the enemy's air defense system is enough to intercept most of your nuclear warheads, your nuclear weapons will become unreliable again.And if you have only a few tiny nukes, attacking your enemy with it can be like throwing a gravel at a lion

Early warning systems actually include more than satellite systems.I think you are familiar with the American system.The soviet,the 1972 plan envisages three types of lua capable: the construction of ring ground radar arrays around the Soviet Union, a series of over the horizon (OTH) radars, and EW satellite systems. From 1975 to 1977, the daryal-u (Pechora) large phased array radar program was started.OKO is part of a satellite system,It had 101 satellites in all, and there were a few small accidents. There is also a control center that connects all radars.There are more systems in the Soviet Union.But Russia's efforts to upgrade these systems have been slow because of a lack of funding.
As for China, The military has been stingy in revealing some of the last century's projects.7010 rader and Qianshao.It seems that PLA is building a satellite system.The systems of these two countries may be lagging behind those of the United States, but they can still work.The giant phased array radar can detect the missile in the space of 3000km, and the infrared detection satellite can find the trajectory of the missile.

All these expensive weapons are designed to make nuclear weapons more reliable.There is a real problem with the reliability of French and British nuclear weapons.But if compared with India and Pakistan, because of their advanced SSBN technology, their nuclear weapons are still reliable.I may have expressed the idea that a country can become an empire only if it has nuclear weapons.But that's not all I want to say.At present, several major forces in the world possess nuclear weapons.They are the superpowers of the past or the present.In those crazy times of the last world, if these forces want to express their attitudes and interests, they must possess nuclear weapons to deter their opponents，the other power.Now Britain may be gradually giving up that status and giving up the autonomy of nuclear weapons.But weak countries like Iran and North Korea, even with nuclear weapons, won't get what they want.A nuclear bomb is an amplifier of power. The lack of nuclear power will only make you in a more dangerous situation.

[Immoren]

Four levels of fortifications-
Field fortifications (Level 4)
Field fortifications are fortification built, as well as firing zones cleared, by troops themselves based on the mission and task with their own equipment and machines. Mainly using material found onsite. Unit can also be supported with supply of pre-cut timber, roofing plates and other similar bulk material. Field fortifications offer moderate protection and they are suitable for short duration fighting. Terrain is used as part of fortification as far as manpower allows. Field fortifications are simple and easy to build. Fortifications and either open or have only light roofing. If possible, fighting parts of fortifications are equipped with protective holes. Fortifications are usually unhardened. In addition of combat fortifications, field fortifications include foxholes and/or dugouts for accommodations. Obstacles are not built. Decoy fortifications are built which double as makeshift fortifications. Protective levels of field fortifications are gradually built starting from small arms fire, fragments of hand grenades and up to area effect weapons like surface detonating shells.

Light component fortifications (Level 3)
Light component fortifications are fortifications done based on mission and purpose of unit with material and engineering support from higher level of command. Light-weight human transportable pre-fab fortifications like woodcut(?) foxholes and dugouts are used and fighting and living fortifications. Light component fortifications allow defensive battles for extended periods. Terrain is used as part of fortifications. roofing for combat fortifications are done with local materials. Accommodations are pre-fab dugouts as priority. Some fortifications are built with local materials. Decoy fortifications are build to cover width and depth. Some of decoy fortifications must double as combat fortifications. Obstacles are built on endangered approaches. Light component fortification offers same protection as field fortification and protection and surface detonating shells.

Heavy component fortification.(Level 2)
Heavy component fortifications are mainly built by engineering units or civilian contractors. Fortifications are primarily made with heavy, machine transportable pre-fab fortifications like concrete slab foxholes and dugouts. Fortifications can be supplemented with light component fortifications and field fortifications. structure of fortifications is otherwise same as at lower levels. Heavy component fortification offers same protection as field and light component fortifications as well as protection as against 155mm shell with delayed fuse and 100kg aerial bomb.

Base(?) fortification (Level 1)
Base fortifications are fortification based on careful structural planning by professional task groups like civilian building contractors and engineering construction units. Base fortifications are always cast onsite from concrete and using purpose built heavy concrete elements and rock blasting. In peace time base fortifications usually include camoflage and decoys. Positions are supplemented with suitable combat and sleeping fortifications, decoys and counter movement systems. Base fortifications use structural engineering methods to create fortifications that are strong enough. Base fortifications need to protect at least against 250kg aerial bomb.

[Dayganistan]

I've been wondering something in regards to artillery. Do self propelled guns mounted on a truck chassis have similar advantages to towed guns? Is there any reason to use a towed gun over a Caesar or Archer like system?

[Austrasien]

I've been wondering something in regards to artillery. Do self propelled guns mounted on a truck chassis have similar advantages to towed guns? Is there any reason to use a towed gun over a Caesar or Archer like system?

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018 ... rn-combat/

1. In the early wars of the 20th Century, towed artillery pieces were relatively invulnerable, and they were rarely severely damaged or destroyed except by very infrequent direct hits...

4. Estimated Israeli loss statistics of the October 1973 War suggest that because of size and characteristics, self-propelled artillery is more vulnerable to modern counter-artillery means than was towed artillery in that and previous wars; this greater historical physical vulnerability of self-propelled weapons is consistent with recent empirical testing by the US Army...

...It is evident from vulnerability testing of current Army self-propelled weapons, that these weapons–while offering much more protection to cannoneers and providing tremendous advantages in mobility–are much more vulnerable to hostile action than are towed weapons, and that they are much more subject to mechanical breakdowns involving either the weapons mountings or the propulsion elements.

[Gallia-]

Four levels of fortifications-
Field fortifications (Level 4)
Field fortifications are fortification built, as well as firing zones cleared, by troops themselves based on the mission and task with their own equipment and machines. Mainly using material found onsite. Unit can also be supported with supply of pre-cut timber, roofing plates and other similar bulk material. Field fortifications offer moderate protection and they are suitable for short duration fighting. Terrain is used as part of fortification as far as manpower allows. Field fortifications are simple and easy to build. Fortifications and either open or have only light roofing. If possible, fighting parts of fortifications are equipped with protective holes. Fortifications are usually unhardened. In addition of combat fortifications, field fortifications include foxholes and/or dugouts for accommodations. Obstacles are not built. Decoy fortifications are built which double as makeshift fortifications. Protective levels of field fortifications are gradually built starting from small arms fire, fragments of hand grenades and up to area effect weapons like surface detonating shells.

Light component fortifications (Level 3)
Light component fortifications are fortifications done based on mission and purpose of unit with material and engineering support from higher level of command. Light-weight human transportable pre-fab fortifications like woodcut(?) foxholes and dugouts are used and fighting and living fortifications. Light component fortifications allow defensive battles for extended periods. Terrain is used as part of fortifications. roofing for combat fortifications are done with local materials. Accommodations are pre-fab dugouts as priority. Some fortifications are built with local materials. Decoy fortifications are build to cover width and depth. Some of decoy fortifications must double as combat fortifications. Obstacles are built on endangered approaches. Light component fortification offers same protection as field fortification and protection and surface detonating shells.

Heavy component fortification.(Level 2)
Heavy component fortifications are mainly built by engineering units or civilian contractors. Fortifications are primarily made with heavy, machine transportable pre-fab fortifications like concrete slab foxholes and dugouts. Fortifications can be supplemented with light component fortifications and field fortifications. structure of fortifications is otherwise same as at lower levels. Heavy component fortification offers same protection as field and light component fortifications as well as protection as against 155mm shell with delayed fuse and 100kg aerial bomb.

Base(?) fortification (Level 1)
Base fortifications are fortification based on careful structural planning by professional task groups like civilian building contractors and engineering construction units. Base fortifications are always cast onsite from concrete and using purpose built heavy concrete elements and rock blasting. In peace time base fortifications usually include camoflage and decoys. Positions are supplemented with suitable combat and sleeping fortifications, decoys and counter movement systems. Base fortifications use structural engineering methods to create fortifications that are strong enough. Base fortifications need to protect at least against 250kg aerial bomb.

Where is Gorchak doe?

Is he 1 or 2?

[Velkanika]

I don't really understand much about naval combat, any good starting sources for someone who knows little to nothing about it?

I majored in History with a focus specifically on modern naval history, which is more or less everything from 1890 to the present day. Let me give you my recommended reading list for learning about this topic, and most of these are on Kindle if you don't want to wait/pay for a hard copy:

Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, 12th ed. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1890)
Carl von Clausewitz, On War: Reprint Edition, Kindle Edition, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008)
James Starvidis, Seapower: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans (New York: Penguin Press, 2017)
Peter Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015)
Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013)
Wayne P. Hughes and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2018)
Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1986)
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics: The U.S. Naval Institute Wheel Book Series, ed. Wayne P. Hughes (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015)

Besides that list of recommended reading, I also strongly suggest that you buy Command: Modern Operations on Steam. That will let you play around with a lot of the concepts those authors discuss, and I personally think that playing C:MO is the next best thing to actually going to sea and participating in a naval exercise. The concepts and tactics suddenly make a whole lot more sense when you watch them unfold, even if it's in a computer simulation that relies on unclassified information and a lot of educated guesswork.

If you really want to dig into the topic as something beyond just learning about the basics, pick up a subscription or three to some of the academic journals that discuss it. If you're American, the US Naval Institute Proceedings is fantastic.

Edit: Oh, and pick up Sun Tzu, The Art of War from somewhere if you want to understand modern Chinese doctrine. Amazon has it for $0.50 on Kindle, so if you haven't read it then you should go fix that.

[Triplebaconation]

3000 pages of NIP crap and Clausewitz aren't "good starting sources" lol

Modern Naval Combat by David Miller will put you above 99.9% of the people on NS even if it's a little dated.

If you really feel compelled to read Sun Tzu I'm sure you can find a 2500-year-old book for less than 50 cents.

[Gallia-]

the brassey's land warfare series is ok for technical things

it's from the 80's but all you're really missing is stuff like hyperspectral sensors and various GMTI hybrid algos and maybe space radars (i think a brassey's book i have covers space radar) but nothing fundamental has changed

kinda steep tho on amazong

there are 2 editions one from the mid 80s and another from the late 90s and the latter tends to have a bit of updated info tho so get that if you can

defense of hill 781 is also good for seeing how a mechanized battalion works in the 80s at NTC

[Shanghai industrial complex]

Edit: Oh, and pick up Sun Tzu, The Art of War from somewhere if you want to understand modern Chinese doctrine. Amazon has it for $0.50 on Kindle, so if you haven't read it then you should go fix that.

What do you think of Mao Zedong's military theory?This is the core of the PLA in the last century.Sun Tzu's art of war is too abstract, and he doesn't just talk about war.

[Gallia-]

the PVA was cool in korea

ltc-dr john english's book (a perspective on infantry) has a whole section devoted to extolling the virtues of 1950's IDF paratrooper night attacks and PLA short attacks which are all good

PLA not so spicy after it but that's life i guess

[Shanghai industrial complex]

the PVA was cool in korea

ltc-dr john english's book (a perspective on infantry) has a whole section devoted to extolling the virtues of 1950's IDF paratrooper night attacks and PLA short attacks which are all good

PLA not so spicy after it but that's life i guess

The PLA in the 1950s was a veteran who had been fighting for decades.Long term use of technically inferior equipment against the enemy, yes, they have to use these tactics.It is difficult for the PLA to be as spicy as their predecessors.Experience is very important,the last time they fought was in 1989.Emm...but they became crazy about the US military's superior firepower doctrine after Korean War.

[Velkanika]

Well, I'm popular tonight.

3000 pages of NIP crap and Clausewitz aren't "good starting sources" lol

They are if you want to be able to have an in-depth conversation with any of the people who do this stuff as their day job. Also, don't knock it until you've read it, and I know you haven't read much from the Naval Institute if you're calling it collectively trash.

the brassey's land warfare series is ok for technical things

it's from the 80's but all you're really missing is stuff like hyperspectral sensors and various GMTI hybrid algos and maybe space radars (i think a brassey's book i have covers space radar) but nothing fundamental has changed

kinda steep tho on amazong

there are 2 editions one from the mid 80s and another from the late 90s and the latter tends to have a bit of updated info tho so get that if you can

defense of hill 781 is also good for seeing how a mechanized battalion works in the 80s at NTC

Brassey is pretty good for land warfare from what I've read so far, but I haven't finished it yet so I'll refrain from commenting beyond seconding that recommendation. Land warfare is also a fair bit more "readable" IMO, mainly because tactical victory can generally be defined as owning a key piece of terrain so key concepts are a lot less abstract for a novice to pick up, mainly because the diagrams and maps make sense at a glance without an existing knowledge base. Naval and aerial warfare relies more on systems that interact in extremely complex ways, and is generally covered a lot less in mass media so people are starting from literally zero instead of having a basic understanding of the concepts and mechanisms like with ground warfare.

Edit: Oh, and pick up Sun Tzu, The Art of War from somewhere if you want to understand modern Chinese doctrine. Amazon has it for $0.50 on Kindle, so if you haven't read it then you should go fix that.

What do you think of Mao Zedong's military theory?This is the core of the PLA in the last century.Sun Tzu's art of war is too abstract, and he doesn't just talk about war.

I've read Mao, he derived a lot of his basic concepts from Sun Tzu's doctrine. Realistically, you need to read both if you want to crawl inside Xi's head, but if you want to just understand where they're coming from doctrinally Sun Tzu is what ultimately informs most of their military philosophy. Mao's Little Red Book really needs to have a whole bunch of associated information alongside it in order to understand what exactly the CCP was trying to say with it, and that message changes a bit literally with every reprinting due to frequent and major changes. It's more of a social phenomena honestly.

Back on topic, I think that Mao's military theory is a good example of convergent evolution in military doctrine. He's saying a lot of the same stuff Clausewitz did back in the day, but with a modern twist. His ideas about attacks on the periphery are solid, and definitely something I need to look for the next time I dive into PLA military literature. PLA short attacks like Galla mentioned are also very interesting, but I'm personally more a fan of set-piece pinning attacks and spoiler offensives.

[Gallia-]

compared to land, the sea is a lot less complex, obviously