Your Nation's Air Force Mark III: Best Korea Edition

[United Earthlings]

An F-111 would be far more expensive to maintain and fly than an F-35.

A-5 is useless for any modern missions and would be ridiculously expensive to maintain as well.

Not necessarily, at the risk of incurring the wrath of the dead, if you recall our previously spiel on variable costs, maintenance/operating costs per flight hour tend to have a lot of variable costs associated with them.

The uselessness of any aircraft is subjective, upgraded and properly maintained even older aircraft designs can still fulfill a successful role if so desired by one’s political leadership.

If you want to maintain two entirely different supply lines for the same role Su-34 would be ok I guess. Doesn't seem very efficient.

Assuming Barfleur went the Su-34 route, logically that would mean sometime in the past or future having acquired Su-27s or Su-30s.

None would work as a dedicated tank-buster. If you're facing something like the invasion of Fulda Gap, with thousands of tanks and a vast array of targets behind the lines, an air force will use deep strike aircraft for...deep strikes. You need to give them something like the A-10 incapable of deep strikes to ensure tactical air support is available.

Very few nations built dedicated modern ground attack/CAS fixed-wing aircraft like the A-10. The widespread introduction of PGMs {Precision Guided Munitions} basically permits any aircraft to turn into a dedicated tank-buster.

On the other hand even strategic aircraft will be used against tactical targets as an air campaign against a smaller opponent progresses.

I didn’t say that using those specific words, but that’s part of what I was alluding to when I stated about the potential benefit of additional platforms.

[Triplebaconation]

Not necessarily, at the risk of incurring the wrath of the dead, if you recall our previously spiel on variable costs, maintenance/operating costs per flight hour tend to have a lot of variable costs associated with them.

The uselessness of any aircraft is subjective, upgraded and properly maintained even older aircraft designs can still fulfill a successful role if so desired by one’s political leadership.

I suppose one would could imagine a variety of implausible scenarios where F-111s somehow decrease in operating costs as they age and A-5s remain viable platforms.

If you want to maintain two entirely different supply lines for the same role Su-34 would be ok I guess. Doesn't seem very efficient.

Assuming Barfleur went the Su-34 route, logically that would mean sometime in the past or future having acquired Su-27s or Su-30s.

Great. This doesn't solve the problem of buying, for example, both JDAMs and KABs to do the exact same thing. You can just wave an NS magic wand and all the boring stuff like avionics incompatibility and certification goes away though.

Very few nations built dedicated modern ground attack/CAS fixed-wing aircraft like the A-10. The widespread introduction of PGMs {Precision Guided Munitions} basically permits any aircraft to turn into a dedicated tank-buster.

Yes, brilliant observation. Is it coincidence that very few nations are seriously worried about being overrun by the Warsaw Pact? Today's air forces have different strategic considerations and generally have the luxury of an air campaign that occurs in phases. Tank-busting {Precision Guided Munitions} weren't some new thing when the A-10 was conceived - they were in widespread use and its main armament.

In an apocalyptic conflict (aka Wednesday on NS) multirole fighters and strike/inderdiction aircraft will have far more missions than they can handle, and close air support is likely to be a low priority. In those circumstances a dedicated anti-tank or close support attack aircraft may make sense, though it certainly won't resemble a strike aircraft for the obvious reasons that these types will be in highest demand for strike missions.

Nor need it necessarily resemble an A-10.

[Gallia-]

robo harriers

[Barfleur]

If you want to maintain two entirely different supply lines for the same role Su-34 would be ok I guess. Doesn't seem very efficient.

Assuming Barfleur went the Su-34 route, logically that would mean sometime in the past or future having acquired Su-27s or Su-30s.

Historically, Barfleur's arms industry has been domestic, though there is the occasional collaboration with a foreign partner. I was referring to an aircraft with similar functions/specifications as the Su-34, not necessarily the same airplane.

[Kassaran]

I'm not so sure this is actually a good question to ask here, but I'll try anyways.

In regards to COIN and low-to-mid intensity conflicts,
Where Time-to-Target and enemy anti-air capabilities are limited,
Using fixed wing prop aircraft vs. rotary wing aviation:

What are the various advantages and disadvantages? Would there be a reason to favor one over the other or is that purely doctrinal? I'd assume you'd never just go completely in one direction (so if I'm wrong there, set me straight please), but an air-mobile transport ala utility gunships/transport helos would seem to be ideal to get around excessive IED/guerilla ambushes, though it heightens observability. Additionally, spot-FARPs/LZ's can be set up overnight in relatively isolated locations and moved within a week if need-be in the event that you wish to keep your enemy guessing as to your objectives and force strength.

I might be overthinking all of this though when it comes to the advantages of rotary-wing aviation and I know they are very resource and maintenance intensive in such situations, but outside of speed and durability, I'd think their higher maneuverability and adaptability in the battlefield against insurgents or a non-nuclear/developed enemy would make them kings of the battlespace. Having fixed-wing propeller aviation almost seems to be sub-par at that time due to my own perception of less flexibility and mission adaptability for a potential tradeoff in durability and responsiveness (which even then is becoming less and less a factor with modern rotary-wing/tilt-rotor configruations). Outside of using fixed-wing aviation for logistics and transport into/out-of the combat zone, doesn't really seem like a contest to me.

[Taihei Tengoku]

Bush planes bro

[Kassaran]

Bush planes bro

Still don't know which would win in a fight though, dedicated attack helicopters or dedicated attack planes. I could see both as having vastly different effectiveness at different missions, such as the higher load capacity and initial responsiveness of fixed-wing propulsion, but to me, the helicopter has an allure in how minimal of a footprint it really needs to be effective and the flexibility in the operations it can support for relatively small cost per flight hour over similar fixed-wing aircraft.

[United Earthlings]

I suppose one would could imagine a variety of implausible scenarios where F-111s somehow decrease in operating costs as they age and A-5s remain viable platforms.

I suppose one could also imagine a variety of implausible scenarios where B-52s somehow on average have lower annual operating costs then their successors and F-4s remain viable platforms, but that wouldn’t be consist with reality now would it?

Great. This doesn't solve the problem of buying, for example, both JDAMs and KABs to do the exact same thing. You can just wave an NS magic wand and all the boring stuff like avionics incompatibility and certification goes away though.

None of the questions Barfleur asked that I responded to was to do directly with any of those subjects.

I believe your skipping ahead of the conversation, come back.

Yes, brilliant observation. Is it coincidence that very few nations are seriously worried about being overrun by the Warsaw Pact? Today's air forces have different strategic considerations and generally have the luxury of an air campaign that occurs in phases. Tank-busting {Precision Guided Munitions} weren't some new thing when the A-10 was conceived - they were in widespread use and its main armament.

In an apocalyptic conflict (aka Wednesday on NS) multirole fighters and strike/inderdiction aircraft will have far more missions than they can handle, and close air support is likely to be a low priority. In those circumstances a dedicated anti-tank or close support attack aircraft may make sense, though it certainly won't resemble a strike aircraft for the obvious reasons that these types will be in highest demand for strike missions.

Nor need it necessarily resemble an A-10.

By widespread use, I was referring to the use at a minimal of at least 50% of munitions being expended in a conflict/war being PGMs, which didn’t take place until decades well after the A-10 was conceived. I wasn’t talking about basic availability of PGMs.

NS forces being overrun by Friday by Warsaw Pact equivalent forces, you just described to a T the Cold War DARPA Assault Breaker Program.

Historically, Barfleur's arms industry has been domestic, though there is the occasional collaboration with a foreign partner. I was referring to an aircraft with similar functions/specifications as the Su-34, not necessarily the same airplane.

Good to know, not familiar with all the NS similar aircraft to the Su-34 that are available for purchase on the global NS market, but the Su-34s real life counterparts are as follows {sourced from the Su-34 wikipedia article}:

1. Sukhoi Su-24
2. Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
3. McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle
4. Shenyang J-16
5. General Dynamics F-111, FB-111

[Kassaran]

Wouldn't CAS be better handled by dedicated squadrons of attack helicopters like Apache, which can feature 16 Hellfires, 300-700 rounds of 30mm, and have integrated combat targeting enabling for better hand-off of missiles between aircraft and better synchronized attacks against all involved? It seems to me, the dangers to helicopters fomr MANPADs are dramatically reduced in a Fulda Gap defense situation because the majority of troops are mounted on mechanized and motorized elements and might not have the flexibility or reactiveness of troops that have otherwise been deployed in/on defensive positions? Maybe I'm completely underestimating the effectiveness of convoy-integrated SPAAG that could keep up with those elements making the initial charge, but it seems to me that having them at all makes you inevitably a larger target as they're perhaps bigger threats to aircraft than helicopters anyways?

[The Manticoran Empire]

Wouldn't CAS be better handled by dedicated squadrons of attack helicopters like Apache, which can feature 16 Hellfires, 300-700 rounds of 30mm, and have integrated combat targeting enabling for better hand-off of missiles between aircraft and better synchronized attacks against all involved? It seems to me, the dangers to helicopters fomr MANPADs are dramatically reduced in a Fulda Gap defense situation because the majority of troops are mounted on mechanized and motorized elements and might not have the flexibility or reactiveness of troops that have otherwise been deployed in/on defensive positions? Maybe I'm completely underestimating the effectiveness of convoy-integrated SPAAG that could keep up with those elements making the initial charge, but it seems to me that having them at all makes you inevitably a larger target as they're perhaps bigger threats to aircraft than helicopters anyways?

To be perfectly honest, the SPAAG is best used against Attack Helicopters anyway, which is why a lot are built with Pop Up capability. Helicopters can "pop up" from behind forests or mountains so SPAAGs are often fitted with systems that reduce their reaction times. The upside for the helicopter is that it can fire its weapons while evading because the pilot and gunner are different people.

[Kassaran]

Huh, I guess that makes sense. I was guessing that because of the more obvious nature of SPAAG, they made less trouble for attack helicopters than attack aircraft which might need to maintain more altitude and thus more exposure time with present SPAAG systems. Of course that's if the system is even active or detectable at that time as an entirely turned off SPAAG sans a backup electric drive system would be probably completely undetectable. I was under the impression that MANPADS and small arms fire were the bigger threat to helicopters given the altitude at which a helicopter would need to fly to avoid easy detection and interception by AA systems in general.

[Gallia-]

Helicopters are being outcompeted by Predator drones with the selection pressures of the battlefield. The fact that they require manned crews is a huge disadvantage to them in the current environment.

Both can reliably kill SPAAGs and other trash but a Predator drone can actually be treated as ammunition and thus get shot down due to the pilot being too aggressive. A helicopter being shot down due to aggressive tactics leads to investigations.

The USAF might not like it, but the future of CAS and low altitude flight ops in general is the Predator drone. Maybe the US Army will bring back UCAR to replace dumpster fires like "Bell Invictus 360" and "Sikorsky Raider X-1". That would be too woke for the US Army, sadly.

[Taihei Tengoku]

Bush planes bro

Still don't know which would win in a fight though, dedicated attack helicopters or dedicated attack planes. I could see both as having vastly different effectiveness at different missions, such as the higher load capacity and initial responsiveness of fixed-wing propulsion, but to me, the helicopter has an allure in how minimal of a footprint it really needs to be effective and the flexibility in the operations it can support for relatively small cost per flight hour over similar fixed-wing aircraft.

Do you need something on a specific square inch or do you need to pop over terrain? Use a helicopter

For everything else use a twin otter or something

[Triplebaconation]

...

In reality the F-111 at the end of its service cost more than the B-52 to fly as well.

This is because its complex but obsolete systems required an incredible amount of maintenance. They also made upgrades, including integrating new weapons, technically and financially risky.

F-111 costs would continue to rise, F-35 costs will likely decline for the next 15-20 years.

The uselessness of the A-5 has little to do with its age.

I'm not sure what you mean about skipping ahead of the conversation in regards to duplicating supply lines. It's a moot point anyway since Barfleur intended an indigenous equivalent to all of these aircraft.

Since we're freed from discussing real aircraft, I will again repeat the main point in simpler terms.

Large and sophisticated strike aircraft have been able to destroy tanks with as much efficiency as "dedicated antitank aircraft" for decades, regardless of the proportion of smart munitions dropped. That they've commonly been employed in doing so is a luxury afforded by the current strategic environment. Large and sophisticated strike aircraft don't lack capability for the role, they have excess capability that makes them poor dedicated antitank aircraft.

The F-111 is a perfect example of this. Its sophisticated attack sensors made it one of the best tank-killers of Desert Storm. But it only flew "tank-plinking" missions in the second half of the 43-day air campaign - after the strategic phase wound down. If an air force is required to carry out large-scale deep strike missions and tactical support simultaneously, the deep strike aircraft will be busy with deep strike.

[United Earthlings]

In reality the F-111 at the end of its service cost more than the B-52 to fly as well.

This is because its complex but obsolete systems required an incredible amount of maintenance. They also made upgrades, including integrating new weapons, technically and financially risky.

How are you defining end of service that doesn’t result in a straw man? Maybe, it’s just me, but the year an aircraft is withdrawn from service I would consider an invalidity data point. There’s also the question of metrics and what’s exactly being calculated. By F-111 are we talking about all variants in service or just the U.S. Air Force F-111Fs? While, I don’t disagree with you that complex, but nearing obsolete systems can be costly maintenance wise, that’s not the issue I’m trying to discuss with you.

F-111 costs would continue to rise, F-35 costs will likely decline for the next 15-20 years.

That’s a given, but again not the issue I was attempting to discuss with you. If said nation’s fleet of F-111s operating costs are lower than the initial F-35 costs, then would it be reasonable to state that the F-111s still have some defined intrinsic value to said nation’s air force?

The uselessness of the A-5 has little to do with its age.

Ok, but not the point I was discussing, so moving on…

I'm not sure what you mean about skipping ahead of the conversation in regards to duplicating supply lines. It's a moot point anyway since Barfleur intended an indigenous equivalent to all of these aircraft.

To be specific it was your use of a Non Sequitur which then resulted in the point becoming moot since it has yet to be fully established what Barfleur’s intentions are.

You basically Schrödinger's cat the conversation.

Since we're freed from discussing real aircraft, I will again repeat the main point in simpler terms.

Large and sophisticated strike aircraft have been able to destroy tanks with as much efficiency as "dedicated antitank aircraft" for decades, regardless of the proportion of smart munitions dropped. That they've commonly been employed in doing so is a luxury afforded by the current strategic environment. Large and sophisticated strike aircraft don't lack capability for the role, they have excess capability that makes them poor dedicated antitank aircraft.

The F-111 is a perfect example of this. Its sophisticated attack sensors made it one of the best tank-killers of Desert Storm. But it only flew "tank-plinking" missions in the second half of the 43-day air campaign - after the strategic phase wound down. If an air force is required to carry out large-scale deep strike missions and tactical support simultaneously, the deep strike aircraft will be busy with deep strike.

I agree the specific use of the F-111 you described is the perfect example of what I’ve been saying, though from what I’ve gathered not the example you hoped it would be. The use of PGMs increased the efficiency of the F-111 as a tank buster/ground attack aircraft to the point where from an operational point of view there was little to any difference had a dedicated ground attack aircraft performed the same mission. And because the F-111s were available, they were able to be repurposed with as much efficiency as possible into performing that tank-plinking mission. Could another platform in the inventory been repurposed, potentially-possibly, but the availability of the F-111 allowed other aircraft to pursue other missions. PGMs permitted a strategic tactical bomber to be converted into a good overall dedicated antitank aircraft. The widespread deployment of PGMs and the sensors to guide them permit strike aircraft to perform large-scale deep-strike missions and tactical support simultaneously if so desired, no longer is one mission an exclusion to the other. Where in the past before PGMs become widespread and widely deployed the mission was either or, that has been replaced with the and, where the mission requirements can be changed at a moment’s notice.

I don’t know about you, but I can’t image the concept of a true multi-role aircraft existing without PGMs and there corresponding sensors that make their use possible.

[Triplebaconation]

Again, you're missing the point, which is blindingly obvious. The F-111 was never a dedicated tankbuster. It was able to fly tank-plinking missions because the strategic phase of a prolonged air war that preceded large-scale ground combat was more or less over. During this earlier strategic phase the F-111 fleet could not fly tank-plinking missions because all available aircraft were allocated to strategic targets.

In a peer conflict, which on NS is just WW2 that looks like Ace Combat, these two entirely different missions may have to done at the same time. Barfleur's large and complex exemplars are poorly suited to the role he's defined because their characteristics mean they'll be better used in deep strike and interdiction in this scenario, and the cost of such large and complex aircraft ensures there will rarely be enough around to perform both missions simultaneously.

A PGM that enables an aircraft to carry out a carefully planned coordinated strike on targets 500 miles behind the front while being available for close air support at a moment's notice has yet to be invented.

For the role he envisions, a smaller and less complex aircraft is ideal. It need not and probably shouldn't conceptually resemble the A-10, but it certainly shouldn't require 50% more maintenance per flight than the most dismal estimates for the F-35C like the F-111 during its glory days.

[The Manticoran Empire]

Again, you're missing the point, which is blindingly obvious. The F-111 was never a dedicated tankbuster. It was able to fly tank-plinking missions because the strategic phase of a prolonged air war that preceded large-scale ground combat was more or less over. During this earlier strategic phase the F-111 fleet could not fly tank-plinking missions because all available aircraft were allocated to strategic targets.

In a peer conflict, which on NS is just WW2 that looks like Ace Combat, these two entirely different missions may have to done at the same time. Barfleur's large and complex exemplars are poorly suited to the role he's defined because their characteristics mean they'll be better used in deep strike and interdiction in this scenario, and the cost of such large and complex aircraft ensures there will rarely be enough around to perform both missions simultaneously.

A PGM that enables an aircraft to carry out a carefully planned coordinated strike on targets 500 miles behind the front while being available for close air support at a moment's notice has yet to be invented.

For the role he envisions, a smaller and less complex aircraft is ideal. It need not and probably shouldn't conceptually resemble the A-10, but it certainly shouldn't require 50% more maintenance per flight than the most dismal estimates for the F-35C like the F-111 during its glory days.

What would be your reccomendation, then?

[Barfleur]

I love bush planes as much as anyone, but for the ground-attack role, use Apache/Tiger/Mangusta/Ka-52 helicopters. Aside from requiring no space to take of, a helo can carry a heavier payload (see Apache vs. Super Tucano), and can carry more machine guns/autocannons.

Good to know, not familiar with all the NS similar aircraft to the Su-34 that are available for purchase on the global NS market, but the Su-34s real life counterparts are as follows {sourced from the Su-34 wikipedia article}:

1. Sukhoi Su-24
2. Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
3. McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle
4. Shenyang J-16
5. General Dynamics F-111, FB-111

IRL I'm a sucker for the Super Hornet, but for this nation I decided to do the hard thing and create all my own aircraft (or purchase them on the NS market). Nothing that exists in real life.

[Hrstrovokia]

Is there a definitive list of Gen 4 to 4.5 aircraft that are licensed produced in countries other than that of the designer/designers origin?

For instance the Su-30 designed in Russia and then built in India, same for J-11 in China, KF-16 in Republic of Korea

[Taihei Tengoku]

? Super Tucano lifts more payload than Apache on half the horsepower because it's a plane that actually flies rather than a helicopter that has to beat the air into submission

[Gallia-]

use Apache/Tiger/Mangusta/Ka-52 helicopters.

Lol.

Aside from requiring no space to take of,

This is not an especially notable advantage. Plenty of things require no space to take off.

a helo can carry a heavier payload (see Apache vs. Super Tucano),

Not in the slightest, and not really relevant.

and can carry more machine guns/autocannons.

What is this? Vietnam?

[United Earthlings]

Again, you're missing the point, which is blindingly obvious. The F-111 was never a dedicated tankbuster.

And again you’re missing the blindingly obvious point I’ve been trying to inform you about because you’re apparently stuck, incorrectly, on this idea that I think the F-111 was a dedicated tankbuster.

It was able to fly tank-plinking missions because the strategic phase of a prolonged air war that preceded large-scale ground combat was more or less over. During this earlier strategic phase the F-111 fleet could not fly tank-plinking missions because all available aircraft were allocated to strategic targets.

It’s not a requirement, but it helps if you gather supporting documentation.

“In December 1990, Air Force crews first came up with the idea of “tank plinking”, using GBU-12 500-pound LGBs dropped from F-111s to destroy Iraqi tanks protected in earth revetments. The idea was neither part of the F-111Fs concept of operations nor something that was planned. Rather, crews discovered that at dusk they were able to spot hot Iraqi tanks on their aircraft’s infrared sensors against the cool background of the sand. The first “tank plinking” sorties occurred on February 5. From then until the end of the war, nearly three-quarters of all F-111Fs sorties were devoted to enemy ground forces, amounting to 664 sorties in a twenty-three day period. On the night of February 13-14 alone, for example, forty-six F-111Fs dropped 184 GBU-12s and destroyed 132 Iraqi armored vehicles. Overall, F-111Fs destroyed 920 Iraqi vehicles.”

The Sauce: Thomas Mahnken, Technology and the American War of War since 1945, Pg 171

You’re free to form your own opinion of interpretation, but it’s pretty clear what the text is saying.

A PGM that enables an aircraft to carry out a carefully planned coordinated strike on targets 500 miles behind the front while being available for close air support at a moment's notice has yet to be invented.

Depending on how one chooses to define behind the front and at a moment’s notice, for the definition I have in mind that capability has already been invented, decades ago. Define it, call it whatever you want.

“Loitering high over the battlefield for hours, bombers were guided by ground-terminal attack controllers as they dropped PGMs against battlefield targets. Often, aircraft delivered their ordnance within minutes of a request. Between October 2001 and March 2002, ten B-52s and eight B-1s out of Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, and B-2s out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri, flew more than 48 percent of combat missions in Afghanistan and dropped nearly seven thousand tons of munitions, approximately 75 percent of the campaign’s total.”

Some more sauce: Ibid, Pg 200

---

IRL I'm a sucker for the Super Hornet, but for this nation I decided to do the hard thing and create all my own aircraft (or purchase them on the NS market). Nothing that exists in real life.

Me too, for whatever reason it's one of my favorite jet fighters. The numerous times I've watched the Blue Angels perform an Air Show I’ve never been disappointed.

I didn’t quite go that hard-core, I just cheated a little in God Mode by deleting all RL nations from existence, replaced by my nation and other similar to RL counterpart NS nations. So, the Super Hornet exists, it’s because my nation created it. This applies equally to all NS created equipment {just so it's clear both equipment my nation designed and equipment designed by other NS nations that may or may not be facsimiles of real life equipment}.

[Triplebaconation]

And again you’re missing the blindingly obvious point I’ve been trying to inform you about because you’re apparently stuck, incorrectly, on this idea that I think the F-111 was a dedicated tankbuster.

PGMs permitted a strategic tactical bomber to be converted into a good overall dedicated antitank aircraft.

I think you just don't understand what dedicated means.

It’s not a requirement, but it helps if you gather supporting documentation.

“In December 1990, Air Force crews first came up with the idea of “tank plinking”, using GBU-12 500-pound LGBs dropped from F-111s to destroy Iraqi tanks protected in earth revetments. The idea was neither part of the F-111Fs concept of operations nor something that was planned. Rather, crews discovered that at dusk they were able to spot hot Iraqi tanks on their aircraft’s infrared sensors against the cool background of the sand. The first “tank plinking” sorties occurred on February 5. From then until the end of the war, nearly three-quarters of all F-111Fs sorties were devoted to enemy ground forces, amounting to 664 sorties in a twenty-three day period. On the night of February 13-14 alone, for example, forty-six F-111Fs dropped 184 GBU-12s and destroyed 132 Iraqi armored vehicles. Overall, F-111Fs destroyed 920 Iraqi vehicles.”

The Sauce: Thomas Mahnken, Technology and the American War of War since 1945, Pg 171

You’re free to form your own opinion of interpretation, but it’s pretty clear what the text is saying.

Yes, it's pretty clear it's saying that F-111s weren't used against tanks until the later phases of the air campaign, which began on January 17 and lasted for 43 days, just as I've been repeating. What were they doing from January 17 to February 5? Flying over 3000 sorties against strategic targets. There were no bombs dropped in December 1990, but the Air Force did fly training missions in Operation Night Camel to validate the idea.

It's not a requirement, but it helps if you actually read and understand your sources. I'm beginning to think you're just Manokan with a bad thesaurus.

Depending on how one chooses to define behind the front and at a moment’s notice, for the definition I have in mind that capability has already been invented, decades ago. Define it, call it whatever you want.

“Loitering high over the battlefield for hours, bombers were guided by ground-terminal attack controllers as they dropped PGMs against battlefield targets. Often, aircraft delivered their ordnance within minutes of a request. Between October 2001 and March 2002, ten B-52s and eight B-1s out of Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, and B-2s out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri, flew more than 48 percent of combat missions in Afghanistan and dropped nearly seven thousand tons of munitions, approximately 75 percent of the campaign’s total.”

Some more sauce: Ibid, Pg 200

We've heard ad nauseum how you're constantly preparing and refining the "United Commonwealth" doctrine for peer-level NS conflict even though it exists in a bubble universe, and your idea of an air campaign is...Afghanistan.

This may be why the concept that in a major war there will be a lot of important deep strike targets and a limited number of deep strike aircraft is difficult for you. If an aircraft is suitable for deep strike, it will be used against these deep strike targets until that phase of the air war is over or it's been attrited away. It won't be available for battlefield tasks. I'm not even sure you're arguing against this at this point or just going on about nothing.

Anyway, I found out Friday my time is literally too valuable to waste on you. Adieu.

[Barfleur]

use Apache/Tiger/Mangusta/Ka-52 helicopters.

Lol.

kek.

Aside from requiring no space to take of,

This is not an especially notable advantage. Plenty of things require no space to take off.

Fair point.

a helo can carry a heavier payload (see Apache vs. Super Tucano),

Not in the slightest, and not really relevant.

Okay, I did a poor job of phrasing--the Super Tucano can carry more weapons, but attack helicopters also have transport and air assault capability. My favorite example is the Hind, but really any helicopter can carry artillery or ground troops. Take a Chinook and add several machine guns and Hellfire missiles, and you have an air assault chopper capable of carrying and landing anything and killing enemy tanks, vehicles, and troops on the ground.

and can carry more machine guns/autocannons.

What is this? Vietnam?

It's no secret that taking off and landing are the two most dangerous times for a helicopter crew, even more so under fire. Giving helos the ability to fight back would do much to prevent them from being taken down like sitting ducks.

[Spirit of Hope]

Not in the slightest, and not really relevant.

Okay, I did a poor job of phrasing--the Super Tucano can carry more weapons, but attack helicopters also have transport and air assault capability. My favorite example is the Hind, but really any helicopter can carry artillery or ground troops. Take a Chinook and add several machine guns and Hellfire missiles, and you have an air assault chopper capable of carrying and landing anything and killing enemy tanks, vehicles, and troops on the ground.

The Hind isn't a great example of this because it can't carry a large troop load, or equipment, and the space given over to troops makes it worse at being an attack helicopter. Notably nothing like the Hind has been adopted since the Hind.

Sticking hellfires on a Chinook doesn't make it good at killing tanks, and does make it worse at transporting things. It's like strapping missiles to a C-130 and calling it a bomber.

Transportation and attack are two very different roles, which is why they are generally conducted by two separate airframes.