NS Military Realism Consultancy Thread Mk X Purps Safe Space

[Taihei Tengoku]

Wonder what a conscript with bad eye could do? (I won' mind being conscripted. Wanted to be a Marine when my eyes are Ok.)

Get a pair of glasses, usually. If they're that bad you might get sent somewhere you don't need good eyesight for.

[Theodosiya]

Wish we had that down here.

[North Arkana]

Or once you're in long enough they'll just pay for corrective surgery for your eyesight.

[Questers]

Wish we had that down here.

What, glasses?

I think you have eye glasses in Indonesia mate.

[Dostanuot Loj]

Hi people! Random former asshole here!

Got a question for you all, since I have taken some time to research this, but found pretty much nothing conclusive. Can a modern oscillating turret be made NBC proof? If so, can you provide the sources for it? Thanks, guys!

I know what everyone else says, but they are wrong.

Yes, they can be NBC proofed. The Austrians did it for years.

The issue is that there is no point because beyond the 1950s they're pointless. Especially in a modern sense where special armour makes them beyond pointless.

Was talking to a tanker the other day. He was talking to me about how much he'd liked driving the A1 and A2, but when I asked him about autoloaders, he said his experience in the 1128 MGS was a nightmare because of it. He'd rather take the extra crewmember any day than an autoloader, not only is it faster, but also more reliable and easily fixable. Besides, if damage happens that renders your loader obsolete, it likely wasn't damage that an autoloader could have survived. Helped me change some of my thoughts on tank designs. What I got out of him was that not only was it uncomfortable for even American gunners and tank commanders to work around a broken autoloader, but also that when it worked, it couldn't be counted on to work with the crew with as much synergy as a flesh-and-blood human had.

A few things.
1: Opinions on equipment from the grunts who use them are best limited to simple things, not technical critique. They really have no idea what they are talking about because it's not needed to do their job.
2: There is a heavy, unrelenting bias against autoloaders among US tankers. Issues very specific to the design of the MGS have not helped this.
3: The MGS was not a nightmare, he is full of shit. The MGS worked as intended after initial issues were sorted out, and still act as intended.
4: Damage that takes out a loader, is taking out the tank. Switching crew positions to replace a casualty in battle ceased to be a thing when armour protection became so high that penetrating it became serious business.

American tankers learn that their system is the best.

Soviet/Russian tankers learn that their system is the best.

French tankers learn that their system is the best.

etc.

etc.

And then reality ensues

You have reality wrong.
The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

[Theodosiya]

Wish we had that down here.

What, glasses?

I think you have eye glasses in Indonesia mate.

Military issue glass. But then again, the requirement to enter the military is quite strict...

[Minoa]

I am currently reviewing Minoa’s defence history: this is the current draft summary for something like this (current year, 2073):

Minoa (under Empress Joana) abolished its military and resigned from NATO in 2070 due to the [term I don't know] by the Minoan Armed Forces between 2061 and 2069. Minoa has no defence treaty because it would violate Minoa’s neutrality, but informally the armed forces of Catalonia (International Brigade), Spain and France protect Minoa on an annual rotating basis. Portugal informally protects the Empress only due to her dual Minoan-Portuguese nationality.

Since abolition, there have been domestic and foreign efforts to persuade Minoa to re-establish an all-volunteer self-defence force similar to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), but Empress Joana has insisted in Minoa having no armed forces until 2080 at the earliest (roughly the same time between the end of World War II to the establishment of the Bundeswehr and the JSDF).

I am not sure if "insurgency", "mutiny" or "militia" is the correct term to describe an official armed force that invaded and occupied a foreign country despite the opposition of all levels of government except the former Prime Minister (in secrecy). Rest assured, that Prime Minister has since 2070 been serving a de facto life term for war crimes.

Additionally, while I know anti-war activists are clearly opposed to foreign wars like Iraq, I wonder if they would realistically be opposed to any kind of military, even a all-volunteer self-defence force that cannot take part in foreign conflicts?

[Questers]

Mutiny. You might use insubordination also.

[Taihei Tengoku]

I am currently reviewing Minoa’s defence history: this is the current draft summary for something like this (current year, 2073):

Minoa (under Empress Joana) abolished its military and resigned from NATO in 2070 due to the [term I don't know] by the Minoan Armed Forces between 2061 and 2069. Minoa has no defence treaty because it would violate Minoa’s neutrality, but informally the armed forces of Catalonia (International Brigade), Spain and France protect Minoa on an annual rotating basis. Portugal informally protects the Empress only due to her dual Minoan-Portuguese nationality.

Since abolition, there have been domestic and foreign efforts to persuade Minoa to re-establish an all-volunteer self-defence force similar to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), but Empress Joana has insisted in Minoa having no armed forces until 2080 at the earliest (roughly the same time between the end of World War II to the establishment of the Bundeswehr and the JSDF).

I am not sure if "insurgency", "mutiny" or "militia" is the correct term to describe an official armed force that invaded and occupied a foreign country despite the opposition of all levels of government except the former Prime Minister (in secrecy). Rest assured, that Prime Minister has since 2070 been serving a de facto life term for war crimes.

Additionally, while I know anti-war activists are clearly opposed to foreign wars like Iraq, I wonder if they would realistically be opposed to any kind of military, even a all-volunteer self-defence force that cannot take part in foreign conflicts?

The Japanese haven't thought too highly of the JSDF--its historical image is that of a sinecure for losers who couldn't get a real company job, comparable in prestige to the DMV in the US. Its main utility to the public is disaster relief. Things have changed somewhat since Koizumi but even "defending treaty allies with the JSDF" was highly contentious because it's a backdoor to the Imperial Rule Assistance Society or something

From anectodes and internet documentaries I think the Bundeswehr is in somewhat the same position.

[Federated Kingdom of Prussia]

The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

Maybe we could have a sperg about why this is? pls?

[North Arkana]

The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

Maybe we could have a sperg about why this is? pls?

http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

[Allanea]

I am currently reviewing Minoa’s defence history: this is the current draft summary for something like this (current year, 2073):

Minoa (under Empress Joana) abolished its military and resigned from NATO in 2070 due to the [term I don't know] by the Minoan Armed Forces between 2061 and 2069. Minoa has no defence treaty because it would violate Minoa’s neutrality, but informally the armed forces of Catalonia (International Brigade), Spain and France protect Minoa on an annual rotating basis. Portugal informally protects the Empress only due to her dual Minoan-Portuguese nationality.

Since abolition, there have been domestic and foreign efforts to persuade Minoa to re-establish an all-volunteer self-defence force similar to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), but Empress Joana has insisted in Minoa having no armed forces until 2080 at the earliest (roughly the same time between the end of World War II to the establishment of the Bundeswehr and the JSDF).

I am not sure if "insurgency", "mutiny" or "militia" is the correct term to describe an official armed force that invaded and occupied a foreign country despite the opposition of all levels of government except the former Prime Minister (in secrecy). Rest assured, that Prime Minister has since 2070 been serving a de facto life term for war crimes.

Note that this is what actually happened in Israel.

Or rather, the military and the Minister of Defense planned an invasion of Lebanon all the way to Beirut, while deceiving the Prime Ministeri nto believing that they'd only go up to the Litani River (about 40 km from the border). Lulz ensued as Begin discovered the country to be thrust into a multi-year nonsense quagmire.

[Allanea]

Additionally, while I know anti-war activists are clearly opposed to foreign wars like Iraq, I wonder if they would realistically be opposed to any kind of military, even a all-volunteer self-defence force that cannot take part in foreign conflicts?

Resistance to standing military forces was, in fact, a very big thing in the Anglosphere, up to the 1820s in some places.

What killed it off in most circles was the gradual changes in technology that made it virtually impossible to ensure the security of a country in wartime without some manner of standing army and (especially) a navy. Arguably the War of 1812 was the final straw. Basically complete antimilitarism is only going to be a mass movement if the population is assured (by virtue of the country's location, or geopolitical status) that it's not actually ever being invaded, and if it's being invaded it's screwed anyway. (For examples, Iceland has essentially no military, Ireland has only a rather symbolic one, and so on.)

[Taihei Tengoku]

I am currently reviewing Minoa’s defence history: this is the current draft summary for something like this (current year, 2073):


I am not sure if "insurgency", "mutiny" or "militia" is the correct term to describe an official armed force that invaded and occupied a foreign country despite the opposition of all levels of government except the former Prime Minister (in secrecy). Rest assured, that Prime Minister has since 2070 been serving a de facto life term for war crimes.

Note that this is what actually happened in Israel.

Or rather, the military and the Minister of Defense planned an invasion of Lebanon all the way to Beirut, while deceiving the Prime Ministeri nto believing that they'd only go up to the Litani River (about 40 km from the border). Lulz ensued as Begin discovered the country to be thrust into a multi-year nonsense quagmire.

little league

[Dostanuot Loj]

The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

Maybe we could have a sperg about why this is? pls?

It's been covered in detail, and the socio-cultural-political stuff is not my forte.
I do know some details on the operational side because I know some former Iraqi officers involved in the movement to upgrade their army after the Iran-Iraq war.
The movement that failed, FYI.

[Austrasien]

Additionally, while I know anti-war activists are clearly opposed to foreign wars like Iraq, I wonder if they would realistically be opposed to any kind of military, even a all-volunteer self-defence force that cannot take part in foreign conflicts?

Resistance to standing military forces was, in fact, a very big thing in the Anglosphere, up to the 1820s in some places.

What killed it off in most circles was the gradual changes in technology that made it virtually impossible to ensure the security of a country in wartime without some manner of standing army and (especially) a navy. Arguably the War of 1812 was the final straw. Basically complete antimilitarism is only going to be a mass movement if the population is assured (by virtue of the country's location, or geopolitical status) that it's not actually ever being invaded, and if it's being invaded it's screwed anyway. (For examples, Iceland has essentially no military, Ireland has only a rather symbolic one, and so on.)

The Napoleanic invasion of Switzerland also had a big impact on the debate because Switzerland had been the prototype of a country defended by a "well ordered militia". Seeing it fall to pieces before the French with barely any resistance didn't do much to advance the idea of a volunteer defense force.

[Purpelia]

Although, to be fair, France at the time was the most powerful military force in the western hemisphere. I am not sure how relevant them beating someone is to proving that someones defenses were bad. It's kind of like saying that a ballistic vest is badly designed because it can't stop an atomic bomb.

[The Technocratic Syndicalists]

You have reality wrong.
The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

If you're implying the US could have achieved the same results with M4 shermans that's beyond absurd, even with 76mm gun at point blank range it would be useless against the glacis, turret face, or turret sides of even the monkey model T-72. The Shermans would have to close to point blank range and hit the side of the hull or shoot it from the rear. And considering most of the Iraqi tanks were buried in hull-down positions that doesn't seem likely. Meanwhile the 125mm gun of the T-72 can obviously skewer an M4 at any range. You might as well claim P-51s could achieve air superiority over their Mig-29s or that we could have suppressed their IADS with P-47s.

The kill ratio of American (and British) tanks in the gulf war, exceeding 100:1 overall, is an anomaly in the history of armored warfare. Training would obviously explain some part of it but if we compare it to other tank battles with dissimilarity trained crews it still exceeds the L:E rations in those engagements by at least an order of magnitude. Israeli tank crews were significant better trained than their Arab counterparts in their 1967 and 1973 wars and yet they never managed to achieve a kill ratio anywhere near what the Americans and Brits accomplished in the gulf war. Ditto for the Wehrmacht at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The only way to explain the absurd kill ratios of coalition tanks in ODS is thus to conclude that they not only had better crews but were vastly superior technologically which is the point I was making in the first place; every tank crew being told their tank is the best is amusing because if it's not true they could be in for a rude awakening.

[The Akasha Colony]

Although, to be fair, France at the time was the most powerful military force in the western hemisphere. I am not sure how relevant them beating someone is to proving that someones defenses were bad. It's kind of like saying that a ballistic vest is badly designed because it can't stop an atomic bomb.

But that was the point.

The previous expectation was that while Switzerland's neighbors might be able to field large armies, the fact that the Swiss on paper were prepared to raise their enormous militia force to protect their mountain stronghold was supposed to theoretically make them an extremely difficult target. In an age before regular armies were common, it was expected that a large, well-motivated citizen militia force would be a significant deterrent. Switzerland was perhaps the ideal state in this regard, as it had geographic advantages and was a fairly unified country by the standards of the time with a long tradition of local militias and a reputation for military prowess.

But it didn't work out that way. It wasn't that the militia were slowly overwhelmed by French manpower, ground down after a series of brutal fights they could never win strategically. It wasn't Grant's Overland campaign. They tried to fight, but with fairly dismal results. A huge segment of the Swiss population, from young boys to old men to women, flocked to the field to fight the French, who had dispatched a fairly small army into Switzerland. And yet they were defeated quickly and decisively by this small French force of regulars.

Which demonstrated a rather inescapable fact: that standing armies composed of regular, trained men was now necessary for national defense. The old idea of relying on a citizen militia with nothing more than a nominal force of maybe some royal guardsmen wasn't viable anymore. A standing force that could fight its own battles and if necessary act as a cadre for a larger mobilization became the accepted model.

[Gallia-]

You have reality wrong.
The Americans could have won 73 Easting if they had switched equipment with the Iraqis. That battle (That whole war) is really just a chronicle of how absofuckinglutelyterribad the Iraqi Army was (And still is). If the US troops had been equipped with circa 1944 equipment they could have won that battle.

If you're implying the US could have achieved the same results with M4 shermans that's beyond absurd, even with 76mm gun at point blank range it would be useless against the glacis, turret face, or turret sides of even the monkey model T-72. The Shermans would have to close to point blank range and hit the side of the hull or shoot it from the rear. And considering most of the Iraqi tanks were buried in hull-down positions that doesn't seem likely. Meanwhile the 125mm gun of the T-72 can obviously skewer an M4 at any range. You might as well claim P-51s could achieve air superiority over their Mig-29s or that we could have suppressed their IADS with P-47s.

The kill ratio of American (and British) tanks in the gulf war, exceeding 100:1 overall, is an anomaly in the history of armored warfare. Training would obviously explain some part of it but if we compare it to other tank battles with dissimilarity trained crews it still exceeds the L:E rations in those engagements by at least an order of magnitude. Israeli tank crews were significant better trained than their Arab counterparts in their 1967 and 1973 wars and yet they never managed to achieve a kill ratio anywhere near what the Americans and Brits accomplished in the gulf war. Ditto for the Wehrmacht at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The only way to explain the absurd kill ratios of coalition tanks in ODS is thus to conclude that they not only had better crews but were vastly superior technologically which is the point I was making in the first place; every tank crew being told their tank is the best is amusing because if it's not true they could be in for a rude awakening.

Stop with the revisionism and bad analysis. This is how you make "RMA" emerge from its eldritch closet.

The US Army would have won with anything because the Iraqis could only manage the greatest hits of the combined arms teams of 1916. Meanwhile the US Army had the combined arms teams of 1990 who were not only better trained but veteran troops who had seen dozens of battles against similar and tougher opponents in other deserts halfway across the world. The fact that none of the Iraqis wanted to actually be there, much like the Argentinians of the Falklands, and only a small minority of Hard Men fought, doesn't help matters and contributed more to the victory than any amount of technology could have.

It wasn't the US Army vs. 100:1 tanks or whatever.

It was the Republican Guard vs. 10:1 tanks against, with a degraded C3I, poor reconnaissance, and tactical surprise all in favour of the Americans.

The Egyptians in '73 were a lot more capable than the Iraqis were in Desert Storm because their armies were at the peak of their fighting conditions, equipped with ultra-modern weapons, and all of them were itching for a fight to get payback for '67. That's why they did alright. Mostly because they wanted to fight and do their jobs, though.

The Iraqis in '91 were fresh from a massive purge of capable officers from the Iran-Iraq War, didn't want to go to war after this massive war they'd just fought, and were caught out of position by an enemy that took them by surprise because they worshiped the cult of the trench. No one, except the Republican Guard, wanted to fight. Saddam was banking that the Americans would try to chew through his trenches, or that his screens would be able to inform his mobile reserve that the Americans were sweeping through the desert, and when the latter didn't materialize because the C3I had been bombed to smithereens, each Iraqi tank division got jumped by at least a reinforced American tank division, and usually two.

It's hardly a surprise that a demoralized army didn't fight. It's also hardly a surprise that a group of fighters, caught with their pants down and already out of their league, by a force twice as big as them, would lose.

[Purpelia]

Although, to be fair, France at the time was the most powerful military force in the western hemisphere. I am not sure how relevant them beating someone is to proving that someones defenses were bad. It's kind of like saying that a ballistic vest is badly designed because it can't stop an atomic bomb.

But that was the point.

The previous expectation was that while Switzerland's neighbors might be able to field large armies, the fact that the Swiss on paper were prepared to raise their enormous militia force to protect their mountain stronghold was supposed to theoretically make them an extremely difficult target. In an age before regular armies were common, it was expected that a large, well-motivated citizen militia force would be a significant deterrent. Switzerland was perhaps the ideal state in this regard, as it had geographic advantages and was a fairly unified country by the standards of the time with a long tradition of local militias and a reputation for military prowess.

But it didn't work out that way. It wasn't that the militia were slowly overwhelmed by French manpower, ground down after a series of brutal fights they could never win strategically. It wasn't Grant's Overland campaign. They tried to fight, but with fairly dismal results. A huge segment of the Swiss population, from young boys to old men to women, flocked to the field to fight the French, who had dispatched a fairly small army into Switzerland. And yet they were defeated quickly and decisively by this small French force of regulars.

Which demonstrated a rather inescapable fact: that standing armies composed of regular, trained men was now necessary for national defense. The old idea of relying on a citizen militia with nothing more than a nominal force of maybe some royal guardsmen wasn't viable anymore. A standing force that could fight its own battles and if necessary act as a cadre for a larger mobilization became the accepted model.

But that's the thing. Under Napoleon the French army was the best in Europe not just in terms of numbers but also skill, equipment and leadership. They were just generally the best. Anyone would have, and indeed did have serious problems with them. It's kind of hard to argue that X is bad because it did not work against Napoleon when nothing worked against him.

[Allanea]

In actual reality, a lot of the national militias by the 1810s didn’t really live up to the advertisement of standing army opponents. Standing army opponents argued that it would cost less money and be less dangerous to the public liberty if, instead of a standing ‘mercenary’ army of full-time soldiers, the state provided weapons and funds to arm a whole bunch of patriotic citizens, drilled them regularly, and then, when war came, turned these citizens (or, realistically, some part of them), out to fight.

The American experience was that this militia never existed. State governments actually filed false reports as to the amount of people they were drilling and the weapons they stockpiled. People drilled very rarely, and the only people who maintained any kind of regular training were upper middle-class and upper-class people who took to drilling and military training as a hobby (much like how many people today take to firearms training or other sorts of emergency training as a hobby with the excuse they’re doing it ‘for self-defense’ or ‘for emergencies’ or whatever).

When the time came for these people to turn out and fight the British, it turned out that not all of the supplies that were listed on paper actually existed, the training was limited, and many people simply didn’t have the will to fight and performed very badly in actual combat if they actually turned out at all.

The obvious problem here is that if you have a national movement opposed to militarism dominating the nation’s politics, it is unlikely you have a strong national interest in military preparedness.

[The Akasha Colony]

But that's the thing. Under Napoleon the French army was the best in Europe not just in terms of numbers but also skill, equipment and leadership. They were just generally the best. Anyone would have, and indeed did have serious problems with them. It's kind of hard to argue that X is bad because it did not work against Napoleon when nothing worked against him.

It's actually very easy to make that argument.

Firstly, Napoleon was not involved at all. He didn't lead or command any of the armies involved in the invasion of Switzerland and he was not even involved in the rulership of the French Republic at the time. He was just another (albeit high profile) general and was busy preparing for his expedition to Egypt at the time the French invaded Switzerland and had departed on that campaign by the time the Swiss resistance was finally put down.

But beyond that, the larger point still stands. Napoleon is hailed as a brilliant leader because he introduced new concepts and reforms to the French military, but the foundation of these concepts were universal. And that's why his tactics and strategies were so heavily studied by foreign powers both during and long after his campaigns. Because things didn't go back to the way they were after he was exiled for good. You can't put the genie back in the bottle once everyone's seen how effective the Napoleonic system was. They couldn't write the whole thing off as "only Napoleon could do it" and magically unwind several decades of rapid military progress. Especially after it was demonstrated that in the end, Napoleon could be beaten, using many of the same concepts he had pioneered. The theme of the Napoleonic Wars was "adapt or die." It's sort of the theme of most wars, really.

Napoleon sucks up most of the air and attention toward the period but it was hardly his era alone. Most of the battles the French fought and won during that period were commanded by other competent French generals, Napoleon's own cadre of marshals best-known among them. Alexander Suvorov managed to fight the French for years in Italy without losing a single battle. Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher and most famously Arthur Wellesley saw success in defeating Napoleon the final time, so it can hardly be said that "nothing worked against" Napoleon.

[Allanea]

In a somewhat belated edition of Allanea vs. the Book Backlog, I bring to you a review of Military Incompetence : Why the American Military Doesn't Win, by Richard A. Gabriel.

The book suffers - it should be said in advance - from the disadvantage of having been written too early. It has been written in 1985 - before the successes of Operation Desert Storm, the US operations in the Balkan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As such, Richard Gabriel bases his case primarily on a detailed analysis of the more infamous American military failures of the post-Vietnam era - the Iran hostage rescue attempt (Operation Eagle Claw), the Mayaguez Incident, and the Son Tay raid.

It should be said from the outset that I find the author's conclusions - that US military failures are caused by an insufficiently professional officer corps, and that they can be fixed by an extension of the officer's career to 30 years and a return to the military draft - somewhat dubious. (The author claims, in reverse of what we know to be the truth today, that the 'burden' of military service primarily falls on poor and minorities).

In every example in the book, however, the author demonstrates how failures of organization at the highest levels - failures in the organization of the Pentagon teams planning the missions, bickering between the commanders of the various services, failure to fully consider the role and goal of a mission - materialize into tragic disaster for Colonels, Lieutenants, and Privates who are carrying out the policy in practice.

An insistence that elements of the Marine Corps participate in a mission leads to replacement of Air Force pilots by Marine Pilots with no experience using the navigation equipment of their helicopters or flying them in long overland journeys.

A lack of desire by senior generals to reconsider a mission plan leads to a vast POW rescue operation being launched against a Vietnamese facility - three months after intelligence agencies confirm the facility to be empty.

Planning failures by generals lead to both comedy and tragedy - military operations being launched despite the armed forces having no maps of the area where they'll operate and being forced to use tourist maps, bombings and invasions of a foreign country to free hostages - continued stubbornly after the hostages have been freed. Warnings by officers and soldiers that a course of action is downright suicidal - ignored outright. Large-scale peacekeeping missions, launched without even an agreement on their purpose.

All of this flies in the face of the fictionalized portrayal of American strategic command as a council of wise, extremely competent men sitting in hi-tech command rooms to decide the fate of the world. All too often, Gabriel's book shows - not so much the incompetence of the US officer corps, as he perhaps would like to show - but the story of competent, well-trained Colonels, Majors, and Privates, thrown into the way of harm by a military apparatus that is somewhat like a reverse Chinese room - less competent than the sum of its parts.
Even if one doubts Gabriel's conclusions, the book provides several fascinating test cases on how the organization of military command on the highest echelons can - in the words of another historian, on a different subject - "tear defeat out of the jaws of victory".

[Gallia-]

People talk about branch parochialism today like it's a big deal. They forget that before the Unified Combatant Commanders and overall streamlining of the military command that happened because of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the US military was a lot more competitive within itself. One of the odder legacies of WW2 that was never fully resolved with the 1947 DoD reorganization, nor with Goldwater-Nichols as we see with Future Combat Systems.