NS Military Realism Consultation Thread Type 08

[Questers]

Living in Questers kinda sucks though.

edit: unless you don't mind never having a car, living with your parents and grandparents until you're 30, being conscripted (lol), and not having a smartphone or modern computer.

[Imperializt Russia]

Just seen your edit, so do you eschew battalions in favour of heavy companies?

[Questers]

no, the battalions are still there, im just breaking it down to company level.

[Imperializt Russia]

no, the battalions are still there, im just breaking it down to company level.

Oh, so a Battalion would be two companies plus HQ, and there would be two Battalions plus HQ to a Regiment?

[The Kievan People]

Ironically... I had to redesign my divisions again. (I'm sure I'm losing some credibility over this)

The secret to credibility is to do nothing, ever. But look like if you did do something it would be awesome.

[Questers]

no, the battalions are still there, im just breaking it down to company level.

Oh, so a Battalion would be two companies plus HQ, and there would be two Battalions plus HQ to a Regiment?

no.

The Regiment/Btn is, cut down:
Btn HQ - 2 vehicles
4 x Companies: 18 vehicles per coy (4x4, +2)

or
http://iiwiki.com/wiki/Regiments_of_the ... ganisation
http://iiwiki.com/wiki/Cavalry_regiment ... d_Yeomanry

[Imperializt Russia]

Ironically... I had to redesign my divisions again. (I'm sure I'm losing some credibility over this)

The secret to credibility is to do nothing, ever. But look like if you did do something it would be awesome.

It works for me.

I have honestly no idea why anyone listens to my advice.

[Questers]

tbh you should go on irc more

[Imperializt Russia]

I should do anything tbh.

I have had a terminal case of the lazies for like five years.

Since I came to NS...
Hmm...

[Spirit of Hope]

I should do anything tbh.

I have had a terminal case of the lazies for like five years.

Since I came to NS...
Hmm...

Don't start getting ideas. If you do something they may expect me to do something. And I like not doing anything.

Ironically... I had to redesign my divisions again. (I'm sure I'm losing some credibility over this)

Every time you do it is informative, so no you are not losing credibility. Though I do question sanity.

I hope this is the last time because it's getting a bit boring, honestly, but the strategic situation is changing. So I need more Divisions. These are more lightweight in terms of personnel (and once again, are composed of some reserve units) but are still pretty beastly in terms of materiel. They're also more Fuller-y. I got rid of the exploitation element as well, I don't think it fitted with my doctrine.

(Image)

Wheels get the fuck out.

18,500 personnel
444 Ermine main battle tanks
444 Marten armoured fighting vehicles
288 Springhare reconnaissance fighting vehicle
156 AS-21C 155-mm self-propelled howitzers and 36 MRAS-MA 227-mm MRLS
36 Chinkara attack helicopters
1,500 other vehicles, tracked and wheeled

I reduced number of SPGs now there are 3 batteries of 36, 1 per brigade, and 2 batteries of 24 for the division. as usual, division artillery commander can take control of all units at any time.

No transport/utility helicopters or heavy lift helicopters?

[HMS Vanguard]

I don't think it's that complex—but like anything complex, it can be briefly summarised. The more broad the summary, the briefer—I would argue that Germany lost WW2 because of a strategic failure to contain its objectives within its means, for example. You can go all the way down and get real specific and say that since Germany lost its tungsten source by late 1943, it produced inferior tank ammunition. We can make broad judgments about why wars were won or lost, if we've the empirics.

Ok, so to address your points without breaking your quote up:

I agree aircraft are a form of artillery. You'll notice I agreed aircraft are still very useful for a certain number of things—reconnaissance, for which they're invaluable, I agree, and striking of targets that are beyond the range of artillery. I don't want to contest the field of view point.

The reaction time is true nominally but I feel like you're addressing it out of context. Aircraft can attack a target after themselves spotting it: I think this is a somewhat nebulous claim. They can attack targets that they themselves can identify via their own electronic intelligence. The coordination of other data requires centralised command and control, i.e. JSTARS. That information has to be fed back and collated in some useful way, and then taken into consideration as part of the broader plan. I would personally love to fight a person who simply threw aircraft over the battle and they attacked anything they found. That is dispersion of assets at its finest!

Aircraft can be on station to be called in by ground controllers. But in that sense there's no initiative at all: they are waiting to be called in.

I don't agree that aircraft can break up large formations from the air. I don't see any evidence for that, if I'm honest. The problem with aircraft themselves is their reaction time when given a task is low, which is what you alluded to. Against a competent and mobile opponent, I don't believe it's possible. Aircraft can strike targets and deliver a huge quantity of ordnance beyond artillery range. They have an important role in interdiction precisely because you can concentrate them and plan an operation, i.e. you can act. You can incorporate the destruction of bridges as part of an overall operational plan, and carry it out—direct all air forces to the support of this operation, fighters and SEAD, and attack the bridges at precisely the right time.

In summary: I argue that aircraft are an operational tool for the following reasons:
To scatter your aircraft around and have them target things they discover on their own initiative is a great waste because you lose concentration & mass. Combined arms means co-ordination of forces to work together on a tactical/operational level. Independent air operations are a waste for this reason, because they're not carried out in co-ordination in ground forces.

Aircraft can't break up offensives led by mobile formations because of their reaction time. Artillery can lay minefields and ICM type area-weapons over an advance because they can shoot so quickly and en-masse. Yes they are not in direct contact but intelligence passes between the battalion/regiment->division quicker than it passes from those assets to the aircraft formation. Aircraft have an AWFUL track record at penetration of tech/org parity air defences. I really want to cite Yom Kippur as an example of this. Proper SEAD takes time, which you do not have in that situation. In my view there's no justification in the belief that you can penetrate a Corps/Army level air barrier to launch some kind of devastating attack on an advancing ground force. You need time to work in SEAD, to gather proper intelligence, and to properly plan attack timetables.

My main argument, however, was NOT against the use of tactical aircraft!!! It was against the reliance of CAS/aerial assault breaker as part of an established rule to deal with a breakthrough. This is especially true of exploitations—tanks and MICVs are moving too fast to be countered by aircraft. You can't build up clear picture of enemy exploitation unless it stalls, in which case it's no longer an exploitation. In my view, exploitation attack is supported by TBM attacks on airfields and very dense jamming environment, as well as concentrated fighter cover. Fighters and SAM do not need to destroy aerial counter-attack, only turn it back. Here's also where it can be political: air force commander might not want to spend 100 aircraft or whatever to stop breakthrough. Ground forces commander will demand it. They will argue with supreme commander and whole process is delayed while tanks are moving through the rear area. This exploitation can be broken up and stalled by counter-attacks on its flanks supported by artillery.

I think CAS is important in breaking strongpoints as part of a breakthrough, not as part of defending against a breakthrough. You identify your main thrusts and assign them CAS aircraft to increase the speed at which the breakthrough occurs, because you're increasing the amount of firepower your penetrating units have to do their task.

I'm not impressed with any examples provided so far. Goodwood—where were the Luftwaffe's air defences? They were absent. Allies rained down bombs on stationary targets undefended. So what? I can not think of any example where one airforce was able to launch decisive counter-attacks to blunt an offensive. Let's take the allied counter-attack at Arras. According to people here, Rommel should have called in Luftwaffle to spam 50lb bombs and break up allied tank formations. what he actually did was skilfully position anti-tank guns and use his own panzers to break up this very threatening attack. Luftwaffle was restricted in whole campaign to bombing stationary targets or CAS of strongpoints or terror bombing civilians. And don't even mention Vietnam...

Would this tactic have worked against USSR? No. The air environment was too dense, jamming was too dense, Soviets had mass quantity of SAMs. Ground artillery was given the task of breaking up formations with JSTARs guided DPICM to do what air force had promised to do but actually couldn't.

Conceding the importance of aerial reconnaissance systems like JSTARS concedes the point, to my mind. Whether the weapon is fired by the aircraft itself or by a second vehicle which is directed and in effect controlled by the aircraft is not a key distinction. In both cases, responding to a situation depends foremost upon the availability of aircraft. I see the same trend in naval warfare, where it seems to be a current fad to invent new doctrines that restore surface ships as gunboats (missile boats, in this case) and displace aircraft carriers. The weapons can indeed be moved onto surface ships, but the aircraft are still necessary for targeting, so usually these doctrines bring in reconnaissance aircraft from an unspecified location, and hope that the reader will accept that one aircraft is approximately the same as zero. The reality is that the system is dependent on, and built around, the aircraft that provides targeting data, not the ground system that pulls the trigger.

This is the status for the last generation, that is for equipment in service now, where reconnaissance and strike aircraft are still moderately distinct. In the next generation, the real advance of aircraft like the F35 is not stealth, but the distribution of JSTARS/AWACS-like capability to every strike fighter. The entire system becomes highly decentralised and therefore highly survivable. It is almost impossible to completely knock out the enemy's aerial reconnaissance capability because that implies destroying his entire air force. Note that an F35-like force would be highly valuable even if it were completely unarmed: as a battlefield reconnaissance system, it is far superior to small collections of vulnerable jet liner conversions. And since those sensors contribute the bulk of the cost, at the margin it is practically free to hang weapons on them too.

Having said all that, I don't think that the advantage of placing detection, decision, and action in one package is negligible either. Note that keeping the detection-decision-action loop inside the aircraft doesn't imply spreading the aircraft everywhere. If one knows there is a major attack in a given location, one can just as well concentrate aircraft to that location as concentrate mines to that location. Mines are cheaper, but they are also undirected, so they have a very low success rate. Aircraft will see what they are attacking and destroy what they see. You've also used some sleight of hand comparing the reaction times of aircraft and artillery. It's true that artillery are placed close to the front and aircraft generally are not, but this is because artillery are slower to respond, not faster. If artillery could move and engage any part of the front within a few hours then they, too, would be concentrated in central collection points rather than placed close to the front. The sleight of hand is assuming that artillery are pre-positioned in exactly the right places. In reality most artillery pieces will be pre-positioned in the wrong places and never enter the battle at all, while aircraft will be concentrated on the decisive point.

Finally, I don't see any good comparison with WWII. In WWII it was possible to make no defence at all and still survive an air attack with minimal damage just because it was extremely hard to hit anything with the technology of that time (air defences were similarly ineffective at destroying aircraft, btw; essentially no air attacks were actually stopped by AA fire, although sometimes sufficient attrition was imposed to make repeated attacks uneconomic). Today, hitting even moving targets from the air is a solved problem; concealment is the only really effective defence and active defences are the only possible defence if concealment is abandoned, for instance to move or attack.

[The Teutonic Republic]

How effective would chlorine trifluoride incendiary munitions be? The ability to explosively ignite human tissue, burn through concrete, and create fires that can't be put out with any fire extinguishing system is rather enticing. On the other hand safely storing and handling ClF3 seems like an equally lethal proposition.

[Imperializt Russia]

How effective would chlorine trifluoride incendiary munitions be? The ability to explosively ignite human tissue, burn through concrete, and create fires that can't be put out with any fire extinguishing system is rather enticing. On the other hand safely storing and handling ClF3 seems like an equally lethal proposition.

Therein lies your problem.
Because of storage, handling and security concerns, chemical weapons were abundant in stockpile in the European Theatre in WWII yet were hardly used at all.

[The Teutonic Republic]

How effective would chlorine trifluoride incendiary munitions be? The ability to explosively ignite human tissue, burn through concrete, and create fires that can't be put out with any fire extinguishing system is rather enticing. On the other hand safely storing and handling ClF3 seems like an equally lethal proposition.

Therein lies your problem.
Because of storage, handling and security concerns, chemical weapons were abundant in stockpile in the European Theatre in WWII yet were hardly used at all.

I though chemical weapons weren't used in WW2 due to fear of potential chemical retaliation from the enemy?

[Elan Valleys]

How effective would chlorine trifluoride incendiary munitions be? The ability to explosively ignite human tissue, burn through concrete, and create fires that can't be put out with any fire extinguishing system is rather enticing. On the other hand safely storing and handling ClF3 seems like an equally lethal proposition.

Therein lies your problem.
Because of storage, handling and security concerns, chemical weapons were abundant in stockpile in the European Theatre in WWII yet were hardly used at all.

It was more the fact that the Germans hadn't used them. Chemical mortar battalions whilst used primarily for large scale smokescreens still had their full stocks of chemical rounds.

[Imperializt Russia]

Therein lies your problem.
Because of storage, handling and security concerns, chemical weapons were abundant in stockpile in the European Theatre in WWII yet were hardly used at all.

I though chemical weapons weren't used in WW2 due to fear of potential chemical retaliation from the enemy?

Didn't stop their use in WWI, did it?

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany particularly, had vast chemical weapon stockpiles. In amidst the other horrors of the Ostfront, chemical warfare would hardly have been out of place. Yet it did not occur against armies. When you're trading areas literally the size of Ukraine every couple of months, security of chemical weapon assets becomes a critical concern that you cannot control. Their storage, handling and shipping are also highly problematic.

[The Akasha Colony]

How effective would chlorine trifluoride incendiary munitions be? The ability to explosively ignite human tissue, burn through concrete, and create fires that can't be put out with any fire extinguishing system is rather enticing. On the other hand safely storing and handling ClF3 seems like an equally lethal proposition.

Not worth the difficulty, most likely.

Remember, your munitions will spend most of their time in proximity to your own troops. They're only in proximity to the enemy for a fraction of a second, usually. So safety and reliability is very important. There doesn't seem to be any way that a chlorine triflouride anything would ever conform to modern insensitive munitions standards.

I though chemical weapons weren't used in WW2 due to fear of potential chemical retaliation from the enemy?

Chemical weapons are hard to store and transport, and can only be used effectively when the weather is right (don't want those gases blowing back toward friendly lines!).

[Brytene]

So what do people think about quadbike ATVs as a standard light reconnaissance vehicle? My military isn't a big hitter (only one true carrier) and relies on mostly small-scale and mobile insertions, or else clinging to a bigger power to save them. An ATV can be carried easily by choppers, small boats, etc, and gives infantry mobility and carrying capacity, but obviously it's more or less useless in a fight compared to an LAC.

Should I start issuing them to Brytisc troops, yay, nay?

tbh i just like quadbikes

[Spirit of Hope]

So what do people think about quadbike ATVs as a standard light reconnaissance vehicle? My military isn't a big hitter (only one true carrier) and relies on mostly small-scale and mobile insertions, or else clinging to a bigger power to save them. An ATV can be carried easily by choppers, small boats, etc, and gives infantry mobility and carrying capacity, but obviously it's more or less useless in a fight compared to an LAC.

Should I start issuing them to Brytisc troops, yay, nay?

tbh i just like quadbikes

For a reconnaissance vehicle they aren't a bad idea, they shouldn't be your main transport however.

[Laywenrania]

How does this sound for a WWII destroyer? I don't have any fancy drawings yet, so I'll just use a Gearing for reference, since OOC it is based off the Gearing-class (IC it has nothing to do with the Gearing).

It has 4 quintuple-torpedo tubes, one behind the aft stack and one in place of the aft 5"/38 turret; the other two are the same as in the picture. The two dual 40mm mounts on either side of the forward smokestack are changed to quad mounts, with another quad mount 40mm on top of the bridge in front of the 5" gun director (which is moved a little bit further aft to make room). There is a dual 40mm mount on each side of the superstructure between torpedo mounts 2 and 3. There are four 20mm Oerlikons on the stern instead of three, another 4 on platforms by the second smokestack, and four on bridge structure as shown in the image. The depth charge throwers along the side are replaced with 12 trainable Hedgehog mortars, 6 on the deck on either side of the superstructure, 4 in front of the twin 40mm mounts and 2 behind. The forward 5"/38s are the same as in the image.

In total, it is armed with 4 5"/38s in twin turrets, 20 torpedo tubes, 16 40mm Bofors, 12 20mm Oerlikons, 12 Hedgehogs, and 2 depth charge rails at the stern.

The warships thread is busy arguing about F-35s, so I'll just leave this here.

As the previous poster, I would say too many torpedo tubes for that time. Even the Shimakaze had only 15. And I wouldn't delete the aft turret. It leaves a pretty big gap in fire zones. So I would suggest to leave the aft turret and remove that torpedo tube.
And with the added guns (esp. the Bofors on the bridge) your top weight could get critical.
Oh and you have 20 Bofors according to your description.

[Gallia-]

>based on gearing
>+1 everything

this isnt how ships work

[Brytene]

For a reconnaissance vehicle they aren't a bad idea, they shouldn't be your main transport however.

Yeah I was thinking for small independent roving teams (2-8 men) and recon. We have LACs and heavier for large-scale transport

[Iltica]

What's the best way to defend several really long borders if you don't have a lot of manpower? They're DMZs but I don't think that's enough.

[Laywenrania]

What's the best way to defend several really long borders if you don't have a lot of manpower? They're DMZs but I don't think that's enough.

Defend as in repelling multiple large-scale invasions all over the long borders?

[Iltica]

What's the best way to defend several really long borders if you don't have a lot of manpower? They're DMZs but I don't think that's enough.

Defend as in repelling multiple large-scale invasions all over the long borders?

No just one invasion on all 3 at once... I'm surrounded one the northern, western, and southern borders with the eastern being the ocean.