The NS Infantry Discussion Thread, Model 4

[Nirvash Type TheEND]

snip

We prefer you spoiler posts with numerous large images. Also while IFVs and APCs are relevant, battle tanks are not, and should be taken to the main ground vehicle threads.

Also you should totes look into tracked IFVs

[The Archangel Conglomerate]

Ok, I was wrong about the 5,56. It seems I misremembered. . . again.

---

Found something recently. 13,2mm TuF drawing. I haven't seen it on any of the threads, so I figure I'll put it here.

[Purpelia]

Ok, I was wrong about the 5,56. It seems I misremembered. . . again.

---

Found something recently. 13,2mm TuF drawing. I haven't seen it on any of the threads, so I figure I'll put it here.

What confuses me is that the drawings for a German anti tank rifle round are done in imperial and english.

[Lemanrussland]

No, I wouldn't of been. Vietnam lasted 20 years and cost millions of lives. By war's standards, both World Wars were over really quickly, but the consequences of both were massive.
I used those wars as examples as they all lasted a long ass time, cost a shit load of lives and caused massive suffering to pretty much everyone involved, contrary to what Sherman's quote claimed would happen if you try your very best to fuck the enemy as much as possible.

And again. What possible strategy could the Allies have adopted in 1939 or 1941 to finish the war sooner, which was within their technological reach in the time period, (i.e. not guided weapons or nukes), and at a meaningfully smaller amount of casualties?

Just a comment:

The strategic bombing campaign in Europe was probably not cost effective, when you consider that German industrial output continued to expand throughout the war, that the political power and authority of the Nazi regime was never seriously threatened as a result of any supposed "demoralizing effect" that the bombing had on the German population, and when you take into account the huge material cost of the strategic bombing program.

As much as 40 to 50 percent of the British war effort went into the RAF, and the USAAF consumed as much as 25-35 percent of US industrial output, large amounts of those resources went to the strategic bombing offensive (RAF Bomber Command accounted for less than a quarter of the RAF, yet used the most factory space and labor). RAF Bomber Command lost 8,325 bombers and 64,000 aircrew, and the USAAF lost 8,237 bombers and 73,000 crew (which exceeds the total USN and USMC casualties in the Pacific).

Now, I'm not saying it had no effect. Forcing Germany to divert resources into air and civil defense deprived the Heer of men and material, and the attacks on oil and nitrate production were quite effective. All in all though, I don't think it was worth the huge cost. A more limited bombing campaign focusing on key sectors like oil production would have freed up resources for fighter production and tactical bombing.

In any event, the results of the strategic bombing campaign definitely did not line up with the predictions of Bomber Mafia theorists of the '20s and '30s.

[Spirit of Hope]

Ok, I was wrong about the 5,56. It seems I misremembered. . . again.

---

Found something recently. 13,2mm TuF drawing. I haven't seen it on any of the threads, so I figure I'll put it here.

What confuses me is that the drawings for a German anti tank rifle round are done in imperial and english.

Probably some Americans had to write a report on it, mention its possible dangers to their men and material and other stuff. Its why some of the best resources available on the internet about soviet combat units come from the US Army. You want to know as much as you can about what your enemy is doing.

[Spreewerke]

Wasn't the 'wound-not-kill' doctrine one of the driving forces behind M16 and 5,56mm NATO development?

No. The driving forces were that the AKM was out-shooting the M14 and that soldiers were dying over it. The whole "low recoil in full auto" was way higher of a priority then the "we have TOO MANY JOULES" factor, which was more of a suppletory evidence then a driving reason.


Source: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Lo ... =ADA050268 (WARNING: It's a download link, I couldn't actually find anywhere where this was being hosted online)

North Vietnamese forces of both kinds would have been using primarily Type-56s as far as AK variants went. China was not yet producing stamped receivers at that time, so it would have been the Type-III v. M14/M16 and not the AKM (the stamped Type-56 has a bit more in common with the RPK, anyway).

[Arkandros]

And again. What possible strategy could the Allies have adopted in 1939 or 1941 to finish the war sooner, which was within their technological reach in the time period, (i.e. not guided weapons or nukes), and at a meaningfully smaller amount of casualties?

Just a comment:

The strategic bombing campaign in Europe was probably not cost effective, when you consider that German industrial output continued to expand throughout the war, that the political power and authority of the Nazi regime was never seriously threatened as a result of any supposed "demoralizing effect" that the bombing had on the German population, and when you take into account the huge material cost of the strategic bombing program.

As much as 40 to 50 percent of the British war effort went into the RAF, and the USAAF consumed as much as 25-35 percent of US industrial output, large amounts of those resources went to the strategic bombing offensive (RAF Bomber Command accounted for less than a quarter of the RAF, yet used the most factory space and labor). RAF Bomber Command lost 8,325 bombers and 64,000 aircrew, and the USAAF lost 8,237 bombers and 73,000 crew (which exceeds the total USN and USMC casualties in the Pacific).

Now, I'm not saying it had no effect. Forcing Germany to divert resources into air and civil defense deprived the Heer of men and material, and the attacks on oil and nitrate production were quite effective. All in all though, I don't think it was worth the huge cost. A more limited bombing campaign focusing on key sectors like oil production would have freed up resources for fighter production and tactical bombing.

In any event, the results of the strategic bombing campaign definitely did not line up with the predictions of Bomber Mafia theorists of the '20s and '30s.

You haven't taken into account that there really was no such thing as precision bombing during the majority of WWII. The earliest guided bombs were used by the Germans against allied warships around 1943 with the Fritz X, and the Allies did not get similar technology until mid 1944 with the Azon (which was much less controllable than the Fritz X). Because of this, the only way to hit a small target (like a railway to disrupt supplies, or a small forward AA position) during the majority of the European Theater operations was through sheer saturation. Because of this, massive amounts of resources had to be devoted to bombers, simply due to the sheer size of the planes themselves and the amount of ordinance required.

[Purpelia]

You haven't taken into account that there really was no such thing as precision bombing during the majority of WWII. The earliest guided bombs were used by the Germans against allied warships around 1943 with the Fritz X, and the Allies did not get similar technology until mid 1944 with the Azon (which was much less controllable than the Fritz X). Because of this, the only way to hit a small target (like a railway to disrupt supplies, or a small forward AA position) during the majority of the European Theater operations was through sheer saturation. Because of this, massive amounts of resources had to be devoted to bombers, simply due to the sheer size of the planes themselves and the amount of ordinance required.

On the other hand, sending those bombers to bomb targets that actually mattered like factories, oil refineries etc. would have been a step in the right direction.

[The Republic of Lanos]

Even though Speer persevered in the face of the strategic bombing campaign, German military production still couldn't cope with the Soviet Union's during the entire war. Even if there was no bombing campaign being done against the Germans, they would have still lost the military production competition, especially after December 7, 1941.

[The Kievan People]

Even though Speer persevered in the face of the strategic bombing campaign, German military production still couldn't cope with the Soviet Union's during the entire war. Even if there was no bombing campaign being done against the Germans, they would have still lost the military production competition, especially after December 7, 1941.

There is a question of cause and effect here.

Germany SHOULD have been able to surpass the USSRs military production.

[Arkandros]

You haven't taken into account that there really was no such thing as precision bombing during the majority of WWII. The earliest guided bombs were used by the Germans against allied warships around 1943 with the Fritz X, and the Allies did not get similar technology until mid 1944 with the Azon (which was much less controllable than the Fritz X). Because of this, the only way to hit a small target (like a railway to disrupt supplies, or a small forward AA position) during the majority of the European Theater operations was through sheer saturation. Because of this, massive amounts of resources had to be devoted to bombers, simply due to the sheer size of the planes themselves and the amount of ordinance required.

On the other hand, sending those bombers to bomb targets that actually mattered like factories, oil refineries etc. would have been a step in the right direction.

We did. What do you mean, we didn't bomb factories? Those were some of the major targets of allied bombing raids, along with supply depots. What you're thinking of (bombing of population centers) was done either because that's where the factories/refineries/supplies were, or because they were major population centers and the bombings were psychological attacks.

[Lemanrussland]

Just a comment:

The strategic bombing campaign in Europe was probably not cost effective, when you consider that German industrial output continued to expand throughout the war, that the political power and authority of the Nazi regime was never seriously threatened as a result of any supposed "demoralizing effect" that the bombing had on the German population, and when you take into account the huge material cost of the strategic bombing program.

As much as 40 to 50 percent of the British war effort went into the RAF, and the USAAF consumed as much as 25-35 percent of US industrial output, large amounts of those resources went to the strategic bombing offensive (RAF Bomber Command accounted for less than a quarter of the RAF, yet used the most factory space and labor). RAF Bomber Command lost 8,325 bombers and 64,000 aircrew, and the USAAF lost 8,237 bombers and 73,000 crew (which exceeds the total USN and USMC casualties in the Pacific).

Now, I'm not saying it had no effect. Forcing Germany to divert resources into air and civil defense deprived the Heer of men and material, and the attacks on oil and nitrate production were quite effective. All in all though, I don't think it was worth the huge cost. A more limited bombing campaign focusing on key sectors like oil production would have freed up resources for fighter production and tactical bombing.

In any event, the results of the strategic bombing campaign definitely did not line up with the predictions of Bomber Mafia theorists of the '20s and '30s.

You haven't taken into account that there really was no such thing as precision bombing during the majority of WWII. The earliest guided bombs were used by the Germans against allied warships around 1943 with the Fritz X, and the Allies did not get similar technology until mid 1944 with the Azon (which was much less controllable than the Fritz X). Because of this, the only way to hit a small target (like a railway to disrupt supplies, or a small forward AA position) during the majority of the European Theater operations was through sheer saturation. Because of this, massive amounts of resources had to be devoted to bombers, simply due to the sheer size of the planes themselves and the amount of ordinance required.

Yes, but the RAF, for example, basically made it their policy to attack cities as area targets. The USAAF tried to focus on military targets, but as you said the inaccuracy of bombs required the use of large numbers of bombers, which resulted in practically the same effect as the RAF bombing.

All I'm saying is, they should have focused on specific sectors like oil production, instead of trying to bomb cities to kill civilians and destroy factories. The US Strategic Bombing Survey found that attacks on aviation, ball bearing, tank, consumer goods and steel production did not really have a great effect on the German war effort. Area attacks on civilians definitely did not have a practical impact on the war in Europe (except when infrastructure and other militarily significant things were destroyed).

[Arkandros]

You haven't taken into account that there really was no such thing as precision bombing during the majority of WWII. The earliest guided bombs were used by the Germans against allied warships around 1943 with the Fritz X, and the Allies did not get similar technology until mid 1944 with the Azon (which was much less controllable than the Fritz X). Because of this, the only way to hit a small target (like a railway to disrupt supplies, or a small forward AA position) during the majority of the European Theater operations was through sheer saturation. Because of this, massive amounts of resources had to be devoted to bombers, simply due to the sheer size of the planes themselves and the amount of ordinance required.

Yes, but the RAF, for example, basically made it their policy to attack cities as area targets. The USAAF tried to focus on military targets, but as you said the inaccuracy of bombs required the use of large numbers of bombers, which resulted in practically the same effect as the RAF bombing.

All I'm saying is, they should have focused on specific sectors like oil production, instead of trying to bomb cities to kill civilians and destroy factories. The US Strategic Bombing Survey found that attacks on aviation, ball bearing, tank, consumer goods and steel production did not really have a great effect on the German war effort. Area attacks on civilians definitely did not have a practical impact on the war in Europe.

So you're saying the psychological effect of ~50% of your city disappearing in a fireball wouldn't make you rethink your support of a war? One that your country is quite blatantly losing? Damn, you're one resilient patriot. (or fucking insane, take your pick)
As for the attacks on oil, I feel I should point out that Germany's reserves were low even before the bombing campaigns. quite a bit of their power was derived from coal, and during the late war period, as gasoline and diesel became even more scarce, synthetic coal fuel was created. Also, this. Basically, the allies acknowledged petroleum as a priority target even during the early stages of the war, below only airfields and command systems. Again, poor accuracy meant multiple missions had to be flown against each target, and each flight risked bomber loss, lowering the chance of target elimination. As can be seen on the wiki page, over 500 strikes were executed on petroleum targets alone during the war.

[Lemanrussland]

Yes, but the RAF, for example, basically made it their policy to attack cities as area targets. The USAAF tried to focus on military targets, but as you said the inaccuracy of bombs required the use of large numbers of bombers, which resulted in practically the same effect as the RAF bombing.

All I'm saying is, they should have focused on specific sectors like oil production, instead of trying to bomb cities to kill civilians and destroy factories. The US Strategic Bombing Survey found that attacks on aviation, ball bearing, tank, consumer goods and steel production did not really have a great effect on the German war effort. Area attacks on civilians definitely did not have a practical impact on the war in Europe.

So you're saying the psychological effect of ~50% of your city disappearing in a fireball wouldn't make you rethink your support of a war? One that your country is quite blatantly losing? Damn, you're one resilient patriot. (or fucking insane, take your pick)
As for the attacks on oil, I feel I should point out that Germany's reserves were low even before the bombing campaigns. quite a bit of their power was derived from coal, and during the late war period, as gasoline and diesel became even more scarce, synthetic coal fuel was created. Also, this. Basically, the allies acknowledged petroleum as a priority target even during the early stages of the war, below only airfields and command systems. Again, poor accuracy meant multiple missions had to be flown against each target, and each flight risked bomber loss, lowering the chance of target elimination. As can be seen on the wiki page, over 500 strikes were executed on petroleum targets alone during the war.

It probably did have an effect on German civilians, but did this nebulous "they are demoralized" effect have a real impact on the war? The Nazi regime was never in serious trouble politically speaking, and was not forced into a negotiated peace. They had to be defeated utterly before they surrendered. Hardly the result predicted by the people behind the strategic bombing program (some of them even so far as to say massed bomber attacks would render armies obsolete).

The attacks on oil production and infrastructure did make sense, and did actually hurt the German economy. The blood letting by Harris and the RAF Bomber Command didn't make much sense, though. In my opinion that was a waste of resources, not to mention barbaric.

[EsToVnIa]

No. The driving forces were that the AKM was out-shooting the M14 and that soldiers were dying over it. The whole "low recoil in full auto" was way higher of a priority then the "we have TOO MANY JOULES" factor, which was more of a suppletory evidence then a driving reason.


Source: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Lo ... =ADA050268 (WARNING: It's a download link, I couldn't actually find anywhere where this was being hosted online)

North Vietnamese forces of both kinds would have been using primarily Type-56s as far as AK variants went. China was not yet producing stamped receivers at that time, so it would have been the Type-III v. M14/M16 and not the AKM (the stamped Type-56 has a bit more in common with the RPK, anyway).

Fairly certain they used AK-47s.

[Spreewerke]

North Vietnamese forces of both kinds would have been using primarily Type-56s as far as AK variants went. China was not yet producing stamped receivers at that time, so it would have been the Type-III v. M14/M16 and not the AKM (the stamped Type-56 has a bit more in common with the RPK, anyway).

Fairly certain they used AK-47s.

No. Since they were fighting the French first, they started off with the FAMAS.

[Puzikas]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

[Spirit of Hope]

North Vietnamese forces of both kinds would have been using primarily Type-56s as far as AK variants went. China was not yet producing stamped receivers at that time, so it would have been the Type-III v. M14/M16 and not the AKM (the stamped Type-56 has a bit more in common with the RPK, anyway).

Fairly certain they used AK-47s.

The Type-56 is a chinese knock off of the AK-47/AKM. So I wouldn't be surprised if the Type 56 is what they were using since it is closer and shared a land border.

[EsToVnIa]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

CAS is infantry-related still, yes?

No. Since they were fighting the French first, they started off with the FAMAS.

Well now I feel silly.

[Lemanrussland]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

B-but men pilot the airplanes!

But yeah, it is off topic. Sorry about that. It sort of stemmed from the earlier discussion about brutality in war.

If you guys want to continue the discussion, the air force discussion thread would be the correct place.

[Arkandros]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

Sorry, taking it to TG. I leave with an actual infantry idea: alt-history NotAxis NotAmerica Stg44 in .44 magnum; Y/N?
The practical application of a .44 Magnum SMG is rather low, I'm aware, but could such a project function in a larger-than-normal SMG package to negate some of the recoil and muzzle climb?

[Lemanrussland]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

CAS is infantry-related still, yes?

No. Since they were fighting the French first, they started off with the FAMAS.

Well now I feel silly.

I would say no. It fits more in the air force thread (along with other forms of tactical support, like interdiction and air reconnaissance).

I'm not really sure where army aviation (helicopters) would go. Probably in the air force thread or the military realism thread.

[Fordorsia]

IFVs? They're Infantry related.

APCs? Also infantry related.

Troop carrying Helicopters? Starting to walk near the line but, as long as you keep it within the realm of deployment and tactics using troop helicopters, they're infantry related.


Airlift by airplane? Same as above.

But strategic bombarding and discussion of the applications against Axis Germany? Yea, that's not Infantry related.

Sorry, taking it to TG. I leave with an actual infantry idea: alt-history NotAxis NotAmerica Stg44 in .44 magnum; Y/N?

Why the fuck not?

[The Republic of Lanos]

I'm going to use 7.92mm rounds even up to this day.

What?

[Tule]

No, I wouldn't of been. Vietnam lasted 20 years and cost millions of lives. By war's standards, both World Wars were over really quickly, but the consequences of both were massive.
I used those wars as examples as they all lasted a long ass time, cost a shit load of lives and caused massive suffering to pretty much everyone involved, contrary to what Sherman's quote claimed would happen if you try your very best to fuck the enemy as much as possible.

And again. What possible strategy could the Allies have adopted in 1939 or 1941 to finish the war sooner, which was within their technological reach in the time period, (i.e. not guided weapons or nukes), and at a meaningfully smaller amount of casualties?

If the testimonies of Generals Jodl and Westphal at the Nuremberg trial are to be believed, Germany would have been steamrolled if the West had attacked immediately in September 1939.

Something to do with the Wehrmacht being busy on the other damn side of the country.