NS Military Realism Consultation Thread #3

[GHawkins]

Which gets back to my point. Infantry ride in the armored vehicles until they arrive at the battlefield. Then they disembark. At this point the infantry are not inside the vehicle, they probably aren't even right next to it. They are nearby taking cover and operating alongside the armored vehicle. Their is no point to keeping infantry inside an armored vehicle when it is at the battlefield.

Thank you. It's what I am trying to say, that keeping them inside the vehicle on the battlefield is a bad idea. The other part of what I'm saying is that if you want to have them get the speed benefit of the transport, in for example a flanking maneuver, they should get on top instead of inside. Though that's open for discussion (and what we're doing now).

Also, the A-10 situation was under the assumption the other party (the one sending the A-10) has air superiority.

Its called air defense, it takes the form of MANPADS, Avengers, and other anti air capabilities on the ground. As I have already stated the Egyptians proved this could work during the Yom Kippur War. (Yes they eventually lost but their were a lot of reasons for that)

I know that air defense is effective. However, Desert Storm has proven that aircraft are devastating to armoured formations, whether covered by air defense or not. I do know that aircraft are vulnerable as well, but they have teeth that they will show against ground forces.

And yes, I know the entire point of APCs and IFVs. I'm just saying that riding them desant or not doesn't matter, the infantry inside them is fucked either way if they engage in high-intensity combat. So I'd say that they'd prefer desant because their chances are a lot higher then, as they can quicker get off the vehicle and into combat positions and get away from the vehicle in case of attack that would destroy the vehicle.

Then why would you make armored vehicles at all? By your logic their isn't a point, so we should just have open topped vehicles that let the infantry jump out.

My point was that it's preferable to, if you require them near the vehicles, to have them on top and not inside them, that in such a case desant is more effective than having them ride inside. And the reason that WWII generation APCs had no top was exactly that, the infantry could get out quicker.

[Galla-]

I'm just going to assume you've never read anything about the Soviet Army ever. Indeed it's tactical doctrine was to walk with troops alongside IFVs.

Oh I've read enough. I know their tactic was to walk besides the vehicles. And they can't do that while inside their vehicles. So, what do they do when they have to flank an enemy? Get inside their vehicles again and make a perfect target? No, they ride on top of it if they want to use speed as their advantage. They'd dismount again when it became useful for them to walk again, when they were engaging. On top of that, they'd ride their IFVs on top till the point of engagement. Why? Because if they arrived and were inside, they'd be blown up together with the IFV if unfortunate enough to encounter an ATGM. Fact remains that jumping off an IFV is faster than getting out through the hatches.

The point isn't that it's bad if the shell is a direct hit, which as you noted would be deadly in any scenario, but that a shell or a bomb explosion will kill anyone riding desant. Only a very near miss would injure people inside.

As you stated, their doctrine was to walk besides the vehicles anyway. Which means whether riding desant or not, they'd be screwed over when artillery came into play. So, what do you do when you're screwed either way, either by an ATGM or artillery? You get on top, so you can dismount for the ATGM and spread out to have fewer casualties by artillery.

When have air attacks' casualty production exceeded the casualty production of artillery guns, in any actual or hypothetical high intensity conflict? Never.

Operation Desert Storm. The A-10's alone killed more than 30% of Saddam's armoured vehicles. And those were tanks alone. I have no statistics about other vehicles such as IFVs or trucks, but the A-10's killed about 1200~ of Saddam's 3400~ tank losses.

I wouldn't say riding on the outside is preferable to the inside. On the outside on a fast moving armored vehicle infantry aren't going to add much to the formations firepower. While at the same time they will make themselves more vulnerable to enemy small arms and artillery fire.

Your A-10 though doesn't really work, because any vehicle formation would have attached Anti-air ability to, at least attempt, to counter the enemy air force.

Now the whole point of APC's and IFV's was to transport your troops safely to the battlefield, where they would then disembark and engage enemy forces, alongside the armored vehicles. This create a network of mutual support.

The IFVs are vulnerable either way, the infantry inside it as well. I do admit, they are protected from shrapnel and small arms fire. But the heavy weapons will always be focused on the vehicles first. And that's where the causalities will bleed. The intensity of modern-day artillery barrages, vehicles won't offer the protection that the infantry requires.

Also, the A-10 situation was under the assumption the other party (the one sending the A-10) has air superiority.

And yes, I know the entire point of APCs and IFVs. I'm just saying that riding them desant or not doesn't matter, the infantry inside them is fucked either way if they engage in high-intensity combat. So I'd say that they'd prefer desant because their chances are a lot higher then, as they can quicker get off the vehicle and into combat positions and get away from the vehicle in case of attack that would destroy the vehicle.

1) Well you haven't read anything, except maybe Isby and his ilk, judging from your attempt at piecing it together.

2) Yes, this makes sense when the air is filled with shrapnel. Plenty of sense.

3) ODS isn't comparable, and not really relevant. It's more relevant than COIN though because it actually lets you test things, like logistics, since there is a significant use of artillery by Allied troops. On the other hand, there was zero organised resistance to Allied air and ground forces, with just small pockets of companies or battalions of Iraqi troops who either surrendered or fought against grossly better trained NATO forces. It was really just a live fire training exercise for the NATO troops, and a complete wash for the Iraqis who tried to fight but couldn't because they were completely unable to oppose the Allied air forces.

Yes, it shows what happens when the enemy cannot oppose your air force because he lacks an air force or air defence of his own. Why is that relevant to a parity opponent who has similar aircraft and superior air defence artillery? Please, tell me.

I shan't get into the A-10 survival rate in the late 1980's against a Soviet forward IADS, but it wasn't pretty. I'm thinking of a very particular estimate of sortie survival on some blog (I think it might have been up-ship) for the A-10 that had some really grim statistics.

Regardless, Falklands is a better one to pick. It was against parity troops who were both well trained, conventional armies, even if both sides lacked artillery and mechanisation. If you're going to pick something to show what air defences can do while being biased about it, pick a war where they were actually used, not just a curbstomp by a vastly more powerful and capable coalition of countries beating up some dirt farmers.

4) If the IFV doesn't offer protection from artillery, nothing does. Its sole purpose in life is to keep infantry alive under armour, and transport them to their objective fast enough to keep up with the main battle tanks.

No. What is relevant about fighting peasant dirt farmers with DShKs on flatbed trucks that is relevant to fighting the Soviet Army with a fully mechanised military?

those farmers fought the soviet army and its fully mechanised military. perhaps you should ask them. at the very least, its a more current example than WW2.

Why?

They're probably illiterate and don't know maths, so they can't put it into any meaningful terms. The Soviets themselves decided that such lessons learned in Afghanistan were irrelevant to a high intensity war, but relevant if the USSR were to continue COIN.

Zapad-81 is a much better way of learning how to fight a high intensity war.

[Ea90]

I don't recall an MLRS being a Regimental asset, though if you use the Regimental system as opposed to the Divisional system, I guess it would be by default.
I'd say a battery of six per Regiment.

Yep, I decided to do what the US are doing now with their BCTs and transitioning to Regiment/Brigade-sized units as the main manoeuvre groups instead of divisions.
I think of the Yanintovian Army as a particularly rocket artillery-heavy force, so could I get away with 30 or would that be way too much?

[Samozaryadnyastan]

Thirty is more than the Soviets gave to entire Divisions.

[Spirit of Hope]

Its called air defense, it takes the form of MANPADS, Avengers, and other anti air capabilities on the ground. As I have already stated the Egyptians proved this could work during the Yom Kippur War. (Yes they eventually lost but their were a lot of reasons for that)

I know that air defense is effective. However, Desert Storm has proven that aircraft are devastating to armoured formations, whether covered by air defense or not. I do know that aircraft are vulnerable as well, but they have teeth that they will show against ground forces.

Desert Storm is a really bad example, hence why I used the Yom Kippur War as an example. The Iraq Army didn't have anything like a modern air defense, while the United States had modern aircraft. In the Yom Kippur war you saw a much closer parity of equipment, though not of training which is why the Israelites won the war. If you threw the A-10 at modern air defense it would die, if you through any modern aircraft at modern air defense it would probably die. You would have to work to systematically reduce the air defense of the enemy.

And yes, I know the entire point of APCs and IFVs. I'm just saying that riding them desant or not doesn't matter, the infantry inside them is fucked either way if they engage in high-intensity combat. So I'd say that they'd prefer desant because their chances are a lot higher then, as they can quicker get off the vehicle and into combat positions and get away from the vehicle in case of attack that would destroy the vehicle.

Then why would you make armored vehicles at all? By your logic their isn't a point, so we should just have open topped vehicles that let the infantry jump out.

My point was that it's preferable to, if you require them near the vehicles, to have them on top and not inside them, that in such a case desant is more effective than having them ride inside. And the reason that WWII generation APCs had no top was exactly that, the infantry could get out quicker.[/quote]

And yet since then armies have moved to closed top vehicles. Why? Because of air burst artillery, didn't want that going off over your open topped APC.

[Ea90]

Thirty is more than the Soviets gave to entire Divisions.

Oh wow, that is a bit ridiculous.
Could I go higher than six without everything going crazy, or would one battery be the limit?

[GHawkins]

1) Well you haven't read anything, except maybe Isby and his ilk, judging from your attempt at piecing it together.

2) Yes, this makes sense when the air is filled with shrapnel. Plenty of sense.

3) ODS isn't comparable, and not really relevant. It's more relevant than COIN though because it actually lets you test things, like logistics, since there is a significant use of artillery by Allied troops. On the other hand, there was zero organised resistance to Allied air and ground forces, with just small pockets of companies or battalions of Iraqi troops who either surrendered or fought against grossly better trained NATO forces. I shan't get into the A-10 survival rate in the late 1980's against a Soviet forward IADS, but it wasn't pretty. I'm thinking of a very particular estimate of sortie survival on some blog (I think it might have been up-ship) for the A-10 that had some really, really grim statistics.

Regardless, Falklands is a better one to pick. It was against parity troops who were both well trained, conventional armies.

4) If the IFV doesn't offer protection from artillery, nothing does. Its sole purpose in life is to keep infantry alive under armour, and transport them to their objective fast enough to keep up with the main battle tanks.

1. I'm doing a project on a hypothetical cold war gone hot. The entire point of Soviet Doctrine was to steamroll over NATO in Germany. You can't steamroll over anyone if you're going at a walking pace. NATO would've set up defensive lines inside Germany. From defensive line to defensive line, the infantry would ride inside the vehicles. However, in combat, infantry running tires them out which degrades their combat effectiveness. If they have to quickly move to another position, having them enter the IFV would take a longer time than jumping on top (I think that's the case, I haven't tried I have to admit). Yes, they make a bigger target and are more vulnerable. However, if you can quickly get out of the combat zone without becoming a target for the bigger guns, than staying in the field longer to load the troops and have a Javelin operator find you, I think you'd prefer the first.

2. The air is filled with shrapnel anyway. So the entire doctrine of the Soviets would be flawed because they had the infantry run besides their vehicles when on the offensive against main defensive lines. That infantry isn't protected by the IFV if they're outside it. And on the inside, they can't do what they are supposed to do and that's fight.

3. Because we can't really test the A-10's combat effectiveness in combat against the Soviet forces, I'll not comment on this point.

4. That all depends on the doctrine. Soviet doctrine was to dismount. The MBTs would form the teeth but behind it the infantry and their IFVs would come. It's purpose was to advance alongside the infantry and give them teeth against entrenched or armoured foes. Not to transport. APCs goal was to transport. IFVs are there to engage and destroy the enemy in a support role of the infantry.

And yet since then armies have moved to closed top vehicles. Why? Because of air burst artillery, didn't want that going off over your open topped APC.

Regarding the modern air defense, that is true. I won't comment on that.

However, this I'd like to comment on. Yes, you are right. They enclosed the vehicle to protect them from shrapnel. But the entire point of mechanized warfare is not to have the infantry sit idle in the vehicle while it's engaged in combat. They are supposed to dismount. And if they are dismounted and doing what they're supposed to do, that air burst artillery will still come. Yet then, they are spread out and not on a concentrated bunch which would've made a lot more casualties.

[Elan Valleys]

However, in combat, infantry running tires them out which degrades their combat effectiveness.

Which is why they do this sort of thing to get fit:

[The UK in Exile]

Oh I've read enough. I know their tactic was to walk besides the vehicles. And they can't do that while inside their vehicles. So, what do they do when they have to flank an enemy? Get inside their vehicles again and make a perfect target? No, they ride on top of it if they want to use speed as their advantage. They'd dismount again when it became useful for them to walk again, when they were engaging. On top of that, they'd ride their IFVs on top till the point of engagement. Why? Because if they arrived and were inside, they'd be blown up together with the IFV if unfortunate enough to encounter an ATGM. Fact remains that jumping off an IFV is faster than getting out through the hatches.



As you stated, their doctrine was to walk besides the vehicles anyway. Which means whether riding desant or not, they'd be screwed over when artillery came into play. So, what do you do when you're screwed either way, either by an ATGM or artillery? You get on top, so you can dismount for the ATGM and spread out to have fewer casualties by artillery.




Operation Desert Storm. The A-10's alone killed more than 30% of Saddam's armoured vehicles. And those were tanks alone. I have no statistics about other vehicles such as IFVs or trucks, but the A-10's killed about 1200~ of Saddam's 3400~ tank losses.



The IFVs are vulnerable either way, the infantry inside it as well. I do admit, they are protected from shrapnel and small arms fire. But the heavy weapons will always be focused on the vehicles first. And that's where the causalities will bleed. The intensity of modern-day artillery barrages, vehicles won't offer the protection that the infantry requires.

Also, the A-10 situation was under the assumption the other party (the one sending the A-10) has air superiority.

And yes, I know the entire point of APCs and IFVs. I'm just saying that riding them desant or not doesn't matter, the infantry inside them is fucked either way if they engage in high-intensity combat. So I'd say that they'd prefer desant because their chances are a lot higher then, as they can quicker get off the vehicle and into combat positions and get away from the vehicle in case of attack that would destroy the vehicle.

1) Well you haven't read anything, except maybe Isby and his ilk, judging from your attempt at piecing it together.

2) Yes, this makes sense when the air is filled with shrapnel. Plenty of sense.

3) ODS isn't comparable, and not really relevant. It's more relevant than COIN though because it actually lets you test things, like logistics, since there is a significant use of artillery by Allied troops. On the other hand, there was zero organised resistance to Allied air and ground forces, with just small pockets of companies or battalions of Iraqi troops who either surrendered or fought against grossly better trained NATO forces. It was really just a live fire training exercise for the NATO troops, and a complete wash for the Iraqis who tried to fight but couldn't because they were completely unable to oppose the Allied air forces.

Yes, it shows what happens when the enemy cannot oppose your air force because he lacks an air force or air defence of his own. Why is that relevant to a parity opponent who has similar aircraft and superior air defence artillery? Please, tell me.

I shan't get into the A-10 survival rate in the late 1980's against a Soviet forward IADS, but it wasn't pretty. I'm thinking of a very particular estimate of sortie survival on some blog (I think it might have been up-ship) for the A-10 that had some really grim statistics.

Regardless, Falklands is a better one to pick. It was against parity troops who were both well trained, conventional armies, even if both sides lacked artillery and mechanisation. If you're going to pick something to show what air defences can do while being biased about it, pick a war where they were actually used, not just a curbstomp by a vastly more powerful and capable coalition of countries beating up some dirt farmers.

4) If the IFV doesn't offer protection from artillery, nothing does. Its sole purpose in life is to keep infantry alive under armour, and transport them to their objective fast enough to keep up with the main battle tanks.

those farmers fought the soviet army and its fully mechanised military. perhaps you should ask them. at the very least, its a more current example than WW2.

Why?

They're probably illiterate and don't know maths, so they can't put it into any meaningful terms. The Soviets themselves decided that such lessons learned in Afghanistan were irrelevant to a high intensity war, but relevant if the USSR were to continue COIN.

Zapad-81 is a much better way of learning how to fight a high intensity war.

because they won, for starters.

[Questers]

A soviet division's artillery regiment in 1989 had 3 troops of 6 mrls. The regiment did not have any mrls.

[GHawkins]

However, in combat, infantry running tires them out which degrades their combat effectiveness.

Which is why they do this sort of thing to get fit:

A flanking maneuver of several miles while under fire. No army in the world trains their soldiers for that. Feel free to correct me there. However, running in combat to do such a flanking maneuver in large scale combat is a lot more tiring than what they have to run at basic.

[Questers]

The USSR also intended to use the firing ports on the BMP until the infantry were very close. http://www.balagan.org.uk/war/arab-isra ... soviet.htm this is a reasonably good summary.

[Elan Valleys]

Which is why they do this sort of thing to get fit:

A flanking maneuver of several miles while under fire. No army in the world trains their soldiers for that. Feel free to correct me there. However, running in combat to do such a flanking maneuver in large scale combat is a lot more tiring than what they have to run at basic.

Those men are running 20 miles, with 20kg of weight, in 4 and a bit hours.

For a flanking manoeuvre, you need someone to engage and 'fix' the enemy. therefore (hopefully) preventing them shooting the flanking force.

[Lubyak]

Could I ask for a link to some of these documents on Soviet tactical/strategic thinking?

[GHawkins]

Could I ask for a link to some of these documents on Soviet tactical/strategic thinking?

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf

Best I could find. I only proof read some things and it seems useful. Please bear in mind that this was written by the US Army and not by any Soviet official. As I don't speak Russian whatsoever, I'm afraid of starting to dig into Russian websites.

[GHawkins]

Another thing I wanted to ask in regards to MANPADS.

I've been looking at equipping my army with either of two options;

I have the Starstreak missile. There are advantages and disadvantages to it, namely the way it has to be guided to its target by the operator and the fact it can only damage the target by actually hitting it (no airburst).

On the other hand, I am looking at the Stinger. Stinger is a launch and forget, but it can be decoyed by countermeasures.

I don't know which one to take. If anyone could help me with a decision. I've been looking at the two because I keep in line with my nation being primarily NATO-orientated. So I'd love people to bring up alternatives, as long as they are NATO-country issued/used.

[Galla-]

1) Well you haven't read anything, except maybe Isby and his ilk, judging from your attempt at piecing it together.

2) Yes, this makes sense when the air is filled with shrapnel. Plenty of sense.

3) ODS isn't comparable, and not really relevant. It's more relevant than COIN though because it actually lets you test things, like logistics, since there is a significant use of artillery by Allied troops. On the other hand, there was zero organised resistance to Allied air and ground forces, with just small pockets of companies or battalions of Iraqi troops who either surrendered or fought against grossly better trained NATO forces. I shan't get into the A-10 survival rate in the late 1980's against a Soviet forward IADS, but it wasn't pretty. I'm thinking of a very particular estimate of sortie survival on some blog (I think it might have been up-ship) for the A-10 that had some really, really grim statistics.

Regardless, Falklands is a better one to pick. It was against parity troops who were both well trained, conventional armies.

4) If the IFV doesn't offer protection from artillery, nothing does. Its sole purpose in life is to keep infantry alive under armour, and transport them to their objective fast enough to keep up with the main battle tanks.

1. I'm doing a project on a hypothetical cold war gone hot. The entire point of Soviet Doctrine was to steamroll over NATO in Germany. You can't steamroll over anyone if you're going at a walking pace. NATO would've set up defensive lines inside Germany. From defensive line to defensive line, the infantry would ride inside the vehicles. However, in combat, infantry running tires them out which degrades their combat effectiveness. If they have to quickly move to another position, having them enter the IFV would take a longer time than jumping on top (I think that's the case, I haven't tried I have to admit). Yes, they make a bigger target and are more vulnerable. However, if you can quickly get out of the combat zone without becoming a target for the bigger guns, than staying in the field longer to load the troops and have a Javelin operator find you, I think you'd prefer the first.

2. The air is filled with shrapnel anyway. So the entire doctrine of the Soviets would be flawed because they had the infantry run besides their vehicles when on the offensive against main defensive lines. That infantry isn't protected by the IFV if they're outside it. And on the inside, they can't do what they are supposed to do and that's fight.

3. Because we can't really test the A-10's combat effectiveness in combat against the Soviet forces, I'll not comment on this point.

4. That all depends on the doctrine. Soviet doctrine was to dismount. The MBTs would form the teeth but behind it the infantry and their IFVs would come. It's purpose was to advance alongside the infantry and give them teeth against entrenched or armoured foes. Not to transport. APCs goal was to transport. IFVs are there to engage and destroy the enemy in a support role of the infantry.

And yet since then armies have moved to closed top vehicles. Why? Because of air burst artillery, didn't want that going off over your open topped APC.

Regarding the modern air defense, that is true. I won't comment on that.

However, this I'd like to comment on. Yes, you are right. They enclosed the vehicle to protect them from shrapnel. But the entire point of mechanized warfare is not to have the infantry sit idle in the vehicle while it's engaged in combat. They are supposed to dismount. And if they are dismounted and doing what they're supposed to do, that air burst artillery will still come. Yet then, they are spread out and not on a concentrated bunch which would've made a lot more casualties.

1. What?

2. It wasn't.

3. Good, because it means I can. Because there wasn't an actual WW3, we can only look at contemporary estimates. The USAF in the 1980's said some things about the A-10's survival in a hypothetical WW3.

- Assumes would be a deployment of 68 A-10s each to six forward bases in West Germany.
- Each pilot would be expected to fly four sorties per day, at most.
- 4*68=272. 272 sorties per base per day, on paper.
- ~7% of aircraft would be lost per 100 sorties.
- During the Vietnam War, the USAF considered 2% loss rates on combat aircraft to be unsustainable. 7% is unimaginable.

Assuming a maximum sortie generation rate for the bases for one day, and considering they'd have no shortage of targets this isn't entirely unrealistic I'm sure, each base will generate let's say 270 sorties. Fine, this is maximum missions, let's get out there and shoot commies because this is the Final War. 1,600 sorties. Day one. Go.

First 100 sorties the A-10 fleet is diminished by 29 aircraft. Next 100 sorties, by 26 aircraft. After 200 sorties, the A-10 fleet is down to ~350 airframes. Next 100 sorties, 25 airframes are lost. Next 100 sorties, 23 airframes. Have you been keeping track? We're down 103 aircraft after 400 missions, or just barely one mission per pilot.

103 aircraft in the first wave. That's over 25% casualties. In any other time, any other place, and any other unit the A-10 force would be considered destroyed and unable to continue combat.

Let's keep going!

Second wave, the USAF decides to cut its losses and drop the sortie rate to 1,200 instead of 1,600, let's be fair.
305*0.07 = 21. 21 aircraft lost in the first 100 sorties of the 2nd wave. Next 100, 20 aircraft. Next 100, 18 aircraft. Next 100, 17 aircraft. End of second wave, 76 aircraft lost.
Third wave starts, we're down to 229 A-10s for the Allied air forces.
First sorties, 16 aircraft lost. Second 100 sorties, 15 aircraft lost. Next 100 sorties, 14 aircraft lost. Final 100 sorties, 12 aircraft lost. 57 aircraft lost in the final wave for the day.

End combat missions day one, World War 3. The American air force has lost 236 A-10s out of a total of 408. This is a 57% loss. By the end of day one of WW3, the USAF has lost over half its A-10 force. The A-10 fleet in Europe is completely annihilated as a force by day four, to the man.

These are actual USAF estimates at the time.

How is ODS relevant, considering only like 2 A-10s were shot down on Year 2 or whatever?

4. IFVs are APCs. \: Soviet infantry do not dismount from BMPs, they ride through the enemy to their objective AND THEN dismount. On top of the objective. The enemy is likely unwilling to call on fire support against his own troops, after all. Best to intermingle with them to prevent the use of artillery.

because they won, for starters.

So what? What did Vietnam tell the USAF about fighting WW3 with tactical nuclear weapons? What did Angola tell the Soviets about fighting the NATO armies in Western Europe?

Could I ask for a link to some of these documents on Soviet tactical/strategic thinking?

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf

Best I could find. I only proof read some things and it seems useful. Please bear in mind that this was written by the US Army and not by any Soviet official. As I don't speak Russian whatsoever, I'm afraid of starting to dig into Russian websites.

No! We do not use Cold War-era documentation about the OPFOR.

We use post-Cold War Heavy OPFOR manuals that detail exactly what the Soviets were doing, instead of what we think they were going to do.

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRec ... =ADA304332

Another thing I wanted to ask in regards to MANPADS.

I've been looking at equipping my army with either of two options;

I have the Starstreak missile. There are advantages and disadvantages to it, namely the way it has to be guided to its target by the operator and the fact it can only damage the target by actually hitting it (no airburst).

On the other hand, I am looking at the Stinger. Stinger is a launch and forget, but it can be decoyed by countermeasures.

I don't know which one to take. If anyone could help me with a decision. I've been looking at the two because I keep in line with my nation being primarily NATO-orientated. So I'd love people to bring up alternatives, as long as they are NATO-country issued/used.

Stinger.

Put the silly RMP Block II upgrades on it so flares don't work and the enemy has to use lasers.

[Questers]

Questarian cavalry regiment

Cavalry Regiment

Regimental Headquarters (x1)
Personnel: 135
25 x officers, (CO Colonel)
57 x NCOs
154 x enlisted

Equipment:
1 x MBT-Command
2 x APCs
4 x scout cars
3 x command trucks
18 x jeeps
5 x radio van
3 x APC-Staff
12 x motorcycles
4 x 5t truck
1 x IFV-Recce/Command
4 x APC-Recce
4 x IFV-Recce

Headquarters Company
----- 4 motorcycles, 8 jeeps, 3 command trucks, 4 scout cars, 2 APC, 1 MBT-Command
----- 2 staff APC, 3 5 ton trucks
----- 84 personnel: 11 officers, 22 NCOs, 51 enlisted (CO Colonel)

Band
----- 1 5t truck
----- 16 personnel (1, 2, 13)

Traffic Control Platoon
----- 5 jeeps, 2 5t trucks
----- 35 personnel (2, 5, 28)

Signals Company
----- 3 motorcycles, 5 jeeps, 3 5t trucks, 5 radio van, 3 APC-Staff,
----- 58 personnel (6, 16, 36)

Recon Company
Personnel: 43
Officers: 5
NCOs: 12
Enlisted: 26

Equipment:
1 x IFV-Recce/Command
4 x APC-Recce
4 x IFV-Recce
5 x Motorcycles
1 x 5t Truck

Headquarters
----- 1 IFV-Recce/Command, 1 5t Truck
----- 9 personnel
Wheeled Platoon
----- 4 APC-Recce
----- 12 personnel
Tracked Platoon
----- 4 IFV-Recce
----- 12 personnel
Motorcycle Platoon
----- 5 motorcycles
----- 10 personnel

Infantry Battalion (x1)
Personnel: 752
38 x officers (CO Lieutenant-Colonel; COM-BAT)
91 x NCOs
623 x enlisted

Equipment:
14 x 5 ton trucks
58 x IFV
1 x IFV-Signals
4 x jeeps
1 x motorcycle
7 x tracked APC
3 x liquid carriers
4 x trailers
1 x radio van
1 x staff APC
2 x ambulance
2 x maintenance workshop

Weaponry:
15 x 120mm mortars
27 x MMG
9 x HMG
6 x heavy sniper rifles
9 x MANPADs
6 x AGS

- Headquarters
----- Jeep, 5 ton truck, 1 IFV, 1 IFV-Signals, 1 staff APC
----- 38 personnel
- Motor Rifle Company
----- 13 IFV
----- 130 personnel
----- 2 x 120mm mortars
----- 2 x HMG
- Motor Rifle Company
----- 13 IFV
----- 130 personnel
----- 2 x 120mm mortars
----- 2 x HMG
- Motor Rifle Company
----- 13 IFV
----- 130 personnel
----- 2 x 120mm mortars
----- 2 x HMG
- Heavy Weapons Company
----- 13 IFV
----- 60 personnel
----- 3 x 120mm mortars
----- 3 x HMG
----- 6 x Sniper teams
- Mortar Battery
----- 1 jeep, 7 tracked APC
----- 46 personnel
----- 6 x 81mm mortars
- Anti-aircraft Platoon
----- 3 IFVs
----- 9 MANPADs
----- 30 personnel
- Grenadier Platoon
----- 3 IFVs
----- 6 AGS
----- 30 personnel
- Supply Platoon
----- 4 5t trucks
----- 18 personnel
-- Service Section
----- 2 5t trucks
----- 12 personnel
-- Motor Transport Section
----- 3 liquid carriers
----- 3 5t truck, 1 trailer
----- 30 personnel
-- Mess Section
----- 1 jeep, 4 5t truck, 5 trailers
----- 40 personnel
-- Communications Section
----- 1 motorcycle, 1 jeep, 1 radio van, 2 staff APC,
----- 36 personnel
-- Medical Station
----- 2 Ambulance
----- 10 personnel
-- Repairs Station
----- 2 Maintenance workshop
----- 12 personnel

Cavalry Battalion (x4)
Personnel: 314
25 x officers
58 x NCOs
231 x enlisted

Equipment:
1 x jeep
3 x staff APC
9 x 5t truck
1 x command van
1 x ARV
9 x trailers
3 x liquid carriers
4 x MBT-command
36 x MBT
4 x scout car
1 x scout car-command
4 x light tank
4 x IFV-recce

Headquarters
----- 1 Jeep, 2 staff APC, 1 MBT-Command
----- 38 personnel
Service Platoon
----- 1 staff APC, 6 5t trucks, 6 trailers, 3 liquid carriers
----- 48 personnel
Maintenance Section
----- 1 Command van, 1 trailer, 1 ARV
----- 14 personnel
Tank Company
----- 12 MBT, 1 MBT-Command, 1 5t truck
----- 58 personnel
Tank Company
----- 12 MBT, 1 MBT-Command, 1 5t truck
----- 58 personnel
Tank Company
----- 12 MBT, 1 MBT-Command, 1 5t truck
----- 58 personnel
Reconaissance Company
----- 4 Scout Car, 4 Light tank, 4 IFV-Recce, 1 Scout Car-Command,
----- 40 personnel

Howitzer Battalion
Personnel: 910
79 x officers
198 x NCOs
633 x enlisted

Equipment:
2 x jeeps
1 x ambulance
4 x maintenance vehicles
5 x liquid carriers
57 x 5t trucks
10 x ACRV (Artillery Command and Recce Vehicle)
4 x Fire Direction trucks
2 x trailers
24 x 122mm SP-Art
8 x 155mm SP-Art

Headquarters
----- 1 jeep, 2 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 IFV-Radar
----- 38 personnel
Gun Battery
----- 8 122mm SP-Art, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 184 personnel
Gun Battery
----- 8 122mm SP-Art, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 184 personnel
Gun Battery
----- 8 122mm SP-Art, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 184 personnel
Gun Battery
----- 8 155mm SP-Art, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 184 personnel
Supply Section
----- 1 jeep, 5 5t trucks, 2 trailers, 5 liquid carriers
----- 80 personnel
Maintenance Section
----- 2 5t trucks, 4 maintenance vehicles
----- 52 personnel
Medical Section
----- 1 ambulance
----- 4 personnel

Air Defence Battalion
Personnel: 118 personnel
18 x officers
25 x NCO
75 x enlisted

Equipment:
1 x staff APC
6 x AD vehicles
6 x SAM vehicles
12x 5t trucks
1 x van
3 x radar vehicles

Headquarters
----- 1 staff APC
----- 6 personnel
AD Troop
----- 3 AD vehicles, 3 5t trucks
----- 24 personnel
AD Troop
----- 3 AD vehicles, 3 5t trucks
----- 24 personnel
SAM Troop
----- 3 SAM vehicles, 3 5t trucks
----- 24 personnel
SAM Troop
----- 3 SAM vehicles, 3 5t trucks
----- 24 personnel
Acquisition Troop
----- 1 van, 3 radar vehicles
----- 16 personnel


Mortar Battalion
Personnel: 609
54 x officers
138 x NCOs
417 x enlisted

Equipment:
2 x jeeps
1 x ambulance
4 x maintenance vehicles
5 x liquid carriers
57 x 5t trucks
8 x ACRV (Artillery Command and Recce Vehicle)
3 x Fire Direction trucks
2 x trailers
16 x 120mm SP-Mortar
8 x 220mm SP-Mortar

Headquarters
----- 1 jeep, 2 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 IFV-Radar
----- 38 personnel
Mortar Battery
----- 8 120mm SP-Mortars, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 145 personnel
Mortar Battery
----- 8 120mm SP-Mortars, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 145 personnel
Mortar Battery
----- 8 220mm SP-Mortars, 12 5t trucks, 2 ACRV, 1 FD Truck
----- 145 personnel
Supply Section
----- 1 jeep, 5 5t trucks, 2 trailers, 5 liquid carriers
----- 80 personnel
Maintenance Section
----- 2 5t trucks, 4 maintenance vehicles
----- 52 personnel
Medical Section
----- 1 ambulance
----- 4 personnel

Engineer Battalion
Personnel: 705
72 x officers
178 x NCOs
555 x enlisted

Equipment:
1 x jeep
12 x APC
19 x 5t trucks
1 x armoured bridgelayer
24 x MBT-Engineer
2 x MBT-Engineer-Command
8 x IFV-Engineer
1 x jeep mine detector,
2 x bulldozers
2 x trenching tractors
12 x treadway bridge
3 x minelayers
2 x dump trucks
3 x cranes
3 x van

Headquarters & Services
----- 1 jeep, 4 APC, 8 5t truck, 1 arm'd bridgelayer
----- 48 personnel
Mineclearer Company
----- 12 mineclearers, 3 5t trucks
----- 60 personnel
Sapper Company (x2)
---- 4 5 trucks, 4 IFV-Engineers, 4 APCs
---- 120 personnel
Tank Company (x2)
---- 12 MBT-Engineer, 1 MBT-Engineer-Command
---- 40 personnel
Bridging Company
----- 1 jeep-mine detector, 2 bulldozer, 2 trenching tractor, 12 treadway bridge
----- 90 personnel
Sapper/Minelayer Platoon
----- 3 minelayers
----- 15 personnel
Construction Platoon
----- 2 dump trucks, 3 cranes, 3 vans
----- 12 personnel

Support Battalion
Personnel: 286
Officers: 15
NCOs: 55
Enlisted: 216

Equipment:
55 5t trucks
1 staff APC
1 jeep
40 trailers
20 liquid carriers

Headquarters
----- Jeep, 1 5t truck, 1 staff APC
----- 9 personnel
Transport Company
----- 54 5t trucks, 20 trailers
----- 108 personnel
Fuel Company
----- 20 liquid carriers, 20 trailers
----- 40 personnel
Maintenance Company
----- 12 maintenance workshops, 3 ARVs, 1 crane, 3 tank repair
----- 75 personnel (4, 12, 59)
CRBN Defence Company
----- 1 jeep, 3 5t trucks, 3 CRBN Recce
----- 36 (3, 9, 24)
Supply and Service Platoon
----- 7 5t trucks
----- 18 personnel (1, 4, 13)

Totals:
Personnel: 4457
Officers: 401
NCOs: 974
Enlisted: 3082

Equipment:
1 x MBT-Command (Regiment) [SA-20RFZ1A]
16 x MBT-Command (Company) [SA-20RFZ1]
4 x MBT-Command (Battalion) [SA-20RFZ]
144 x MBT [SA-20RF]
24 x MBT-Engineer [SA-20RFS1]
2 x MBT-Engineer-Command (Company) [SA-20RFSZ1]
14 x APCs [PT-90]
18 x APC-Staff [PT-90]
4 x APC-Recce [PT-90R]
7 x tracked APC [SA-1]
24 x 122mm SP-Art [SPG-6]
8 x 155mm SP-Art [SPG-5]
6 x AD vehicles [Cedar]
6 x SAM vehicles [Cypress]
16 x 120mm SP-Mortar [SPM-3]
8 x 220mm SP-Mortar [SPM-2]
20 x IFV-Recce [SA-3RA]/[SA-3RO]
1 x IFV-Recce/Command [SA-3RAZ]
58 x IFV [SA-3D]
1 x IFV-Signals [SA-3DZ]
8 x IFV-Engineer [SA-3DS]
20 x scout car [BDRM-2]
4 x scout car-command [BDRM-2U]
16 x light tank [SA-7F]
29 x jeeps [Land rover]
13 x motorcycles
5 x radio van
3 x command trucks
257 x 5-ton truck
64 x trailers
42 x liquid carriers
4 x ambulance
1 x radio van
4 x command van
3 x liquid carriers
14 x maintenance workshop
8 x maintenance vehicles
7 x ARV
3 x tank repair workshops
18 x ACRV (Artillery Command and Recce Vehicle)
7 x Fire Direction trucks
4 x van
3 x radar vehicles
1 x armoured bridgelayer
1 x jeep mine detector,
2 x bulldozers
2 x trenching tractors
12 x treadway bridge
3 x minelayers
2 x dump trucks
4 x cranes
3 x CRBN Recce

[Galla-]

I tried to be this spergy once and only made it as far as something like an infantry brigade.

Then I just did OTAN-style ones and those are much easier and lazier.

[The UK in Exile]

because they won, for starters.

So what? What did Vietnam tell the USAF about fighting WW3 with tactical nuclear weapons? What did Angola tell the Soviets about fighting the NATO armies in Western Europe?

all sorts, you saw the Air Force taking strategic bombers and assigning them to tactical targets, that dogfights were still a thing, that air-defences had reached a level of sophistication requiring dedicated SEAD.

[Galla-]

So what? What did Vietnam tell the USAF about fighting WW3 with tactical nuclear weapons? What did Angola tell the Soviets about fighting the NATO armies in Western Europe?

all sorts, you saw the Air Force taking strategic bombers and assigning them to tactical targets, that dogfights were still a thing, that air-defences had reached a level of sophistication requiring dedicated SEAD.

OK you did get me on the dogfights and stuff like Shrike TBF, but the bombers things would never happen against the USSR. Given Soviet support for the North Vietnamese, it's hardly a surprise. The USAF and USN did learn a fair lot.

The US Army and USMC otoh, not so much. Just look at how Cheyenne panned out. \:

[The UK in Exile]

all sorts, you saw the Air Force taking strategic bombers and assigning them to tactical targets, that dogfights were still a thing, that air-defences had reached a level of sophistication requiring dedicated SEAD.

OK you did get me on the dogfights and stuff like Shrike TBF, but the bombers things would never happen against the USSR. Given Soviet support for the North Vietnamese, it's hardly a surprise. The USAF and USN did learn a fair lot.

The US Army and USMC otoh, not so much. Just look at how Cheyenne panned out.

they used them against Iraq, and once the strategic mission has been taken away from the B-52, why the hell not?

The army learned a hard lesson about Media management and Short service tours.

[Galla-]

OK you did get me on the dogfights and stuff like Shrike TBF, but the bombers things would never happen against the USSR. Given Soviet support for the North Vietnamese, it's hardly a surprise. The USAF and USN did learn a fair lot.

The US Army and USMC otoh, not so much. Just look at how Cheyenne panned out.

they used them against Iraq, and once the strategic mission has been taken away from the B-52, why the hell not?

The army learned a hard lesson about Media management and Short service tours.

Don't worry, WW3 would be short enough that service tours and media wouldn't be a serious problem. It would only last a month at most.

[Ayreonia]

As someone who has served in a mechanized unit, let me throw in my two cents:

- Riding desant in combat is a very, VERY bad idea. Not only does it expose the infantry to small arms fire and shrapnel, it also makes them vulnerable to weapons that don't affect the IFV itself. Let's say the vehicle gets hit by a 25mm HE shell, which is something a modern IFV should be able to shrug off. The infantry riding outside? They're fucked.
- Desanting doesn't really offer any advantages over riding inside. A well-drilled squad is able to dismount in seconds, and eight or so people climbing onto the vehicle actually takes more time than them entering through the hatch(es).
- It's funny that nobody so far has considered that the turret is pretty fucking hard to turn if there's dudes sitting all over the deck.
- For the "fast flanking" advocates: it actually is fast. What if there's a bump (spoiler: there are)? Guys flying off the deck. Same goes for sudden braking.
- No, you're not supposed to dismount on top of the enemy. The IFV and the infantry are there to support each other. Granted, there are situations where you can't help it, but in general, IFV + dismounted squad > IFV + guys inside.

[Samozaryadnyastan]

Thirty is more than the Soviets gave to entire Divisions.

Oh wow, that is a bit ridiculous.
Could I go higher than six without everything going crazy, or would one battery be the limit?

In fairness, while a Division had less than 30 MLRS, in the eighties these MLRS consisted of almost entirely BM-21. Lightweight 122mm rockets. The remainder of the Division had well over a hundred 152mm artillery pieces.

Heftier stuff like Smerch was the asset of a Front's Machine Gun and Artillery Division.

Since you're running with the Regimental model, I'd figure that two batteries of six BM-27 (220mm) sized pieces.

The USSR also intended to use the firing ports on the BMP until the infantry were very close. http://www.balagan.org.uk/war/arab-isra ... soviet.htm this is a reasonably good summary.

Is this part of why BMP-3 has two hull-mounted PKTs?