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(AMW) The Federated Islamic States

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Chemaki
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(AMW) The Federated Islamic States

Postby Chemaki » Sun Feb 24, 2013 6:48 am

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תðʋϧᵹϗð תʋɤᶋףɤףת ðſðלᶋƣɤʯɤƣ תðɕלðʋᵹ

The Federated Islamic States
الدول الإسلامية الاتحادية
کشورهای اسلامی متحد


"One Under God"



Full Name: The Federated Islamic States

Common Names: The FIS, The Islamic States

Capital: Mashhad

National Anthem: Mawtini

Military Anthem: Walla Zaman Ya Selahy

Official Language: Arabic

Common Languages: Pashto, Persian, Arabic, Urdu

Ethnic Groups: Pashtun (35%) , Persian (31%), Arabic (11%), Balochi (6%), Turkmen (4%), Sindhi (4%), Kurd (3%), Punjabi (2%), Other (4%).

Government: Federal Republic

Head of State: Sheikh Ghāīrat Hādi

Head of Government: President Mirzal Dagarzai

State Religion: Islam

Formation: 7th June 1838.

Total Area: 2,507,483 km2

Percent Water: Negligible

Population: 171,189,533

Nominal GDP: $2.18 Trillion (PPP: $2.64 Trillion)

Per Capita GDP: $12,747 (PPP: $15,430)

HDI: 0.891 (Very High)
Life Expectancy: 79.2 years
Literacy Rate: 98%
Gross Enrolment Ratio: 97%
GDP Per Capita (PPP) $15,430


Currency: Rial (1 Rial = 0.617 $)

Internet TLD: .fis

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Last edited by Chemaki on Fri May 29, 2015 9:35 am, edited 21 times in total.

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Chemaki
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Postby Chemaki » Sun Feb 24, 2013 7:01 am

History of the Federated Islamic States


The Dark Ages

Since the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, the area known now as Sarmatia became a fractured melting pot of various Indo-European and Indo-Turkic tribes and cultures, the three most influential being the Pashtuns, the Balochis and the Khurasanis. After half a millenium of Islamic rule, these three large ethnic groups were united in matters of religion, but their political standpoints put each other at odds. The Pashtuns sought to build a new Indian state around the Indus valley and the Afghan foothills, believing themselves to be the rightful claimants to the land after centuries of opression from Islamic Turks. The Khurasanis, meanwhile, were a major power in Central Asia, using their alliance with the emerging Khwarazmian Empire to secure territory around the Caspian Sea. The Balochi nomads provided an important buffer between the two factions, allowing trade to continue across the region; for Arabic and European weapons to be imported east to the Pashtuns, and for surplus crops to be sold to the Khurasanis.

This arrangement proved very fruitful for those involved - The Khurasanis reconquered the old Abbasid territories in Persia, whilst the Pashtuns expanded along the Indus River, their agricultural production supplying both the Balochis and the Kurasani Emirate. However, when the Mongols conquered Khwarazm in 1256, the Kurasani Emirate refused to capitulate, and formed a mutual pact with the Balochis and the Pashtuns in an attempt to secure the Afghan foothills. In 1318, the Khurasani Sheikh, Jalan Hasar, married the Pashtun Princess Tahira and thus united the two nations. Hasar proclaimed himself in control of the new Iranian Caliphate before annexing the Balochi land and thus creating the first unified state in Samartia since the Umayyads. Accepted by many Samartian scholars to be the creation of the first itineration of the Samartian state, Hasar's and Tahira's marriage is now a public holiday, and the subject of arguably the most popular Samartian myth, 'The Princess and the Pashtun'.

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Entitled 'The Princess' Procession', this early 20th century Walmingtonian painting of the story was bought by the Sheikh Mahdi in 1987, where it has since resided in the Sheikh's Palace. The story of 'The Princess and the Pashtun' is one of the longest and most famous epics of Samartian literature, a story recounting Hasar's early childhood, and how he, a distant relative of Muhammed and an ethnic Pashtun in Khurasan, eventually rose to become a Khurasani governor, and finally Sheikh. The story reaches a climax during the heavily romanticized, grandiose wedding ceremony which united the Pashtuns and the Khurasani, a moment which has lives on for hundreds of years through works of literature, plays and films.


The Eleventh Khanate


Hasar's decision to make his son heir to the throne and impose a monarchy proved to be the Caliphate's undoing, however, when his grandson refused to negotiate with the Grand Host, and angered Tamerlane by forbidding trade between the two nations. An unpopular ruler, Afzal Hasar raised taxes to modernize and standardize the Iranian military, and a mandatory grain tax to raise money via exports to Muslim Arabia created a huge famine during the 1360s. After a revolt in the Indus valley left Khurasani Iran starving, Afzal mustered the entirety of his 'model army' to supress the rebellion. With no logistical planning for a long-term conflict, however, the campaign was a failiure, and Afzal returned to Khurasan where he was forced by local governors to capitulate to the Grand Host and lower taxes.

Since the fall of the Iranian Caliphate, the area became the eleventh Khanate, the semi-autonomous Ilkhanate, a constitutional state ruled by the Khans from Afzhal's lineage, and the Council, made up by the Ilkhanate's citizenry. However, the Ilkhanate collapsed around the same time as the Depkazi Khanates, after Khan Salahuddin converted to Christianity after inviting a Shieldian missionary into his palace. Outraged by Salahuddin's choice to convert and then declare independence from the Grand Host as the first Christian Khanate, as well as doubtful of Salahuddin's claim to be a descendent of Muhammed (for it was revealed that he may have been a bastard child) the Council attempted to force Salahuddin to convert back, but with no support from the other Khanates, the Council was powerless to stop Salahuddin. In 1768, however, after Salahuddin converted the Mashhad mosque into the Khanate's first cathedral, widespread rioting forced Salahuddin to flee across the country to Karachi. Now in control of the Khanate's capital, the Council declared themselves provisional government of the Ilkhanate and put a bounty on the Khan's head. Upon arriving in Karachi, Salahuddin and his small contigent of missionaries were ambushed by bandits and massacred at the city gates. As Salahuddin's head was held aloft for all to see, the bandits chanted "Free! We are free! The Khans are no more! Samartia is free!"

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Flag of the Christian Ilkhanate


Revolution and reform

As this message resounded around the now-independent nation, the provisional government took the old Hellenistic name of Samartia as the nation's new name. Despite the tensions that have always ran deep between the Khanates of Central Asia and the Christian Middle East, Samartia was chosen for its ethnic and cultural neutrality, as well as its lack of connotations with the old Iranian Caliphate. With no longer any bloodline that could claim itself descended from the Prophet, the provisional government decided to lay the foundations for the first Islamic Republic. Wealthy landowners and governors across Samartia now had the right to run for Chancellor, or vote for other candidates to be admitted into the government. Elections would be held every five years, after which the council would choose from who most popular ten candidates who would replace unpopular or ineffective Chancellors. The Sheikh would be chosen internally from the council and receive a lifetime position as the head and representative of the government.

The democratic but inflexible government proved to be very stable in Samartia's early years. The fifty-or-so Chancellors (the number would fluctuate as said Chancellors would see fit) were eager to build their own power and solidify the council's rule in the turbulent times following the Khan's overthrow, and only the most competent Chancellors would be able to serve life terms inside the council. However, the council was very Roman-esque, and almost all of the Chancellors were corrupt and elitist, forming power blocs who would force uncooperative Chancellors out during each election. The council had to effectively manage the emerging Samartia, however, to protect their interests, and through necessity modernized Samartian agriculture and infrastructure, as well as passing city planning regulations in the old urban centers of Mashhad, Kandahar, Karachi and Bandar Abbas.

The council also managed to bring Samartia out of decades of isolation, focusing on foreign policy, trade in the Indian Ocean and modernizing the army and navy. With only limited trade between Samartia and its Christian neighbours to the West, the Republic relied on trade with the European powers via Africa, as well as East African states themselves. Trade between the Republic and the remaining Depkazi states flourished as well, and through the Shield and Depkazia, Samartia managed to obtain designs for muskets and early rifles, which were used for the Reformed Infantry corps and the Mounted Sharpshooters corps respectively. In the setting of the Afghan and Khurasani foothills, the Mounted Sharpshooters proved to be extremely effective. The early effectiveness of the new army encouraged the Samartian Council to produce its own firearms through a string of semi-privatized workshops and early factories, which, at the turn of the 19th century, led to a huge industrial boon as coal reserves were found around Karachi and were used to power munitions (and later textiles) factories.

Military expansion and the first Gulf War


Samartia's new military and economic power was finally put to the test during the Gulf War of 1838, when a naval dispute between the Muslim Al Khalifa family of Bahrain and Qatar (the last small vestiges of the old Umayyad Caliphate) and the Christian Kingdom of Arabia sparked an intense conflict between the two states. Wishing to resolve the conflict as quickly as possible to revive trade in the Persian Gulf, Samartia supported the Al Khalifa family in return for a share in future trade tax profits. After a series of short skirmishes where the Samartian sharpshooters proved invaluable, the Republic signed a peace treaty with the Kingdom of Arabia, annexing the states of Bahrain and Qatar and creating the borders that last to this day. In an effort to cement the truce between Arabia and Samartia, as well as helping further Samartia's economic expansion, the Persian Gulf and the Straight of Hormuz became a free trade area, and thus, a prime economic center of the Middle East. The nation of Samartia and the nations of Bahrain and Qatar formally became the Union of Islamic States (the FIS) and Qatari and Bahraini ministers were incorporated into the Samartian government.

"It is unknown whether these Federated Islamic States will stand the test of time, or serve its purpose to protect and empower the Muslim citizenry of the world. What is known, however, is that the Federated Islamic States needs to."
- Sheikh Ārman Abḇazi, on the eve of the Gulf War


However, due to the huge funding the Council put in place to expand the Reformed Army in case of a full-out war with Arabia and the Christian Kingdom of Yemen, domestic economic growth was stymied, and the power divide between the members of the council and the middle class tradesmen hamstrung any entrepreneurial opportunity - All business was controlled by the various council members, and thus, business was tied in so closely with government the FIS more closely resembled a socialist instead of a capitalist state. Angered by the rise in taxes and inflation, tradesmen in Karachi and Bandar Abbas set up the Workers' Charter, a petition which called for the instatement of a freely elected chamber to handle domestic affairs, and to counter the corruption of the Council. Branches of the Chartist movement also included the famous Weaver's movement, some of the first feminists who campaigned against the old Shariah laws and for equal rights for women, including voting rites.

The Liberal Islamic States


Still overcautious about the prospect of an Arab-FIS war, the government only redirected a small portion of its troops to quell protests in Bandar Abbas and Karachi. When police and military intervention only served to heighten the protests and spread further dissent, the Council quickly capitulated in fear of a rebellion. The government became bicameral, with the inclusion of the 'Free House', a 500-strong parliament made up of local representatives who were elected by all male and female citizens of the Republic. Not only did this empower the poorer parts of society, as well as women, but it also gave more remote regions of the large nation a voice in politics (members of the Council almost exlusively came from Mashhad and Karachi). The Weavers also managed to repeal many aspects of Shariah law, allowing women to travel in public in groups, desegregating the workplace, illegalizing polygamy and giving women equal rights in marriage, divorce and legal matters as men.
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Members of the Council and key Chartist members celebrate the construction of the Free House in Mashhad.


After the Free House's creation in 1859, the FIS underwent another rapid period of industrialization, now driven by new entrepreneurs from the middle classes rather than those involved in Council politics. Bandar Abbas and Karachi became major trade ports and Samartian textiles, crops and ores were exported around the world. Controversy arose in the late 19th century as prisoners and African slaves were used to mine salt in the Afghan foothills, which led to the banning of slavery in the FIS in 1923 after mechanized mining equipment became commonplace.

The Great War and the Omani War


The FIS' part in the Great War was largely restricted due to its geopolitical location and extensive trade network. Despite allocating vast funds to keep the military well-equipped with imported and replicated European gear, the Council under Sheikh Zhubīn was still extremely cautious about angering the Aventines, and even though the Samartians openly traded with the Oakists, they also reasserted their neutrality by letting the Byzantines have free trade rights in FIS territory. The only major conflict the FIS was involved in was the Omani war of 1952 - After the discovery of oil in Northern Oman, the Christian Kingdom of Arabia occupied the region, and a bitter conflict between the Omani Emirate and the CKA ensued. With newfound confidence after remaining neutral and building its military up during the Great War, the FIS intervened in the conflict, occupying the coast around Muscat and Dubai.

Initial losses of the 1952 war were in the tens of thousands, almost crippling the military campaign - During the summer of that year the Samartian zone of control fell back to Abu Dhabi. It was only after supplying Omani rebel groups with arms and munitions that the Samartian military managed to claw back land in Southern Arabia, and after spending billions of rial on expanding the air force in light of the prospect of a prolonged Arabian war the government gained the confidence to send more men into Oman. Army volunteer levels were at an all-time high as anti-Christian sentiment spread, and before long almost 250,000 men were stationed in the newly claimed 'South Arab Strip'. After signing a truce with the Christian Kingdom of Arabia, the FIS gained full administrative control over the former Emirate.

The People's Dictatorship

The late 50s and early 60s revolved around a period of nationalization and militarization. A military coup in 1955, led to the Sheikh Zhubīn's forced resignation, and the country was brought under the control of General Na'im Yāsir. A staunch Fascist, Nā'im Yāsir believed in radical reforms to centralize Samartia and increase its military presence in the Middle East. Initially very popular for his 'democratizing' of the Samartian government (the Head of State no longer became the Sheikh, but was now the President of the Free House, and the Council was dismantled and replaced with Nā'im's personal advisers), Yāsir was proclaimed to be a national hero, a grizzled veteran after the 1952 Omani war and a living archetype of the struggle for Jihad.

"What is the Islamic world without the Federated Islamic States? Nothing."
- Nā'im Yāsir during his famous speech at Palace Square, Mashhad, after his instatement as Grand President.


It was during the 60s that the FIS began to look West towards Europe, and in the name of 'promoting stability in the Middle East after the 1952 war', Yāsir imported thousands of arms from Geletia during a trade pact which fixed the price of imported Samartian oil at an all-time low. Soon after, the FIS began the production of its own weapons - Newly-privatized arms manufacturers were paid by the government to produce the ubiquitous weapon of the Samartian (and by extension, Omani) army, the Hm̄lẖkwe-63 (HK-63), an almost exact copy of the Geletian's highly successful AKM. With the introduction of the ZPJ (Armoured Formation) the Samartian military began to mass-produce armoured carriers that could quickly be deployed in Oman or Afghanistan should the need be.

Modernization of the navy was also a priority - The introduction of new aircraft carriers to service the large Samartian airforce was vital should the FIS ever fully defend the straight of Hormuz. By rigging older battleships with flight decks the Samartian navy quickly gained a small fleet of carriers as support. However, given the limited maneuverability, poor structural design and small size the carriers were relegated to a supporting role, and a capitol carrier ship was only introduced in 1968 in the form of the Yāsir-class carrier. The design specifications for the carrier were enormous, and at a cost of almost 450 million rial per ship, the program had to be curbed to produce seven ships instead of the original twenty.

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One of the first 'M̄rghan Zalẖ' (Bird's nest) carriers built at the military port of Muscat, 1965.


This huge military program cost in excess of 400 billion rial over a decade (6% of GDP) and saw the country almost hit bankruptcy in 1969. Oil prices and taxes sharply rose and a wave of recession swept over the country as luxury goods and foodstuffs were forcibly exported and the currency inflated. A mandatory draft was introduced in 1970 when military personnel wages had to be cut to subsistence level and volunteer numbers were at an all-time low. Yāsir had to resort to increasingly extreme Islamic ideals to keep his support, claiming that Samartia now had the power to retake the Arabian peninsula and start a new Jihad. This greatly aggravated Christian powers across the Middle East and Europe, and led to the invasion of the Dhofar strip by the Kingdom of Yemen.

The Invasion of Yemen


The FIS' response was immediate and overwhelming - The numbers of the local Omani Guard swelled to almost 80,000 over the period of two weeks as draft figures soared, and an immediate reaction force of 50,000 men was sent to the Dhofar strip. The entire navy was launched and fleets sent to the Omani and Yemeni coast, as well as across the straight of Hormuz and the Eastern Indian Ocean, to secure Samartian naval waters and disrupt Yemeni shipping. Five of the seven supercarriers were based within range of the strip and Al Mukalla, which were both severely damaged by a series of air raids in early 1971. The city of Salalah was captured by the Samartian military in March that year after heavy ordinance and rocket artillery drove off the Yemeni Crusader forces.

Not content with its occupation of the Dhofar strip, the FIS military advanced along the coast, occupying local port towns and cities with the aid of the navy. Yāsir publicly promised that he would 'remove from the Christian Kingdom of Yemen any threat that it could pose', and that the FIS military would not stop advancing until Yemen was fully demilitarized. Yemen responded by arming thousands of citizens and paramilitaries, encouraging them to fight against 'Islamist oppressors'. This slowed down the Samartian advance considerably - The United Arab Front shifted little over the coming year as more troops were sent in to combat various paramilitary groups in Samartian-occupied territory.

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FIS counter-paramilitaries, both hired locals, prepare for a morning shift at an observation post along the United Arab Front.


Infuriated by the lack of progress made by the new FIS military, Yāsir diverted the Samartian special service branch (the Cẖāw Adre Sāmārt, or Samartian Affairs Bureau) to gain evidence for charging the most ineffective generals with treason, in the hopes that the rest of the army would fall into line and shift the front. Yemen, with support from Christian states all over the Middle East, was still logistically secure, even with imports from East Africa cut off, and Yāsir's advisers came to the consensus that unless Yemen was occupied by the end of the year (1972), estimated losses would be too high to justify continuing the conflict. To close the distance between the United Arab Front and Yemen's capital, St. Abraham, Yāsir funded the construction of the first of a dozen 'Area Denial Systems' around the Dhofar strip. These systems were automated and designed for defense against a concentrated invasion force - Each was loaded with hundreds or thousands of rockets and heavy mortars, some with ranges of up to 100-150 miles, all of which could be launched by a skeleton staff of a few dozen trained soldiers. The Area Denial Systems were irregular and secluded, however, and reliable figures are only named for one ADS outside Salalah, which had 3,700 rockets, 300 heavy mortar rounds and 74 full-time operators. Though, theoretically, the feat of firing off so much ammunition at a moment's notice was impressive, the tactility of the Area Denial Systems was very limited, and the threat of accidental threat detection was a major disincentive.

Collateral Damage


Nowhere was this more apparent than in the 1972 Al-Khatab incident, when an Arabic pirate radio ship sailed 20 miles off of the coast of the Dhofar strip. After failing to respond to radio identification requests and shutting its radio communications down, the operators of ADS-6 (based near Salalah) mistook it for a military submarine and targeted the radio ship, sinking it during the early hours of May 4th, two days after the ship first entered Samartian waters. All 44 civilians onboard the ship died at sea, and a protracted week-long rescue/salvage mission found no survivors. In a bid to halt any international repercussions, Yāsir imposed a media blackout, and details of the incident, including those involved, only surfaced a decade later.

"Al-Khatab was not a matter of national concern. It was an isolated incident and a matter of national security, and not in the public interest... The allegations of other attacks on civilians by the Area Denial Systems are ungrounded and a conspiracy by the former Yemeni government, and by extension the Christian world, planted into our nation to destabilize it from the inside."
- Na'im Yāsir during the Tyrant's Trial.


Similar media blackouts were also imposed on chemical gas attacks across the United Arab Front, both to keep army morale up and to keep support. The final death tolls of the Yemeni war were only released in August, 1972, after the Yemeni government surrendered in St. Abraham, a few hours after the king was killed by a missile strike on the Palace. Amongst the figures were over 30,000 unaccounted civilian deaths, mostly from the indiscriminate use of rockets, artillery and chemical weapons as the front pushed forward. This fact was quickly overlooked, however, as celebration of the victory boosted national spirits, and Samartian Nationalism reached an all-time high.

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Samartian Engineers wait to advance from their dugouts during the siege of St. Abraham.


The Two-State Solution


In a rare moment of diplomatic tact, Yāsir arranged for a formal meeting with the Arabian King Leopold IX where he discussed the possibility of a two-state solution. Unlike the State of Oman which was fully incorporated into the Federated Islamic States, the nation of Yemen was to be divided into two separate regions - The Territory of Yemen was to be run as a state of the FIS, and the Autonomous Territory of Yemen was to be run by its own transitional government, with limited devolution and military support from the FIS.

The two-state solution was beset by problems from its very conception - Almost three months were spent drawing the proposed borders of the state, and another two years were spent devolving the United Yemeni Transitional Council into the Yemeni Council and the Yemeni Transitional Government, the latter to be overseen by the Free House until 'the international community was prepared to give it full autonomy'. After the borders were drawn and the Yemeni Transitional Government was given control over the Autonomous State of Yemen in 1975. Almost immediately the Territory of Yemen destabilized, as many of the Christian majority undertook a mass exodus to leave for the Autonomous State. Towns were abandoned in the space of a few months as almost three million fled to the Autonomous State of Yemen or the Christian Kingdom of Arabia. Tensions grew as the Autonomous State called for their own National Guard, an offer which was repeatedly refused by the Free House and then by Yāsir himself.

Downfall


With the invasion of Yemen a success (at least, according to Yāsir and the Free House, less so for those living in the former nation), the military budget was expected to be cut, with Yāsir promising to further develop the FIS oil economy and welfare programs. Three years later, and no such cut came - The economy was stagnant and slow but steady inflation, and along with strict trade regulations for FIS ships across the Indian Ocean it impacted most prominently on the poor and the middle classes. Food rationing was mandatory in all areas by 1972, electicity was limited to a few hours a day, and the FIS was running a deficit trying to rebuild Yemen's infrastructure.

The situation in Yemen was becoming more dire, with the Allah Yad, a separatist Christian extremist group, gaining support amongst the Yemeni mainstream. With almost 15,000 members and supplied with firearms from the Christian Kingdom of Arabia, the Allah Yad raided FIS outposts and fringe towns, prompting harsh military crackdowns. With the threat of widespread dissent and outright rebellion emerging, Yāsir and the military chief Abdul Riaz drew up a plan to fight a 'War on Terror', isolating and removing separatist elements from mainstream society. This was in the guise of the use of the special service, the CAS, to form a new branch, the TWL (translated as the Anti-Terror League) to crack down on 'subversive activities', including the use of force against military police, smuggling goods into or out of the FIS or the protest of the established government. Within three months, almost 80,000 people were imprisoned, almost 98% of them for nonviolent crimes.

Yāsir also turned his attention to established separatist movements, such as the Islamic Democratic Government based in Afghanistan, increasingly recognized as the legitimate government of the FIS. Alongside the crackdowns in Yemen, 60,000 men were mobilized to secure regions of Afghanistan and Khurasan, echoing the conflicts in the 1960s between Yāsir's forces and those of the IDG. The dissent in Afghanistan proliferated across Samartia as protests to civilian executions and forced labor camps prompted a police crackdown - A slew of laws were enacted, from anti-drinking and anti-drugs laws to banning peaceful protests and imposing state-wide curfews. These laws were mainly targeted to certain demographics: In the face of the anti-drinking and anti-drugs laws, youths and Greek/Christian minorities were portrayed as criminals and recieved hugely disproportionate sentences.

"The War on Terror is not a war for the people of the Federated Islamic States. It is a war against the people of the Federated Islamic States - On those who want free speech, those who want devolution... The War on Terror was a propogation of the Fascist government intended to keep the peoples of the Federated Islamic States under their control, and exists today solely because of the fear the government has of its own people!"
- Emir Iqbal El-Amin, a popular anti-Fascist activist, during a rally in Palace Square, 1975.


The oft-overlooked and ostracized Greek minority proved to be the spark of the revolution, when on the 6th of March in Karachi, a city-wide national pride rally celebrating the 1955 coup, thousands of Greek families were kidnapped by the TWL and taken to a holding camp on the Qatari-CKA border, 800 miles away. Signs of the black police vans of the TWL sparked a protest during the rally, and fearing a military crackdown, protestors fled, spreading panic as rumors of a crackdown spread. With the city descending quickly into chaos, the order was sent to keep the city under martial law, but with a population of almost 9 million, it was impossible to keep the city back under control. Scattered incidents of violence quickly multiplied as stories of TWL shooting civilians spread. Over the coming weeks, as military forces were diverted to quelling dissent in Karachi, insurgent groups regained their footholds in Afghanistan and Yemen, and as conscription rates soared, more and more poorly-trained conscripts were defecting, leading to an organized resistance movement forming in the Karachi metro area.

Any hopes of winning the civil war was dashed in September of that year as the revolutionary forces in Karachi met with the Islamic Democratic Government, forming a front across Balochistan. Oman's local government threatened to pull out of the FIS as local citizens and the Omani National Guard called for those still loyal to Yāsir to be imprisoned as 'enemies of the people' and an Omani-backed military coup in Yemen unseated Yāsir's administration there. With revolutionary forces closing in slowly on Mashhad, and skirmishers pushing the dwindling loyalist military back to the city, Yāsir fled to Bahrain, the Bahraini Emir being the only governor loyal to him. As the revolutionary forces controlled the mainland FIS, the state of Bahrain became less stable as the neighboring Qatari Emirates attempted an invasion, and after months of besieging the island, the Bahrainis revolted against their Emir, taking him and Yāsir hostage.

The transitional government of the FIS was made up of the two major parties in the Free House - The Socialists, who controlled a large majority, and the Democrats. This government was responsible for the reinstatement of the Council (this time as a Federal Council) and the separation of powers (with the Federal Council acting as the executive, and the Federal Court acting as the grand judiciary). The council promised a new election when Yāsir was trialled for his 'crimes against the people' and in 1976, during the Tyrant's Trial, the former dictator was found guilty of 8,711 counts of murder (during the Civil War) and treason against the Federated Islamic States. He was sentenced to public execution by firing squad in Palace Square (now Revolution Square).
Last edited by Chemaki on Sun Feb 24, 2013 7:29 am, edited 1 time in total.

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Chemaki
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Founded: Apr 23, 2010
Ex-Nation

Postby Chemaki » Sun Feb 24, 2013 7:23 am

Culture and Society in the Federated Islamic States



Like how the democracy of many Western Nations is underpinned by old beliefs from Feudal Systems and Greco-Roman culture, the democracy of the FIS is underpinned by old Islamic beliefs, despite the country's morphosis into a secular democracy. The same notions of free speech, equality and morality come from the Qu'ran, just how in the West they stemmed from the teachings of the Bible. In particular, the Federated Islamic States is more left-wing than other countries, and its National Health Service, Social Housing Service, grants for university students and semi-private ownership of utilities companies and oil wells reflects that. Many citizens of the FIS are strong supporters of free speech and equality, and combined with a mandatory added 5% 'charity tax', this has fostered a strong sense of international paternalism, in particular the recent uprising in Arabia highlighting the FIS' need to be a 'beacon of liberal democracy'.

The media of the FIS also reflects that, with five state-owned, television channels (and its own unbiased news agency), and an additional three radio channels. Despite the relative wealth of those in the FIS, many prefer to listen to radio rather than watch television, reflecting the busy cosmopolitan life that many in the FIS live. Rural areas tend to be too remote for television, making radio the only available form of telecommunication, along with internet access.

Western ideals of the 'night out' have also filtered into the cosmopolitan life of the FIS, with many European shops and chains littering the streets of Mashhad, Bandar Abbas, Karachi and Muscat. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are as much expensive tourist resorts as fully-fledged cities, and are promoted as centres of international trade and culture, two of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. The FIS is also very liberal when it comes to drugs, with Tobacco, Cocaine, Extacy and Marijuana being completely legal, and alcohol (not grape-based, however) and most hallucinogens legal in certain establishments. Despite the wide proliferation of drugs, the club scene isn't as widespread as many tourists think - Cinemas, festivals and even theaters are more popular than clubs, and are the mainstay of urban youth culture.

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Dubai, cosmopolitan centre of the Federated Islamic States
Last edited by Chemaki on Sun Feb 24, 2013 7:26 am, edited 1 time in total.

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Chemaki
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Founded: Apr 23, 2010
Ex-Nation

Postby Chemaki » Sun Feb 24, 2013 7:32 am

Politics in the Federated Islamic States


The political engine of the FIS is complicated and obtuse, a product of the fast-growing federation which linked many drastically different cultures under one banner. Nation-wide governance is a bicameral system carried over from the mid-19th century when the Council and Free House ruled side-by-side. After the fall of Yāsir and the restoration of Islamic Democracy, the Council was reintroduced as the Federal Council, which is an unelected chamber made up by Federal Chancellors from the majority party in each state ('state' being an overarching term for States, Emirates, Governates or otherwise), chosen by the incumbent party in the state for their expertise, political leaning or administrative capabilities. The role of the Federal Council is to pass, reject or amend bills proposed by the Free House, and also manage and resolve any issues with regional governments.


Subdivisions of the Federated Islamic States


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Samartia

Population: 65,581,000
GDP: $1060 billion
GDP Per Capita: $16,185
Capital: Darazad (25.45 million)
Other major cities: Kabul (3.48 million), Peshawar (2.65 million), Mashhad (2.4 million), Kandahar (1.74 million), Bandar Abbas (1.39 million), Quetta (1.18 million), Zahedan (0.81 million)

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Persia

Population: 35,372,000
GDP: $487 billion
GDP Per Capita: $13,756
Capital: Tehran (5.87 million)
Other major cities: Isfahan (4.42 million), Shiraz (2.88 million), Ahvaz (1.67 million), Kermanshah (0.87 million)

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Oman

Population: 17,411,000
GDP: $401 billion
GDP Per Capita: $23,088
Capital: Saif Al Maya (12.18 million)
Other cities: Muscat (1.07 million)

Bahrain

Population: 6,098,000
GDP: $116 billion
GDP Per Capita: $19,081
Capital: Manama (0.46 million)

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Baltistan:

Population: 13,993,000
GDP: $85.4 billion
GDP Per Capita: $6,103
Capital: Mardan (2.3 million)
Other major cities: Abbottabad (1.4 million)

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Kurdistan:

Population: 8,812,000
GDP: $59 billion
GDP Per Capita: $6,711
Capital: Ahvaz (1.12 million)
Other cities: Hamedan (0.44 million), Sanandaj (0.32 million)

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Tajikistan

Population: 5,103,000
GDP: $39 billion
GDP Per Capita: $7,618
Capital: Dushanbe (0.81 million)
Last edited by Chemaki on Tue Jul 15, 2014 7:38 am, edited 8 times in total.

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Chemaki
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Postby Chemaki » Sat Jun 08, 2013 4:37 am

People of the Federated Islamic States


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ʋᵹϧɕðל תðɀðϧɕðɤ مرسال داغا ساي

Mīrzāl Dagārzāi, President of the Federated Islamic States The Islamic Social Movement


Coming from a humble background as the son of a lower-middle class entrepeneur in Karachi, Dagārzāi's childhood has left a mark on him as a shrewd politician, his personal ambitions not too far-fetched to spark the ire of critics, and not too deviant of the party line to brand him an extremist or a fringe politician. Currently serving his second term in office following a successful re-election in the January 2013 elections, Dagārzāi has proven a favourite amongst working and middle-class Samartians, his enthusiasm for keeping the FIS a successful welfare state, regional power and a catalyst for reform and development in the Middle East rubbing off onto his supporters. Though he lacks the charisma of his opponents, Dagārzāi's manipulation of the current political situation, bending to both the party lines of the Socialists and the Federalists, has won him a clear victory during the 2013 Federal elections.

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ɕðϧϗð ᶋףƹɂɕðɤ ساركا ثول ساي

Zārka Thūlzāi, Head Chancellor of the Federal Council The Islamic Democratic Party


The former Secretary of Finance, Thūlzāi may only be 34, but her experience managing Parsgas, one of the private largest gas extractors in the FIS, has given her a business acumen almost unrivalled at her age. After winning the Bandar Abbas seat from the Socialists in 2001, Thūlzāi has become a media icon within the world of politics, her young age and her position as a female Secretary working in her favour, despite her privaledged background (having inherited Parsgas from her father). Her opposition to the Democrats' economic reforms after the 2005 election lost her support from her own party, and she resigned as leader of the Bandar Abbas constituency in 2007. She was invited by the Democrats to become a member of the Federal Council and advise the new Secretary of Finance, but when the Democrats lost to the Socialist-Federalist coalition in the 2009, Thūlzāi found her new position precarious. Not wishing to be constrained to her state of Wyḻāt Bandar, which the Democrats only held by a slim minority, she ran for Head Chancellor. After four years of campaigning, her cross-party co-operation within the Federal Council won her the votes of both Socialists and Democrats alike, and in an unprecedented turn of events, the opposition party managed to gain control of the Federal Council.

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ɕðϗᵹɞ ϗðʯɕðɤ ساكب خان ساي

Sāquib Khanzāi, Sheikh of the Republic of Samartia The Islamic Social Movement



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ɞɤſ ᵹʋɤʯ ףƹɕðᵹʯ إيمان حسين بك

Bey Imen Hussain, Sheikh of Bahrain Independent



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ʯðɀſᵹɞ ðתƣðʯ كان حسين نجيب

Najib Adwan, Sheikh of the Republic of Oman



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ðףʋɤת ðɞת-ðל-ףðʋᵹתᵹ احمد عبد الحميد

Ahmed Abd-al-Hamid, Sheikh of the Territory of Kurdistan
Last edited by Chemaki on Wed Sep 17, 2014 5:33 am, edited 2 times in total.

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Chemaki
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Postby Chemaki » Fri Jul 12, 2013 10:52 am

Geography of the Federated Islamic States


The Federated Islamic states is geographically diverse - The foothills of the Hindu Kush in the North-East to the Balochistani Desert, the Indus Valley, the Straight of Hormuz and the Empty Quarter, each part of the FIS has its own distinct geographical identity. Due to its rather unique geopolitical structure, the FIS is in fact a combination of cultures and landscapes, best exemplified by the parallel between the Arabic part of the FIS and Samartia. Whilst the former is comprised of the Territory of Oman, Yemen and the Khalifi Union, the latter envelops East Persia, Afghanistan, Balochistan and the Indus Valley. The two landscapes contract each other greatly, partly because of the underlying tectonic geography which defines the area.

Tectonic Geography of the FIS
The FIS is one of the most tectonically active areas in the world. Straddling three plates (The Eurasian in the North, the Indo-Australian in the East, and the Arabic Plate in the South), the geography of the area is dictated largely by underlying plate movements. The Hindu Kush, a fold mountain range which skirts the North-Eastern border of the FIS, is one of the largest and most impressive natural barriers in the world, its high foothills providing a natural defense for the Samartian military and valuable grazing land for locals.

Another prominent range in the FIS is the Zagros range, which skirts the Western border of Samartia. Another fold mountain range, the Zagros mountains are not as impressive as those of the Hindu Kush, but the range still plays an important part in Samartia's geography, giving Khurasan and Wylat Bandar their distinctive highland landscapes.

Natural Resources
With its control over the Straight of Hormuz and part of the Persian Gulf, one of the most oil-rich areas on the planet, it is no suprise that the FIS is rich in oil and natural gas.

Oil reserves: 144,800 MMbbl (4th)
Gas reserves: 59,100,000,000,000 m3 (1st)
Uranium Reserves: 19,200 tonnes (Unlisted)
Coal Production: 82,000,000 tonnes (8th)
Copper Production: 255,000 tonnes (4th)
Aluminium Production: 4,000 tonnes (1st)
Iron Ore Production: 93,000 tonnes (2nd)
Gold Production: 2.7 tonnes (Unlisted)
Last edited by Chemaki on Sat Jul 13, 2013 5:44 am, edited 2 times in total.

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Chemaki
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Postby Chemaki » Fri Apr 11, 2014 10:45 am

Military inventory of the Federated Islamic States

With 5270 modernized MBTs in service, supported by fresh and formidable transport and reconnaissance vehicles, the FIS' mechanized divisions are amongst the most well-equipped in the world. However, an inferior tank doctrine which focuses heavily on defensive tactics means that the mechanized forces, although extremely effective in conjunction with adequate military and logistical support, fall just short of world-class due to their limited effectiveness as an invasive force. Tank divisions are almost always fielded alongside mechanized infantry (mounted in the Al-Fahd) and artillery, and are used as a 'second wave' force, superceding an initial first strike by air support and missile corps. Third wave forces consisting of infantry (mounted in Nimr carriers), artillery and logistical support are then deployed afterwards, securing large tracts of enemy territory, potentially up to 500 kilometers in a few days.

Personell Transport

Surpassing virtually all of its military equivalents, the Samartian Army's Nimr personell carriers were comissioned in 2009 as part of an attempt to fully mobilize the FIS' military force. Instead of relying on APCs, which were expensive and unsuitable for urban combat, the Nimr carriers offered a cheaper alternative which provided protection against IEDs and mines. Mobile, comfortable and well-protected, it quickly became popular amongst National Guard and Police forces as well. Surpassed by the frontline APC Al-Fahd, variants are still used in the Army for medics and light transports. The Nimr II, with its biological and chemical protection and electronic countermeasures as well as increased capacity, was deployed in 2013. All Nimr variants used by the Samartian army are fitted with twin Nimr missiles.

Number in service:
Nimr 4x4: 12,500 (Army) - 9,000 (National Guard) - 12,000 (Police)
Nimr 6x6: 2,500 (Army) - 17,000 (National Guard) - 3,500 (Police)
Nimr II: 9,000 (Army) - 700 (National Guard) - 55 (Police)

Unlike the Nimr, the Al-Fahd was comissioned for its durability and operational range rather than its flexibility. With similar levels of protection offered by the Nimr, and extended electronic and smoke countermeasures, as well as the potential to be fitted with a 40mm cannon, the Al-Fahd is mass-produced by the Samartian Army as an APC and IFV.

Number in service:
Al-Fahd APC: 7,500 (Army) - 500 (National Guard)
Al-Fahd IFV: 6,000 (Army) - 180 (National Guard)


Main Battle Tanks
The workhorse tank of the Army, the Al-Khalid is as much a showcase of FIS military ingenuity as it is a formidable opponent on the battlefield. Heavily armed and armoured, its 125mm smoothbore cannon is accompanied by anti-aircraft and coaxial machineguns, a rack of anti-tank rockets and a variety of countermeasures. Since 2001 its worth has been proven time and again in small-scale combat, and it has become an iconic symbol of the Samartian Army's tank brigades.

Number in service: 1,350 (Army)

Similar to the Al-Khalid. the Al-Zarrar is more dated (and rather than being new, the Al-Zarrar was based on the old T59 design), but with very similar combat capabilities. Although relatively few tanks were made for the Samartian Army, they have been kept in service due to their cheap maintainance cost and their anti-tank capabilities.

Number in service: 700 (Army)

A more popular conversion of older Samartian tanks, the Safir is a semi-standardized battle tank, stemming from T-55 and T-59 designs. Although lacking the technology and combat effectiveness of its two newer brethren, the Safir is incredibly cheap to produce; old T-55s have been repaired and reserviced with only a few thousand dollars of investment. Kits for the Safir vary, but a rough standard is set; a 125mm cannon with fire control must be fitted and loaded with HEAT ammunition, or for anti-personell combat, chemical warheads. Explosive reactive armour is also a requirement, allowing the Safir to go toe-to-toe with most other MBTs, and flares are used as a simple electronic countermeasure. Finally, a coaxial autocannon is fitted to give the Safir a degree of combat flexibility. Even with these upgrades, the Safir has proven itself to be ineffective on the battlefield against most modern forces; the Army's solution has been to utilize the tank against insurgents and guerilla forces, and use it as a cornerstone of its 'shock and awe' tactics.

Number in service: 1,250 (Army), 1,400 (National Guard)
Number in reserve: 1,600 (Army), 500 (National Guard)


Whilst the vast majority of Samartian tanks are domestically produced, the TB-84-1000 was imported during the late 1970s under Yasir's reigime, which sought an effective MBT to replace the ageing T-55 and counter Byzantine tanks. Geletia, with its long history of conflict with the Byzantine Empire, provided Yasir with the TB-84-1000, an upgraded, modified version of the Byzantine MBT, the T-72. However, the costs of importing any significant number of these new vehicles were so high that by Yasir's fall in 1983, only 650 of the vehicles were in service. Numbers have been slowly dwindling as the model was replaced by the domestically-produced Safir, but the TB-84-1000 still remains in service today.

Number in service: 450 (Army)


Even though the FIS readily produces its own tanks, close relations with the Byzantine Empire following the fall of Yasir has led to many joint endeavours to advance military technology. The T-90MS is the most prominent, a design based off of the iconic Byzantine T-90 and produced in the FIS alongside the Al-Zarrar. Due to their limited numbers and extensive combat capabilities, the T-90MS was used as a command vehicle until the mass introduction of the Al-Khalid. Still on par with the Samartian Army's most popular MBT, the T-90MS has one of the most successful track records of any Samartian military vehicle.

Number in service: 80 (Army)


Support vehicles
Due to the manouverability inherent in all of the Samartian Army's divisions, equally manouverable supporting vehicles are needed. Short and medium-range rocket systems, artillery and aerial defense systems accompany mechanized and tank divisions to provide additional fire support and cover. Along with the Missile Corps, supporting vehicles play a vital role as the Army's 'First Wave', targeting enemy defenses in preparation for a mechanized attack.


Although rather dated, the Aaban is widely regarded as the world's most advanced autocannon-based anti-aircraft system to date. With a fire rate of almost 180 rounds per minute, automatic fire-control radar, an upgraded turret with an armoured roof and faster traversal speed and coolant systems, almost all original shortcomings of the original ZSU-57 system were resolved by the time the Aaban was introduced in 1985. The modern Aaban is also fitted with electronic countermeasures to defend against helicopters, and its fully automated loading system cuts the tank's crew size down to three people, allowing for more room for ammunition. With potential to destroy most subsonic aircraft and engage supersonic jets at distances of up to 7 kilometers away, the Aaban can provide effective anti-air defense during skirmishes and small battles, and its ammunition capacity allows it to be used during extended campaigns.

Number in service: 750 (Army), 470 (National Guard)

For larger conflicts, however, the Kosha is deployed; its system of both autocannons and missiles allow it greater flexibility than the Aaban, and its integration with command vehicles and AWACS allows Kosha units to engage entire aircraft formations at once. Although superior as an anti-aircraft system, the Kosha is also more expensive and requires extended logistical support, meaning that it is only viable in large-scale combat.

Number in service: 700 (Army)

Another successful anti-aircraft and anti-missile system is the Tor, which was originally designed in 1990 to serve as a dedicated SAM system for Samartian military installments. Self-propelled versions are used and are present in all mechanized battalions, though the number of self-propelled systems in service are dwarfed by the thousands installed at military bases and Area Denial Systems.

Number in service: 550 (Army), 1300 static launchers (Missile Corps)

Although the Samartian Army fields a wide variety of anti-air munitions, its support capabilities shine when fighting against other troops on the ground. The Ghazan is currently one of the most widely used battlefield-range missiles, with variants carrying up to 1,000 kilogram payloads and accurate navigation systems. Longer-range versions, currently used in the Missile Corps, can strike targets up to 900 kilometres away.

Number in service: 450 TELs (Army), 600 static launchers (Missile Corps)

A shorter-ranged missile with a smaller payload, the Fateh was designed for precision strikes on enemy emplacements. Its smaller size and lighter weight makes it more viable for smaller conflicts, and unlike the heavier Ghazan, do not require TELs.

Number in service: 600 launchers (Army), 350 static launchers (Missile Corps)

A more dated variant, the Fajr is a short-ranged missile used in offensive combat and attacking static emplacements. Whilst it lacks the range or accuracy of the Ghazan or Fateh, the Fajr is cheap to mass-produce and requires little training to use.

Number in service: 1,100 launchers (Army)

Whilst FIS missile systems have traditionally focused on larger, long-range warheads to attack static targets, the revolutionary Janat provides a dedicated missile system which can lay down sustained fire over the course of a skirmish or larger battle, engage mobile targets and cover large areas of ground. A relatively new invention and the first of its kind in the world, only 160 launchers and a few dozen static systems have been produced to date.

Number in service: 160 launchers (Army), 40 static launchers (Missile Corps)

Outclassed by the newer Janat, the old Toryal is still formidable on the battlefield, and its multiple rockets, each with a range of 90 kilometres, can be fired with deadly accuracy. Used to support only the largest formations, or, more commonly, as a defensive measure, the Toryal, along with the Zargul, are two of the most iconic emblems of the Samartian Army's capbility.

Number in service: 350 launchers (Army), 450 static launchers (Missile Corps)

Alongside the less accurate Scud import, the Zargul provides the bulk of short-range, high-payload missile support, as well as being the cornerstone of the Samartian Army's chemical weapons program. Both have relatively long reaches (between 100 and 500 kilometres) and are used extensively in larger battles and siege warfare.

Number in service (Scuds): 250 (Army), 700 static launchers (Missile Corps)
Number in service (Zarguls): 400 (Army), 800 static launchers (Missile Corps)

Although most MRBMs are used in static emplacements, such as the extensive Area Denial Systems, small numbers are also used by the Samartian Army to give it extra reach whilst in hostile territory. Considering the size of its neighbours, it is imperative to utilize MRBMs as part of an advance to ensure that enemy emplacements across the country can be targeted. These missiles are as follows:

Khyber, a two-stage rocket with a range of 1500 kilometres. 270 in service with the Army, 1050 in service with the Missile Corps.
Khyber-2, with three MIRVs and radar countermeasures. 80 in service with the Army, 450 in service with the Missile Corps.
Khyber-3, which uses a solid-fuel propellant to reach ranges of up to 2000 kilometres. 55 in service with the Army, 800 in service with the Missile Corps.
Storay, the FIS' only ICBM, which has a range of 10,000 kilometres, developed as an offensive measure to support Samartian or allied troops across Eurasia. 35 in service with the Army, 110 in service with the Missile Corps.


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