The Akasha Colony wrote:Radicchio wrote:This vehicle was something i added after a recent RP in my region. Most of my naval command structure was overrun, occupied or destroyed and the surface fleet was engaged. after the RP was over, i developed a small "sleeper" navy including these and a number of small missile boats as a sort of last line of defense for future RPs.
I feel that it is an appropriate solution.
To hide ineffective deathtraps in your ports where you have completely surrendered any ability to concentrate your force? The enemy will be able to figure out you have them relatively easily. After that it's a cakewalk since they are hideously vulnerable.It is actually an image stolen from captain america, but because the movie never says what the mini-sub's capabilities are, i figure it is atleast reasonable to assume that it could operate short distances from the shore with a single torpedo.
EDIT:
And the capabilities of such a craft are well within the guidelines of something that can be built right now (or even 50 years ago) if a nation had the need to develop them, which i feel that i do.
It will be hilariously noisy and slow. No matter how "stealthy" the "attack stealth torpedo" is, it's hard to get around the fact that this design is about as unstealthy as you can get. There's a reason why actual midget submarines look like, well, submarines and not jet fighters.New Oyashima wrote:All in all though, the USN was REALLY lucky that they cought the carriers rearming, and that the "rolling convergence" tactic that lost them a CV in coral sea didn't bite them in the ass. The IJN was unlicky, the USN was lucky. Not to mention CAP from the IJN carriers was drawn away chasing Torpedo bombers.
The IJN fought the battle conservatively because they felt they had a larger margin of superiority than they actually had, and as the superior power had more to lose from the battle than the US did. They held on to larger reserves than necessary and wasted valuable opportunities attempting to build the "perfect" strike group. In comparison, Fletcher decided to attack immediately when the opportunity presented itself, even if it meant reliance on more inexperienced crews. Fletcher knew the Japanese would be dispersed while the Japanese knew nothing of his own disposition.
It was simple probability: the Americans attacked more often, which of course sharply increased the likelihood of catching the enemy in a vulnerable position. It also kept them off balance even when the early strikes failed to score any hits. The Americans attacked the Japanese nine times. The Japanese only managed two attacks on the American carriers, both against the already-damaged Yorktown, and only after the American planes had retreated and left the Japanese with some time to lick their wounds. Despite being the attacker, the Americans forced the Japanese to remain on the defensive for almost the entire battle, snatching away the initiative.
The Japanese had insufficient reconnaissance assets (a recurring problem of their reliance on cruiser-based floatplanes for the task) and wasted resources attacking Midway unsuccessfully (the only "aircraft carrier" in the battle that could not be sunk no matter how many times it was attacked). That they were busy refueling aircraft when they were caught is not surprising, and the large quantity of ordnance and fuel stocked by carriers would be a recurring vulnerability in later battles as well.
Haters gonna hate.
I intend to bulk up this "Sleeper Navy" over time but i am also working on ground based anti-shipping options.
