The Ukrainian War IV: "And von Moltke Laughed ..."

[Wallowis]

I hope China’s invasion of Taiwan is as skillful as Putin’s war. Taiwanese D-Day on the Chinese mainland would be a beautiful sight.

Not going to happen- PRC-RC rivalry is a situation both governing powers of the two nation benefit from and thus it’s not going to change any time soon

Although the PRC's citizens are allegedly upset that the CCP hasn't been aggressive enough

[El Lazaro]

I hope China’s invasion of Taiwan is as skillful as Putin’s war. Taiwanese D-Day on the Chinese mainland would be a beautiful sight.

Not going to happen- PRC-RC rivalry is a situation both governing powers of the two nation benefit from and thus it’s not going to change any time soon

The invasion of Taiwan will be bad for China, but it will happen if Xi thinks he can pull it off and weather the effects. He’s preparing for this right now. The only way to prevent it is by pushing back on the balance of power.

[Chan Island]

Been hearing rumours of a mutiny in the Russian army, can anybody confirm these?

I've also come across some rumours of chechens fighting the Russians down in Kherson. What's significant is that Kadyrov's Tiktok warriors are supposedly there to stop mutiny or surrender- if they are fighting regular units, that means someone down there doesn't want to kill Ukrainians anymore. Again though, just rumours and would love to see it confirmed or refuted.

There's Chechens who have been fighting on Ukraine's side since the start.

I should have stressed then; kadyrov chechens. The tiktok warriors. I know full well that dome fight for Ukraine.

[The New California Republic]

I've also come across some rumours of chechens fighting the Russians down in Kherson.

Wouldn't be surprising. Spetsnaz got into a firefight with Wagner because of an argument, so can believe that Chechens could get into a fight with regulars.

[El Lazaro]

There's Chechens who have been fighting on Ukraine's side since the start.

I should have stressed then; kadyrov chechens. The tiktok warriors. I know full well that dome fight for Ukraine.

Hmm, maybe. I’ve heard Russian troops have to get authorization from officers to retreat, so officers might be dead/unable to contact them and Kadyrov is interpreting the rout as disobeying orders.

[Vistulange]

Not going to happen- PRC-RC rivalry is a situation both governing powers of the two nation benefit from and thus it’s not going to change any time soon

Although the PRC's citizens are allegedly upset that the CCP hasn't been aggressive enough

There's a very good argument to be made that Putin is doing the right thing (on the domestic front, obviously) while Xi is not, if what you say is true.

From my understanding, the Russian government's overall propaganda policy has been one of political demobilisation, as opposed to mobilisation in a pro-government direction. That's unusual, I'd reckon, for many closed regimes; closed regimes often lack the typical tools of establishing legitimacy such as regular free elections, and therefore, popular mobilisation becomes a very good way to build legitimacy. However, mobilising folks—politically—also makes it a touch more difficult to reverse course if a policy is proving to be less-than-optimal, since you've spent an X amount of time investing people into that policy on an emotional level. Their support for the leadership begins to become independent of the leadership itself, instead translating into loyalty for the policy in question. When you demobilise people, in other words, when the arena of politics becomes "nod along, live your life as you do, and don't question the government", it becomes easier to reverse course. That's not to say that it removes all costs associated with reversing one's course, but I'd argue that it makes it relatively easier.

Xi, on the other hand, is using nationalist rhetoric to mobilise a certain base, which is definitely not rare to see in any sort of closed system. However, as mentioned above, the nature of this mobilisation makes it more costly to take an out. Even when the cost of reversing course is high, the calculation might just indicate that reversing course will be higher still, hence locking the leadership into the previous path. It's not path-dependency in the technical sense, but it approaches something like that.

[El Lazaro]

~Snip~

There’s also a theory floating around that Putin tried to kill Dugin for supporting the invasion too much, as explicit support for war/general mobilization would make more people care how Russia is faring in it. That’s all speculation, but it’s not that crazy. Putin has a pattern of cracking down on far-right groups he doesn’t abhor, but who would add a less stable political factor to how popular he is.

I do think this style of government has drawbacks. It forces him to be timid in policy changes (or a “pragmatist” to the rest of the world) and means he lacks political capital to maneuver effectively. The plan, as I understand it, was to dispose of this after conquering Ukraine and forging a new, more energetic national atmosphere through state policy. The subjugation and national erasure of what Putin views as degenerated Russians is supposedly how he would bring about a cultural revolution in Russia, uniting ethnic Russians within one fervent identity and taking a step towards a Russian empire. This plan is not really working out, so going full-fascist now would basically be self-sabotage.

[The New California Republic]

Updated list of Russian losses today, and it probably the biggest of the war so far:

[El Lazaro]

There are reports of blackouts in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Poltava, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa due to Russian rocket attacks against energy infrastructure. Power has not been restored in most of these areas.

[Austria-Bohemia-Hungary]

There are reports of blackouts in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Poltava, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa due to Russian rocket attacks against energy infrastructure. Power has not been restored in most of these areas.

Literally a terrorist state entity

[Sordhau]

There are reports of blackouts in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Poltava, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa due to Russian rocket attacks against energy infrastructure. Power has not been restored in most of these areas.

Literally a terrorist state entity

Targeting vital infrastructure is a rather standard military tactic tbf.

[Salus Maior]

Honest Russian Army ad

[El Lazaro]

Out of the 53000 Russian deaths reported by Ukraine, 5500 have been since the beginning of the counter-offensive, or >10% of the total death toll in 7% of the war’s duration. It also means Russian death rates are up 70% from just before the counter-offensive. Pretty grim, but it’s good to see a change in momentum. Of course, the specific numbers are unreliable, but the proportions do hint at what’s going on in terms of casualties.

[Picairn]

So now with nearly the entire Kharkiv Oblast liberated in 5 days, and the Russian Army taking new defensive positions east of the Oskil river, an operation to attack Luhansk Oblast seems possible. The biggest obstacle to the Ukrainian advance is, of course, the Oskil river and crossing a river is difficult to pull off even with momentum.

The situation in Sviatohirsk and Lyman appears to be contested. Lots of contradictory reports about them being liberated or still under Russian control. But if the Ukrainians can capture Lyman and manage to march north, Russian positions southeast of the Oskil river would be susceptible to an encirclement and may be forced to retreat, allowing Ukrainian troops to cross the river through Oskil town with pontoon bridges (the main bridge has been blown up).

Alternatively they can try to cross the river. But the bridges in Kupiansk and Horokhovatka have been destroyed. Actually I don't think there are any bridges left standing on the Oskil river. So the Ukrainians will have to execute amphibious operations against a (presumably) entrenched defense line with Russian reinforcements and retreating troops. Not exactly favorable conditions for an attacker, even when those Russian troops have extremely low morale and little equipment. The Russians can also call in the (frequently absent) Russian Air Force to interdict the Ukrainian amphibious landings, until the latter consolidates recent gains with AA and SAM systems. The reason the Russian Air Force has been absent from the Kharkiv counteroffensive is, from what I've heard, due to Ukrainian troops saturating the area with AA and SAM systems (such as the mobile Buk-M1 systems and S-300s), as well as Russian failure at SEAD/DEAD operations which prevents effective air support.

As I have stated previously, there seems to be no major towns or cities east of the Oskil river all the way to the Kharkiv Oblast border, only flatlands and scattered settlements, except for Borova and Kivsharivka which are both next to the river. So the Oskil river is perhaps the *last* defense the Russians can mount before running all the way back to Svatove.

I'm also interested in how the Ukrainians will advance after the liberation of Lyman. There are two ways after it: either marching north and threaten the Russians at the Oskil river from behind or attacking Kreminna, threatening Rubizhne and Lysychansk - Severodonetsk.

Judging by the fact that Russian armies were routed after breakthrough during this Ukrainian blitzkrieg due to low morale and severely undermanned battalions restricting the ability to conduct defense-in-depth, I think even LPR/DPR territory is no longer safe. The two statelets must have been stripped bare for manpower and therefore relatively defenseless behind the entrenched line. If Ukraine can somehow secure a breakthrough, there is a possibility the LPR/DPR militias would be routed as quickly as the Russians in Kharkiv.

Thank you for reading through my military speculations for today.

[Tarsonis]

So now with nearly the entire Kharkiv Oblast liberated in 5 days, and the Russian Army taking new defensive positions east of the Oskil river, an operation to attack Luhansk Oblast seems possible. The biggest obstacle to the Ukrainian advance is, of course, the Oskil river and crossing a river is difficult to pull off even with momentum.

The situation in Sviatohirsk and Lyman appears to be contested. Lots of contradictory reports about them being liberated or still under Russian control. But if the Ukrainians can capture Lyman and manage to march north, Russian positions southeast of the Oskil river would be susceptible to an encirclement and may be forced to retreat, allowing Ukrainian troops to cross the river through Oskil town with pontoon bridges (the main bridge has been blown up).

Alternatively they can try to cross the river. But the bridges in Kupiansk and Horokhovatka have been destroyed. Actually I don't think there are any bridges left standing on the Oskil river. So the Ukrainians will have to execute amphibious operations against a (presumably) entrenched defense line with Russian reinforcements and retreating troops. Not exactly favorable conditions for an attacker, even when those Russian troops have extremely low morale and little equipment. The Russians can also call in the (frequently absent) Russian Air Force to interdict the Ukrainian amphibious landings, until the latter consolidates recent gains with AA and SAM systems. The reason the Russian Air Force has been absent from the Kharkiv counteroffensive is, from what I've heard, due to Ukrainian troops saturating the area with AA and SAM systems (such as the mobile Buk-M1 systems and S-300s), as well as Russian failure at SEAD/DEAD operations which prevents effective air support.

As I have stated previously, there seems to be no major towns or cities east of the Oskil river all the way to the Kharkiv Oblast border, only flatlands and scattered settlements, except for Borova and Kivsharivka which are both next to the river. So the Oskil river is perhaps the *last* defense the Russians can mount before running all the way back to Svatove.

I'm also interested in how the Ukrainians will advance after the liberation of Lyman. There are two ways after it: either marching north and threaten the Russians at the Oskil river from behind or attacking Kreminna, threatening Rubizhne and Lysychansk - Severodonetsk.

Judging by the fact that Russian armies were routed after breakthrough during this Ukrainian blitzkrieg due to low morale and severely undermanned battalions restricting the ability to conduct defense-in-depth, I think even LPR/DPR territory is no longer safe. The two statelets must have been stripped bare for manpower and therefore relatively defenseless behind the entrenched line. If Ukraine can somehow secure a breakthrough, there is a possibility the LPR/DPR militias would be routed as quickly as the Russians in Kharkiv.

Thank you for reading through my military speculations for today.

Ukraine will most like consolidate on the west Bank of the Oskil and regroup. Russia has limited digging in capabilities and Ukraine has to take stock of what they've captured, and what they have left to work with. Plus with other operations taking part in the south, digging in the Oskil would be a solid "siegfried line" against Russian counter attacks as well as forming the hinge of a swinging advance through kherson and thr rest of the Russian southern positions.

They should consolidate some reserves in case Russia tries to mobilize an invasion in the North (which no doubt we're watching and informing Ukraine on) and focus on the south. If it were me I'd keep the pressure up in Kherson, and (assuming they have the resources), push for Mauripol and cut their front in half.

[Adamede]

Literally a terrorist state entity

Targeting vital infrastructure is a rather standard military tactic tbf.

So the Russians knocking out vital Ukrainian infrastructure in a temper tantrum over losing Kharkiv is a-ok but the west putting sanctions on Russia meaning Ivan can’t get Lego or McDonalds anymore is a major crime that is needlessly harming innocent people

[Adamede]

So now with nearly the entire Kharkiv Oblast liberated in 5 days, and the Russian Army taking new defensive positions east of the Oskil river, an operation to attack Luhansk Oblast seems possible. The biggest obstacle to the Ukrainian advance is, of course, the Oskil river and crossing a river is difficult to pull off even with momentum.

The situation in Sviatohirsk and Lyman appears to be contested. Lots of contradictory reports about them being liberated or still under Russian control. But if the Ukrainians can capture Lyman and manage to march north, Russian positions southeast of the Oskil river would be susceptible to an encirclement and may be forced to retreat, allowing Ukrainian troops to cross the river through Oskil town with pontoon bridges (the main bridge has been blown up).

Alternatively they can try to cross the river. But the bridges in Kupiansk and Horokhovatka have been destroyed. Actually I don't think there are any bridges left standing on the Oskil river. So the Ukrainians will have to execute amphibious operations against a (presumably) entrenched defense line with Russian reinforcements and retreating troops. Not exactly favorable conditions for an attacker, even when those Russian troops have extremely low morale and little equipment. The Russians can also call in the (frequently absent) Russian Air Force to interdict the Ukrainian amphibious landings, until the latter consolidates recent gains with AA and SAM systems. The reason the Russian Air Force has been absent from the Kharkiv counteroffensive is, from what I've heard, due to Ukrainian troops saturating the area with AA and SAM systems (such as the mobile Buk-M1 systems and S-300s), as well as Russian failure at SEAD/DEAD operations which prevents effective air support.

As I have stated previously, there seems to be no major towns or cities east of the Oskil river all the way to the Kharkiv Oblast border, only flatlands and scattered settlements, except for Borova and Kivsharivka which are both next to the river. So the Oskil river is perhaps the *last* defense the Russians can mount before running all the way back to Svatove.

I'm also interested in how the Ukrainians will advance after the liberation of Lyman. There are two ways after it: either marching north and threaten the Russians at the Oskil river from behind or attacking Kreminna, threatening Rubizhne and Lysychansk - Severodonetsk.

Judging by the fact that Russian armies were routed after breakthrough during this Ukrainian blitzkrieg due to low morale and severely undermanned battalions restricting the ability to conduct defense-in-depth, I think even LPR/DPR territory is no longer safe. The two statelets must have been stripped bare for manpower and therefore relatively defenseless behind the entrenched line. If Ukraine can somehow secure a breakthrough, there is a possibility the LPR/DPR militias would be routed as quickly as the Russians in Kharkiv.

Thank you for reading through my military speculations for today.

Ukraine will most like consolidate on the west Bank of the Oskil and regroup. Russia has limited digging in capabilities and Ukraine has to take stock of what they've captured, and what they have left to work with. Plus with other operations taking part in the south, digging in the Oskil would be a solid "siegfried line" against Russian counter attacks as well as forming the hinge of a swinging advance through kherson and thr rest of the Russian southern positions.

They should consolidate some reserves in case Russia tries to mobilize an invasion in the North (which no doubt we're watching and informing Ukraine on) and focus on the south. If it were me I'd keep the pressure up in Kherson, and (assuming they have the resources), push for Mauripol and cut their front in half.

Melitopol imho looks like a better target. Short line to hold to cut the Russian front in half from the looks of it. Also further from the Russian forces in the Donbas and in Kherson.

[Washington Resistance Army]

It’s still in the rumor phase right now and we won’t know the actual truth until later in the day but Russian telegram has been sporadically talking about the Ukrainians taking land just to the north of Severodonetsk.

[The Lone Alliance]

Snip

Supposedly the Oskil river at Kupiansk is extremely shallow right now, if that's true then it won't matter if the bridges are blown, Ukraine will be able to ford easily, it's also looking like they already have, Russian forces have pulled out of Savatove and possibly even Kreminna, even reports that Ukraine has reached the outskirts of Lysychansk already.

I think the Russian troops lines are in a panic and that panic has become contagious, just wondering if the Russian military is going to be able to get them to stop running before they cross the border, Russia's going to have to find some place to dig in and defend or they're going to be surrendering the entire region to Ukraine without a fight.

And as great as Ukraine pulling a Patton they themselves are going to need to stop and consolidate their gains sometimes too.

[Picairn]

Snip

Supposedly the Oskil river at Kupiansk is extremely shallow right now, if that's true then it won't matter if the bridges are blown, Ukraine will be able to ford easily, it's also looking like they already have, Russian forces have pulled out of Savatove and possibly even Kreminna, even reports that Ukraine has reached the outskirts of Lysychansk already.

I think the Russian troops lines are in a panic and that panic has become contagious, just wondering if the Russian military is going to be able to get them to stop running before they cross the border, Russia's going to have to find some place to dig in and defend or they're going to be surrendering the entire region to Ukraine without a fight.

And as great as Ukraine pulling a Patton they themselves are going to need to stop and consolidate their gains sometimes too.

Any alleged gains east of the Oskil river are incredibly sketchy and the further they get the more I doubt. Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, all I've seen is rumors and claims but no photographic or video evidence. No Russian source has claimed it either. So I'll dismiss them as frivolous until the evidence emerges.

[The Lone Alliance]

Supposedly the Oskil river at Kupiansk is extremely shallow right now, if that's true then it won't matter if the bridges are blown, Ukraine will be able to ford easily, it's also looking like they already have, Russian forces have pulled out of Savatove and possibly even Kreminna, even reports that Ukraine has reached the outskirts of Lysychansk already.

I think the Russian troops lines are in a panic and that panic has become contagious, just wondering if the Russian military is going to be able to get them to stop running before they cross the border, Russia's going to have to find some place to dig in and defend or they're going to be surrendering the entire region to Ukraine without a fight.

And as great as Ukraine pulling a Patton they themselves are going to need to stop and consolidate their gains sometimes too.

Any alleged gains east of the Oskil river are incredibly sketchy and the further they get the more I doubt. Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, all I've seen is rumors and claims but no photographic or video evidence. No Russian source has claimed it either. So I'll dismiss them as frivolous until the evidence emerges.

Thing is even if they aren't I don't think the Ukrainian army at this point will be able to move into those locations in force before the Russians eventually get their act together, because if they do and in the process leave their forward elements scattered about all over northeast Ukraine, if they do start running into Russians who can actually resist they're going to be way too overextended to keep those forward forces supplied.

Really the Oskil river makes a good defensive point for Ukraine as well and I can't see any real large scale movement beyond there, there might be recon elements further east and Russia itself might have pulled back simply because of blind panic, but I'm thinking Ukraine is going to secure the Kharkiv Oblast before they go after anything else.

[Picairn]

According to Ukrainian intellegence, Russian Lt. Gen. Roman Berdnikov, commander of the Western Military District, has been fired from his position. If this is true, he lasted only 15 days. Likely due to Russia's defeat in Kharkiv Oblast.

Tarsonis' suggestion of attacking Mariupol and sever the Russian front in half may have some credence: Igor Girkin says he has received reports about a Ukrainian troop concentration in Vuhledar, about 100km north of Mariupol. Additionally, two Russian channels are saying that Ukraine has removed mines in the town and may start an offensive soon.

[Tarsonis]

Ukraine will most like consolidate on the west Bank of the Oskil and regroup. Russia has limited digging in capabilities and Ukraine has to take stock of what they've captured, and what they have left to work with. Plus with other operations taking part in the south, digging in the Oskil would be a solid "siegfried line" against Russian counter attacks as well as forming the hinge of a swinging advance through kherson and thr rest of the Russian southern positions.

They should consolidate some reserves in case Russia tries to mobilize an invasion in the North (which no doubt we're watching and informing Ukraine on) and focus on the south. If it were me I'd keep the pressure up in Kherson, and (assuming they have the resources), push for Mauripol and cut their front in half.

Melitopol imho looks like a better target. Short line to hold to cut the Russian front in half from the looks of it. Also further from the Russian forces in the Donbas and in Kherson.

But it being farther is why it isn't the ideal target, it would help encicle Kherson, and some of the forces east of there, but it wouldn't cut the lines and would lead the bulk of the Russian forces joined and intact, as well as leave Mauripol as a serviceable port to supply those forces. Taking Mauripol cleaves heavier into the Russian front while seizing their most important logistics hub in the south. Cut off from supplies, the entire western front of the southern theater would collapse, leaving only Donbas in Russian hands.

Riskier than taking Melitopol, but the rewards are far greater.


that's my opinion anyway

[The New California Republic]

The rumours that the Russians on the southern front are trying to surrender are persisting today as well, might actually be something to it.

[Washington Resistance Army]

The rumours that the Russians on the southern front are trying to surrender are persisting today as well, might actually be something to it.

I have a strong feeling this is a Ukrainian psyop to try and ruin Russian morale even further but I’d love to be wrong.