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by Kowani » Wed May 26, 2021 1:37 pm
by Northern Connecticut » Wed May 26, 2021 1:40 pm
by Atheris » Wed May 26, 2021 1:48 pm
Northern Connecticut wrote:So how are we suppost to deal with real crime like theft, rape, and murder.
by Northern Connecticut » Wed May 26, 2021 1:50 pm
by Kowani » Wed May 26, 2021 1:53 pm
Northern Connecticut wrote:So how are we suppost to deal with real crime like theft, rape, and murder.
Here we examine true clearance rates-a potentially more accurate measure of clearance rates that considers known crimes. To calculate true clearance rates, we consider the NCVS known crimes with the number of crimes cleared according to the FBI. True clearance rates presumably consider a large swath of crimes that could be reported to police but are not. Starting in 1990, the overall true percent of crimes cleared was 10.03%. In 1998, the true percent cleared was 7.92%. For 2004 and 2006, the overall true percent cleared was 9.26% and 9.19%, respectively. For 2009, police improved clearance to 12.10% of overall crimes, and in 2014, it was 11.71%. Finally, in 2018 the overall true percent cleared went back down to 10.61%. overall true percent cleared was 10.61%. Considering a few individual crimes, the standard percent cleared was 30.4% for robbery, while the true clearance was 13.83%.223 For burglary in 2018, the standard clearance rate was 13.9%, and the true rate was 5.94%.224 [...] Overall, true clearance rates in the last thirty years remained around 10%. In 2018, the overall standard percent cleared was 21.64 %, while the overall true percent cleared was 10.61%.Considering a few individual crimes, the standard percent cleared was 30.4% for robbery, while the true clearance was 13.83%.223 For burglary in 2018, the standard clearance rate was 13.9%, and
the true rate was 5.94%.
by Novus America » Wed May 26, 2021 2:31 pm
Kowani wrote:Northern Connecticut wrote:
We all want to solve the problem, so what do you think?
a radical divestment from policing and incarceration as a way of societal control, combined with a simultaneous investment in deprived communities
to that end, besides just monetary and infrastructure investments, an end to ethnic segregation is absolutely necessary if you want to avoid just ending up back here in 20-30 years
by Novus America » Wed May 26, 2021 2:39 pm
by North Washington Republic » Wed May 26, 2021 2:48 pm
Novus America wrote:Kowani wrote:a radical divestment from policing and incarceration as a way of societal control, combined with a simultaneous investment in deprived communities
to that end, besides just monetary and infrastructure investments, an end to ethnic segregation is absolutely necessary if you want to avoid just ending up back here in 20-30 years
I disagree. The thing is those investments take a long time to pay off, and in the meantime you will be letting gangs take control, which means the long term payment is unlikely to come. You will not see a major reduction in such crimes until a years after you have implemented such policies.
Mexico has tried this sort of approach and it has been an utter disaster. Cartels control some 30-35% of the country.
You are putting the cart before the horse. We can only look into reducing police budgets AFTER we have significantly reduced crime via such measures. Yes we need to improve infrastructure, yes we need to improve education (although that is very difficult given the politicization and teachers’ unions, which can be just as problematic as the police ones).
So your funding for increase infrastructure, better education, job opportunities, etc (all of which I support) have to come from OTHER sources, not immediate law enforcement cuts. Like maybe tariffs and taxes on the companies that outsourced the manufacturing, which caused a lot of the damage. It is no coincidence the problems are often most severe in areas hit hard by deindustrialization.
Local police already have a hard time recruiting and retaining qualified people, cut their budgets and their quality of candidates will further decline.
See one problem is the the best regarded federal special agent positions, who can make 100+k base pay a year, before overtime which can almost double it, with out the difficulties of urban policing, get the best candidates.
Then rich suburbs who offer much better pay and better conditions offer better incentive as well.
For example in Baltimore City the City Police are facing a chronic shortage of qualified candidates, while the higher paid. better regarded, and less likely to face violence police in the rich suburbs have tons of candidates.
I know a general thing is that people who could not get into the county police right away, if the join the city police only do so as a temporary measure, and promptly seek transfer to the county. So the county poaches the best ones, and the more problematic ones are left in the city. We have similar problems with teachers, do you really think slashing education budgets in urban areas would produce better teachers in those areas?
Good police are expensive. Actually we need to offer better pay and incentives for good police officers to join departments in deprived areas. Community policing is great too, but it is not cheap.
The big centralized police stations are much cheaper than community based ones.
We need to radically improve investment in our disadvantaged communities, yes. But that includes investing in better law enforcement.
On incarceration while we need to stop treating personal drug abuse as a criminal matter, and start treating it as public health matter, the fact is the incapacitation model of justice works. We need dramatically more severe sentences for violent crimes. One thing is we should put say minimum of 25 year federal sentences on people who commit burglary, carjacking, robbery rape, premeditated murder with weapons sold on interstate commerce, with the sentence doubled if death occurs or for subsequent offenses. People in jail can no longer as easily prey on the public at large. To break the cycle of violence, incapacitate the violent.
People only commit subsequent crimes on the public at large AFTER the are released. So do not release them.
That will improve things dramatically. Take the violent criminals off the street, the police will be less likely to view everyone in the areas the currently have third world levels of violence as violent, and you break the cycle.
So actually more funding for disadvantaged communities, far more investment in mental health and childcare, try to handle more nonviolent matters with social services rather than armed police (but they will need and armed police escort standing by in case things get out of hand) create more job opportunities, better infrastructure, better education AND better police forces.
Then we need a way to rebuild healthy community support organizations, churches/synagogues, civic organizations, veterans organizations (conscription should be considered as end of conscription saw a dramatic decrease in such organizations and an increase in crime).
And no more revolving door for violent crimes. Then you will see the results you want. Then you might eventually need fewer police. Actually significantly longer sentences for violent crimes is the best way to reduce the need for police. Take them off the street permanently, and you no longer need police constantly dealing with them.
It will be expensive in the short to medium term. There is no way around it.
by Kowani » Wed May 26, 2021 5:21 pm
Novus America wrote:snip
Several factors cast a doubtful shadow on the intrinsic value and singular role of crime in shaping the agenda. First, crime was rising for almost a decade before it was defined as a problem in the machinery of politics, which serves as an important reminder of Blumer's point that social problems are attached to processes of collective definition. Second, crime can be addressed in a variety of ways—from more prevention to more punishment. The simplistic assumption that increases in crime are behind changes that led to increasing prison populations ignores the politicization of the issue, how target groups were socially constructed, and elite incentives and agency. A crime boom might explain heightened attention to the issue but only goes part of the way in explaining the punitive path and expansion in federal authority. Crime is not divorced from other factors that affect its politicization; only a naïve observer would conclude that other crime campaigns were solely about crime. [...] Conversely, the historical record is replete with cases when crime rose but was not followed by punitive legislation or a national campaign, including rising crime in the post WWII period. So while crime does figure in the story, it is not the main character. Crime did rise and it does matter, but two additional factors suggest that it was not the sole motivation: (1) criminals began to receive longer sentences for the same crimes in the United States (2) the risk of incarceration increased steeply.Therefore, somewhere in the process of policy adoption, legislators decided to punish the same offenses more.
As Crow had loosened its clutch, leaders of the old paradigm remained and sought to enlarge and shift the conflict strategically. They mobilized a new form of resistance, shifting to a new policy domain by moving crime and criminal justice to the agenda. Two focusing events—crime and riots—facilitated mobilization of the issue. The violent insurrections that swelled in the mid- to late-1960s created an opportunity to sharpen the connection of civil rights to crime. Strategic policymakers conflated these events, defining racial disorders as criminal, which necessitated crime control and depoliticized the grievance. Although tinged with racial subtext, this causal story did not disturb the newly institutionalized egalitarian precepts. Conservatives pitted toughness on crime against vigorous advocacy of civil rights by building a durable connection between black activism and crime. The liberal social uplift approach atrophied under the weight of this powerful doctrine. Sandwiched between two traps—being soft on crime and excusing riot-related violence—liberals had to forgo their ideal outcomes and moved closer to the conservative position. They engaged in strategic pursuit, emulating the conservative issue understanding, implicitly endorsing the linkages conservatives had drawn. This vindicated the conservative law-and-order doctrine and deepened the association between crime and racial discord, and ultimately, collapsed the liberal alternative for dealing with root causes. Once partisan consensus emerged, the elite countermovement was able to eclipse the dominance of the civil rights issue, assaulting it not from the segregationist platform but where it was weakest. Strategic entrepreneurs thus used the crime issue as a vehicle to advance a racial agenda without violating norms, attaching the outcomes of old conflict (Great Society programs and civil rights legislation) to the causes of the new problem—the breakdown of law and order.
Prior to 1960, federal involvement in crime and law enforcement was limited. Presidents rarely touched on crime in their public addresses or private messages; party platforms were silent on the issue. The federal government was proscribed from interfering in what was believed to be a state and local concern, only having jurisdiction in cases of treason and espionage, mail fraud, and counterfeit crime. The DOJ was a small entity which only prosecuted Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cases with an emaciated budget. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was the sole voice in this vacuum, fervently speaking about the mounting rate of serious crimes and predicting a further increase. He lamented the public's “submissive attitude,” saying “law enforcement has not yet attained the measure of public support it justly deserves.”39 He was partially right; the FBI reports showed that crime was increasing—it increased 66 percent in the 1950s—but there was little concern at the federal level. Rising crime rates in the 1950s, as far as we can take them as fact, were not initially followed by punitive legislation or a coordinated federal attack on crime. To the contrary, the only anticrime legislation that was passed in this decade concerned specific incidents—gambling and racketeering, crime in planes, obscene mail, and drunk driving.
Three strategies connected crime to racial change. The first variation used by early opponents of civil rights legislation was the argument that the civil rights demonstrations were criminal acts. Southern congressmen had been trying for years to apply criminal charges to civil rights leaders and their followers. A coalition of southern senators (from Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida) introduced legislation in 1961 to criminalize freedom rides and sit-ins. They argued that freedom-riders were using interstate commerce to incite riots and should be criminally punished:
"As to the so-called freedom riders, it is well known that this trip originated far from the South, and had as its announced purpose a trip through several States where local statutes would be violated … . Instead of being encouraged by groups, and cast into the political arena, to be made a political issue, they should be made a violation of the criminal statutes."
And in some places it was. State legislatures in Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina implemented statutes with the aim of criminalizing NAACP actions. Immediately after the lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, states began passing laws with penalties specific to sit-ins and boycotters were brought in on laws that made it illegal to interfere with business.
The second variant to this crime/civil rights linkage was to argue that civil rights and integration would portend a crime wave by bringing violence-prone blacks to white neighborhoods. Senator Richard Russell's statement in 1960 is representative:
"And, Mr. President, I say that the extremely high incidence of crimes of violence among members of the Negro race is one of the major reasons why the great majority of the white people of the South are irrevocably opposed to efforts to bring about enforced association of the races."
Conservative congressmen also blamed “civil rights havens” for the increase in crime; Representative John Bell Williams (D–MS) argued:
This exodus of Negroes from the South, and their influx into the great metropolitan centers of other areas of the Nation, has been accompanied by a wave of crime . … What has civil rights accomplished for these areas? … Segregation is the only answer as most Americans—not the politicians—have realized for hundreds of years.
In the congressional debates over 1964 Civil Rights Act, opponents frequently referred to the fact that crime rates of Southern blacks were much lower compared to their Northern counterparts. In attempting to break a filibuster of the bill, Senator Jacob Javits (R–NY) contested the strategy to link crime and civil rights: “Another favorite diversion of the bill's opponents consists of alluding to crime rates in major northern cities.”
Finally, as the first major legislative civil rights victories were under way, this argument was refashioned from prediction to explanation to challenge the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the summer of 1964, the Harlem and Rochester race riots gave fuel to the familiar argument that had been percolating in the background of civil rights debates since the 1957 Civil Rights Act—that civil rights would engender a crime wave and integration would bring lawlessness. In this version of the argument, several Congressmen campaigned against passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 using the riots as testament to the fact that civil rights bred lawlessness. They argued that because the racial unrest happened in northern states with the most progressive social policy and civil rights, then poverty and racial discrimination could not be to blame. Instead, cities like Philadelphia and Rochester were described as being “victims of their own generosity”; by opening their arms to southern blacks, they were repaid with crime-ridden slums and black discontent. According to one of the major sponsors of later crime legislation, Senator John McClellan (D–AR), “The Civil Rights law is calculated to provoke, and is provoking, an attitude that is contrary to the concept of bringing about an understanding and harmony between the races.”
Despite Hoover's early rumblings about crime rises, the person to succeed in raising the public's awareness of crime and its connection to a wide variety of other social malaise was Barry Goldwater. Goldwater warned voters in 1964:
"[C]hoose the way of this present Administration and you have the way of mobs in the street, restrained only by the plea that they [referring to black militants and civil rights demonstrators] wait until after election time to ignite violence once again."
To dramatize this point, the Goldwater campaign designed a television advertisement called “Choice” which depicted the mayhem of the Harlem riots in 1964, later pulled because it was so inflammatory. It was replaced with an advertisement that began with these words: “Graft! Swindle! Juvenile Delinquency! Crime! Riots!” The same Goldwater who had opposed Kennedy's proposed National Crime Commission, arguing that it would lead to a national police force,60 wanted crime to be a focus of his presidency:
Crime grows faster than population, while those who break the law are accorded more consideration than those who try to enforce the law . … Our wives, all women, feel unsafe on our streets . … Perhaps we are destined to see in this law-loving land people running for office not on their stainless records but on their prison records.
Goldwater is credited in almost folklore like ways with the first intimations of “law and order.” While Goldwater was perhaps the first to vocalize the crime issue in a major political campaign and this is dramatized in most accounts, there is evidence that crime had become an important topic to several southern Democrats prior to Goldwater's orations. In a book about organized crime (the one area federal legislators could get involved in), John McClellan devoted the remaining pages to a new topic on his mind—crime in the streets—singling out the District of Columbia for particular emphasis and calling for “heavier penalties for insidious crimes.” Goldwater campaign Director of Field Operations (and eventual attorney general in the Nixon administration) Richard Kleindienst has been credited by some as the driving force behind the turn toward law and order. As already discussed, crime was a favorite theme of southern Democrats in expressing opposition to civil rights and integration.
The potential explosiveness of this issue was not lost on the Johnson administration, and his aides recommended that he “immediately call a White House Law-and-Order Conference” to demonstrate their commitment to quelling violence: “I am convinced that if the president does not call such a conference, Goldwater will.”65 Although his candidacy was unsuccessful, Goldwater's spirited attack laid the groundwork for extending the debate over civil rights to a ripe domain. Johnson administration officials produced a memorandum outlining steps for an extensive agenda on “crime and delinquency” shortly thereafter, primarily as a reaction to Goldwater's fevered claims: “Although there are existing Federal programs . … The obvious public concern over this matter during the campaign … warrant a new look.”66 In March 1965, Johnson issued his first speech on crime and message to Congress—the first such presidential address specifically on crime—and sent an anti-crime program to Congress with several requests for new legislation. The most important of these, the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA), provided for a three-year pilot program of federal aid to states and localities for the purpose of innovating their criminal justice systems through training programs and experimental projects. After the bill glided easily through Congress without a negative vote, Johnson signed the LEAA, saying, “This bill puts the federal government in partnership with our states and local communities in performing the first and most important function of government: the preservation of law and order.”
Although it was never budgeted more than $7.5 million annually—a pittance in comparison to the criminal justice system today—”the result was a level of federal action that would have been inconceivable ten years earlier.”68 It was the first federal program specifically for the purpose of helping states strengthen their law enforcement capabilities and only the second time to that point that the federal government invested its own resources in the national crime problem.69 It was the model for several pieces of subsequent legislation from the Safe Streets Act three years hence to Clinton's omnibus crime control bill three decades later. It established the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) in the Department of Justice. While conceived with the intention of improving local law enforcement and updating practices and researching the nature of crime, it marked the beginning of an expanded federal government intervention in the area of criminal justice and law enforcement, and spawned the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1968, which would ultimately dole out millions of dollars in federal aid. However, Johnson remained dedicated to discovering the causes of crime, prevention, alternatives to incarceration, and rehabilitation. It was this end to which he established the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice by executive order in 1965 (headed by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach) charged with deep investigation into these social conditions. The commission's bestselling report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, blamed poverty and ghetto conditions for crime, saying “crime and recidivism cannot be cured by any correctional system so long as the roots of crime in slum living, poverty, and joblessness are allowed to persist.”70 Although the welfare approach was now balanced with a harder criminological line, most of the legislation after Johnson announced his war on crime was still rehabilitative—including civil commitment of drug addicts, prisoner rehabilitation, and juvenile delinquency—and had an intensive research focus based on two commissions to study the causes. The only punishment-based alteration of the criminal code was legislation requested by Johnson to protect civil rights workers from violent attacks. Thus, while the federal role in crime expanded quite significantly, the approach did not.
Two crises served to elevate the status of violence as a political issue: crime and riots. Just as the Law Enforcement Assistance Act was being passed, the August 1965 riot in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles dealt the first blow to the poverty approach. The most destructive riot in the twentieth century up to that time ended with 36 dead, more than 1,000 injured and 4,000 arrested, nearly 1,000 buildings burned, and 15,000 National Guardsmen deployed. A U.S. News and World Report headline captured well the contention that emerged with force: “Race Friction—Now a Crime Problem? … The turn: away from demonstrations and toward outlawry. For city after city, it's becoming a problem of crime control.” A series of “long, hot summers” followed the events in Watts, with outbreaks in large cities to small communities, from Elizabethtown to Newark to Omaha. During 1967, 41 percent of cities with populations of more than 100,000 had experienced a racial disturbance, according to a national survey. Figure 4 illustrates the sharp rise in riot activity between 1965 and 1969 and the resulting arrests and injuries.
The frontlash relied on a two-stage maneuver. First, conservatives attached civil rights to lawlessness by arguing that civil disobedience flouted laws and would inevitably lead to more lawless behavior. Thus, nonviolent protest was connected to riots. But then, through a reverse claim, they disconnected the relationship they had just sewn, by arguing that the riots were not connected to legitimate grievances but to “crime in the streets.”
Old habits did die hard; previously confined to debates around civil rights, the arguments linking crime and civil rights were ultimately revived and inserted into debates around crime, but this time with more sophistication and aided by real-world conditions. Early opponents of civil rights legislation had argued that one form of civil rights protest would ultimately lead to more law-breaking and that civil rights and voting rights legislation would reward such lawlessness. The new norm of racial equality required that proponents avoid the explicitly racist justifications of its Jim Crow predecessor. Instead, supporters of punitive crime legislation now argued that civil rights strategies promulgated the idea that laws could be obeyed selectively. With the nation engulfed in violent protests, they reopened this argument to legitimize their attack on the civil rights agenda and initial appeals for heavier handed law enforcement.
The strategy relied on two mutually reinforcing elements: (1) depoliticization and criminalization of racial struggle and (2) racialization of crime. According to this argument, the civil disobedience strategy of movement activists was the major culprit in the crime increase. This claim was empirically unfounded; though arrests related to collective action protests did increase during this time, it was not of a scale to make the aggregate crime rate increase. Some academics believe collective action actually had the opposite effect. But in their advocacy, proponents of the new doctrine championed the view that civil rights demonstrations amounted to violence and created a climate of lawlessness. Senator Richard Russell denounced politicians for condoning them:
The seeds that have been sown by high officials encouraging violations of local law are now producing the crop of violence . … If our highest officials continue to applaud sit-ins, lie-ins, stand-ins, and all other violations of property rights, it can lead us into a state of anarchy.
The argument depended on collapsing the distinction between political protest, which relied on a strategy of nonviolence, with riots; Herman Talmadge (D–GA) concluded that “mob violence such as we have witnessed is a direct outgrowth of the philosophy that people can violate any law they deem to be unjust or immoral or with which they don't agree.” Senator Russell Long gave a speech explaining where the riots started—“When Martin Luther King was in the Birmingham, Alabama, jail and wrote a letter … to the preachers which said civil disobedience is OK if done in the name of civil rights.” J. Edgar Hoover also denounced the nonviolent strategy of civil rights activists:
“Civil disobedience,” a seditious slogan of gross irresponsibility, has captured the imagination of citizens … . I am greatly concerned that certain racial leaders are doing the civil rights movement a great disservice by suggesting that citizens need only obey the laws with which they agree. Such an attitude breeds disrespect for the law and even civil disorder and rioting.
One of the most articulate proponents of this idea was the former Supreme Court Justice Charles E. Whittaker, who, since retiring from the Court, traveled across the country giving speeches and often testified before Congress mainly on this point.
Therefore, even though most protest was still nonviolent, by arguing that civil disobedience violated the rule of law and led to more serious lawlessness, it was violent, and thus, criminal. Thus, the counterproject contended that racial struggle, both peaceful and violent, was inherently criminal. But, for racial disorder to successfully be attached to criminality, a second supporting idea was required.
Just as important as what conservative strategists associated with racial discord, is what they disassociated from it. In order to discredit the idea that violent racial struggle was an outcome of social conditions, conservative strategists became preoccupied with showing that racial discord was neither motivated by police brutality nor did its origins emanate from racial discrimination; rather, it was criminality, pure and simple. For example, though looting was a form of protest, usually targeting discriminatory businesses, looters were depicted as criminals who pursued their loot in a “holiday spirit.” Even while the National Commission on Civil Disorders reported findings that most racial disorders were instigated by confrontations between the local community and police and/or alleged excessive police force, many legislators and public commentators construed them as being perpetrated by professional agitators, Communist Party affiliates, and self-serving looters, hoodlums, and criminals. According to one “top authority,” Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker, the “police brutality” allegations were a “terribly vicious canard which is used to conceal Negro criminality … to try to find someone else to blame for their crimes.” In his statement before the Crime Commission, J. Edgar Hoover, the highest ranked U.S. law enforcement official, dismissed police brutality as part of a communist campaign, stating that the “net effect of the charge of ‘police brutality’ is to provoke and encourage mob action and violence by developing contempt for constituted authority.” Indeed, Hoover's report on the 1964 riots concluded that, because civil rights agencies had not received formal complaints prior to the riots, they could not have been sparked by racial discrimination or police misconduct and went on to applaud the police for performing very well.
They also refuted arguments that riots were outbreaks against impoverished conditions. If poverty were the cause, they argued, then why were the cities that were the best for blacks being victimized? This sentiment was echoed frequently. As Senator Robert Byrd (D–WV) argued:
"So, Mr. President, … [p]overty neither provides a license for laziness nor for lawlessness. We can take the people out of the slums, but we cannot take the slums out of the people. Wherever some people go, the ratholes will follow … . All the housing and all the welfare programs conceivable, will not stop the riots or do away with the slums."
Nor was racial discrimination a factor. After Watts, California Governor Edmund G. Brown declared: “The riot had no connection with whether a Negro has the right to vote or a legal right to any job for which he can qualify. We have established these things in California.” The McCone Commission, charged with analyzing the causes of the Watts riot, blamed the rioting on blacks, calling it a “formless, quite senseless” explosion and denied any role of the police in the agitation. According to one Evening Star editorial, “A man who makes a firebomb and throws it through a shop window is not doing it because his grandfather was a slave . … Those who openly advocate wanton acts should be severely punished.” Others argued that police actions were legitimate responses to the behavior of black residents; for instance, Senator Byrd said that “If they [blacks] conduct themselves in an orderly way, they will not have to worry about police brutality.” Surveys of public opinion demonstrate that this campaign to disassociate police actions from racial unrest was very successful: a mere 13 percent of the public believed “police brutality” was a cause of the riots.
A third image in the frontlash strategists' toolkit was focused on enlisting popular rights-language to their cause. Politicians counterbalanced civil rights claims with criminal justice. The focus on civil rights had gone too far, the argument went, and was permitting the rights of society from protection against criminals and agitators to be sacrificed. For example, in a letter to President Johnson, Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D–SC) noted: “The Nation cries out for leadership; fear permeates the air; insurrections runs rampant; law and order is on the verge of total collapse. … Now is the time to speak of obligations—not rights.” Pitting the priorities of crime and civil rights against each other, another advocate, Georgia Governor Lester Maddox, wired the president in 1967:
"I advised you on numerous occasions starting in early 1964 that national legislation … would bring waves of violence, burning, looting, injury and violent death … Please do not urge additional legislation that strikes down the right to private property, free enterprise … . Please offer no more programs that are nothing more than attempted bribes to buy law and order and good behavior."
To symbolize the priority of crime over civil rights, Representative Craig Hosmer (R–CA), introduced a proposed constitutional amendment: “The right of society in general and individual persons in particular to be protected from crimes against person and property shall be paramount to other rights.” In 1968, Richard Nixon would proclaim that the “first civil right” was the “right to be free from violence.”
Politicians linked civil rights and crime through implicit appeals. Although they avoided explicitly racist exhortations about racial integration breeding crime, they associated the problem of crime with racial change, radicalism, and civil rights demonstrations. Republican leader of the House Gerald Ford gave an emphatic statement to the press:
"The War at home—the war against crime—is being lost … . The homes and the streets of America are no longer safe for our people. This is a frightful situation … . The Republicans in Congress demand that this Administration take the action required to protect our people in their homes, on the streets, at their jobs … . When a Rap Brown and a Stokely Carmichael are allowed to run loose, to threaten law-abiding Americans with injury and death, it's time to slam the door on them and any like them—and slam it hard!"
From 1965 to 1969, nearly 100 pieces of legislation made participating in a riot a federal offense with stiff penalties. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act made it a felony to cross state lines with the intent of inciting or taking part in a riot; another provision banned people convicted of a riot-related felony from federal employment and from receiving federal money. The 1967 District of Columbia Crime Bill also contained an anti-riot provision that gave penalties of up to five years imprisonment and fines of up to $10,000 for engaging in, inciting, or encouraging others to participate in a riot. In addition to numerous crime-related bills, riot-related penalties and provisions also surfaced as riders to civil rights bills, including the 1966 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts. For example, the liberal open housing law of 1968 contained a tacked on antiriot bill (sponsored by Representatives Strom Thurmond [R–SC] and Frank J. Lausche [D–OH]), or the “H. Rap Brown bill,” as it was termed after the Black Power leader. Congress included antiriot provisions in several other bills unrelated to crime that banned students and federal employees convicted of riot offenses from receiving federal money. Even a “routine postal salary bill” contained provisions banning from federal employment any person convicted of an offense related to a riot or civil disorder. Similarly, at least twenty states revised their criminal codes to include riot offenses, with most carrying prison sentences. In 1969 alone, state legislatures proposed more than 100 separate riot-related bills.
However, because the new conservative doctrine had worked vociferously to conflate crime and civil disobedience, with its obvious extensions to civil rights, liberals were forced to walk a tightrope. The liberal position was wedged in a trap—either refute the conservative paradigm, arguing that riots were legitimate expressions of deplorable inner-city conditions, which risked the appearance of sanctioning violence and doing permanent damage to the civil rights agenda, or seek to avoid blame for the riots by presenting a strong case for their distinction from civil rights protest. They pursued the latter strategy.
Liberals tried to project the message that riots were not part of a legitimate articulation of racial discrimination, for fear that the violent nature would hurt their civil rights agenda and create a backlash among previously supportive groups of whites. Black leaders submitted a collective statement printed in the New York Times in 1964 distinguishing between rioting and “legitimate protest.” In 1966, another group of nationally prominent black leaders, including A. Philip Randolph, Dorothy Height, Bayard Rustin, Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young, Jr. published a statement in the New York Times repudiating violence while endorsing criticism of poor conditions in the ghettos. LeRoy Collins, formerly the head of the Community Relations Service of the DOJ, also tried to distinguish riots and protest: “We don't want to associate civil rights with this kind of lawlessness.” And Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach: “To call them [riots] ‘racial’ problems is not a solution but a slogan. What is worse, it is wrong.” President Johnson put the point more bluntly: “A rioter with a Molotov cocktail is not fighting for civil rights any more than a Klansman with a sheet on his back and a mask on his face.” By making these claims, liberals implicitly argued that the urban violence was not part of a larger social ill and that riot participants were common criminals, confirming the conservative claim.
Ultimately, liberals betrayed their early solidaristic calls for social reform and warring on poverty and, by the end of the 1960s, they began downplaying underlying causes, arguing instead for more gun control. Not in small part due to several defeats—Democrats had lost 12 million voters between 1964 and 1968—the early emphasis on poverty and social conditions faded. By 1968, Democrats had aligned themselves with the “law and order” program and were trying desperately to mimic the Republicans. The Democratic platforms during this time period demonstrate how increasingly indistinguishable their position was from the Republicans. The Democratic platform in 1956 contained a mere three sentences on law enforcement; the 1960 platform included only one additional sentence (dealing specifically with organized crime). By the next election, the issue was beginning to rise in importance: “We cannot and will not tolerate lawlessness. We can and will seek to eliminate its economic and social causes.” While crime is no longer ignored, the platform also firmly set out the idea that through eradicating poverty, crime would likewise diminish. The only mention of stricter punishments was focused on the unlawful behavior of employers who discriminate. The 1964 platform highlighted two pieces of legislation—the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 and the Criminal Justice Act of 1964—that were aimed at preventing youth crime and making sure poor people were adequately represented in court, respectively. By 1968, the Democratic Party was clearly beginning to recognize the costs of being seen as supporting lawbreakers and the root causes commitment had faded. The program included a much fortified discussion on the problem of crime and strong critique of dissenters who use violence and pledged a “vigorous and sustained campaign against lawlessness in all its forms.” Meanwhile, Robert Kennedy campaigned for the Indiana primary by voicing his opposition to crime and Humphrey sought the Minnesota primary on law and order.
By the 1970s, the root causes argument had been eliminated in favor of echoing and reinforcing the connection between crime and civil rights, rendering Democrats virtually indistinguishable from their conservative counterparts. For one example, Senator Ted Kennedy (D–MA) echoed the conservative line: “Along with the civil right to vote, go to school, and have a job is the right not to be mugged, robbed, or assaulted.”Polls suggest that, by 1970, people viewed the two political parties as roughly equivalent on crime control. In response to one Gallop survey question on the issue—“which party—the Republican or the Democratic—do you think can do the better job of dealing with crime and lawlessness?”—the majority of respondents saw no difference or had no opinion (44 and 11 percent, respectively), while only 4 percent more respondents believed the Republican Party would do a better job on crime than the Democratic Party (24 and 20 percent, respectively).
After the “long, hot summer” of 1967, where riots occurred in 120 cities, it seemed the “Great Society” had given way to lawlessness. By the end of that summer, there had been at least 150 violent racial disorders spread across 128 cities, resulting in 118 dead, 4,000 injured, about 10,000 arrests, and millions of dollars of property damage. The National Guard had been mobilized twenty-three times and on one occasion U.S. Army troops were deployed. Many perceived the nation as gripped in a state of rebellion (Figure 7).
At the same time, the public believed they were beleaguered by crime. Crime and lawlessness was the top issue to the public in 1968 for the first time since the 1930s, according to the Gallup poll, and about half of the public believed crime was increasing (compared to only 3 percent who said decreasing).The next year, 88 percent of people felt that the problem of “crime in the streets” should have a “great deal of attention paid to it.
Southerners held key positions on both the District of Columbia Crime Committee and the Judiciary Committee and conservatives dominated the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Procedure, which was chaired by John McClellan.
Turning his back on recommendations from Warren Christopher and Ramsey Clark, Johnson instructed Joe Califano to include a riot bill in his upcoming crime message.132 In the message, he said that the law would “give the federal government the power to act against those who might move around the country, inciting and joining in the terror riots.”133 Realizing that he could no longer politically afford to decouple crime and civil rights, Johnson also changed his line dramatically in his 1968 State of the Union speech—“The American people … [h]ave had enough of rising crime and lawlessness”—and the loudest applause from the audience came in parts that attacked crime.134 In his message to Congress requesting action on the Safe Streets bill, he had abandoned the poverty approach for more “immediate solutions to the rising crime rate that will help us maintain order.”135
The negotiation and passage of two major bills exemplifies the escalating punitiveness. The first “immediate solution” was the Omnibus District of Columbia Crime bill. Efforts to get a bill passed on crime in the District began in 1958. There had been excessive attention to crime in the District for years; described as a “sick city,” it dominated news accounts of crime: “‘latchkey’ kids who know no family restraint roam the midnight streets, yoking (mugging), beating, and gang-raping.”136 Ramsey Clark and others believed this attention to have motivations above the crime rate, saying that “people always liked to focus on the nation's capital as a crime center” even though “the statistics never supported it” because “it was really a continuation of the old southern belief that the blacks were incapable of self-government.”137
Passed in 1967, it included warrantless arrests for misdemeanors, investigative detention with no charges or Mirandizing (allowing police interrogation of people not charged with a crime), imposed strict mandatory penalties, and prison sentences for inciting to riot. The conservative-dominated District of Columbia crime committees in the House and Senate deleted provisions related to gun control, drug treatment, and rehabilitation, and revised the penal code to include mandatory sentences for certain offenses. This bill attempted to undercut the Supreme Court's Mallory decision by ensuring the admissibility of confessions made in a three-hour investigative detention (the Mallory rule excluded confessions obtained by delaying arraignment). President Johnson vetoed the bill with reservations over detention and the mandatory minimums.
In February 1967, the commission established by Johnson in the 1965 LEAA to study the priorities in criminal justice reform issued its report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. The commission found “far more crime than ever is reported,” and advocated federal aid to local police of “several hundred million dollars annually.” Based on this report and its 200 recommendations, Johnson requested from Congress the “most comprehensive set of anti-crime proposals ever sent by a President to Congress,” which implemented the recommendations of the report and included a mix of expansive federal gun control legislation, provisions for aid to state innovation in criminal justice, and prisoner rehabilitation. Aides had warned against the move to further “federalize” the crime problem; the Director of Johnson's Crime Commission, James Vorenberg, sent a message to Joe Califano where he strongly admonished restraint: “the ‘safe streets’ approach runs the risk of the President and the federal government appearing to take very direct responsibility for eliminating or reducing crime on the streets.”138
Although President Johnson's proposed legislation left the House Judiciary Committee with little modification, once on the Floor, the bill was dramatically rewritten by a Republican and Southern Democratic coalition through a series of amendments debated over the course of three days. The Senate did the House one better, foisting even more provisions that were anathema to the president's 22-point program and even attempting to rename the bill. These revisions gave extra funds with the “highest priority” of funds earmarked for riots and civil disorders, reassigned control of funds from the Attorney General to state governors, and expanded the power of electronic surveillance, overriding Johnson's strong belief that wiretapping should only be used in cases related to national security. The two bills were squared in the conference committee, with conservative John McClellan, the Senate sponsor, ultimately triumphing.
The conservatives who controlled crime-related committees influenced nearly every facet of the Safe Streets Act in ways that benefited their aims. One journalist and expert on crime legislation during the 1960s noted that while the conservative coalition usually “exercises negative control, and merely votes down bills, or parts of bills, that it dislikes,” the crime issue provided “an opportunity to exercise positive control, both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.” The conservative coalition made sure that the crime legislation would be immune from civil rights challenge and wouldn't get into the hands of those sympathetic to civil rights, teaming up on several key roll call votes. First, they amended the law to make sure that disbursement of funds was not based on compliance with the condition of the Civil Rights Act in Title VI, which gave the federal government power to withhold funds from agencies that were racially discriminatory. They also objected to the grants being administered by the attorney general for fear that he would enforce racial guidelines on local governments. In the Senate hearings on the bill, McClellan grilled Ramsey Clark over his potential authority to require recipient agencies to be racially inclusive. When Clark answered that the Civil Rights Act would indeed apply and that discriminatory law enforcement agencies would be in violation, Senator Thurmond interrupted:
"I gave you the illustration that now HEW is trying to get schools to haul children from one place to another specifically to bring up the racial balance in schools. I am asking you here under this bill, coupled with Title VI of the civil rights act, would your director have the right to withhold funds if he wanted a racial balance brought into the personnel of the police department … ?"
Title I of the resulting act created a three-person LEAA to administer the grants and stipulated that the LEAA could not require that grant recipients had a racially balanced police force. This dictum was not merely symbolic; some states including Alabama and Mississippi still prohibited blacks from being employed as state police. Second, they changed the federally administered local grants into state block grants, in one of the most controversial and hotly debated provisions of the bill. The administration's bill had originally designed the grants to go directly to cities and local agencies with populations over 50,000 but House Republicans Everett Dirksen (R–IL) and Gerald Ford (R–MI) proposed to change the structure to block grants to be given directly to states. It was understood that if the money went to cities, agencies controlled by liberal Democrats and blacks in city government would administer it. Alternatively, if the money was channeled through at the state level, governors would have discretion over how the money was used and the majority of governors were ideologically conservative. Republicans and southern Democrats argued vociferously for the block grant amendment, upholding the tradition of attaching local control to federal funding that often resulted in racially discriminatory administration. Third, the act barred LEAA funds from going to any agency that had ties to the anti-poverty agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), an agency criticized for being complicit in the riots.146 The above are powerful examples of how the conservative coalition used a pet project—crime—to advance the cornerstones of their prior agenda on civil rights.
Attention to racial disorders figured prominently in the protracted debates around the crime bill:
I do know that our courts and our national leadership has placed too much emphasis on minority rights without regard to the fact that society collectively also has rights … . I am charging the officials at Justice with ignoring their responsibility to society and to the American people in order not to offend certain minority groups.
McClellan and other anti-civil rights legislators had not yet forgiven the Court for disturbing its Jim Crow practices; in a direct example of frontlash, they submitted several provisions to curb the Court.
While the debates on Safe Streets were going on, the House passed a bill to punish people involved in the riots. The bill was introduced by Representative William Cramer (R–FL), who had originally tried to pass riot penalties as an amendment to the failed 1966 Civil Rights Act. Emmanuel Celler (D–NY) proposed to combine the antiriot legislation with another bill that was to ensure protection of civil rights workers, which had originally been part of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. Despite it being an uncontroversial provision in 1966, the bill ultimately failed after arch-segregationist William Colmer (D–MS) argued against the combination because he believed the civil rights protection would make the riot punishment futile. Some in Congress objected to the racial connotations of the antiriot bill; William F. Ryan (D–NY) believed the legislation was motivated by the same “white backlash” as that that killed the Civil Rights Act of 1966; Frank Thompson Jr. (D–NJ) argued that the bill was for sole purpose of stopping Stokely Carmichael, the black power leader. Despite the fact that the Commission on Civil Disorders found no evidence of a communist conspiracy, the riots were connected to communism and outside “professional” agitators and antipoverty workers. The DOJ's own video “Riotmakers: The Technology of Social Demolition” explained the riots of the 1960s as being coordinated by professional agitators, which were dubbed “Leninoids.” In his statement for the bill, Cramer presented the accounts of officials in cities that had had riots, which alleged the influence and participation of outside agitators; Colmer also claimed the riots were an “organized conspiracy … . backed by the Communists.” Many argued that the riots were not disjointed events or spontaneous outbreaks to racial bias and police brutality but were part of a conspiracy. In the hearings on anti-riot provisions, Representative Joel Broyhill (D–VA) argued:
"These outbreaks of lawlessness … are conceived in the twisted minds of the hate-mongers, a trained cadre of professional agitators who operate in open defiance of law, order, and decency … . Moving among these people, the dregs of our society, these insidious enemies of our democratic form of government preach a cant of hate and contempt for law and order … . They create fear wherever they go, and feed with delight on this fear … . They train other malcontents in the art of destruction…these vultures of our society carry on their nefarious work on funds provided by the very tax-payers whose lives and property they threaten."
The resulting legislation contained a sprawling definition of a riot; for instance, a riot could consist of a public disturbance of a group of only three people, which effectively meant that large peaceful demonstrations with a scuffle between three bystanders could constitute a riot. This legislation also provided for the prosecution of civil rights leaders.153 When Congress passed it, many fully expected it to be overturned by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment protections.
After being debated in committee and Congress for two years and suffering the addition of twenty-five amendments to the original administration proposal, the Safe Streets bill was finally sent to the president to sign on 6 June 1968. Even opponents of the bill, such as John G. Dow (D–NY) felt compelled by public anxiety over crime and riots to vote for the bill:
This bill, as now amended, I regret exceedingly, and will only vote for it because of the widespread desire of all our people to curb crime and prevent continuation of violence in our land. As the price for this, we are saddled with amendments that threaten our liberties and may remain to haunt us.
Members of Congress referred to the blistering public pressure they faced to crack down. Torrents of constituent mail flowed into their offices, and businesses, nonprofits, and civic organizations lobbied for passage of the crime bill. Democrats had witnessed the departure of several colleagues in the midterm elections in 1966—forty-seven representatives and three senators were voted out of office (in addition to eight governors), some for their vote against a crucial crime bill. A former member of Congress and the House Judiciary Committee wrote the president urging his veto of Safe Streets: “One of the reasons I am no longer in Congress is because I voted against the D.C. [crime] Bill.” Now, fourteen liberal Democrats in the Senate were facing an election a few months away where crime was a major campaign theme.
With only seventeen members of the House voting against Safe Streets and only four in the Senate, no federal agency had come out against it, and, with an impending election four months hence, Johnson's hands were tied, even though the bill was unrecognizable from the administration's proposed legislation and did not include any of the recommendations of the crime commission's 18-month study. Although Warren Christopher called the bill “perplexing” and noted that Congress should have given the president a much better bill, he urged the president to “take into account the very large majorities which supported the bill in Congress,” who threatened to override a veto. Johnson reluctantly signed it five hours before the deadline saying it contained “more good than bad” and with a request that the Congress remove the electronic surveillance provisions.
The resulting law, 134 pages in length, was the “most extensive federal anti-crime measure in the nation's history.” Safe Streets, which began in a 1965 request from the president for funds for training local law enforcement through categorical grants, gun control, right to privacy (limiting wiretapping), drug control, and agency reorganization, was transformed into a radically different bill before passing in 1968. The 1968 act overturned three major Supreme Court rulings relating to defendants' rights, removed the federal courts' ability to review state court rulings on voluntary confessions, made a huge investment in riot control, and dramatically expanded law enforcement's powers relating to wiretapping. Much of the gun control legislation requested by Johnson was either not acted on or watered down significantly. In short, this bill had become a “vehicle for ‘law enforcement’ rather than ‘criminal justice’ in its journey through the legislature.” Street crime and riots were folded into same crime package. It was as much about political dissidents and racial conflict in the cities as it was about ordinary crime, perhaps more so. In the first month, $4 million was disbursed to forty states for riot prevention and control.
Most importantly, under Safe Streets, the federal government would disperse millions of dollars in aid to state law enforcement, the first piece of major legislation to implement block grants and the revenue sharing concept. It was only the second program of federal assistance to the states designated for crime control (with ancestral ties to the first (OLEA), established three years earlier and expired by the passage of Safe Streets). Compared to the 1965 LEAA's appropriation of $10 million, it gave $400 million in the first two years for the state planning grants, with a larger budget in following years.
Criminal justice policies were not the only arena affected by the fusion of crime and civil rights; several Civil Rights bills suffered defeat on the justification that they would be seen as rewarding riots and criminality. Consider the memo of one Johnson aide passing on the sentiments of Representative Bill Hungate (D–MO), a member of the Judiciary Committee:
"[T]he Civil Rights Bill will not pass in anything like its present form; the feeling on the floor is that we have given enough to Civil Rights workers who have just been stirring up trouble; that the bill could not have come to the floor at a worse time."
Indeed, after 1965, Congress' civil rights agenda slowed considerably. More of the Kerner Report's recommendations on law enforcement were implemented than its vast program for reducing deprivation in the cities. Crime became an excuse for not expanding civil rights and social justice. Civil rights and crime were inversely related on agenda; as action on civil rights withered, criminal justice was expanded.
The focus on violence had predictable effects, spilling over into discussions of civil rights. As racial disorders spread throughout cities across the country, civil rights related agencies and court decisions came under attack for being complicit in the disorder, in the strong version, and for indirectly aiding racial disorder by giving in to the early demands of “agitators,” in the more discreet account. In the 1967 debates over extending the Office of Economic Opportunity, one of the primary arguments against it was that poverty programs were connected to black insurgency and lawlessness. Representative Paul Fino (R–NY) maintained:
"There is little doubt that the Office of Economic Opportunity has been at the bottom of much of the rioting and troublemaking which we have sadly witnessed in the past few years throughout this country … . It has hired muggers and criminals. It has subsidized revolution and social agitation."
In the 1967 congressional debates over passing the anti-riot act, law enforcement officers from various cities testified that antipoverty workers had participated in the riots; indeed, one accused the OEO of giving a grant of $7,700 to a leader of the riots in Nashville. Some, such as Representative William Chappell (D–FL), identified the earlier “permissiveness” of the Supreme Court as a key cause behind the riots: “But when the courts ruled that certain disruptive marches were in order because of their own sense of social reform, the destruction and riots that followed must be laid at the judicial doorstep.”
“You want to know what this was really all about?” he asked with the bluntness of a man who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had little left to protect. “The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or blacks, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”
by Postauthoritarian America » Wed May 26, 2021 7:19 pm
by Just-An-Illusion » Wed May 26, 2021 7:26 pm
by Page » Thu May 27, 2021 12:22 am
Just-An-Illusion wrote:There are good cops, unfortunately when they try to stand up against their fellow officers they get fired.
by Saiwania » Thu May 27, 2021 1:29 am
Page wrote:There are otherwise good people who are cops but there are no good cops because policing as it exists today is fundamentally harmful, as it enforces oppression and exploitation. No amount of intrinsic goodness on the part of an individual can alter the nature of irredeemable work.
by The Lone Alliance » Thu May 27, 2021 2:33 am
Page wrote:SNIP
by Borderlands of Rojava » Thu May 27, 2021 5:12 am
by Borderlands of Rojava » Thu May 27, 2021 5:13 am
The Lone Alliance wrote:Page wrote:SNIP
Laws are in effect oppressive, it's just considered a justified form of oppression. So there is no way to make policing not oppressive by it's very nature.
And the solution "Let people commit whatever crimes they want" is not a solution either. So we're forced to decide what balance of oppression is acceptable for modern society.
by Page » Thu May 27, 2021 6:38 am
The Lone Alliance wrote:Page wrote:SNIP
Laws are in effect oppressive, it's just considered a justified form of oppression. So there is no way to make policing not oppressive by it's very nature.
And the solution "Let people commit whatever crimes they want" is not a solution either. So we're forced to decide what balance of oppression is acceptable for modern society.
by Vassenor » Thu May 27, 2021 6:56 am
by Gravlen » Thu May 27, 2021 8:45 am
by San Lumen » Thu May 27, 2021 10:15 am
by Ifreann » Thu May 27, 2021 10:24 am
San Lumen wrote:https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/555767-georgia-sheriffs-deputy-demoted-after-k-9-left-in-hot-patrol-car
A sheriff’s deputy in Georgia was demoted this week and suspended for five days after he left a K-9 dog in a hot patrol car, causing the animal to die.
No charges will be filed.
by Borderlands of Rojava » Thu May 27, 2021 11:46 am
Ifreann wrote:San Lumen wrote:https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/555767-georgia-sheriffs-deputy-demoted-after-k-9-left-in-hot-patrol-car
A sheriff’s deputy in Georgia was demoted this week and suspended for five days after he left a K-9 dog in a hot patrol car, causing the animal to die.
No charges will be filed.
There's a memorial website for police dogs who die in the line of duty and a lot of them are shot by their own cops while attacking criminals.
by Nanako Island » Thu May 27, 2021 11:50 am
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by Kowani » Thu May 27, 2021 11:53 am
To test the relationship between lagged transfers and dogs killed by police, we estimate a negative binomial regression, including the same controls as the previous regressions (as well as a lagged dependent variable). Results, presented in Table 2, confirm that a positive relationship exists. Holding all else constant, police that received the highest 1033 transfers kill dogs at an order of magnitude higher rate than those with no transfers (0.161 compared with 0.009). Such findings strengthen our confidence in the claim that military transfers are related to LEA violence.
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