Right Wing Discussion Thread XIX

[Totally Not OEP]

Whether they would be slaughtered or not is irrelevant to the fact they had already taken the step of hostile action and, further, is a rationalization solely based on hindsight; Berlin didn't have that advantage in 1914. And No, the six divisions was promised for the BEF in the event of war; that's well over 100,000 troops, closer to 120,000 or so really and, in total, is three corps; that's a larger force than Germany detached for duty in the Eastern Front when the Russians invaded East Prussia. The declaration of protection for the French Coast entailed the threat of the Royal Navy.

By your own source
“On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German”.
He was only allowed to order forces across AFTER Germany had already violated the border!
Your own source says Germany was the aggressor.
August 2 was AFTER Germany had already taken aggressive action against France!

Germany had nearly 70 divisions on the western Front. And the 6 British divisions were ordered defend France. That was not an act of aggression. The British declaring they would DEFEND the coast of their ally against attack was not aggression.

Berlin did not have that knowledge and foresight because the military and foreign ministry did not coordinate at all, their political intelligence shit, the foreign ministry full of idiots, the military lacking knowledge of political affairs and foreign policy. Yes Germany was politically and diplomatically clueless, which was the problem.

The simple fact is that attacking France was not necessary for Germany, and had they not the would have easily won the war.

You did not read the post in full:

Joseph Joffre, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the French army since 1911 and the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy met on 1 August, to agree that the military conduct of the war should exclusively be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German but not the Belgian frontier. Joffre sent warning orders to the covering forces near the frontier, requiring the VII Corps to prepare to advance towards Mühlhausen (Mulhouse) to the north-east of Belfort and XX Corps to make ready to begin an offensive towards Nancy.

Joffre met Messimy on 1 August, conferring onto him the position of Commander in Chief. Concurrent to this, mobilization was ordered and French forces began to amass in accordance with Plan XVII, which entailed an offensive strike into Germany.

And no, the Germans lacked foresight because they were not physics. France and Russia were openly aligned and France had begun to mobilize; any rational thinker had to conclude, out of a sense of caution if nothing else, that France was preparing to and likely would come into the conflict in order to defend her commitments to Russia. Paris did nothing to dispel this notion in the leadup to the crisis, with the German ambassador being told ambiguously that France "would defend her interests".

[United Muscovite Nations]

Regardless, had Germany not attacked France, they would have won the war. France couldn't have touched Germany. Germany's invasion of France became a quagmire that destroyed their country.

[Totally Not OEP]

Regardless, had Germany not attacked France, they would have won the war. France couldn't have touched Germany. Germany's invasion of France became a quagmire that destroyed their country.

The simple reality of geography dictated that Russia could not be rapidly defeated but the comparatively small size of France/Western Europe made such possible. To this end, and definitely in line with the contemporary view of Russia as a serious land power-especially given her ongoing reforms-it made sense to Berlin and indeed any rational thinker that the Germans needed to rapidly defeat the French so as to be able to solely focus on Russia.

Likewise, the Haber-Bosch Process was still being industrialized and within Belgium the Germans captured large stocks of nitrates, which proved quite useful in sustaining German war production for the first year.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Regardless, had Germany not attacked France, they would have won the war. France couldn't have touched Germany. Germany's invasion of France became a quagmire that destroyed their country.

The simple reality of geography dictated that Russia could not be rapidly defeated but the comparatively small size of France/Western Europe made such possible. To this end, and definitely in line with the contemporary view of Russia as a serious land power-especially given her ongoing reforms-it made sense to Berlin and indeed any rational thinker that the Germans needed to rapidly defeat the French so as to be able to solely focus on Russia.

Likewise, the Haber-Bosch Process was still being industrialized and within Belgium the Germans captured large stocks of nitrates, which proved quite useful in sustaining German war production for the first year.

That the military thinkers of the day still believed the Infantry offensive to be effective doesn't mean that any serious thinker did. People like Petain were already realizing that the French Army was not a serious fighting force and would take years to reform. If anything, the German invasion sped up this process.

[Totally Not OEP]

The simple reality of geography dictated that Russia could not be rapidly defeated but the comparatively small size of France/Western Europe made such possible. To this end, and definitely in line with the contemporary view of Russia as a serious land power-especially given her ongoing reforms-it made sense to Berlin and indeed any rational thinker that the Germans needed to rapidly defeat the French so as to be able to solely focus on Russia.

Likewise, the Haber-Bosch Process was still being industrialized and within Belgium the Germans captured large stocks of nitrates, which proved quite useful in sustaining German war production for the first year.

That the military thinkers of the day still believed the Infantry offensive to be effective doesn't mean that any serious thinker did. People like Petain were already realizing that the French Army was not a serious fighting force and would take years to reform. If anything, the German invasion sped up this process.

I think to call the French Army of 1914, especially after the Three Years Law, a non-serious force is, well, a non-starter.

[Hakons]

WWI is so sad. It gutted Western society, and spawned loads of wars immediately after it ended.

[United Muscovite Nations]

That the military thinkers of the day still believed the Infantry offensive to be effective doesn't mean that any serious thinker did. People like Petain were already realizing that the French Army was not a serious fighting force and would take years to reform. If anything, the German invasion sped up this process.

I think to call the French Army of 1914, especially after the Three Years Law, a non-serious force is, well, a non-starter.

It was a non-serious force, at least on the offensive. It relied on equipment and doctrine that was already ill-suited to war. Le feu tue.

[Novus America]

By your own source
“On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German”.
He was only allowed to order forces across AFTER Germany had already violated the border!
Your own source says Germany was the aggressor.
August 2 was AFTER Germany had already taken aggressive action against France!

Germany had nearly 70 divisions on the western Front. And the 6 British divisions were ordered defend France. That was not an act of aggression. The British declaring they would DEFEND the coast of their ally against attack was not aggression.

Berlin did not have that knowledge and foresight because the military and foreign ministry did not coordinate at all, their political intelligence shit, the foreign ministry full of idiots, the military lacking knowledge of political affairs and foreign policy. Yes Germany was politically and diplomatically clueless, which was the problem.

The simple fact is that attacking France was not necessary for Germany, and had they not the would have easily won the war.

You did not read the post in full:

Joseph Joffre, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the French army since 1911 and the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy met on 1 August, to agree that the military conduct of the war should exclusively be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German but not the Belgian frontier. Joffre sent warning orders to the covering forces near the frontier, requiring the VII Corps to prepare to advance towards Mühlhausen (Mulhouse) to the north-east of Belfort and XX Corps to make ready to begin an offensive towards Nancy.

Joffre met Messimy on 1 August, conferring onto him the position of Commander in Chief. Concurrent to this, mobilization was ordered and French forces began to amass in accordance with Plan XVII, which entailed an offensive strike into Germany.

And no, the Germans lacked foresight because they were not physics. France and Russia were openly aligned and France had begun to mobilize; any rational thinker had to conclude, out of a sense of caution if nothing else, that France was preparing to and likely would come into the conflict in order to defend her commitments to Russia. Paris did nothing to dispel this notion in the leadup to the crisis, with the German ambassador being told ambiguously that France "would defend her interests".

You ignore that Germany had taken aggressive action before that.
On July 29 Germany informed Britain it was planning to attack France an demanding British neutrality in case of such attack as well as the the right to cross Belgian territory to do so.
On July 31 Germany gave an ultimatum to France that it would attack unless France surrendered control of its border fortresses.

Germany’s insane demands had already driven France to desperation, the actions on August first was in response to Germany’s ultimatum. By August 1st Germany had already made it clear it intended to attack France. So the French of course mobilized. But if he already had permission to cross the border on the first, why did he have to be given it on the 2nd? Having the ability to conduct a war that had NOT YET started did not mean he had the power to start it.

But again irrelevant because German stupidity has already engaged in aggression against France on the 29 and 31st. Although the French did not agree to the ultimatum they ordered “their troops to withdraw 10 km (6 mi) from the border to avoid any incidents“.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I

And the Germans lacked knowledge of the political system in France although this knowledge was available. They lacked knowledge because they did not get it. Because their foreign ministry were complete morons who did not coordinate with the military.
Which went back even further to the Morocco Crisis and such.

The Germans simply sucked at diplomacy.

[New Paine]

Is there a meme of right-wingers liking One Punch Man, or is it just me? I haven’t watched an single episode yet, and I thought I might give it a try.

[Kubra]

Regardless, had Germany not attacked France, they would have won the war. France couldn't have touched Germany. Germany's invasion of France became a quagmire that destroyed their country.

The simple reality of geography dictated that Russia could not be rapidly defeated but the comparatively small size of France/Western Europe made such possible. To this end, and definitely in line with the contemporary view of Russia as a serious land power-especially given her ongoing reforms-it made sense to Berlin and indeed any rational thinker that the Germans needed to rapidly defeat the French so as to be able to solely focus on Russia.

Likewise, the Haber-Bosch Process was still being industrialized and within Belgium the Germans captured large stocks of nitrates, which proved quite useful in sustaining German war production for the first year.

And let's be real the big reason the german advance stalled was because of the division diverted from the offensive to the east, they couldn't advance farther with their flanks exposed else they end up more embarrassingly encircled than the french a few decades earlier. The problem mostly disappears if they remained as originally planned.
I mean hindsight is 20/20, but still.

[Stiltball]

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/ ... ampaign=di

[Fahran]

WWI is so sad. It gutted Western society, and spawned loads of wars immediately after it ended.

I'm thinking of The Wasteland now.

"April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.
Winter kept us warm, covering
Earth in forgetful snow, feeding
A little life with dried tubers."

[Fahran]

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/trump-invites-israel-not-palestine-to-discuss-peace-plan.html?utm_medium=s1&utm_source=tw&utm_campaign=di

It's a bit difficult to conclude a peace without one of the belligerent nations present, but I suppose Israel could simply impose whatever terms it likes on Palestine by force in the absence of a genuine willingness to negotiate. That said, we have no reason to back Israel under such conditions given that a failure there would not result in their destruction or an immediate setback for our geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

[Novus America]

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/trump-invites-israel-not-palestine-to-discuss-peace-plan.html?utm_medium=s1&utm_source=tw&utm_campaign=di

It's a bit difficult to conclude a peace without one of the belligerent nations present, but I suppose Israel could simply impose whatever terms it likes on Palestine by force in the absence of a genuine willingness to negotiate. That said, we have no reason to back Israel under such conditions given that a failure there would not result in their destruction or an immediate setback for our geopolitical and economic interests in the region.

Historically peace was largely imposed by the victor. Although naive types today may think that everyone can just agree on a mutually agreeable solution, often, as in this case it is impossible because the two sides have mutually exclusive goals.

[United Muscovite Nations]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

[Nakena]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

The - quote Nancy Pelosi - "Great State of Israel" is the Only Democracy in the Middle East™ and also the Greatest Ally™ ever.

[North German Realm]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

In reality, it's because Israel's primary enemies in the region tend to be the US's enemies also. At some point, this meant "states that the USSR supports" (which meant supporting Israel and KSA was of absolute necessity). Now, it means the IR and its merry band of marauders in the "Axis of Resistance", which is a real poor replacement.

[Proctopeo]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

In reality, it's because Israel's primary enemies in the region tend to be the US's enemies also. At some point, this meant "states that the USSR supports" (which meant supporting Israel and KSA was of absolute necessity). Now, it means the IR and its merry band of marauders in the "Axis of Resistance", which is a real poor replacement.

I also presume that there's a not-insignificant amount of people who want to avoid a second Holocaust.

[Novus America]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

In reality, it's because Israel's primary enemies in the region tend to be the US's enemies also. At some point, this meant "states that the USSR supports" (which meant supporting Israel and KSA was of absolute necessity). Now, it means the IR and its merry band of marauders in the "Axis of Resistance", which is a real poor replacement.

Mostly that. The main reason is the other countries in the region are either outright hostile or even more unreliable.

[North German Realm]

In reality, it's because Israel's primary enemies in the region tend to be the US's enemies also. At some point, this meant "states that the USSR supports" (which meant supporting Israel and KSA was of absolute necessity). Now, it means the IR and its merry band of marauders in the "Axis of Resistance", which is a real poor replacement.

I also presume that there's a not-insignificant amount of people who want to avoid a second Holocaust.

That's not why the US is allied with Israel. While many among the military and the civilians are probably partial to a second Holocaust not happening, countries don't form military alliances because it's beneficial to the other party. It is however, why Israel is allied with the US (because having the largest military in the world as your friend is probably going to help with making sure a second Holocaust doesn't happen).

[Nakena]

Israel wasnt so close allied with the USA until 1973. Soon after AIPAC also started becomig a thing, too.

[Totenborg]

Is there a meme of right-wingers liking One Punch Man, or is it just me? I haven’t watched an single episode yet, and I thought I might give it a try.

I can't speak for right wingers as I'm a dirty lefty, but I think One Punch Man is excellent.

[Diopolis]

What exactly is our geopolitical interest in supporting Israel? A country which has never fought a war on our side, and which has planned terror attacks against our nationals in order to further its own interests?

AIPAC.

[Tombradyonia]

The simple reality of geography dictated that Russia could not be rapidly defeated but the comparatively small size of France/Western Europe made such possible. To this end, and definitely in line with the contemporary view of Russia as a serious land power-especially given her ongoing reforms-it made sense to Berlin and indeed any rational thinker that the Germans needed to rapidly defeat the French so as to be able to solely focus on Russia.

Likewise, the Haber-Bosch Process was still being industrialized and within Belgium the Germans captured large stocks of nitrates, which proved quite useful in sustaining German war production for the first year.

And let's be real the big reason the german advance stalled was because of the division diverted from the offensive to the east, they couldn't advance farther with their flanks exposed else they end up more embarrassingly encircled than the french a few decades earlier. The problem mostly disappears if they remained as originally planned.
I mean hindsight is 20/20, but still.

There are myths and stories aplenty, often ending with the conclusion that if only Moltke had strengthened his right wing in the way that Schlieffen had conceived of it, the defeat of France would have been assured.
The reality, I believe, is far different. The Schlieffen plan in a sense doomed the Germans to a long drawn out war and a battle of attrition which they couldn't win (considering they were not up against France alone).

The key issue was that the plan was extremely rigid. Everything was planned to the last detail, so much so that one train being late could derail the entire schedule. Also, the plan contained no failsafe. Most countries had a mobilization plan which had them gather their strength and get troops to certain points and for them to wait there for a go/no go. The German mobilization plan (included as part of Schlieffen's plan) did not have such a go/no go mechanism. In the case of Imperial Germany, mobilization meant war.

Another issue is that the ideas that Schlieffen and his successor Moltke had were at best unrealistically optimistic and depended significantly on the enemy doing precisely what the plan required the enemy to do. In the end, even with an entire extra army on the right wing, the attack would have failed. Perhaps the battle of the Marne would have been drawn out longer than it was in reality, but by the end of 1914 there still would have been a race to the sea and the very same end that we got in the end. Germany simply did not have the forces to do what it wanted to do, and the lack of coordination between the commanders of First and Second armies doomed the plan and almost got First army destroyed.

[North German Realm]

And let's be real the big reason the german advance stalled was because of the division diverted from the offensive to the east, they couldn't advance farther with their flanks exposed else they end up more embarrassingly encircled than the french a few decades earlier. The problem mostly disappears if they remained as originally planned.
I mean hindsight is 20/20, but still.

There are myths and stories aplenty, often ending with the conclusion that if only Moltke had strengthened his right wing in the way that Schlieffen had conceived of it, the defeat of France would have been assured.
The reality, I believe, is far different. The Schlieffen plan in a sense doomed the Germans to a long drawn out war and a battle of attrition which they couldn't win (considering they were not up against France alone).

The key issue was that the plan was extremely rigid. Everything was planned to the last detail, so much so that one train being late could derail the entire schedule. Also, the plan contained no failsafe. Most countries had a mobilization plan which had them gather their strength and get troops to certain points and for them to wait there for a go/no go. The German mobilization plan (included as part of Schlieffen's plan) did not have such a go/no go mechanism. In the case of Imperial Germany, mobilization meant war.

Another issue is that the ideas that Schlieffen and his successor Moltke had were at best unrealistically optimistic and depended significantly on the enemy doing precisely what the plan required the enemy to do. In the end, even with an entire extra army on the right wing, the attack would have failed. Perhaps the battle of the Marne would have been drawn out longer than it was in reality, but by the end of 1914 there still would have been a race to the sea and the very same end that we got in the end. Germany simply did not have the forces to do what it wanted to do, and the lack of coordination between the commanders of First and Second armies doomed the plan and almost got First army destroyed.

The decision to abandon the Prussian general idea of "let the commanders do what they do best and improvise as long as it follows a general plan" in favor of "Every little detail must be meticulously planned 10 years in advance" was one of their biggest mistakes where the military is concerned imo.