Right Wing Discussion Thread XIX

[Questarian New Yorkshire]

The IJ government was evil, but to say that its decision to bomb Pearl Harbor was a totally unprovoked act of aggression that no one could have possibly seen coming is ridiculous. The US government wanted Japan to attack something, because they wanted the war; they just didn't expect it to be the big target that would get hit.

FDR very much did want into the war and tried his hardest to provoke Japan into attacking. That's not to say the Japanese government wasn't evil, because they were, but we certainly kept kicking the hornets nest.

It's not revisionism to say that Japan felt goaded into attacking because of American actions. Revisionism is saying the Rape of Nanking didn't happen or something. Just because Americans don't like hearing that they did things that contributed to the descent into war between the two empires doesn't mean it isn't true. I know Americans like thinking that they are some unfucked virgin in a world full of sluts, but America is one and placing severe economic sanctions on your enemy to goad them is a classic foreign policy maneuver that has been done many times in history; I'm kind of surprised some people actually think that America's decisions had absolutely zero role in Japan deciding to finally strike.

Although clearly some posters did get my point, so I shouldn't complain too hard.

[Questarian New Yorkshire]

I haven't been dismissing anything America has done. I'm not a fan of American foreign interference in general.

But then again, your dismissing of Japanese war crimes doesn't give you any moral high ground. You're just whining that your particular favorite brutal imperial power didn't win against someone else's favorite brutal imperial power. That's what this argument comes down to.

imagine being so butthurt over losing your empire you side with the Japanese Empire.

Be sure to catch our next episode, where you will learn that Hitler was, in fact, a man of peace, and was bullied into WW2 against his will by the Jews the Freemasons the British Empire international Bolshevism American Big Money.

So long folks, and death to America!

Of course, other posters had the point fly over their head completely, and resorted to sarcasm.

[Albrenia]

To be fair, I probably misunderstood your point a bit QNY. It seemed to me that you were trying to justify the Imperial Japanese as the 'good guys' in the conflict where it clearly was a pretty awful thing all around.

Sorry for my mistake.

[Fahran]

I'm not here to moralise. I'm here to put a small, even if it's a tiny and insignificant, thread of doubt in the minds of at least one person that the United States is the city on the shining hill, some kind of moral superior, bla bla bla.

This right here is why I interpreted it as a moral claim. Your posts came across as an apologia and had hints of moralizing present. You're stating that your objective was to plant the seeds of doubt regarding the moral nature of the United States, and doing it in the context of a regime that became so homicidal at certain points that the Nazis, the people who committed the largest genocide in European history, were appalled. There are plenty of US policy decisions that deserve criticism. Setting an embargo on Japan and waging war against Japan don't really number among them for either moral or practical reasons.

Like I said in my post, the United States provoked Japan into war (and no, you are not correct that historians universally agree — at all). Of course, Americans are taught that the reverse happened, and that the barbaric Japanese deployed a surprise attack, so killing all of them was justified. I'm just here to suggest that history is not exactly as you were all taught it in your schools. You claim to live in a democracy, but you have a party line to follow nonetheless.

Again, it depends on precisely how we define provocation and on which model of neo-realism we employ. In context though, it doesn't really matter. The short-lived confirmation of American hegemony in the Pacific at the expense of Japanese hegemony and sovereignty demonstrates some degree of efficacy in the approach that was taken, though we need not have taken that approach at all had we minded our own business in the nineteenth century and imposed the Monroe Doctrine with extreme prejudice. That'd be far more feasible, even today, if we could expect to mind our own business without people bugging us, but, sadly, that doesn't seem possible unless you're Switzerland.

Your earlier remarks described the American embargo on Japan as a problem. It was certainly a problem for Japan in the same respect that their ambitions in the Pacific and attacks on our key allies were a problem - if we're speaking solely of interests and power. If your argument is moral, you lose any and all footing immediately. As for the insinuations of racism, I'm not certain what purpose they served, but your point seems quite a bit different overall from what UMN, Nap, and WRA had to say.

Also, simping for Xi is bad, anon. 0/10 Worst e-boy.

[Cisairse]

Of course, Americans are taught that the reverse happened, and that the barbaric Japanese deployed a surprise attack, so killing all of them was justified. I'm just here to suggest that history is not exactly as you were all taught it in your schools.

Either there are regional differences I was not aware of, or you're just flatly wrong. In my history classes in school, I was very much taught that Pearl Harbor was a direct response to American oil embargoes.

[Fahran]

Either there are regional differences I was not aware of, or you're just flatly wrong. In my history classes in school, I was very much taught that Pearl Harbor was a direct response to American oil embargoes.

Attacks on US territories were planned well before the US embargo was approved in July of 1941 because the Japanese command believed (mistakenly) that any attempt to conquer British colonial possessions would lead to military intervention by the United States. Additionally, the Japanese had intended to conquer the Philippines by that time as well. The embargo was a provocation by some metrics but the idea that Japan was going to maintain a neutral stance towards the US ignores a lot of the documentary evidence we have. The Japanese had been sitting on similar schemes since 1927. Yamamoto gave a lecture on the topic in 1928 and explored the option again in May of 1941, two months before the embargo occurred. It was approved on July 2. The US froze Japanese assets on July 26 and initiated the embargo beginning on August 1, after the attack had been planned and approved. Emperor Hirohito passed on the chance to veto the plan in September and it occurred in December.

Source

[United Muscovite Nations]

Approaching it from any international perspective other than liberalism, Japan's actions in the leadup to the Second World War make perfect sense, and whether they were deplorable or not makes no difference. There is of course morality in international affairs but under the international system of the time there was little room to consider this as moral considerations were discarded by the great powers and as a result paying heed to them would significantly hinder your ability to respond. From a constructivist perspective, Japan's interests can be defined in two ways: ideological and material. The first, the ideological goal of the Japanese Empire was to become the British Empire of the Pacific, to be a Great Power in the vein of the Europeans so that the Europeans would not be able to crush them like they had the other Asian nations. Materially, this ideological goal drove them into war in many places in order to provide them the resources for self-sufficiency so that the Europeans and the United States would not be able to cut them off. The oil embargo threatened both of these goals and thus can only be seen from the Japanese perspective as an act of aggression and a provocation. Combined with troop movements and fleet movements by the United States, Japan was then faced with a Goliath Paradox (i.e. the paradox that starting a war with a larger power results in giving an advantage to the smaller power), and its actions were therefore quite reasonable.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Either there are regional differences I was not aware of, or you're just flatly wrong. In my history classes in school, I was very much taught that Pearl Harbor was a direct response to American oil embargoes.

Attacks on US territories were planned well before the US embargo was approved in July of 1941 because the Japanese command believed (mistakenly) that any attempt to conquer British colonial possessions would lead to military intervention by the United States. Additionally, the Japanese had intended to conquer the Philippines by that time as well. The embargo was a provocation by some metrics but the idea that Japan was going to maintain a neutral stance towards the US ignores a lot of the documentary evidence we have. The Japanese had been sitting on similar schemes since 1927. Yamamoto gave a lecture on the topic in 1928 and explored the option again in May of 1941, two months before the embargo occurred. It was approved on July 2. The US froze Japanese assets on July 26 and initiated the embargo beginning on August 1, after the attack had been planned and approved. Emperor Hirohito passed on the chance to veto the plan in September and it occurred in December.

Source

The US had been aiding China for a long time before then, both directly and indirectly.

[Questarian New Yorkshire]

This right here is why I interpreted it as a moral claim. Your posts came across as an apologia and had hints of moralizing present.

You read that — I didn't write it.

Again, it depends on precisely how we define provocation and on which model of neo-realism we employ. In context though, it doesn't really matter. The short-lived confirmation of American hegemony in the Pacific at the expense of Japanese hegemony and sovereignty demonstrates some degree of efficacy in the approach that was taken, though we need not have taken that approach at all had we minded our own business in the nineteenth century and imposed the Monroe Doctrine with extreme prejudice. That'd be far more feasible, even today, if we could expect to mind our own business without people bugging us, but, sadly, that doesn't seem possible unless you're Switzerland.

Your earlier remarks described the American embargo on Japan as a problem. It was certainly a problem for Japan in the same respect that their ambitions in the Pacific and attacks on our key allies were a problem - if we're speaking solely of interests and power. If your argument is moral, you lose any and all footing immediately. As for the insinuations of racism, I'm not certain what purpose they served, but your point seems quite a bit different overall from what UMN, Nap, and WRA had to say.

Also, simping for Xi is bad, anon. 0/10 Worst e-boy.

Although the comment thread seems to start with my comment about the US provoking Japan, it actually doesn't. In fact it goes all the way back to the last time I was posting on "RW"DT about how Americans perceive nationality and nationhood.

My point was that conflicts between the United States and various Asian countries (mostly it's Japan and China, but you can also put North Korea, Viet Nam and Philippines as well) carry all the characteristics of a race war, even if neither side openly calls it that. I also said or implied that nuclear holocaust on China (or Korea) was ethnocide because it's motivated by a desire to suppress resistance to US (white) hegemony in the Pacific and eliminate a rival 'culture' (ie race.)

We will come back to this.

I agree to an extent that US foreign policy has been effective. You are right in that sense. US foreign policy has not been a problem for the people it has been designed to benefit. Of course, it has been a problem for others, just as Japanese foreign policy has been a problem for China and so on. Like I said I am not here to say that US should be winner or Japan should be winner or whatever (although I think I have made my point of view very clear on the question of US and Chinese konfrontasi). I'm pointing out that this narrative of the Pacific War: the US did nothing wrong, we was protecting the Chinese civilians, the Japanese were all barbaric murderers trying to start war with us since 1920s etc is just wrong. In fact the US antagonised Japan, treated their citizens as second or third class persons, and engaged in hostile diplomacy designed to push Japan into a corner because Japan threatened the US position in Asia and China NOT because the US is a humanitarian, universalist liberal interventionist state.

Finally, concerning the diplomacy which lead up to the Pacific War, I will point you in the direction of John Toland's excellent The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire and the chapters he dedicates leading up to the opening of hostilities with the United States. I can send you the relevant chapters if you are actually going to read them (I'm not interested in debating the issue much further than already has happened, however.)

[Questarian New Yorkshire]

You see, while whataboutism can be dumb, it has one useful purpose: if you can point out an agent's hypocrisy you can reveal their true intentions.

For instance —
Americans: We are here to prevent the Japanese from committing atrocities against the Chinese.
Also Americans: Oh yeah we should launch a nuclear holocaust on the Chinese.

All states which aren't orbiting the US, like incels orbiting the one female that pays them attention, understand that most of US propaganda is just that, propaganda, and that US and its forces will inflict terrible atrocities on the civil population of their country if they get a chance. That's why they acquire, or try to acquire, nuclear arms. That's why they put guns over butter, also.

[United Muscovite Nations]

You see, while whataboutism can be dumb, it has one useful purpose: if you can point out an agent's hypocrisy you can reveal their true intentions.

Thank you for posting this in particular, because I'm tired of people acting like Whataboutism is just a red herring. Appealing to the hypocrisy of one's critics, while not an argument that one is morally superior, is an argument that the people criticizing you have ulterior motives that undermine their attempt to establish their own moral superiority.

[Imperium Romanum Sanctis]

Approaching it from any international perspective other than liberalism, Japan's actions in the leadup to the Second World War make perfect sense, and whether they were deplorable or not makes no difference. There is of course morality in international affairs but under the international system of the time there was little room to consider this as moral considerations were discarded by the great powers and as a result paying heed to them would significantly hinder your ability to respond. From a constructivist perspective, Japan's interests can be defined in two ways: ideological and material. The first, the ideological goal of the Japanese Empire was to become the British Empire of the Pacific, to be a Great Power in the vein of the Europeans so that the Europeans would not be able to crush them like they had the other Asian nations. Materially, this ideological goal drove them into war in many places in order to provide them the resources for self-sufficiency so that the Europeans and the United States would not be able to cut them off. The oil embargo threatened both of these goals and thus can only be seen from the Japanese perspective as an act of aggression and a provocation. Combined with troop movements and fleet movements by the United States, Japan was then faced with a Goliath Paradox (i.e. the paradox that starting a war with a larger power results in giving an advantage to the smaller power), and its actions were therefore quite reasonable.

The last thing Japanese foreign policy could be described as is 'quite reasonable'.

Japanese declarations of war from 1937 onwards were muddled, poorly planned and often completely random. For starters, Japan clearly misjudged the willingness of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to resist them, believing they could repeat the Mukden Incident with the Marco Polo Bridge and quickly snatch some morsels of China, rather than engaging in an all-out war.

Even when that was proved wrong, and China opted to resist Japan, they still misjudged the situation; believing they could subjugate the Chinese in a mere 3 months. Instead, it took them those three months just to take Shanghai. Frustrated and unable to deal with the realities of a prolonged conflict, the Japanese Army took out its frustrations on the citizens of Nanjing, raping and murdering their way through the capital.

Years later, with the Second Sino-Japanese War ongoing and the Japanese Army already overstretched, Tokyo decided that it would be a great idea to occupy French Indochina as well. This occupation succeeded, but resulted in an ongoing insurrection by the Viet Minh that the Japanese would have to deal with until their empire collapsed in 1945.

The next year, now in desperate need of resources and already rationing supplies at home, Japan decided to attack the previously isolationist United States, which had a much larger navy and industrial base. For good measure, they also decided to attack the British, Dutch and Philippinos.

And to top it all off, the Japanese government did not always have control over its own military, with major actions (like attacking ships/industry owned by countries not formally at war with Japan) frequently being taken by renegade officers behind the government's back.

Really, with such a disjointed and idiotic decision-making process, it's no wonder the Japanese Empire fell. There's plenty of words one could apply to Japanese foreign policy, but the last one I'd use is "reasonable".

[Nap the Magnificent]

Japan having military plans for a war with the US or other nations is not surprising. The US had war plans for a war between itself and the British Empire during the 1930's. As I said earlier, people were predicting a war in the Pacific between Japan and the US since the end of WWI when the British Empire decided to not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was done over fears that it would force the Empire into a war with the United States that would have meant the conquering and probable annexation of Canada by the United States. It would have been stupid for the Japanese military to not have war plans with the United States; after all the US military also had them for Japan - War Plan Orange. It's ridiculous to criticize the Japanese for doing the same thing that the United States did.

The thing is America could not tolerate a powerful Japan in the Pacific while the European powers could accept it to some extent. That is not to say that they were chuffed to bits about it, but they were willing to accept it as a reality and work with the Japanese - America was not. There was heavy American pressure on the British Empire to abrogate the alliance when Versailles was being hammered out, despite Japan having shown itself to be a good ally to Britain over quite some time.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Approaching it from any international perspective other than liberalism, Japan's actions in the leadup to the Second World War make perfect sense, and whether they were deplorable or not makes no difference. There is of course morality in international affairs but under the international system of the time there was little room to consider this as moral considerations were discarded by the great powers and as a result paying heed to them would significantly hinder your ability to respond. From a constructivist perspective, Japan's interests can be defined in two ways: ideological and material. The first, the ideological goal of the Japanese Empire was to become the British Empire of the Pacific, to be a Great Power in the vein of the Europeans so that the Europeans would not be able to crush them like they had the other Asian nations. Materially, this ideological goal drove them into war in many places in order to provide them the resources for self-sufficiency so that the Europeans and the United States would not be able to cut them off. The oil embargo threatened both of these goals and thus can only be seen from the Japanese perspective as an act of aggression and a provocation. Combined with troop movements and fleet movements by the United States, Japan was then faced with a Goliath Paradox (i.e. the paradox that starting a war with a larger power results in giving an advantage to the smaller power), and its actions were therefore quite reasonable.

The last thing Japanese foreign policy could be described as is 'quite reasonable'.

Japanese declarations of war from 1937 onwards were muddled, poorly planned and often completely random. For starters, Japan clearly misjudged the willingness of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to resist them, believing they could repeat the Mukden Incident with the Marco Polo Bridge and quickly snatch some morsels of China, rather than engaging in an all-out war.

Even when that was proved wrong, and China opted to resist Japan, they still misjudged the situation; believing they could subjugate the Chinese in a mere 3 months. Instead, it took them those three months just to take Shanghai. Frustrated and unable to deal with the realities of a prolonged conflict, the Japanese Army took out its frustrations on the citizens of Nanjing, raping and murdering their way through the capital.

Years later, with the Second Sino-Japanese War ongoing and the Japanese Army already overstretched, Tokyo decided that it would be a great idea to occupy French Indochina as well. This occupation succeeded, but resulted in an ongoing insurrection by the Viet Minh that the Japanese would have to deal with until their empire collapsed in 1945.

The next year, now in desperate need of resources and already rationing supplies at home, Japan decided to attack the previously isolationist United States, which had a much larger navy and industrial base. For good measure, they also decided to attack the British, Dutch and Philippinos.

And to top it all off, the Japanese government did not always have control over its own military, with major actions (like attacking ships/industry owned by countries not formally at war with Japan) frequently being taken by renegade officers behind the government's back.

Really, with such a disjointed and idiotic decision-making process, it's no wonder the Japanese Empire fell. There's plenty of words one could apply to Japanese foreign policy, but the last one I'd use is "reasonable".

The overall goals, if not the specific policy decisions, were entirely reasonable. And again, is it isolationist when the US is basically fighting an undeclared war against you in China with its air force?

Also you're looking at the whole conflict with the benefit of hindsight.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Japan having military plans for a war with the US or other nations is not surprising. The US had war plans for a war between itself and the British Empire during the 1930's. As I said earlier, people were predicting a war in the Pacific between Japan and the US since the end of WWI when the British Empire decided to not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was done over fears that it would force the Empire into a war with the United States that would have meant the conquering and probable annexation of Canada by the United States. It would have been stupid for the Japanese military to not have war plans with the United States; after all the US military also had them for Japan - War Plan Orange. It's ridiculous to criticize the Japanese for doing the same thing that the United States did.

The thing is America could not tolerate a powerful Japan in the Pacific while the European powers could accept it to some extent. That is not to say that they were chuffed to bits about it, but they were willing to accept it as a reality and work with the Japanese - America was not. There was heavy American pressure on the British Empire to abrogate the alliance when Versailles was being hammered out, despite Japan having shown itself to be a good ally to Britain over quite some time.

^This. Based in their ideological understanding of European imperialism as well as the historical cooperation between the US and Britain, Japan had good reason to suspect that war with one colonial power would mean war with all of them.

[Nap the Magnificent]

To be honest, I don't think the British Empire would have aided the Americans, let alone the other European powers aiding the Americans, had it not been for the war in Europe.

[Imperium Romanum Sanctis]

The last thing Japanese foreign policy could be described as is 'quite reasonable'.

Japanese declarations of war from 1937 onwards were muddled, poorly planned and often completely random. For starters, Japan clearly misjudged the willingness of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to resist them, believing they could repeat the Mukden Incident with the Marco Polo Bridge and quickly snatch some morsels of China, rather than engaging in an all-out war.

Even when that was proved wrong, and China opted to resist Japan, they still misjudged the situation; believing they could subjugate the Chinese in a mere 3 months. Instead, it took them those three months just to take Shanghai. Frustrated and unable to deal with the realities of a prolonged conflict, the Japanese Army took out its frustrations on the citizens of Nanjing, raping and murdering their way through the capital.

Years later, with the Second Sino-Japanese War ongoing and the Japanese Army already overstretched, Tokyo decided that it would be a great idea to occupy French Indochina as well. This occupation succeeded, but resulted in an ongoing insurrection by the Viet Minh that the Japanese would have to deal with until their empire collapsed in 1945.

The next year, now in desperate need of resources and already rationing supplies at home, Japan decided to attack the previously isolationist United States, which had a much larger navy and industrial base. For good measure, they also decided to attack the British, Dutch and Philippinos.

And to top it all off, the Japanese government did not always have control over its own military, with major actions (like attacking ships/industry owned by countries not formally at war with Japan) frequently being taken by renegade officers behind the government's back.

Really, with such a disjointed and idiotic decision-making process, it's no wonder the Japanese Empire fell. There's plenty of words one could apply to Japanese foreign policy, but the last one I'd use is "reasonable".

The overall goals, if not the specific policy decisions, were entirely reasonable. And again, is it isolationist when the US is basically fighting an undeclared war against you in China with its air force?

The goals were far-fetched and unreasonable. Maybe something the Japanese could achieve in two or three centuries. Not in the several years or decades they hoped (and pursued).

As for support for Chiang and the Kuomintang, what of it? The West did the same thing for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War, but you didn't see Franco become an oversensitive idiot and declare war on half the world for supplying his enemies.

Sure, America was backing the Nationalists in their war with Japan. The assistance they offered wasn't particularly game-changing (at least not until after Pearl Harbour), and the US was never going to outright declare war on Japan (given the ongoing Great Depression, growing isolationism and the Neutrality Act). Japan was naturally in a tough position with its seemingly never-ending war in China and economic sanctions depriving it of much needed petroleum, rubber and other resources, but pursuing war with the West just made the situation exponentially worse. It was by far one of the dumbest decisions made by a government in the history of war declarations.

[Fahran]

Japan having military plans for a war with the US or other nations is not surprising. The US had war plans for a war between itself and the British Empire during the 1930's. As I said earlier, people were predicting a war in the Pacific between Japan and the US since the end of WWI when the British Empire decided to not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was done over fears that it would force the Empire into a war with the United States that would have meant the conquering and probable annexation of Canada by the United States. It would have been stupid for the Japanese military to not have war plans with the United States; after all the US military also had them for Japan - War Plan Orange. It's ridiculous to criticize the Japanese for doing the same thing that the United States did.

When you approve a plan to attack another nation a month before the cited provocation, it's a pretty clear sign that you're the aggressor in that scenario. The guy who wrote up that plan had also been angling to implement that plan for an additional two months and it fit into a grand strategy that existed much earlier, one based on faulty assumptions and the outright conquest of American colonial possessions.

The thing is America could not tolerate a powerful Japan in the Pacific while the European powers could accept it to some extent. That is not to say that they were chuffed to bits about it, but they were willing to accept it as a reality and work with the Japanese - America was not. There was heavy American pressure on the British Empire to abrogate the alliance when Versailles was being hammered out, despite Japan having shown itself to be a good ally to Britain over quite some time.

America couldn't tolerate a Japan that was intent on gobbling up its own territories and the territories of allied powers. The US didn't intercede at an earlier stage despite growing Japanese strength and successes against Russia, China, and France. It reacted as it became apparent that the Japanese had hegemonic ambitions that clashed with American interests and refused to engage in good faith negotiations regarding disagreements. And the Japanese were planning to invade British possessions by 1941.

[United Muscovite Nations]

The overall goals, if not the specific policy decisions, were entirely reasonable. And again, is it isolationist when the US is basically fighting an undeclared war against you in China with its air force?

The goals were far-fetched and unreasonable. Maybe something the Japanese could achieve in two or three centuries. Not in the several years or decades they hoped (and pursued).

As for support for Chiang and the Kuomintang, what of it? The West did the same thing for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War, but you didn't see Franco become an oversensitive idiot and declare war on half the world for supplying his enemies.

Sure, America was backing the Nationalists in their war with Japan. The assistance they offered wasn't particularly game-changing (at least not until after Pearl Harbour), and the US was never going to outright declare war on Japan (given the ongoing Great Depression, growing isolationism and the Neutrality Act). Japan was naturally in a tough position with its seemingly never-ending war in China and economic sanctions depriving it of much needed petroleum, rubber and other resources, but pursuing war with the West just made the situation exponentially worse. It was by far one of the dumbest decisions made by a government in the history of war declarations.

Franco was in a much weaker position than Imperial Japan and wasn't directly threatened with invasion by the Soviet Union. Besides there was nothing Franco could do about it. Sure Japan wasn't a first rate power, but Franco wasn't even a second or third rate power.

[Fahran]

...economic sanctions depriving it of much needed petroleum, rubber and other resources, but pursuing war with the West just made the situation exponentially worse. It was by far one of the dumbest decisions made by a government in the history of war declarations.

US sanctions weren't put in place until August of 1941. Japan began planning for war in earnest at the beginning of July, before sanctions on petroleum were even confirmed.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Japan having military plans for a war with the US or other nations is not surprising. The US had war plans for a war between itself and the British Empire during the 1930's. As I said earlier, people were predicting a war in the Pacific between Japan and the US since the end of WWI when the British Empire decided to not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was done over fears that it would force the Empire into a war with the United States that would have meant the conquering and probable annexation of Canada by the United States. It would have been stupid for the Japanese military to not have war plans with the United States; after all the US military also had them for Japan - War Plan Orange. It's ridiculous to criticize the Japanese for doing the same thing that the United States did.

When you approve a plan to attack another nation a month before the cited provocation, it's a pretty clear sign that you're the aggressor in that scenario. The guy who wrote up that plan had also been angling to implement that plan for an additional two months and it fit into a grand strategy that existed much earlier, one based on faulty assumptions and the outright conquest of American colonial possessions.

The thing is America could not tolerate a powerful Japan in the Pacific while the European powers could accept it to some extent. That is not to say that they were chuffed to bits about it, but they were willing to accept it as a reality and work with the Japanese - America was not. There was heavy American pressure on the British Empire to abrogate the alliance when Versailles was being hammered out, despite Japan having shown itself to be a good ally to Britain over quite some time.

America couldn't tolerate a Japan that was intent on gobbling up its own territories and the territories of allied powers. The US didn't intercede at an earlier stage despite growing Japanese strength and successes against Russia, China, and France. It reacted as it became apparent that the Japanese had hegemonic ambitions that clashed with American interests and refused to engage in good faith negotiations regarding disagreements. And the Japanese were planning to invade British possessions by 1941.

"its own territories"
Its colonial possessions, don't be dishonest.

[Imperium Romanum Sanctis]

The goals were far-fetched and unreasonable. Maybe something the Japanese could achieve in two or three centuries. Not in the several years or decades they hoped (and pursued).

As for support for Chiang and the Kuomintang, what of it? The West did the same thing for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War, but you didn't see Franco become an oversensitive idiot and declare war on half the world for supplying his enemies.

Sure, America was backing the Nationalists in their war with Japan. The assistance they offered wasn't particularly game-changing (at least not until after Pearl Harbour), and the US was never going to outright declare war on Japan (given the ongoing Great Depression, growing isolationism and the Neutrality Act). Japan was naturally in a tough position with its seemingly never-ending war in China and economic sanctions depriving it of much needed petroleum, rubber and other resources, but pursuing war with the West just made the situation exponentially worse. It was by far one of the dumbest decisions made by a government in the history of war declarations.

Franco was in a much weaker position than Imperial Japan and wasn't directly threatened with invasion by the Soviet Union. Besides there was nothing Franco could do about it. Sure Japan wasn't a first rate power, but Franco wasn't even a second or third rate power.

Franco, at least after the civil war was over and Germany was running wild in Europe, had the opportunity to take revenge. He could easily have taken Gibraltar and cut off access to the Mediterranean. Indeed, he even considered joining WWII on the side of the Germans if the Vichy French government ceded Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to Spain. In the end though, he opted not to, because he was smart and understood the bigger picture.

Given Japan's legitimate concerns with the Soviet Union, it would have been much wiser for them to focus on said concerns. They already had a mutual understanding of sorts with Chiang Kai-shek (at least until they mucked that up with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) and could have focused on defending their territories against future Soviet aggression. Hell, had they not gotten bogged down in China, they could even have joined Hitler in Operation Barbarossa and snatched some free territory for themselves. They'd have found themselves in a much better situation than what happened historically.

[Imperium Romanum Sanctis]

...economic sanctions depriving it of much needed petroleum, rubber and other resources, but pursuing war with the West just made the situation exponentially worse. It was by far one of the dumbest decisions made by a government in the history of war declarations.

US sanctions weren't put in place until August of 1941. Japan began planning for war in earnest at the beginning of July, before sanctions on petroleum were even confirmed.

Yeah, that's a good point. Thanks for making note of it.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Franco was in a much weaker position than Imperial Japan and wasn't directly threatened with invasion by the Soviet Union. Besides there was nothing Franco could do about it. Sure Japan wasn't a first rate power, but Franco wasn't even a second or third rate power.

Franco, at least after the civil war was over and Germany was running wild in Europe, had the opportunity to take revenge. He could easily have taken Gibraltar and cut off access to the Mediterranean. Indeed, he even considered joining WWII on the side of the Germans if the Vichy French government ceded Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to Spain. In the end though, he opted not to, because he was smart and understood the bigger picture.

Given Japan's legitimate concerns with the Soviet Union, it would have been much wiser for them to focus on said concerns. They already had a mutual understanding of sorts with Chiang Kai-shek (at least until they mucked that up with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) and could have focused on defending their territories against future Soviet aggression. Hell, had they not gotten bogged down in China, they could even have joined Hitler in Operation Barbarossa and snatched some free territory for themselves. They'd have found themselves in a much better situation than what happened historically.

Okay, Field Marshal Hindsight.

[Nap the Magnificent]

Japan having military plans for a war with the US or other nations is not surprising. The US had war plans for a war between itself and the British Empire during the 1930's. As I said earlier, people were predicting a war in the Pacific between Japan and the US since the end of WWI when the British Empire decided to not renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was done over fears that it would force the Empire into a war with the United States that would have meant the conquering and probable annexation of Canada by the United States. It would have been stupid for the Japanese military to not have war plans with the United States; after all the US military also had them for Japan - War Plan Orange. It's ridiculous to criticize the Japanese for doing the same thing that the United States did.

When you approve a plan to attack another nation a month before the cited provocation, it's a pretty clear sign that you're the aggressor in that scenario. The guy who wrote up that plan had also been angling to implement that plan for an additional two months and it fit into a grand strategy that existed much earlier, one based on faulty assumptions and the outright conquest of American colonial possessions.

The thing is America could not tolerate a powerful Japan in the Pacific while the European powers could accept it to some extent. That is not to say that they were chuffed to bits about it, but they were willing to accept it as a reality and work with the Japanese - America was not. There was heavy American pressure on the British Empire to abrogate the alliance when Versailles was being hammered out, despite Japan having shown itself to be a good ally to Britain over quite some time.

America couldn't tolerate a Japan that was intent on gobbling up its own territories and the territories of allied powers. The US didn't intercede at an earlier stage despite growing Japanese strength and successes against Russia, China, and France. It reacted as it became apparent that the Japanese had hegemonic ambitions that clashed with American interests and refused to engage in good faith negotiations regarding disagreements. And the Japanese were planning to invade British possessions by 1941.

They had started planning for it in 1941 because tensions were increasing over continued and intensified support for China by the US and the failure of diplomatic options. The Japanese knew war was a possibility and that their only hope was a first and decisive strike against the United States and then sue for peace. They figured that if they showed they could not be pushed around the US would not treat them like a rebellious vassal state. Once again, American bombers were being planned to be transferred to the Philippines and the entire reason why the carriers were not in Pearl Harbor was because they had been delivering fighters to places such as Wake and Midway that would escort the bombers to their new bases further East. War was already considered inevitable by the majority of the American population before the attack on Pearl Harbor. It did not come out of nowhere. Hirohito did not approve to actually implement the plan until November of 1941 because after three different conferences the Japanese leadership came to the conclusion that all diplomatic channels would be pointless - the Hull note was taken as an affront to their sovereignty and an attempt to undermine their control over Manchukuo and Korea (and it probably would have resulted in that at some point). It was more than just the oil embargoes.

That is because the UK had been forced into an alliance with the United States as a result of the War in Europe. Before that they didn't consider the UK to be a possible belligerent. Even after the Tientsin Incident, which really soured Anglo-Japanese relations, there was still the possibility of renewing a good relationship that had been enjoyed by both countries for a long time. Britain didn't even react that strongly when Japan invaded Manchuria and even stated that they had legitimate grievances, albeit an illegal response. Worth noting that when Britain did ask for assistance with the Tientsin Incident, America refused because they said they weren't interested in starting a war with Japan to protect British interests - so much for wanting to defend an ally!

America couldn't careless about the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Chinese sovereignty or British Malaya. In fact the US didn't want them around as well, the US had been giving refuge and support to Indian nationalists for some time and continued pushing for Britain to leave India and for France to give up Indochina even in the middle of WWII. It's false to claim it was done with pure intentions or protecting other nations when America had annexed the Philippines and was entirely okay with the Shanghai International Settlement because they had a large say in it; they were also more than willing to dictate Chinese trade policy to the rest of the world without consulting the Chinese. It was purely about America's own imperial ambitions in the Pacific just as it was about Japan's own ambitions.