NationStates

Greater Persian State wrote:This relies on the DPP actually declaring a Republic of Taiwan


That won't happen, Tsai doesn't support it

Novus America wrote:

Greater Persian State wrote:This relies on the DPP actually declaring a Republic of Taiwan


That won't happen, Tsai doesn't support it

Of course, there is little political will to actually declare independence.
It is not going to happen any time soon.

But we can and should still recognize the ROC as a legitimate government.

Bombadil wrote:TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — After more than 60 countries sent messages of congratulations to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) after her landslide victory in the 2020 election, China cried foul, claiming that their actions violated the "one-China" principle.

Let's hope we continue to see breaking away from gross hypocrisy and more examples of the world seeing Taiwan for what it is, an independent, democratic nation.

Greater Persian State wrote:This relies on the DPP actually declaring a Republic of Taiwan


That won't happen, Tsai doesn't support it

Greater Persian State wrote:I love the current ROC flag....

Novus America wrote:

Bombadil wrote:TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — After more than 60 countries sent messages of congratulations to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) after her landslide victory in the 2020 election, China cried foul, claiming that their actions violated the "one-China" principle.

Let's hope we continue to see breaking away from gross hypocrisy and more examples of the world seeing Taiwan for what it is, an independent, democratic nation.

Yes.
Hopefully the “one China principle” as advocated by the PRC keeps dying.

Pilipinas and Malaya wrote:

Novus America wrote:
Yes.
Hopefully the “one China principle” as advocated by the PRC keeps dying.

In all honesty, it never worked and was totally obsolete since there barely has been any discussion between both presidents. No negotiations or agreements of any sort on this during recent years.

Resarkia wrote:

Pilipinas and Malaya wrote:
In all honesty, it never worked and was totally obsolete since there barely has been any discussion between both presidents. No negotiations or agreements of any sort on this during recent years.

The one China policy in terms of the tawianeese China conflict was never really followed particularly by the us. The us may only official recognize the pre but trades with both and sends a fleet to protect "a part of china" from a part of China. Now the one nation, two policies system with Taiwan has basically shown Taiwanese that reunification is not a good idea at least under the current regime.

Pilipinas and Malaya wrote:

Novus America wrote:
Yes.
Hopefully the “one China principle” as advocated by the PRC keeps dying.

In all honesty, it never worked and was totally obsolete since there barely has been any discussion between both presidents. No negotiations or agreements of any sort on this during recent years.

Novus America wrote:

Pilipinas and Malaya wrote:
In all honesty, it never worked and was totally obsolete since there barely has been any discussion between both presidents. No negotiations or agreements of any sort on this during recent years.

True, and most countries treat the ROC as de facto a separate country, if not officially. But it is time to end this charade.

Bombadil wrote:“We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state,” Tsai told the BBC. “We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.”

Link

Love it!

Looking at how Xi has dealt with Taiwan compared to his predecessors, I’d argue that there are many things Xi got right about Taiwan, though they are ultimately insufficient to guarantee his most desired final outcome, which is reunification.

Firstly, Xi shifted away from the old approach of appealing solely to the Taiwanese haute bourgeoisie, or upper middle/business class. This approach really started to take off in the 1980s when mainland China was in desperate need of cash, so Beijing prioritized inviting Taiwanese businesses (like Terry Gou) over to set up shop, while all of its dealings with Taiwan were done through Taiwanese businesses or the KMT, which lorded over Taiwan at the time and had backdoor channels with the CCP dating from the Civil War. The idea was that by coopting the Taiwanese elite, the PRC could somehow drag the rest of Taiwan into its orbit and eventually accept unification.

(Image)
“Taiwan Approved Investments in Mainland China by Cases Accumulation from 1991 to 2014.” This is literally the only thing the PRC was working on for much of its early history of interacting directly with Taiwan — making mainland China a great place for elite Taiwanese to make money

This strategy wasn’t totally unsuccessful; it helped build China’s economy, and it did play a role in agreements like the 1992 consensus and the opening of the so-called “Three Links” (mail, transportation, and trade) with Taiwan. But it outlived its purpose, especially after the Taiwanese elite fragmented while the interests of the elite and lower middle classes started to diverge — symptoms of democratization in the 1990s and wage stagnation of the 2000s.

The final nail in the coffin for this strategy came during the Sunflower Movement of 2014 — not so long after Xi Jinping took office — when a trade deal with mainland China supported by the KMT and Taiwanese businesses was stopped by a protest led by young middle class Taiwanese. From that point on, it became clear to Xi that the Deng-Jiang-Hu policy of reining in Taiwan by reining in the businesses and KMT had lost its shine.

That is why under Xi, while friendly interactions with Taiwanese businesses and the KMT have continued, there has been more of an emphasis on getting young Taiwanese of all stripes to live, work, and study in mainland China so that they see the the mainland as the best place to get ahead in life, or at the very least a place that they can never get away from. This is a smart move, if not a necessary one, on Xi’s part, since the youth are the future of Taiwan, so anything that keeps Taiwan close by will have to involve the Taiwanese youth. And given the fact that almost all Taiwanese under the age of 30 have been educated to accept “green values” (i.e. Taiwan’s separateness from China), allowing them a bigger piece of the mainland pie while the Taiwan pie shrinks can keep them somewhat intertwined with the rest of China regardless of how they may feel about China personally.

Secondly, Xi compartmentalized Hong Kong and Taiwan. Previously, there was a tendency among the Chinese leadership to think that Hong Kong and Taiwan are basically the same (by virtue of not living under the mainland’s system), so they can deal with one place the same way they deal with the other. That’s how they rubbed shoulders with the Taiwanese elite just like how they rubbed shoulders with the Hong Kong elite, and it’s also how they sold “one country, two systems” to Taiwan assuming it can become another Hong Kong or Macau. So Xi started preaching a different, non-HK 1C2S plan to Taiwan. Which obviously didn’t convince Taiwan, but at least it set a precedent for not using an uber-capitalist former colony like Hong Kong as a guide to develop Cross-Strait policy.

Still, there are serious blind spots in Xi’s current Taiwan strategy that is preventing him from successfully selling reunification.

One is that it’s too “mainland-centric,” meaning it is designed to make mainland China better without really changing the situation on the ground in Taiwan. This is a common flaw found in both Xi’s approach and the old approach, and it’s one thing Beijing’s policies towards Hong Kong and Taiwan have in common — Taiwanese are expected to feel better about China if some of them go over to the other side of the strait and enrich themselves and the mainlanders they work with; nothing is done to address social issues within Taiwan that could make the people there feel like China means well for them. It’s kind of like how some mainlanders think they can stop Hong Kong from rioting by simply building up the Greater Bay Area and turning every city near Hong Kong into international financial centers so that HK ends up making less than 0.00001% of China’s GDP and everybody has to find work in Shenzhen.

No matter how friendly of a place mainland China is to Taiwanese, most Taiwanese will naturally prefer to work, live, retire, and die in Taiwan, because that’s where they live. Any plan to lure Taiwanese closer to the mainland will simply have to take that into consideration. But since the PRC does not control Taiwan and Xi’s number one job is to look after mainland China, there isn’t that much Xi can do to resolve this blind spot.

The other is that it’s still too “money-centric” — and this is where the “just throwing money at Taiwan” argument has some credence. Yes, Xi’s appeal to the Taiwanese youth means that mainland China is finally throwing the money at the people who need it the most, but it’s still throwing money. And while money talks, creating an environment where a good number of Taiwanese want to reunify with the mainland under the best terms available is going to require a lot more than that. Money isn’t buying the green media and trashy tabloids like the Apple Daily (unless it’s, well, spent there). Money isn’t reforming the education system, whose primary role in the desinicization of Taiwan’s youth is well documented. The renminbi can’t solve all of Taiwan’s internal problems, like aging or low wages (unless you ask your boss for a raise…by threatening to take a job in mainland China that pays better). Money maintained peace with Taiwan, but going beyond that necessitates thinking beyond money.