Turkish military offensive in Syria/Rojava

[Nea Byzantia]

Can people step back for one goddamn moment and actually read - I know, it's shocking to request something like this - either Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth book, or actual academic responses to that book, before going off on "neo-Ottomanism"?

You guys keep using that word.

It doesn't mean what you think it means, at least not in this context.

What is "Neo-Ottomanism"?

[Vistulange]

Can people step back for one goddamn moment and actually read - I know, it's shocking to request something like this - either Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth book, or actual academic responses to that book, before going off on "neo-Ottomanism"?

You guys keep using that word.

It doesn't mean what you think it means, at least not in this context.

What is "Neo-Ottomanism"?

Neo-Ottomanism refers to a counter-argument against the foreign policy of the Kemalist Republican elite, which was to look West, towards liberal democratic values, and to largely become uninvolved in the Middle East, which did not fit the Kemalist elite's ideal for Turkey in any shape whatsoever. The Kemalist elite's vision of Turkey was that of a Turkish nation-state, where the ideal citizen identified as a citizen of the Republic as opposed to his confession, and where the state was a liberal democratic state. Mind you, this was in the 1930's and early to mid-1940's, so take "liberal" with a pinch of salt: It doesn't fall into the same context as the liberalism we would understand in 2019. More critically, the Kemalist ideology emphasised the role of the break from the Ottoman Empire - a revolution in and of itself - as a defining part of Turkish identity. There are certain quotes from Kemalist elites that help clarify the Kemalist elite's viewpoint regarding their position. Below is a passage from a notable journalist of the Early Republican Era:

We have brought down God from his throne just as we have done with the Sultan; our temples are factories.

This quote demonstrates the nature of the Kemalist regime: Fiercely secularist, and rigidly developmental. The West, specifically France, was looked at as an example, and the Middle East was shunned. Kemalist foreign policy largely worked on the basis of securing a lasting and stable peace for Turkey, in order to prevent the last century of the Ottomans happening again. That was the reason for the Turko-Greek rapprochement after the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, and had the Cyprus Question not broken out, that rapprochement would have very likely continued. The Kemalists approached foreign policy in a very, very realistic manner, and did not try to alter the status quo in a maximalist manner as did Nazi Germany, its contemporary. While Germany was swallowing up countries and partitioning others, all Turkey did was revise the regime of the Straits and sign the Montreux Convention in 1936, and establish a fait accompli in Hatay and annex it in 1939, both of which were very acceptable to the world powers at the time. It made minor revisions to the Lausanne Treaty while practically remaining a status quo power.

In contrast, neo-Ottomanism espouses the revitalisation of what is perceived to be Ottoman culture and influences in domestic politics, while in the foreign arena, it involves abandoning the Kemalist strategy of being non-involved in regional affairs, in regards to the Balkans and the Middle East, i.e. the former lands of the Ottoman empire. This involvement is very specifically meant to be largely cultural and diplomatic in nature, hence the "zero problems strategy" espoused by Davutoğlu during his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister. This strategy is why Turkish foreign aid numbers soared during the AKP era, and this is why the Foreign Ministry was either emptied, or sidelined, as the Kemalist bureaucrats in the institution prevented any meaningful implementation of the vision. It should be noted at this point that Davutoğlu - the prime architect of the AKP foreign policy - refused to call the strategy "neo-Ottomanism". This foreign policy in no way constituted anything territorial or military, it did not envision "enlargement" of Turkey in a line akin to 1930's Germany, or indeed, any notion that "injustice was done to the Turkish nation in 1923 through Lausanne".

The glorification of Abdulhamid II, for instance, is not due to his Hamidian Regiments which conducted massacres in the East; which are often brought up by critics; but instead due to the perception that he was a sultan who refused to concede to Western demands and was a strong leader. Whether or not these are true is another matter: What the point here is is that these talking points employed by the AKP have specific purposes. The Hamidian Regiments in the Hamidian Era are ignored not necessarily out of a desire to whitewash Ottoman history and specifically Abdulhamid II - though it is a beneficial side-effect - but instead because they do not fit the purpose of the talking point itself. Had it been the AKP's goal to fuel an xenophobic and racist electorate, the Hamidian Regiments would be brought up daily, and yet, in references to the Hamidian Era by any senior AKP figure, these are entirely omitted. Instead, the focus is on Abdulhamid II's strong leadership, his perceived lack of concessions to Western powers, and his "benevolence".

Another example is the handling of the Kurdish issue itself. Prior to 2015, the AKP had embarked on a very anti-nationalist drive, with statements such as "we have thrown nationalism under our feet" by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan - which is still made a talking point in pro-nationalist and anti-AKP circles, about a decade later - and acts such as the "Alevi Opening" and the "Kurdish Opening" in the late 2000's and early 2010's. The latter primarily rested upon a categorical rejection of nationalism and an embracement of the neo-Ottoman ideal, the notion of Muslim peoples co-existing in peace without regard for nationality. Both Kurds and Turks are mainly Sunni Muslims (with one difference being that the Turkish Kurds tend to be largely Shafi'i, and Turks tend to be Hanafi), and the perception was that they both lived together in peace in the Ottoman era, and the Republic destroyed all that. Therefore, by rejecting nationalism and embracing the neo-Ottoman ideal, the Solution Process with the PKK was started.

I cannot overstate just how important it is to underline and emphasise that this is not "Islamism" in the way the Western viewer views it. The AKP and Erdoğan in no way represent Islamism. They have absolutely zero, zero goals of "unifying world Muslims" or "defeating the decadent West". The Islamist roots they come from, with Necmettin Erbakan at the helm, did do some aspects of that, namely by rejecting the banking system built on interest (and encouraging the establishment of banks that had no interest, but instead "profit shares" which oddly (!) happened to have the same ratios as interest rates!) but it was mostly all talk and no action, and besides, Erbakan got ousted from power pretty quickly. That very ouster led Erdoğan and his inner circle to greatly water down their ideology, incorporate large aspects of neoliberal ideology into it, and there you have the Justice and Development Party that ran in 2003.

And the West loved it. Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy Ali Babacan was adored by Western investors - rightly so, he continued the program prescribed by the IMF and first implemented under the social democrat Kemal Derviş without touching a single thing - while Prime Minister Erdoğan went with the rhetoric of having broken free from the IMF. Essentially, the "Islamism" seen in both the late Ottoman Empire and the AKP era in Turkey are not visions of Islamic unification, but instead mechanisms and tools to keep the existing state unified and stable. Whether or not they worked is an entirely different argument.

Erdoğan has shown himself to be an incredibly pragmatic politician who doesn't have too many qualms flip-flopping, especially when it comes to the question of nationalism. You condemn him as being "racist", with "Turks going on to commit genocide", but be wary: Should Erdoğan decide that his alliance with the MHP isn't as bountiful as he'd like, he could very well sack Süleyman Soylu - the right-wing nationalist Interior Minister - which is rumoured to be soon enough, in Ankara circles, and immediately seek a rapprochement with the HDP, partner them into his winning coalition while sacrificing the MHP, and return to the late-2000's and early-2010's rhetoric and actions. You would end up wondering "what the fuck just happened".

Tl;dr: Neo-Ottomanism does not refer to the expansion of territory to match former Ottoman territories, or necessarily to military action against threats, or to purge Kurds. It refers to foreign policy that seeks to be active through soft power in the Middle East and the Balkans, defined primarily by juxtaposing itself against the pre-2003 foreign policy conducted by the Kemalist state apparatus which was one of relative non-involvement in the Middle East.

[Arumdaum]

Very unfortunate what's happening to Rojava...

21st century Catalunya?

[Keldros]

https://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-fighters-seen-fraternising-turkish-soldiers-near-kobani-border-video-612629

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-c ... -turkey-on



https://www.theguardian.com/world/video ... rder-video

https://www.rt.com/news/238713-isis-com ... -hospital/

Just another friendly reminder for all you folks talking about turkey's supposed legitimate grievances. you basically support a country that is friends with ISIS. We shouldn't have ran, we should have stayed and fought the terrorist enabling turks till the few surviving Turkish soldiers finally made it back across the border with horror in their eyes. Sadly the US just can't win or even fight wars anymore

The entire Middle East isn’t worth the bones of one Alabama grenadier.

[Arumdaum]

https://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-fighters-seen-fraternising-turkish-soldiers-near-kobani-border-video-612629

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-c ... -turkey-on



https://www.theguardian.com/world/video ... rder-video

https://www.rt.com/news/238713-isis-com ... -hospital/

Just another friendly reminder for all you folks talking about turkey's supposed legitimate grievances. you basically support a country that is friends with ISIS. We shouldn't have ran, we should have stayed and fought the terrorist enabling turks till the few surviving Turkish soldiers finally made it back across the border with horror in their eyes. Sadly the US just can't win or even fight wars anymore

The entire Middle East isn’t worth the bones of one Alabama grenadier.

Why?

[Nea Byzantia]

What is "Neo-Ottomanism"?

Neo-Ottomanism refers to a counter-argument against the foreign policy of the Kemalist Republican elite, which was to look West, towards liberal democratic values, and to largely become uninvolved in the Middle East, which did not fit the Kemalist elite's ideal for Turkey in any shape whatsoever. The Kemalist elite's vision of Turkey was that of a Turkish nation-state, where the ideal citizen identified as a citizen of the Republic as opposed to his confession, and where the state was a liberal democratic state. Mind you, this was in the 1930's and early to mid-1940's, so take "liberal" with a pinch of salt: It doesn't fall into the same context as the liberalism we would understand in 2019. More critically, the Kemalist ideology emphasised the role of the break from the Ottoman Empire - a revolution in and of itself - as a defining part of Turkish identity. There are certain quotes from Kemalist elites that help clarify the Kemalist elite's viewpoint regarding their position. Below is a passage from a notable journalist of the Early Republican Era:

We have brought down God from his throne just as we have done with the Sultan; our temples are factories.

This quote demonstrates the nature of the Kemalist regime: Fiercely secularist, and rigidly developmental. The West, specifically France, was looked at as an example, and the Middle East was shunned. Kemalist foreign policy largely worked on the basis of securing a lasting and stable peace for Turkey, in order to prevent the last century of the Ottomans happening again. That was the reason for the Turko-Greek rapprochement after the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, and had the Cyprus Question not broken out, that rapprochement would have very likely continued. The Kemalists approached foreign policy in a very, very realistic manner, and did not try to alter the status quo in a maximalist manner as did Nazi Germany, its contemporary. While Germany was swallowing up countries and partitioning others, all Turkey did was revise the regime of the Straits and sign the Montreux Convention in 1936, and establish a fait accompli in Hatay and annex it in 1939, both of which were very acceptable to the world powers at the time. It made minor revisions to the Lausanne Treaty while practically remaining a status quo power.

In contrast, neo-Ottomanism espouses the revitalisation of what is perceived to be Ottoman culture and influences in domestic politics, while in the foreign arena, it involves abandoning the Kemalist strategy of being non-involved in regional affairs, in regards to the Balkans and the Middle East, i.e. the former lands of the Ottoman empire. This involvement is very specifically meant to be largely cultural and diplomatic in nature, hence the "zero problems strategy" espoused by Davutoğlu during his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister. This strategy is why Turkish foreign aid numbers soared during the AKP era, and this is why the Foreign Ministry was either emptied, or sidelined, as the Kemalist bureaucrats in the institution prevented any meaningful implementation of the vision. It should be noted at this point that Davutoğlu - the prime architect of the AKP foreign policy - refused to call the strategy "neo-Ottomanism". This foreign policy in no way constituted anything territorial or military, it did not envision "enlargement" of Turkey in a line akin to 1930's Germany, or indeed, any notion that "injustice was done to the Turkish nation in 1923 through Lausanne".

The glorification of Abdulhamid II, for instance, is not due to his Hamidian Regiments which conducted massacres in the East; which are often brought up by critics; but instead due to the perception that he was a sultan who refused to concede to Western demands and was a strong leader. Whether or not these are true is another matter: What the point here is is that these talking points employed by the AKP have specific purposes. The Hamidian Regiments in the Hamidian Era are ignored not necessarily out of a desire to whitewash Ottoman history and specifically Abdulhamid II - though it is a beneficial side-effect - but instead because they do not fit the purpose of the talking point itself. Had it been the AKP's goal to fuel an xenophobic and racist electorate, the Hamidian Regiments would be brought up daily, and yet, in references to the Hamidian Era by any senior AKP figure, these are entirely omitted. Instead, the focus is on Abdulhamid II's strong leadership, his perceived lack of concessions to Western powers, and his "benevolence".

Another example is the handling of the Kurdish issue itself. Prior to 2015, the AKP had embarked on a very anti-nationalist drive, with statements such as "we have thrown nationalism under our feet" by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan - which is still made a talking point in pro-nationalist and anti-AKP circles, about a decade later - and acts such as the "Alevi Opening" and the "Kurdish Opening" in the late 2000's and early 2010's. The latter primarily rested upon a categorical rejection of nationalism and an embracement of the neo-Ottoman ideal, the notion of Muslim peoples co-existing in peace without regard for nationality. Both Kurds and Turks are mainly Sunni Muslims (with one difference being that the Turkish Kurds tend to be largely Shafi'i, and Turks tend to be Hanafi), and the perception was that they both lived together in peace in the Ottoman era, and the Republic destroyed all that. Therefore, by rejecting nationalism and embracing the neo-Ottoman ideal, the Solution Process with the PKK was started.

I cannot overstate just how important it is to underline and emphasise that this is not "Islamism" in the way the Western viewer views it. The AKP and Erdoğan in no way represent Islamism. They have absolutely zero, zero goals of "unifying world Muslims" or "defeating the decadent West". The Islamist roots they come from, with Necmettin Erbakan at the helm, did do some aspects of that, namely by rejecting the banking system built on interest (and encouraging the establishment of banks that had no interest, but instead "profit shares" which oddly (!) happened to have the same ratios as interest rates!) but it was mostly all talk and no action, and besides, Erbakan got ousted from power pretty quickly. That very ouster led Erdoğan and his inner circle to greatly water down their ideology, incorporate large aspects of neoliberal ideology into it, and there you have the Justice and Development Party that ran in 2003.

And the West loved it. Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy Ali Babacan was adored by Western investors - rightly so, he continued the program prescribed by the IMF and first implemented under the social democrat Kemal Derviş without touching a single thing - while Prime Minister Erdoğan went with the rhetoric of having broken free from the IMF. Essentially, the "Islamism" seen in both the late Ottoman Empire and the AKP era in Turkey are not visions of Islamic unification, but instead mechanisms and tools to keep the existing state unified and stable. Whether or not they worked is an entirely different argument.

Erdoğan has shown himself to be an incredibly pragmatic politician who doesn't have too many qualms flip-flopping, especially when it comes to the question of nationalism. You condemn him as being "racist", with "Turks going on to commit genocide", but be wary: Should Erdoğan decide that his alliance with the MHP isn't as bountiful as he'd like, he could very well sack Süleyman Soylu - the right-wing nationalist Interior Minister - which is rumoured to be soon enough, in Ankara circles, and immediately seek a rapprochement with the HDP, partner them into his winning coalition while sacrificing the MHP, and return to the late-2000's and early-2010's rhetoric and actions. You would end up wondering "what the fuck just happened".

Tl;dr: Neo-Ottomanism does not refer to the expansion of territory to match former Ottoman territories, or necessarily to military action against threats, or to purge Kurds. It refers to foreign policy that seeks to be active through soft power in the Middle East and the Balkans, defined primarily by juxtaposing itself against the pre-2003 foreign policy conducted by the Kemalist state apparatus which was one of relative non-involvement in the Middle East.

Interesting. Thanks.

I just wanted to note the following:

The Kemalist elite's vision of Turkey was that of a Turkish nation-state, where the ideal citizen identified as a citizen of the Republic as opposed to his confession, and where the state was a liberal democratic state.

Would you say that this was sort of building on the Edict of Gulhane - which if I'm not mistaken was an attempt to modernize the Ottoman Empire, and do away with the old confessional divisions?

[Vistulange]

Interesting. Thanks.

I just wanted to note the following:

The Kemalist elite's vision of Turkey was that of a Turkish nation-state, where the ideal citizen identified as a citizen of the Republic as opposed to his confession, and where the state was a liberal democratic state.

Would you say that this was sort of building on the Edict of Gulhane - which if I'm not mistaken was an attempt to modernize the Ottoman Empire, and do away with the old confessional divisions?

In some ways, yes; in others, no.

The Gülhane Edict did indeed seek to modernise the Empire, and one of the ideologies put forth to keep the Empire stable was indeed "Ottomanism", which the Gülhane Edict followed. It sought to unify all subjects of the Empire under the common identity of "Ottoman" as opposed to "Muslim", "Catholic", "Orthodox" and so on. However, to say that the Gülhane Edict was an attempt to do away with old confessional divisions would be a bit of a stretch in my opinion. While it guaranteed the rights of religious minorities - which is quite important, as Kurds for instance would not be counted as minorities - it did not do what the French Revolution did and strip away identifiers other than "nationality".

Of course, the Gülhane Edict did have an incredible effect on the empire by triggering Tanzimat, which literally means "reorganisation", the thorough modernisation of the Ottoman state into something that was a 19th century state as opposed to a relic from the 17th century. However, this Tanzimat Era did not necessarily translate into a proper understanding of citizenship as we now know it, and that would need to wait until 1923, at least on paper.

[Nea Byzantia]

Interesting. Thanks.

I just wanted to note the following:


Would you say that this was sort of building on the Edict of Gulhane - which if I'm not mistaken was an attempt to modernize the Ottoman Empire, and do away with the old confessional divisions?

In some ways, yes; in others, no.

The Gülhane Edict did indeed seek to modernise the Empire, and one of the ideologies put forth to keep the Empire stable was indeed "Ottomanism", which the Gülhane Edict followed. It sought to unify all subjects of the Empire under the common identity of "Ottoman" as opposed to "Muslim", "Catholic", "Orthodox" and so on. However, to say that the Gülhane Edict was an attempt to do away with old confessional divisions would be a bit of a stretch in my opinion. While it guaranteed the rights of religious minorities - which is quite important, as Kurds for instance would not be counted as minorities - it did not do what the French Revolution did and strip away identifiers other than "nationality".

Of course, the Gülhane Edict did have an incredible effect on the empire by triggering Tanzimat, which literally means "reorganisation", the thorough modernisation of the Ottoman state into something that was a 19th century state as opposed to a relic from the 17th century. However, this Tanzimat Era did not necessarily translate into a proper understanding of citizenship as we now know it, and that would need to wait until 1923, at least on paper.

And besides, didn't subsequent Sultans; especially Abdulhamid II do away with these reforms?

[Chan Island]

Calling it now. There's going to be a fucking genocide in Rojava now because of this. Utterly depressing.

[The Black Forrest]

https://www.ibtimes.co.in/isis-fighters-seen-fraternising-turkish-soldiers-near-kobani-border-video-612629

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-c ... -turkey-on



https://www.theguardian.com/world/video ... rder-video

https://www.rt.com/news/238713-isis-com ... -hospital/

Just another friendly reminder for all you folks talking about turkey's supposed legitimate grievances. you basically support a country that is friends with ISIS. We shouldn't have ran, we should have stayed and fought the terrorist enabling turks till the few surviving Turkish soldiers finally made it back across the border with horror in their eyes. Sadly the US just can't win or even fight wars anymore

They were just following orders? Where have I heard that before?

[Nea Byzantia]

Interesting. Thanks.

I just wanted to note the following:


Would you say that this was sort of building on the Edict of Gulhane - which if I'm not mistaken was an attempt to modernize the Ottoman Empire, and do away with the old confessional divisions?

In some ways, yes; in others, no.

The Gülhane Edict did indeed seek to modernise the Empire, and one of the ideologies put forth to keep the Empire stable was indeed "Ottomanism", which the Gülhane Edict followed. It sought to unify all subjects of the Empire under the common identity of "Ottoman" as opposed to "Muslim", "Catholic", "Orthodox" and so on. However, to say that the Gülhane Edict was an attempt to do away with old confessional divisions would be a bit of a stretch in my opinion. While it guaranteed the rights of religious minorities - which is quite important, as Kurds for instance would not be counted as minorities - it did not do what the French Revolution did and strip away identifiers other than "nationality".

Of course, the Gülhane Edict did have an incredible effect on the empire by triggering Tanzimat, which literally means "reorganisation", the thorough modernisation of the Ottoman state into something that was a 19th century state as opposed to a relic from the 17th century. However, this Tanzimat Era did not necessarily translate into a proper understanding of citizenship as we now know it, and that would need to wait until 1923, at least on paper.

Also, I thought Tanzimat began with Sultan Mahmud II; and it was in reaction to the Ottomans losing Greece (and also Egypt; cause Muhammad Ali Pasha). Am I mistaken?

[Gormwood]

Calling it now. There's going to be a fucking genocide in Rojava now because of this. Utterly depressing.

And right-wingers will either say they don't care or celebrate it.

[Vistulange]

In some ways, yes; in others, no.

The Gülhane Edict did indeed seek to modernise the Empire, and one of the ideologies put forth to keep the Empire stable was indeed "Ottomanism", which the Gülhane Edict followed. It sought to unify all subjects of the Empire under the common identity of "Ottoman" as opposed to "Muslim", "Catholic", "Orthodox" and so on. However, to say that the Gülhane Edict was an attempt to do away with old confessional divisions would be a bit of a stretch in my opinion. While it guaranteed the rights of religious minorities - which is quite important, as Kurds for instance would not be counted as minorities - it did not do what the French Revolution did and strip away identifiers other than "nationality".

Of course, the Gülhane Edict did have an incredible effect on the empire by triggering Tanzimat, which literally means "reorganisation", the thorough modernisation of the Ottoman state into something that was a 19th century state as opposed to a relic from the 17th century. However, this Tanzimat Era did not necessarily translate into a proper understanding of citizenship as we now know it, and that would need to wait until 1923, at least on paper.

And besides, didn't subsequent Sultans; especially Abdulhamid II do away with these reforms?

Well, no. Sultans prior to Abdulhamid II were largely the drivers of reform, actually. It was Mahmud II who bombed the Janissary barracks in Istanbul in 1826, destroying the entire corps, as they were constantly resisting any sort of reformation, for example. Those that came after him, and after Abdulmecid I - the one who promulgated the Edict - also continued the reforms.

Abdulhamid II does represent a reactionary point in some ways, namely the doing away with the Parliament and indefinitely suspending the Constitution; but the same Abdulhamid II established the three major modern schools - Harbiye (military academies), Mülkiye (bureaucratic schools), and Tıbbiye (medical schools) - in the Empire to train extremely well-educated and capable people to run the Empire. This goal, by definition, necessitated that the students of these schools receive modern, liberal, open-minded education. This worked a bit too well for Abdulhamid II, as these very students ended up overthrowing him in the 1908 Revolution and establishing the Second Constitutional Era. From then on, the Sultans were relegated to effective puppets, with a hint of true democracy as we know it between 1908-1911, and the effective rule of the Committee of Union and Progress from then onwards until 1918.

[Nea Byzantia]

And besides, didn't subsequent Sultans; especially Abdulhamid II do away with these reforms?

Well, no. Sultans prior to Abdulhamid II were largely the drivers of reform, actually. It was Mahmud II who bombed the Janissary barracks in Istanbul in 1826, destroying the entire corps, as they were constantly resisting any sort of reformation, for example. Those that came after him, and after Abdulmecid I - the one who promulgated the Edict - also continued the reforms.

Abdulhamid II does represent a reactionary point in some ways, namely the doing away with the Parliament and indefinitely suspending ; but the same Abdulhamid II established the three major modern schools - Harbiye (military academies), Mülkiye (bureaucratic schools), and Tıbbiye (medical schools) - in the Empire to train extremely well-educated and capable people to run the Empire. This goal, by definition, necessitated that the students of these schools receive modern, liberal, open-minded education. This worked a bit too well for Abdulhamid II, as these very students ended up overthrowing him in the 1908 Revolution and establishing the Second Constitutional Era. From then on, the Sultans were relegated to effective puppets, with a hint of true democracy as we know it between 1908-1911, and the effective rule of the Committee of Union and Progress from then onwards until 1918.

Here's another question: If the Ottoman Empire had stayed out of World War I, do you think they would've survived much longer? If so, how much longer?

[The South Falls]

Well, no. Sultans prior to Abdulhamid II were largely the drivers of reform, actually. It was Mahmud II who bombed the Janissary barracks in Istanbul in 1826, destroying the entire corps, as they were constantly resisting any sort of reformation, for example. Those that came after him, and after Abdulmecid I - the one who promulgated the Edict - also continued the reforms.

Abdulhamid II does represent a reactionary point in some ways, namely the doing away with the Parliament and indefinitely suspending ; but the same Abdulhamid II established the three major modern schools - Harbiye (military academies), Mülkiye (bureaucratic schools), and Tıbbiye (medical schools) - in the Empire to train extremely well-educated and capable people to run the Empire. This goal, by definition, necessitated that the students of these schools receive modern, liberal, open-minded education. This worked a bit too well for Abdulhamid II, as these very students ended up overthrowing him in the 1908 Revolution and establishing the Second Constitutional Era. From then on, the Sultans were relegated to effective puppets, with a hint of true democracy as we know it between 1908-1911, and the effective rule of the Committee of Union and Progress from then onwards until 1918.

Here's another question: If the Ottoman Empire had stayed out of World War I, do you think they would've survived much longer? If so, how much longer?

I don't think they would have done so. Their state was already decrepit, and the Young Turks would have not been sufficient to prevent colonial powers from taking their chunks out of the empire. And anyway, their state would have collapsed to a similar war of Independence, whether in 1919, or in 1939. They'd have probably 15-20 years left to live, at the most.

[Vistulange]

Well, no. Sultans prior to Abdulhamid II were largely the drivers of reform, actually. It was Mahmud II who bombed the Janissary barracks in Istanbul in 1826, destroying the entire corps, as they were constantly resisting any sort of reformation, for example. Those that came after him, and after Abdulmecid I - the one who promulgated the Edict - also continued the reforms.

Abdulhamid II does represent a reactionary point in some ways, namely the doing away with the Parliament and indefinitely suspending ; but the same Abdulhamid II established the three major modern schools - Harbiye (military academies), Mülkiye (bureaucratic schools), and Tıbbiye (medical schools) - in the Empire to train extremely well-educated and capable people to run the Empire. This goal, by definition, necessitated that the students of these schools receive modern, liberal, open-minded education. This worked a bit too well for Abdulhamid II, as these very students ended up overthrowing him in the 1908 Revolution and establishing the Second Constitutional Era. From then on, the Sultans were relegated to effective puppets, with a hint of true democracy as we know it between 1908-1911, and the effective rule of the Committee of Union and Progress from then onwards until 1918.

Here's another question: If the Ottoman Empire had stayed out of World War I, do you think they would've survived much longer? If so, how much longer?

I honestly don't like counterfactuals, they're impossible to really go about, but I'll give it a shot for it's sake.

It depends entirely on security and stability. What the Ottoman Empire did not have was a long-lasting peace that would allow it to reform and rebuild, to consolidate. That was what the Kemalist elite desperately tried, and successfully achieved in 1923 with Lausanne. Lausanne, to them, was the key to recover from the disastrous legacy they had inherited, without fear of world powers constantly plotting to partition and share the country they had in their hands. It was not without reason that 1939-1941 was the Republic's years of utmost fear and dread: Stuck between two behemoths, and vulnerable to being partitioned just as Poland was with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Rumour has it that Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu began to dance zeybek and drink all night upon hearing the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in celebration - and no, this is not me trying to be humorous on my own, it's a story often told.

To answer your question, it honestly depends. The Ottoman Empire could have reformed into a more or less democratic, equal country with a constitutional monarchy, but for that, it would need to be, above all, secure. The War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace gave the Republic, respectively, the political fuel for such a peace, and the opportunity to rebuild without interruption.

[Nea Byzantia]

Here's another question: If the Ottoman Empire had stayed out of World War I, do you think they would've survived much longer? If so, how much longer?

I honestly don't like counterfactuals, they're impossible to really go about, but I'll give it a shot for it's sake.

It depends entirely on security and stability. What the Ottoman Empire did not have was a long-lasting peace that would allow it to reform and rebuild, to consolidate. That was what the Kemalist elite desperately tried, and successfully achieved in 1923 with Lausanne. Lausanne, to them, was the key to recover from the disastrous legacy they had inherited, without fear of world powers constantly plotting to partition and share the country they had in their hands. It was not without reason that 1939-1941 was the Republic's years of utmost fear and dread: Stuck between two behemoths, and vulnerable to being partitioned just as Poland was with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Rumour has it that Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu began to dance zeybek and drink all night upon hearing the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in celebration - and no, this is not me trying to be humorous on my own, it's a story often told.

To answer your question, it honestly depends. The Ottoman Empire could have reformed into a more or less democratic, equal country with a constitutional monarchy, but for that, it would need to be, above all, secure. The War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace gave the Republic, respectively, the political fuel for such a peace, and the opportunity to rebuild without interruption.

The main issue of course, would've been Ottoman Imperial Territories in the Levant, Iraq, and Arabia; which would've been agitating for independence. Chances are the European Powers would've been ogling those lands anyways.

[Nea Byzantia]

Here's another question: If the Ottoman Empire had stayed out of World War I, do you think they would've survived much longer? If so, how much longer?

I honestly don't like counterfactuals, they're impossible to really go about, but I'll give it a shot for it's sake.

It depends entirely on security and stability. What the Ottoman Empire did not have was a long-lasting peace that would allow it to reform and rebuild, to consolidate. That was what the Kemalist elite desperately tried, and successfully achieved in 1923 with Lausanne. Lausanne, to them, was the key to recover from the disastrous legacy they had inherited, without fear of world powers constantly plotting to partition and share the country they had in their hands. It was not without reason that 1939-1941 was the Republic's years of utmost fear and dread: Stuck between two behemoths, and vulnerable to being partitioned just as Poland was with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Rumour has it that Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu began to dance zeybek and drink all night upon hearing the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in celebration - and no, this is not me trying to be humorous on my own, it's a story often told.

To answer your question, it honestly depends. The Ottoman Empire could have reformed into a more or less democratic, equal country with a constitutional monarchy, but for that, it would need to be, above all, secure. The War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace gave the Republic, respectively, the political fuel for such a peace, and the opportunity to rebuild without interruption.

In a related question; why did the Ottoman Empire get involved in World War I? Weren't they aware of their own fragility? What were they hoping to gain?

[Farnhamia]

I honestly don't like counterfactuals, they're impossible to really go about, but I'll give it a shot for it's sake.

It depends entirely on security and stability. What the Ottoman Empire did not have was a long-lasting peace that would allow it to reform and rebuild, to consolidate. That was what the Kemalist elite desperately tried, and successfully achieved in 1923 with Lausanne. Lausanne, to them, was the key to recover from the disastrous legacy they had inherited, without fear of world powers constantly plotting to partition and share the country they had in their hands. It was not without reason that 1939-1941 was the Republic's years of utmost fear and dread: Stuck between two behemoths, and vulnerable to being partitioned just as Poland was with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Rumour has it that Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu began to dance zeybek and drink all night upon hearing the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in celebration - and no, this is not me trying to be humorous on my own, it's a story often told.

To answer your question, it honestly depends. The Ottoman Empire could have reformed into a more or less democratic, equal country with a constitutional monarchy, but for that, it would need to be, above all, secure. The War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace gave the Republic, respectively, the political fuel for such a peace, and the opportunity to rebuild without interruption.

In a related question; why did the Ottoman Empire get involved in World War I? Weren't they aware of their own fragility? What were they hoping to gain?

*swoops in* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_e ... orld_War_I *swoops out*

[United Muscovite Nations]

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Docume ... NGLISH.PDF

[Gormwood]

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2425032015ENGLISH.PDF

So is this another "Kurds Had It Coming" pitch?

[United Muscovite Nations]

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2425032015ENGLISH.PDF

So is this another "Kurds Had It Coming" pitch?

Forced displacement is never good. But let's not pretend that the YPG are perfectly innocent and have never committed terrorist actions or forced people from their homes as refugees, who need to be returned. There are reasons there are groups within Rojava's territory who support the Turkish operation.

[Aureumterra]

So is this another "Kurds Had It Coming" pitch?

Forced displacement is never good. But let's not pretend that the YPG are perfectly innocent and have never committed terrorist actions or forced people from their homes as refugees, who need to be returned. There are reasons there are groups within Rojava's territory who support the Turkish operation.

I’ve given up trying to convince socialists that Rojava isn’t perfect

[Vistulange]

I honestly don't like counterfactuals, they're impossible to really go about, but I'll give it a shot for it's sake.

It depends entirely on security and stability. What the Ottoman Empire did not have was a long-lasting peace that would allow it to reform and rebuild, to consolidate. That was what the Kemalist elite desperately tried, and successfully achieved in 1923 with Lausanne. Lausanne, to them, was the key to recover from the disastrous legacy they had inherited, without fear of world powers constantly plotting to partition and share the country they had in their hands. It was not without reason that 1939-1941 was the Republic's years of utmost fear and dread: Stuck between two behemoths, and vulnerable to being partitioned just as Poland was with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Rumour has it that Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu began to dance zeybek and drink all night upon hearing the commencement of Operation Barbarossa in celebration - and no, this is not me trying to be humorous on my own, it's a story often told.

To answer your question, it honestly depends. The Ottoman Empire could have reformed into a more or less democratic, equal country with a constitutional monarchy, but for that, it would need to be, above all, secure. The War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace gave the Republic, respectively, the political fuel for such a peace, and the opportunity to rebuild without interruption.

In a related question; why did the Ottoman Empire get involved in World War I? Weren't they aware of their own fragility? What were they hoping to gain?

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), specifically the triumvirate leading the Empire - Talat, Cemal, and Enver - were acutely aware of the fragility of the Empire. Enver was a slightly more idealistic fellow, with dreams of a pan-Turkic union and whatnot - he died fighting the Soviets in Central Asia - but they were still aware of the problems they faced. They hoped to gain - through a decisive victory - security for the Ottoman Empire.

You see, Ottoman foreign policy up until the CUP had been one of pragmatism. The Ottomans established temporary and relatively non-committal alliances in responses to specific crises, with the best example being the Crimean War: Against Russian aggression, the Ottomans allied with the United Kingdom and France, which allowed Ottoman victory in the war. Just about two decades earlier, Russia had been an ally against the rebellious Muhammad Ali in his revolt against the central government. This tactic of establishing temporary alliances had the advantage of preventing the Ottomans from being roped into conflicts which did not interest them, and allowed them to use the multi-polar world order to play the powers against one another. In fact, it's often stated that it's the intense diplomatic efforts and skill of the Ottomans post-1826 that allowed the Empire to survive another century.

However, the CUP had other plans. By taking sides in the World War, with what they thought would be the winning side - remember, this was in 1915 and at the time, it seemed quite like Germany would win the war, hands down - they hoped to establish a political order in Europe that would not endanger Ottoman integrity for the foreseeable future. While Enver was quite the Germanophile, the Ottomans had tried for an alliance with the British first, but that fell through, and so they went to the Germans instead.

Basically, the calculation was the same as the one the Kemalists did in 1923, though with significant errors and problems that caused the Empire to enter the war, on the wrong side, and come out on the losing side.

[Torrocca]

https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2425032015ENGLISH.PDF

That Amnesty International report is by and large trash that tries to corroborate a Turkish narrative of the YPG committing ethnic cleansing. It's also been debunked.

As for the displacements, those literally happened because the villages hadn't yet been secured and still featured an ISIS presence. It was an act of military necessity.

Also, now US troops are being bombed by Turkey.