Turkish military offensive in Syria/Rojava

[Nea Byzantia]

Considering the terrorist activities the Kurdish organizations have been involved in

According to Erdogan. Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

Yes, because Rojava and SDF are totally innocent and angelic...They didn't do anything.

[SD_Film Artists]

According to Erdogan. Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

Yes, because Rojava and SDF are totally innocent and angelic...They didn't do anything.

No one is totally innocent and angelic, but that's not the same as being the PKK.

[Vistulange]

Considering the terrorist activities the Kurdish organizations have been involved in

According to Erdogan. Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

According to very varying Turkish governments since 1978, actually. This might come as a shock, but the PKK didn't start with Erdoğan and wasn't invented by Erdoğan as some sort of spectre - it's a very real thing in our lives, thank you very much.

[SD_Film Artists]

According to Erdogan. Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

According to very varying Turkish governments since 1978, actually. This might come as a shock, but the PKK didn't start with Erdoğan and wasn't invented by Erdoğan as some sort of spectre - it's a very real thing in our lives, thank you very much.

A lie said multiple times doesn't make it any more true.

[The East Marches II]

Persecution and the fear of a kurdish state to be born, which as a neighboring state to Turkey, a Kurdish state would likely be not very friendly, given the history of bad treatment of Turks toward Kurds. A kurdish state would also mean Turkey losing a chunk of its territory. (reason:fear, territorial integrity)

Then there is the load of displaced syrians from the not-yet finished civil war who are currently blocked in Turkey, which either can be left free to move en masse to europe, or be housed in some way.
That's an other reason publicly used by Turkey for its attack. Remove terrorists, house displaced syrians, all fit nicely, except the ones being removed are the Kurds. While actual isis members are getting released during the chaos. (reason:incompetence or power influence by isis)

Also, in the most forgiving stance possible toward Erdogan, being remembered in history as the turkish president under which Turkey lost a chunk of it's territory is still pretty bad, personally for him. (reason:shame)

There is a difference between genocide and ethic cleansing, even if they run pretty close. Wiping a strip of land of a specific ethnic group (kurds) to implant a different group, is ethnic cleansing. That currently happening is indisputable.

Again, though, this doesn't explain why he embarked on the Solution Process back in 2013-2015, when he came - perhaps - closer to solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey without losing territory. Certainly a lot closer than the 1990's and early 2000's which were marked by warfare, and the late 2010's which are also marked by warfare.

And I argue that contrary to the belief on this forum that it's because Erdoğan is a tinpot dictator who just genocides Kurds for an incredibly debatable "advantage" with an added sauce of "Turks genocide people anyway, let's go on with that line of reasoning", it's primarily due to domestic political concerns, namely the requirement to pander to the MHP base which is currently in favour of the AKP. The problem with this argument is that since not many people on this forum do not follow Turkish politics - rightfully so, though still problematic in this context - it's difficult to get people past "yeah nah he's just genocidal".

The falsification would be of this manner: Demonstrating that Erdoğan, free of the need to have the MHP supporting his coalition and without a nationalist-oriented coalition ally to replace the MHP, continues to pursue aggressive policies against Kurds and pro-Kurdish parties. This would falsify my argument, which I would be happy to accept, though admittedly I'd rather not see Kurds being oppressed. There are two things that can happen that can break up the seemingly happy marriage between Erdoğan and the MHP.

1) Erdoğan decides that the MHP isn't a good coalition partner any longer.

This basically implies that in regards to domestic politics, the MHP base is no longer sufficient enough to keep support for Erdoğan at an acceptable level. We are already seeing semblances of this line of thought with the debate about lowering the necessary electoral threshold to 40%, with the support for the AKP and Erdoğan gradually diminishing. We have not yet seen clear signs that the alliance between Erdoğan and the MHP are deteriorating right now.

2) The MHP decides that their interests are not served by allying Erdoğan.

This is the reverse of the first point. Essentially, Devlet Bahçeli could very well decide that going with the opposition as he did prior to 2015 would serve him better politically, and perhaps catapult him into a better position than he is right now. Additionally, Bahçeli's health is in poor condition. Should he retire, or die in office, the MHP could perhaps elect a leader who is not as Erdoğan-oriented as Bahçeli.

Should either of the two happen, Erdoğan will need to find an ally: The AKP by itself is no longer enough to keep the system and government up on a legitimacy and legislative sense. There, we also see two options:

1) Erdoğan allies with the HDP.

This is basically a return to the 2013-2015 state of affairs, with the nationalist MHP on the opposition stands and the pro-Kurdish HDP tacitly giving support for Erdoğan's policies. I see this as largely unlikely to happen, but Turkish politics have surprised me in the past - namely with the MHP and HDP's sudden turnaround - so I cannot in good faith say that this is impossible.

2) Erdoğan finds a new ally.

And our prime candidate for this "new ally" is the nationalist İYİP. An splinter party from the MHP, they are largely the same in regards to ideology, albeit a bit more watered down and a bit more appealing to the younger demographic, and not as explicitly anti-Kurdish; but still quite nationalist. Erdoğan has indeed been making overtures towards them, though their leader Meral Akşener (oddly enough, a woman in Turkish nationalist politics) is quite firmly on the opposition side. Whether or not she can hold her position as party leader is debatable, though. She has however fended off some leadership challenges in quite a strong manner.

A surprisingly informed and well thought out take for NSG tbh. Well done!

[Duhon]

i've seemingly ignored it as i'm not here looking at all the replies all the time

of course i have replied earlier when i questioned you about erdogan's motivations for launching the offensive now, but needless to say i don't exactly believe everything you say that i have caught sight of, especially now that the turkish military and their paidfors are now in the thick of things killing off who they can

You're free to not believe what I've said, obviously. But since I'm not exactly seeing an argument, I'm also free to think that you aren't seeing the whole picture.

part of what you've said, just to clarify
whether or not rojava is the falklands nearly forty years removed or not, it is apparent from the reports i've checked that there is ethnic animus among those invading
maybe i'm not seeing the whole picture -- that's certainly a possibility, given this is syria, you're a turk, and things have not been black and white for the longest time
but even if you grant that, i'm gonna say that you're not so free from blindspots yourself, especially with regards to erdogans' motivations or that of the military rank and file

[Nea Byzantia]

Considering the terrorist activities the Kurdish organizations have been involved in

Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

Do you believe this guy?

[Vistulange]

According to very varying Turkish governments since 1978, actually. This might come as a shock, but the PKK didn't start with Erdoğan and wasn't invented by Erdoğan as some sort of spectre - it's a very real thing in our lives, thank you very much.

A lie said multiple times doesn't make it any more true.

So you are telling me, a Turk, that all those attacks perpetrated by the PKK since their inception, are lies?

Er...okay, I guess.

Again, though, this doesn't explain why he embarked on the Solution Process back in 2013-2015, when he came - perhaps - closer to solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey without losing territory. Certainly a lot closer than the 1990's and early 2000's which were marked by warfare, and the late 2010's which are also marked by warfare.

And I argue that contrary to the belief on this forum that it's because Erdoğan is a tinpot dictator who just genocides Kurds for an incredibly debatable "advantage" with an added sauce of "Turks genocide people anyway, let's go on with that line of reasoning", it's primarily due to domestic political concerns, namely the requirement to pander to the MHP base which is currently in favour of the AKP. The problem with this argument is that since not many people on this forum do not follow Turkish politics - rightfully so, though still problematic in this context - it's difficult to get people past "yeah nah he's just genocidal".

The falsification would be of this manner: Demonstrating that Erdoğan, free of the need to have the MHP supporting his coalition and without a nationalist-oriented coalition ally to replace the MHP, continues to pursue aggressive policies against Kurds and pro-Kurdish parties. This would falsify my argument, which I would be happy to accept, though admittedly I'd rather not see Kurds being oppressed. There are two things that can happen that can break up the seemingly happy marriage between Erdoğan and the MHP.

1) Erdoğan decides that the MHP isn't a good coalition partner any longer.

This basically implies that in regards to domestic politics, the MHP base is no longer sufficient enough to keep support for Erdoğan at an acceptable level. We are already seeing semblances of this line of thought with the debate about lowering the necessary electoral threshold to 40%, with the support for the AKP and Erdoğan gradually diminishing. We have not yet seen clear signs that the alliance between Erdoğan and the MHP are deteriorating right now.

2) The MHP decides that their interests are not served by allying Erdoğan.

This is the reverse of the first point. Essentially, Devlet Bahçeli could very well decide that going with the opposition as he did prior to 2015 would serve him better politically, and perhaps catapult him into a better position than he is right now. Additionally, Bahçeli's health is in poor condition. Should he retire, or die in office, the MHP could perhaps elect a leader who is not as Erdoğan-oriented as Bahçeli.

Should either of the two happen, Erdoğan will need to find an ally: The AKP by itself is no longer enough to keep the system and government up on a legitimacy and legislative sense. There, we also see two options:

1) Erdoğan allies with the HDP.

This is basically a return to the 2013-2015 state of affairs, with the nationalist MHP on the opposition stands and the pro-Kurdish HDP tacitly giving support for Erdoğan's policies. I see this as largely unlikely to happen, but Turkish politics have surprised me in the past - namely with the MHP and HDP's sudden turnaround - so I cannot in good faith say that this is impossible.

2) Erdoğan finds a new ally.

And our prime candidate for this "new ally" is the nationalist İYİP. An splinter party from the MHP, they are largely the same in regards to ideology, albeit a bit more watered down and a bit more appealing to the younger demographic, and not as explicitly anti-Kurdish; but still quite nationalist. Erdoğan has indeed been making overtures towards them, though their leader Meral Akşener (oddly enough, a woman in Turkish nationalist politics) is quite firmly on the opposition side. Whether or not she can hold her position as party leader is debatable, though. She has however fended off some leadership challenges in quite a strong manner.

A surprisingly informed and well thought out take for NSG tbh. Well done!

The thread needed some reality checks.

[The East Marches II]

A lie said multiple times doesn't make it any more true.

So you are telling me, a Turk, that all those attacks perpetrated by the PKK since their inception, are lies?

Er...okay, I guess.

A surprisingly informed and well thought out take for NSG tbh. Well done!

The thread needed some reality checks.

Careful, you might make the fine Journos at ABC look bad if you keep that up.

[Ifreann]

Which are equivalent to the lives of anyone else in every respect except paperwork. So on the basis of people lacking that paperwork, you don't care if they live or die. But once they acquire the proper paperwork, then their lives have value to you. The paperwork, which is all citizenship really is, is what matters to you.

Meh label it how ever you wish.

That really doesn't sound strange to you? That the value of a person's life is determined by filling in the proper forms and filing them with the proper bureaucracy?

It will never cease to entertain how brave some people are with other people's lives.

Apparently just six US soldiers have died in Syria since 2014. You probably lose more American citizens to exploding toilets.

---

Trump's sanctions on Turkey seem to be having absolutely no effect whatsoever.

Not a surprise to me as all Trump's foreign policy interventions do nothing but piss off US allies, and make the US look weaker than they were.

I'm sure he's going to destroy Turkey's economy any day now.

---

what did shitler get out of the holocaust?

Popularity, real estate and slave labour.

Vast amounts of wealth.

[Nea Byzantia]

Persecution and the fear of a kurdish state to be born, which as a neighboring state to Turkey, a Kurdish state would likely be not very friendly, given the history of bad treatment of Turks toward Kurds. A kurdish state would also mean Turkey losing a chunk of its territory. (reason:fear, territorial integrity)

Then there is the load of displaced syrians from the not-yet finished civil war who are currently blocked in Turkey, which either can be left free to move en masse to europe, or be housed in some way.
That's an other reason publicly used by Turkey for its attack. Remove terrorists, house displaced syrians, all fit nicely, except the ones being removed are the Kurds. While actual isis members are getting released during the chaos. (reason:incompetence or power influence by isis)

Also, in the most forgiving stance possible toward Erdogan, being remembered in history as the turkish president under which Turkey lost a chunk of it's territory is still pretty bad, personally for him. (reason:shame)

There is a difference between genocide and ethic cleansing, even if they run pretty close. Wiping a strip of land of a specific ethnic group (kurds) to implant a different group, is ethnic cleansing. That currently happening is indisputable.

Again, though, this doesn't explain why he embarked on the Solution Process back in 2013-2015, when he came - perhaps - closer to solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey without losing territory. Certainly a lot closer than the 1990's and early 2000's which were marked by warfare, and the late 2010's which are also marked by warfare.

And I argue that contrary to the belief on this forum that it's because Erdoğan is a tinpot dictator who just genocides Kurds for an incredibly debatable "advantage" with an added sauce of "Turks genocide people anyway, let's go on with that line of reasoning", it's primarily due to domestic political concerns, namely the requirement to pander to the MHP base which is currently in favour of the AKP. The problem with this argument is that since not many people on this forum do not follow Turkish politics - rightfully so, though still problematic in this context - it's difficult to get people past "yeah nah he's just genocidal".

The falsification would be of this manner: Demonstrating that Erdoğan, free of the need to have the MHP supporting his coalition and without a nationalist-oriented coalition ally to replace the MHP, continues to pursue aggressive policies against Kurds and pro-Kurdish parties. This would falsify my argument, which I would be happy to accept, though admittedly I'd rather not see Kurds being oppressed. There are two things that can happen that can break up the seemingly happy marriage between Erdoğan and the MHP.

1) Erdoğan decides that the MHP isn't a good coalition partner any longer.

This basically implies that in regards to domestic politics, the MHP base is no longer sufficient enough to keep support for Erdoğan at an acceptable level. We are already seeing semblances of this line of thought with the debate about lowering the necessary electoral threshold to 40%, with the support for the AKP and Erdoğan gradually diminishing. We have not yet seen clear signs that the alliance between Erdoğan and the MHP are deteriorating right now.

2) The MHP decides that their interests are not served by allying Erdoğan.

This is the reverse of the first point. Essentially, Devlet Bahçeli could very well decide that going with the opposition as he did prior to 2015 would serve him better politically, and perhaps catapult him into a better position than he is right now. Additionally, Bahçeli's health is in poor condition. Should he retire, or die in office, the MHP could perhaps elect a leader who is not as Erdoğan-oriented as Bahçeli.

Should either of the two happen, Erdoğan will need to find an ally: The AKP by itself is no longer enough to keep the system and government up on a legitimacy and legislative sense. There, we also see two options:

1) Erdoğan allies with the HDP.

This is basically a return to the 2013-2015 state of affairs, with the nationalist MHP on the opposition stands and the pro-Kurdish HDP tacitly giving support for Erdoğan's policies. I see this as largely unlikely to happen, but Turkish politics have surprised me in the past - namely with the MHP and HDP's sudden turnaround - so I cannot in good faith say that this is impossible.

2) Erdoğan finds a new ally.

And our prime candidate for this "new ally" is the nationalist İYİP. An splinter party from the MHP, they are largely the same in regards to ideology, albeit a bit more watered down and a bit more appealing to the younger demographic, and not as explicitly anti-Kurdish; but still quite nationalist. Erdoğan has indeed been making overtures towards them, though their leader Meral Akşener (oddly enough, a woman in Turkish nationalist politics) is quite firmly on the opposition side. Whether or not she can hold her position as party leader is debatable, though. She has however fended off some leadership challenges in quite a strong manner.

Do you see Erdogan being ousted/losing power sometime in the next few years?

[SD_Film Artists]

A lie said multiple times doesn't make it any more true.

So you are telling me, a Turk, that all those attacks perpetrated by the PKK since their inception, are lies?

Er...okay, I guess.

I was refering to Edogan and his media saying or implying that the YPG and most other Kurdish groups are the same as the PKK.

[SD_Film Artists]

Forgive me if I don't believe the word of someone who tries oppress journalists both inside and outside his country.

Do you believe this guy?

Did the Canadian government try to bring criminal law against a German satirist just for being a German satirist?

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/worl ... 46341.html

Germany abolishes law that bans insulting foreign leaders

Decision comes days after Donald Trump's inauguration and a year after prosecution of German comic who wrote crude poem about Turkish President

[Nea Byzantia]

Do you believe this guy?

(Image)

Did the Canadian government try to bring criminal law against a German satirist just for being a German satirist?

No, but Trudeau is giving massive tax breaks to Media Companies that combat "Fake News"; of course, its the Trudeau Government who gets to decide what exactly is "Fake News"; hence the relative silence on the SNC-Lavalin Scandal so close to the Election. Plus, his whole Blackface Scandal has been quickly swept under the rug by Canadian Media. Sure, Trudeau, isn't openly blackmailing foreign governments; but he is undermining freedom of the press and freedom of speech as much as Erdogan is, but in a much more, sly, underhanded manner.

As another example, look at how harshly Macron's Government cracked down on the Yellow Vests in France; where was the Media Coverage of that? Instead, everybody, hypocritically talks about Erdogan or Putin or Xi being authoritarian; but nobody is willing to look at Western leaders and what they do.

EDIT: OBLIGATORY DISCLAIMER: I am not defending Erdogan or Putin or Xi; I'm simply saying its the height of hypocrisy to criticize Authoritarian Regimes abroad, if we are not also willing to condemn and call out the authoritarianism of our own Governments at home. All Governments engage in Authoritarianism if and when it suits their interests to do so; so if one is going to critique those Regimes, one must find better reasons then they're Authoritarian.

[SD_Film Artists]

Did the Canadian government try to bring criminal law against a German satirist just for being a German satirist?

No, but Trudeau is giving massive tax breaks to Media Companies that combat "Fake News"; of course, its the Trudeau Government who gets to decide what exactly is "Fake News"; hence the relative silence on the SNC-Lavalin Scandal so close to the Election. Plus, his whole Blackface Scandal has been quickly swept under the rug by Canadian Media. Sure, Trudeau, isn't openly blackmailing foreign governments; but he is undermining freedom of the press and freedom of speech as much as Erdogan is, but in a much more, sly, underhanded manner.

As another example, look at how harshly Macron's Government cracked down on the Yellow Vests in France; where was the Media Coverage of that? Instead, everybody, hypocritically talks about Erdogan or Putin or Xi being authoritarian; but nobody is willing to look at Western leaders and what they do.

EDIT: OBLIGATORY DISCLAIMER: I am not defending Erdogan or Putin or Xi; I'm simply saying its the height of hypocrisy to criticize Authoritarian Regimes abroad, if we are not also willing to condemn and call out the authoritarianism of our own Governments at home. All Governments engage in Authoritarianism if and when it suits their interests to do so; so if one is going to critique those Regimes, one must find better reasons then they're Authoritarian.

I think both the blackface scandal and the yellow vest protests were widely documented. Are you seriously saying that Macron has even half the countrol of the media that Erdogan has?

https://www.france24.com/en/20190427-fr ... ax-protest

^ French media on the yellow vest protests, and it seems fairly balanced.

[Vistulange]

Again, though, this doesn't explain why he embarked on the Solution Process back in 2013-2015, when he came - perhaps - closer to solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey without losing territory. Certainly a lot closer than the 1990's and early 2000's which were marked by warfare, and the late 2010's which are also marked by warfare.

And I argue that contrary to the belief on this forum that it's because Erdoğan is a tinpot dictator who just genocides Kurds for an incredibly debatable "advantage" with an added sauce of "Turks genocide people anyway, let's go on with that line of reasoning", it's primarily due to domestic political concerns, namely the requirement to pander to the MHP base which is currently in favour of the AKP. The problem with this argument is that since not many people on this forum do not follow Turkish politics - rightfully so, though still problematic in this context - it's difficult to get people past "yeah nah he's just genocidal".

The falsification would be of this manner: Demonstrating that Erdoğan, free of the need to have the MHP supporting his coalition and without a nationalist-oriented coalition ally to replace the MHP, continues to pursue aggressive policies against Kurds and pro-Kurdish parties. This would falsify my argument, which I would be happy to accept, though admittedly I'd rather not see Kurds being oppressed. There are two things that can happen that can break up the seemingly happy marriage between Erdoğan and the MHP.

1) Erdoğan decides that the MHP isn't a good coalition partner any longer.

This basically implies that in regards to domestic politics, the MHP base is no longer sufficient enough to keep support for Erdoğan at an acceptable level. We are already seeing semblances of this line of thought with the debate about lowering the necessary electoral threshold to 40%, with the support for the AKP and Erdoğan gradually diminishing. We have not yet seen clear signs that the alliance between Erdoğan and the MHP are deteriorating right now.

2) The MHP decides that their interests are not served by allying Erdoğan.

This is the reverse of the first point. Essentially, Devlet Bahçeli could very well decide that going with the opposition as he did prior to 2015 would serve him better politically, and perhaps catapult him into a better position than he is right now. Additionally, Bahçeli's health is in poor condition. Should he retire, or die in office, the MHP could perhaps elect a leader who is not as Erdoğan-oriented as Bahçeli.

Should either of the two happen, Erdoğan will need to find an ally: The AKP by itself is no longer enough to keep the system and government up on a legitimacy and legislative sense. There, we also see two options:

1) Erdoğan allies with the HDP.

This is basically a return to the 2013-2015 state of affairs, with the nationalist MHP on the opposition stands and the pro-Kurdish HDP tacitly giving support for Erdoğan's policies. I see this as largely unlikely to happen, but Turkish politics have surprised me in the past - namely with the MHP and HDP's sudden turnaround - so I cannot in good faith say that this is impossible.

2) Erdoğan finds a new ally.

And our prime candidate for this "new ally" is the nationalist İYİP. An splinter party from the MHP, they are largely the same in regards to ideology, albeit a bit more watered down and a bit more appealing to the younger demographic, and not as explicitly anti-Kurdish; but still quite nationalist. Erdoğan has indeed been making overtures towards them, though their leader Meral Akşener (oddly enough, a woman in Turkish nationalist politics) is quite firmly on the opposition side. Whether or not she can hold her position as party leader is debatable, though. She has however fended off some leadership challenges in quite a strong manner.

Do you see Erdogan being ousted/losing power sometime in the next few years?

It's likely. We expect an early election either in 2020 or 2021, practically nobody expects the government to last until 2023 when regular elections are scheduled to be held. That said, I - as you can expect - cannot say anything definitive.

So you are telling me, a Turk, that all those attacks perpetrated by the PKK since their inception, are lies?

Er...okay, I guess.

I was refering to Edogan and his media saying or implying that the YPG and most other Kurdish groups are the same as the PKK.

Same? No. Closely linked, affiliated, and very possibly trading arms and weaponry? Very likely. The chart I posted above has been interpreted as evidence that the groups are very distinct, but the point is, they aren't. When all of interlinked ones - that excludes Barzani's people, for very good reason - all see Abdullah Öcalan as the leader, while Cemil Bayık only handles the PKK, it does give a cause for serious concern regarding their affiliations with one another, really.

To claim that the YPG and the PKK are the one and the same is a tad far-fetched. However, to claim that they are completely different organisations with very little links to each other is at best, very naive.

[Nea Byzantia]

Do you see Erdogan being ousted/losing power sometime in the next few years?

It's likely. We expect an early election either in 2020 or 2021, practically nobody expects the government to last until 2023 when regular elections are scheduled to be held. That said, I - as you can expect - cannot say anything definitive.

But if Erdogan knows his days are numbered, wouldn't he want to ride it out till 2023?

[Vistulange]

It's likely. We expect an early election either in 2020 or 2021, practically nobody expects the government to last until 2023 when regular elections are scheduled to be held. That said, I - as you can expect - cannot say anything definitive.

But if Erdogan knows his days are numbered, wouldn't he want to ride it out till 2023?

He would, but there's always a certain dilemma:

If this course carries on, the economy and socio-political situation in Turkey might be even worse by 2023, when he might lose everything. If, on the other hand, he can hold an election next year when things aren't that bad, he could scrape together a majority in Parliament and maybe win the presidential race itself, getting himself five more years.

The fact that I'm talking about "X more [time]" should be indicative of his position, however. This Erdoğan isn't the Erdoğan of 2011. His days are numbered, though just how long those numbers will be is a matter for huge debate. They're playing the overtime nowadays, but with Turkey, those overtimes can go anywhere. Here's hoping a coup doesn't happen.

[Nea Byzantia]

But if Erdogan knows his days are numbered, wouldn't he want to ride it out till 2023?

He would, but there's always a certain dilemma:

If this course carries on, the economy and socio-political situation in Turkey might be even worse by 2023, when he might lose everything. If, on the other hand, he can hold an election next year when things aren't that bad, he could scrape together a majority in Parliament and maybe win the presidential race itself, getting himself five more years.

The fact that I'm talking about "X more [time]" should be indicative of his position, however. This Erdoğan isn't the Erdoğan of 2011. His days are numbered, though just how long those numbers will be is a matter for huge debate. They're playing the overtime nowadays, but with Turkey, those overtimes can go anywhere. Here's hoping a coup doesn't happen.

That's also a possibility; especially if things get worse....or rather when

[-Ocelot-]

But if Erdogan knows his days are numbered, wouldn't he want to ride it out till 2023?

He would, but there's always a certain dilemma:

If this course carries on, the economy and socio-political situation in Turkey might be even worse by 2023, when he might lose everything. If, on the other hand, he can hold an election next year when things aren't that bad, he could scrape together a majority in Parliament and maybe win the presidential race itself, getting himself five more years.

The fact that I'm talking about "X more [time]" should be indicative of his position, however. This Erdoğan isn't the Erdoğan of 2011. His days are numbered, though just how long those numbers will be is a matter for huge debate. They're playing the overtime nowadays, but with Turkey, those overtimes can go anywhere. Here's hoping a coup doesn't happen.

Speaking of the economy, how does Turkey manage to maintain such a strong military force and conduct operations abroad while having to deal with increasing economic isolation? Is this whole thing sustainable? What's Erdogan's long-term plans, exactly?

[Vistulange]

He would, but there's always a certain dilemma:

If this course carries on, the economy and socio-political situation in Turkey might be even worse by 2023, when he might lose everything. If, on the other hand, he can hold an election next year when things aren't that bad, he could scrape together a majority in Parliament and maybe win the presidential race itself, getting himself five more years.

The fact that I'm talking about "X more [time]" should be indicative of his position, however. This Erdoğan isn't the Erdoğan of 2011. His days are numbered, though just how long those numbers will be is a matter for huge debate. They're playing the overtime nowadays, but with Turkey, those overtimes can go anywhere. Here's hoping a coup doesn't happen.

Speaking of the economy, how does Turkey manage to maintain such a strong military force and conduct operations abroad while having to deal with increasing economic isolation? Is this whole thing sustainable? What's Erdogan's long-term plans, exactly?

I'll break this response into two pieces so it's simpler to answer.

For about six decades - give or take - Turkey has had the mentality of trying to make sure its arms needs could be met from domestic sources as much as possible. This was largely triggered by the Johnson Letter of 1964 when the first Cyprus operation was aborted due to a lack of amphibious landing craft, necessitating that Turkey develop its own. This was because within NATO doctrine, Turkey was never meant to be an offensive force, it was meant to be a defensive one, specifically to fall back to the Taurus Mountains and fend off the Soviets until...whenever, and not to undertake operations against the Soviets themselves. Therefore, US aid was never directed towards such help. However, at a point when Turkish interests diverged from American interests, Turkish governments realised the importance of, well, not getting practically everything from the US.

The Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974 sealed the deal, with the resulting arms embargo crippling Turkey's military capabilities. From then on, a state policy - largely independent of coming and going governments, though that's not saying much in the context of 1970's Turkey - was implemented which focused on domestic arms production. Following the 1980 coup d'etat, the military largely assumed control of foreign and defence policies (this continued until the AKP era, more specifically, until 2007) and continued with this program. Finally, the AKP itself continued these programs in some shape or form, though they do have a slight record of contracting defence bids to corporations close to them as opposed to the most capable - this, I've done personal research and study on under a professor of mine, which will probably be published sometime next year.

So yeah, that's pretty much how Turkey is able to sustain such an armed force while its economy is down the shitter. Not to mention the relative prestige Turks afford to the military - though that has been immensely diminished since 2007 and 2010 - as well as the overall capacity of its officer corps. That's not to say that there aren't problems with its officer corps and the purges of these corps, but the Turkish Armed Forces are still a well-trained NATO force.

As for Erdoğan's long-term goal? If you had asked me this question back in, say, 2011 or 2012, I could have answered this very differently, and perhaps I could have come up with a plethora of varying answers, all of which could be equally plausible. Right now, I'm fairly certain that the answer is "survive", and not much else. He's brought the country to such a state that he knows that he'll be tried for pretty much anything on the Turkish Penal Code when the next government that's not his lackeys is sworn in, and the thing is, with the powers they've forced onto the Presidency, there's literally very little they can do to stop the next government from purging everybody even remotely affiliated with the AKP without any legal repercussions.

[SD_Film Artists]

To claim that the YPG and the PKK are the one and the same is a tad far-fetched. However, to claim that they are completely different organisations with very little links to each other is at best, very naive.

And yet Erdogan is saying that both are terrorists. You could claim that the other organisations are supporting terrorism and thus could be breaking some laws in Turkey, but that's not the same as being an enemy combatant as well as the fact that Turkish law doesn't have jurisdiction there. For example, the British police/army can't walk into Chicargo and arrest anyone who has rose-tinted glasses for the IRA; at most they could request an extraditon if someone is found to have direct links with an active & illegal IRA group.

[Vistulange]

To claim that the YPG and the PKK are the one and the same is a tad far-fetched. However, to claim that they are completely different organisations with very little links to each other is at best, very naive.

And yet Erdogan is saying that both are terrorists. At most you could claim that the other organisations are supporting terrorism and thus could be breaking some laws in Turkey, but that's not the same as being an enemy combatant as well as the fact that Turkish law doesn't have jurisdiction there. For example, the British police/army can't walk into Chicargo and arrest anyone who has rose-tinted glasses for the IRA; at most they could request an extraditon if someone is found to have direct links with an active & illegal IRA group.

I happen to agree with him, really, in that it's very much the PKK's - and its overarching organisation's - M.O. to create these specific groups in order to give themselves a semblance of institutionalism and legitimacy, but in the end, YPG simply happens to be the HPG in Syria, just as the PYD is the PKK in Syria.

Moreover, there's a slight problem with the Chicago analogy: You haven't worked under the assumption that state capacity has broken down completely in the United States. While under normal circumstances what you say holds true, in practice, when state capacity breaks down, other states don't tend to care too much about the sovereignty of said state. The same could be said for when the US armed and trained opposition groups against Assad.

[-Ocelot-]

Speaking of the economy, how does Turkey manage to maintain such a strong military force and conduct operations abroad while having to deal with increasing economic isolation? Is this whole thing sustainable? What's Erdogan's long-term plans, exactly?

I'll break this response into two pieces so it's simpler to answer.

For about six decades - give or take - Turkey has had the mentality of trying to make sure its arms needs could be met from domestic sources as much as possible. This was largely triggered by the Johnson Letter of 1964 when the first Cyprus operation was aborted due to a lack of amphibious landing craft, necessitating that Turkey develop its own. This was because within NATO doctrine, Turkey was never meant to be an offensive force, it was meant to be a defensive one, specifically to fall back to the Taurus Mountains and fend off the Soviets until...whenever, and not to undertake operations against the Soviets themselves. Therefore, US aid was never directed towards such help. However, at a point when Turkish interests diverged from American interests, Turkish governments realised the importance of, well, not getting practically everything from the US.

The Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974 sealed the deal, with the resulting arms embargo crippling Turkey's military capabilities. From then on, a state policy - largely independent of coming and going governments, though that's not saying much in the context of 1970's Turkey - was implemented which focused on domestic arms production. Following the 1980 coup d'etat, the military largely assumed control of foreign and defence policies (this continued until the AKP era, more specifically, until 2007) and continued with this program. Finally, the AKP itself continued these programs in some shape or form, though they do have a slight record of contracting defence bids to corporations close to them as opposed to the most capable - this, I've done personal research and study on under a professor of mine, which will probably be published sometime next year.

So yeah, that's pretty much how Turkey is able to sustain such an armed force while its economy is down the shitter. Not to mention the relative prestige Turks afford to the military - though that has been immensely diminished since 2007 and 2010 - as well as the overall capacity of its officer corps. That's not to say that there aren't problems with its officer corps and the purges of these corps, but the Turkish Armed Forces are still a well-trained NATO force.

As for Erdoğan's long-term goal? If you had asked me this question back in, say, 2011 or 2012, I could have answered this very differently, and perhaps I could have come up with a plethora of varying answers, all of which could be equally plausible. Right now, I'm fairly certain that the answer is "survive", and not much else. He's brought the country to such a state that he knows that he'll be tried for pretty much anything on the Turkish Penal Code when the next government that's not his lackeys is sworn in, and the thing is, with the powers they've forced onto the Presidency, there's literally very little they can do to stop the next government from purging everybody even remotely affiliated with the AKP without any legal repercussions.

I see.

At this point I'm not sure which is worse. Erdogan surviving the entire thing or the military coming into power again and purging countless people. Perhaps Turkey does need a military junta to remove Erdogan's influence and stop him from destroying everything that modern Turkey supposedly represents, from secularism to nation above religion. But then again a military junta would have to purge countless people from positions of power to restore the previous status quo.

[SD_Film Artists]

And yet Erdogan is saying that both are terrorists. At most you could claim that the other organisations are supporting terrorism and thus could be breaking some laws in Turkey, but that's not the same as being an enemy combatant as well as the fact that Turkish law doesn't have jurisdiction there. For example, the British police/army can't walk into Chicargo and arrest anyone who has rose-tinted glasses for the IRA; at most they could request an extraditon if someone is found to have direct links with an active & illegal IRA group.

I happen to agree with him, really, in that it's very much the PKK's - and its overarching organisation's - M.O. to create these specific groups in order to give themselves a semblance of institutionalism and legitimacy

Whether it happens to please the PKK or not is beside the point; the YPG and other Kurds are not terrorists yet the Turkish media keep claiming that they are.

Moreover, there's a slight problem with the Chicago analogy: You haven't worked under the assumption that state capacity has broken down completely in the United States.

Rojava was far from anarchy if that's what you mean by 'state capacity has broken down'.