How could the USSR win the Cold War?

[Novus America]

>stalin repeateadly wrote off the CCP in favor of working with the KMT
Precisely, that's what makes it so weird. Stalin did not reciprocate Mao's feelings in the slightest, but he still broke with Krushchev over him being insufficiently stalin-esque. You can find plenty of examples of Mao praising Stalin, but *never* Khrushchev, despite the latter actually sending a great deal of material support for the fledgling PRC and signing considerable trade agreements in the 2 interim years.
I mean sure the split was gonna happen but form of such is another story. Would a more sufficiently stalin-esque general secretary meant the chinese would be the ones hawking destalinisation, for example?

It was more an excuse than anything based in reality. One chief difference, and was more Chinese willful ignorance than rooted in reality, was that Mao was irritated by Khrushchev being unwilling to aggressively challenge the West. Mao used the excused of Stalin supporting the Korean War and other movements, despite Stalin having shied away from open conflict with the West repeatedly, to attack Khruschev despite said CCCP leader ultimately doing the Cuban Missile Crisis and other such events. Beijing, unlike Moscow, didn't grasp the nuclear balance of power until the 1960s.

This is true with an important caveat.
The Soviet nuclear forces only caught up with the US in the 70s.

In the 50s to early 60s the US had the Soviets completely and utterly outmatched in nuclear weapons. Not only in numbers, but also in delivery systems and defense systems.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear ... kpiles.svg

Mao with his Posadist wackiness was all for using nuclear weapons (despite China not having any before 1964).

Had nuclear war broken out in the 50s or early 60s it would not be mutually assured destruction, but unilaterally assured destruction.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev new the situation much better than Mao did.

But one of the biggest differences was seniority.
Mao accepted the fact that Stalin came to power earlier and was older as giving Stalin seniority.
But Mao assumed when Stalin died, he (Mao) would effectively inherit leadership of the Marxist world and movement. Khrushchev obviously did not believe this and believed the Soviets union lead the Marxist movement not based on seniority of an individual but on its economic and military power.

So while the split was more than just Mao’s delusions, Mao’s delusions played a big part.

[United Muscovite Nations]

How could the Soviet Union Win the Cold War?

My answer:
The USSR is at it's peak during the Stalin and Khruschev era, it is infact stronger
than the west at the time. Problem is that the USSR did not have an atomic bomb available unlike the west which had multiple atomic bombs.
But AMerican children were big in Communism and socialism back then so the idea for the USSR to influence the United States to convert into a communist country and civil war could be necessary for that transition. AFter the USA turns communist it could start working with the USSR and take on NATO in Europe and japan in the pacific.

You are ignoring the fact that the defeat of the USSR was economic, not military. Implementing Perestroika in the 1970s would have made a massive difference, it was too little too late by the 1980s.

Perestroika was a poorly thought out reform that made the situation much worse, not better. You can't just introduce markets into a country that didn't have them.

[Novus America]

You are ignoring the fact that the defeat of the USSR was economic, not military. Implementing Perestroika in the 1970s would have made a massive difference, it was too little too late by the 1980s.

Perestroika was a poorly thought out reform that made the situation much worse, not better. You can't just introduce markets into a country that didn't have them.

Well you can introduce them, slowly if you create a liberalized pricing mechanism first.
Of course Perestroika did not create the liberalized pricing mechanism, and markets without proper pricing mechanisms always fail.

You are correct Perestroika did it wrong.

China did pretty much the opposite, and it worked.

[Confederate States of German America]

This is true with an important caveat.
The Soviet nuclear forces only caught up with the US in the 70s.

In the 50s to early 60s the US had the Soviets completely and utterly outmatched in nuclear weapons. Not only in numbers, but also in delivery systems and defense systems.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear ... kpiles.svg

Mao with his Posadist wackiness was all for using nuclear weapons (despite China not having any before 1964).

Had nuclear war broken out in the 50s or early 60s it would not be mutually assured destruction, but unilaterally assured destruction.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev new the situation much better than Mao did.

But one of the biggest differences was seniority.
Mao accepted the fact that Stalin came to power earlier and was older as giving Stalin seniority.
But Mao assumed when Stalin died, he (Mao) would effectively inherit leadership of the Marxist world and movement. Khrushchev obviously did not believe this and believed the Soviets union lead the Marxist movement not based on seniority of an individual but on its economic and military power.

So while the split was more than just Mao’s delusions, Mao’s delusions played a big part.

Partly what I meant.

The Soviets recognized the balance of power did not fit such a course of action until they could achieve a comparable striking power. Unfortunately for them, however, by the time this was done both sides were just far too strong to justify any such action because to overly go aggressive was a means of total destruction for both. China later, and even Mao, kinda understood this later on by the late 1960s after their border clashes with the USSR ironically enough. This is why the PRC began to seek ties with the United States, to give them the protection they needed.

[CrvenaParsa]

Outlast the United States.

Which they couldn’t.

If they have had upped their disinformation campaign and exploited the melting pot more, perhaps they could have.

[Racist Commonwelath of East Virginia]

They could have won by embracing Christ as their saviour, abandoning communism and allowing free enterprise. Then so much of the state budget wouldn't have to go towards commodities that the market can supply and they could spend the rest of the money on the Cold War.

[The New California Republic]

You are ignoring the fact that the defeat of the USSR was economic, not military. Implementing Perestroika in the 1970s would have made a massive difference, it was too little too late by the 1980s.

Perestroika was a poorly thought out reform that made the situation much worse, not better. You can't just introduce markets into a country that didn't have them.

Again that's why I added the bit about introducing it in the 70s, which would also imply it wouldn't be a carbon copy.

[Confederate States of German America]

Even if the Soviet state reformed its economy, that's not a win that's just surviving.

[Vetalia]

You are ignoring the fact that the defeat of the USSR was economic, not military. Implementing Perestroika in the 1970s would have made a massive difference, it was too little too late by the 1980s.

Perestroika would have failed in the 1970s just like it did in the 1980s because its approach was fundamentally flawed; it neglected liberalizing foreign trade, currency reform and failed to address the root cause of the centrally planned economy's failure, which was the lack of accurate and useful prices for inputs to produce goods and services. The Chinese economic reforms, on the other hand, took the exact opposite approach and succeeded spectacularly by any measure.

[United Muscovite Nations]

You are ignoring the fact that the defeat of the USSR was economic, not military. Implementing Perestroika in the 1970s would have made a massive difference, it was too little too late by the 1980s.

Perestroika would have failed in the 1970s just like it did in the 1980s because its approach was fundamentally flawed; it neglected liberalizing foreign trade, currency reform and failed to address the root cause of the centrally planned economy's failure, which was the lack of accurate and useful prices for inputs to produce goods and services. The Chinese economic reforms, on the other hand, took the exact opposite approach and succeeded spectacularly by any measure.

Liberalizing foreign investment is literally what caused the collapse of the Soviet economy in 1990-91.

[Vetalia]

Liberalizing foreign investment is literally what caused the collapse of the Soviet economy in 1990-91.

Exactly. It happened far too late and was not properly coordinated with reform of the pricing system or currency convertability for it to ever work. The Chinese model created Special Economic Zones to encourage foreign investment but also simultaneously and gradually phased out centrally planned pricing to allow markets to set an increasing number of prices for goods, liberalized the yuan to allow it to exchange more freely with the USD and also provided capital to state-owned enterprises to help them weather the transition, all things the USSR did not.

Literally everything the Chinese did right in economic reform, the Soviet Union did wrong in perestroika.

[Novus America]

Liberalizing foreign investment is literally what caused the collapse of the Soviet economy in 1990-91.

Exactly. It happened far too late and was not properly coordinated with reform of the pricing system or currency convertability for it to ever work. The Chinese model created Special Economic Zones to encourage foreign investment but also simultaneously and gradually phased out centrally planned pricing to allow markets to set an increasing number of prices for goods, liberalized the yuan to allow it to exchange more freely with the USD and also provided capital to state-owned enterprises to help them weather the transition, all things the USSR did not.

Literally everything the Chinese did right in economic reform, the Soviet Union did wrong in perestroika.

Yes. Obviously economic reforms were needed, but Gorbachev simply had no idea what he was doing, and did it completely wrong. He did it backwards, tried to build a second story before even building a foundation.

[Novus America]

Perestroika was a poorly thought out reform that made the situation much worse, not better. You can't just introduce markets into a country that didn't have them.

Again that's why I added the bit about introducing it in the 70s, which would also imply it wouldn't be a carbon copy.

It would have to be more than a little different though. It would have to be radically different regardless of the time frame.
And clearly Gorbachev was not the man for the job.
They would need someone much more intelligent and competent, with a good understanding of economics theory, principles and practice.

[Federal Spanish States]

To be honest, what way would have ANYBODY won a conflict that was practically over in the 1980's? There are no winners here, just "combatants".

[Novus America]

This is true with an important caveat.
The Soviet nuclear forces only caught up with the US in the 70s.

In the 50s to early 60s the US had the Soviets completely and utterly outmatched in nuclear weapons. Not only in numbers, but also in delivery systems and defense systems.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear ... kpiles.svg

Mao with his Posadist wackiness was all for using nuclear weapons (despite China not having any before 1964).

Had nuclear war broken out in the 50s or early 60s it would not be mutually assured destruction, but unilaterally assured destruction.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev new the situation much better than Mao did.

But one of the biggest differences was seniority.
Mao accepted the fact that Stalin came to power earlier and was older as giving Stalin seniority.
But Mao assumed when Stalin died, he (Mao) would effectively inherit leadership of the Marxist world and movement. Khrushchev obviously did not believe this and believed the Soviets union lead the Marxist movement not based on seniority of an individual but on its economic and military power.

So while the split was more than just Mao’s delusions, Mao’s delusions played a big part.

Partly what I meant.

The Soviets recognized the balance of power did not fit such a course of action until they could achieve a comparable striking power. Unfortunately for them, however, by the time this was done both sides were just far too strong to justify any such action because to overly go aggressive was a means of total destruction for both. China later, and even Mao, kinda understood this later on by the late 1960s after their border clashes with the USSR ironically enough. This is why the PRC began to seek ties with the United States, to give them the protection they needed.

It is indeed deliciously ironic, that China under Mao would actually seek better relationships with the West AFTER it got nuclear weapons but was so hell bent on fighting on confrontation when it lacked them.

[Novus America]

Which they couldn’t.

If they have had upped their disinformation campaign and exploited the melting pot more, perhaps they could have.

Not sure what you mean by “exploiting the melting pot”, but no.
They tried their best. The failure of their disinformation and propaganda was not from lack of trying, it was because the West had programs to fight and and Western society was (at least at the time) strong enough disinformation and propaganda alone could not destroy it.

[Bahktar]

I don't think it's possible for the USSR to win the Cold War.
In the point it'd start to liberalize economically and politically, it would be impossible to stop the internal ethnic tensions the USSR had & hid ever since it absorbed & occupied millions into it's nation, unwillingly.

[Confederate States of German America]

To be honest, what way would have ANYBODY won a conflict that was practically over in the 1980's? There are no winners here, just "combatants".

Soviet and NATO doctrine did allow for conventional conflict within established limits. NATO's was generally taken as Warsaw Pact crossing the Rhine while for the Soviets it was less clear; perhaps as little as just a status quo. Both sides also understood, as declassified documents (largely CIA) showed both sides knew the other could and would participate in a conventional conflict but both recognized the extreme danger of unintended escalation.

[Confederate States of German America]

It's important to note that, while the USSR could indeed reform and remain around, it simply could not win after 1945. By the 1980s, the three of the four largest economies were the United States, Japan, then the USSR and finally West Germany. If you're looking closely, you're seeing a pattern there that underlines how economically dominant the Western Bloc was and the gap was growing in all sectors. Up until about 1985, the conventional balance leaned in favor of the Soviets but then it began to decisively shift as new Western equipment and troop quality standards, aided by a massive overall buildup of forces, began to translate into an advantage not only in economic muscle but also in military sectors.

The success of the U.S. in operations throughout the 1980s against Soviet aligned forces proved this, as did the various proxy conflicts. Israel once again thrashed the Soviet backed Arabs in the form of various engagements against the Syrians. In Africa, South Africa, despite never deploying more than 6,000 troops at a time, was able to tie down at least 100,000 Cuban troops despite extensive aid from the Warsaw Pact; casualty totals also show just had damn effective SADF, a Western type force, was despite the various restrictions enforced upon it by Western opinion. Finally, and not in the 80s but still relevant, was Desert Storm in 1991. Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world, veterans after years of conflict against Iran, extensively trained and equipped. As a result it was widely expected that the U.S. would have a real fight on its hands if it came down to it. Instead, U.S. airpower utterly shredded Iraqi forces while the ground troops, at their peak point due to the Reagan buildup fully in effect, rolled over opposition in just 96 hours. The Kremlin was utterly shocked, and although they could make some rationalizations as to what happened it was really apparent all the same how far the U.S. had pulled ahead. The biggest shock, however, was that it was finally clear to Moscow that, not only could the United States afford such a military unlike themselves, but that they had constructed it and had the will to maintain it.

[Kubra]

>stalin repeateadly wrote off the CCP in favor of working with the KMT
Precisely, that's what makes it so weird. Stalin did not reciprocate Mao's feelings in the slightest, but he still broke with Krushchev over him being insufficiently stalin-esque. You can find plenty of examples of Mao praising Stalin, but *never* Khrushchev, despite the latter actually sending a great deal of material support for the fledgling PRC and signing considerable trade agreements in the 2 interim years.
I mean sure the split was gonna happen but form of such is another story. Would a more sufficiently stalin-esque general secretary meant the chinese would be the ones hawking destalinisation, for example?

It was more an excuse than anything based in reality. One chief difference, and was more Chinese willful ignorance than rooted in reality, was that Mao was irritated by Khrushchev being unwilling to aggressively challenge the West. Mao used the excused of Stalin supporting the Korean War and other movements, despite Stalin having shied away from open conflict with the West repeatedly, to attack Khruschev despite said CCCP leader ultimately doing the Cuban Missile Crisis and other such events. Beijing, unlike Moscow, didn't grasp the nuclear balance of power until the 1960s.

For the people involved in the ideological struggles of the time, it was a reality. Outside of China and the Soviet Union, a lot of violence went into fucking with each other based on alignment: the soviet-aligned activists are revisionists, and so we hit them bats. The chinese-aligned activists are ultra-left deviationists, and so we hit them with bats. It was crazy, japanese student marxists spent more time fighting each other than they did the authorities, and they got really creative with it. For rank-and-file party workers within who were not privy to politburo dealings, this is the explanation given to them, and thus the one they were supposed to honestly believe. Folks rarely themselves go to blows unless they honestly believe in the reason they are doing so.

[Risottia]

Perestroika was a poorly thought out reform that made the situation much worse, not better. You can't just introduce markets into a country that didn't have them.

Perestrojka was more rushed than poorly-thought. And it was rushed because it was coming late - so late that eventually all it took to sink the Union was a drunkard senior Party member used as puppet by the West.
The idea of having markets in the Soviet economy wasn't the cornerstone of perestrojka, also markets had been already implemented back during the NEP and later with the kolkhoz markets.
The point of perestrojka (which Gorby outlines in his namesake book) was basically rebuilding the whole Union from scratch, ousting from the places of power the senior Party members and military which had created the Brezhnev-era stagnation by making themselves into a de-facto aristocracy.

[United Muscovite Nations]

It's important to note that, while the USSR could indeed reform and remain around, it simply could not win after 1945. By the 1980s, the three of the four largest economies were the United States, Japan, then the USSR and finally West Germany. If you're looking closely, you're seeing a pattern there that underlines how economically dominant the Western Bloc was and the gap was growing in all sectors. Up until about 1985, the conventional balance leaned in favor of the Soviets but then it began to decisively shift as new Western equipment and troop quality standards, aided by a massive overall buildup of forces, began to translate into an advantage not only in economic muscle but also in military sectors.

The success of the U.S. in operations throughout the 1980s against Soviet aligned forces proved this, as did the various proxy conflicts. Israel once again thrashed the Soviet backed Arabs in the form of various engagements against the Syrians. In Africa, South Africa, despite never deploying more than 6,000 troops at a time, was able to tie down at least 100,000 Cuban troops despite extensive aid from the Warsaw Pact; casualty totals also show just had damn effective SADF, a Western type force, was despite the various restrictions enforced upon it by Western opinion. Finally, and not in the 80s but still relevant, was Desert Storm in 1991. Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world, veterans after years of conflict against Iran, extensively trained and equipped. As a result it was widely expected that the U.S. would have a real fight on its hands if it came down to it. Instead, U.S. airpower utterly shredded Iraqi forces while the ground troops, at their peak point due to the Reagan buildup fully in effect, rolled over opposition in just 96 hours. The Kremlin was utterly shocked, and although they could make some rationalizations as to what happened it was really apparent all the same how far the U.S. had pulled ahead. The biggest shock, however, was that it was finally clear to Moscow that, not only could the United States afford such a military unlike themselves, but that they had constructed it and had the will to maintain it.

Iraq lost in large part due to environmental factors: the main push happened during a massive dust storm that hampered the Soviet-built IR optics on the Iraqi tanks, but not the thermal optics on the American tanks. Numerous American AAR's attest to this and many even argue that the Iraqis would have won the war had it not been for the dust storm.

[Novus America]

It's important to note that, while the USSR could indeed reform and remain around, it simply could not win after 1945. By the 1980s, the three of the four largest economies were the United States, Japan, then the USSR and finally West Germany. If you're looking closely, you're seeing a pattern there that underlines how economically dominant the Western Bloc was and the gap was growing in all sectors. Up until about 1985, the conventional balance leaned in favor of the Soviets but then it began to decisively shift as new Western equipment and troop quality standards, aided by a massive overall buildup of forces, began to translate into an advantage not only in economic muscle but also in military sectors.

The success of the U.S. in operations throughout the 1980s against Soviet aligned forces proved this, as did the various proxy conflicts. Israel once again thrashed the Soviet backed Arabs in the form of various engagements against the Syrians. In Africa, South Africa, despite never deploying more than 6,000 troops at a time, was able to tie down at least 100,000 Cuban troops despite extensive aid from the Warsaw Pact; casualty totals also show just had damn effective SADF, a Western type force, was despite the various restrictions enforced upon it by Western opinion. Finally, and not in the 80s but still relevant, was Desert Storm in 1991. Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world, veterans after years of conflict against Iran, extensively trained and equipped. As a result it was widely expected that the U.S. would have a real fight on its hands if it came down to it. Instead, U.S. airpower utterly shredded Iraqi forces while the ground troops, at their peak point due to the Reagan buildup fully in effect, rolled over opposition in just 96 hours. The Kremlin was utterly shocked, and although they could make some rationalizations as to what happened it was really apparent all the same how far the U.S. had pulled ahead. The biggest shock, however, was that it was finally clear to Moscow that, not only could the United States afford such a military unlike themselves, but that they had constructed it and had the will to maintain it.

Iraq lost in large part due to environmental factors: the main push happened during a massive dust storm that hampered the Soviet-built IR optics on the Iraqi tanks, but not the thermal optics on the American tanks. Numerous American AAR's attest to this and many even argue that the Iraqis would have won the war had it not been for the dust storm.

Citation needed.
Also dust is pretty common in war, if your optics do not work with it you are in trouble.
Most of the battles did not take place in dust storms.

And aircraft more thank tanks were the decisive factor.

[United Muscovite Nations]

Iraq lost in large part due to environmental factors: the main push happened during a massive dust storm that hampered the Soviet-built IR optics on the Iraqi tanks, but not the thermal optics on the American tanks. Numerous American AAR's attest to this and many even argue that the Iraqis would have won the war had it not been for the dust storm.

Citation needed.
Also dust is pretty common in war, if your optics do not work with it you are in trouble.
Most of the battles did not take place in dust storms.

And aircraft more thank tanks were the decisive factor.

Don't have the PDF, but it was an AAR from the DoD website, here are some screenshots I took:


https://imgur.com/a/r8RXQAq

Giant sandstorms like you get in the Kuwaiti desert, however, are not present in Central Europe, where the Soviets and Americans would have fought, so it's really not that much of an advantage.

The Iraqis didn't have top of the line Soviet air defense or numerous Soviet aircraft, so again, that doesn't translate to a huge American overwhelming of the Soviet military. Even into the late 80's the balance of power between the US and USSR was pretty even.

[Novus America]

Citation needed.
Also dust is pretty common in war, if your optics do not work with it you are in trouble.
Most of the battles did not take place in dust storms.

And aircraft more thank tanks were the decisive factor.

Don't have the PDF, but it was an AAR from the DoD website, here are some screenshots I took:


https://imgur.com/a/r8RXQAq

Giant sandstorms like you get in the Kuwaiti desert, however, are not present in Central Europe, where the Soviets and Americans would have fought, so it's really not that much of an advantage.

The Iraqis didn't have top of the line Soviet air defense or numerous Soviet aircraft, so again, that doesn't translate to a huge American overwhelming of the Soviet military. Even into the late 80's the balance of power between the US and USSR was pretty even.

Okay, that source is not as dramatic as you initially presented.
Besides only referring to a single battle, it points out that had the weather been better the US would just use smoke and aircraft instead.

We won the battles where the weather was clear too.

Yes sensors are important, the US superiority in sensors would also work against the Soviets.
We had smoke generating equipment in Europe too.
Also
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati ... Cricket_19
US aircraft were definitely superior.

The US by the 80s had a massive advantage in several pieces of technology.
Our superiority in computers and electronics went not only to sensors, but also to PGMs.
Which was our biggest advantage. The Soviets because of their poor computer technology were way behind in PGMs.